| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Create Group wizard (Electron-only) consolidates 6 steps across 4 interfaces
into a single multi-step page: group creation on hub, node attachment, root
selection via folder picker, GEK initialization, and auto-pairing — all in one
flow. Browser SPA keeps its current behavior unchanged.
Public group support (Option A — GEK for all groups):
- All groups have GEK regardless of visibility; open-join groups auto-admit
via TOFU when join_policy is "open"
- Key rotation blocked for public groups (API guard + UI hidden)
- Hub signaling allows WebRTC offers for nodes hosting open-join groups even
when the caller isn't a member yet
- attach_group writes join_policy to node.toml
- Daemon loads GEK for all groups, not just private ones
- Known-device path in join_request now auto-admits to open-join groups
Node loopback API bridge (Electron IPC):
- node:detect, node:call, node:pairing-code IPC handlers in main process
- Renderer never sees tokens, paths, or keys (session token = physical access)
- platform.js node namespace for UI consumption
- Loopback endpoints: roots CRUD, member-upload toggle, reload
Bug fixes:
- Root change detection: removed premature ctx["roots"] updates from add_root
and remove_root that prevented indexer retarget on reload
- Duplicate offline message: global fallback now gated on !group
- Signaling membership check: fallback to open-join groups for non-members
Sidebar groups sorted by last_activity_at (most recent first):
- New Group.last_activity_at column with Alembic migration
- POST /v1/groups/{id}/activity endpoint, called on connect and chat send
- Client-side sort + throttled hub updates (1/min)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Node admin panel (NodePage) now covers every CLI operation over MNP:
group attach/detach, roster, member unpin, GEK rotate, denylist, reload.
Daemon hot-loads new groups and tears down removed ones on config reload
instead of requiring a full restart. Group attach/detach via MNP or
local API triggers an automatic reload so the group is live immediately.
Fixed GroupPage hang on first visit to a newly created group: the JWT
issued at login didn't include the new group, the node rejected with
not_a_member, and the token-refresh path returned without re-triggering
the connect effect (Boolean(token) didn't change). Now bumps retryKey
after a successful refresh so the effect re-runs with the fresh token.
NodePage marks groups hosted by the node but absent from the hub with a
"not on hub" badge so stale groups are visible and easy to remove.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Hub/UI:
- Icon-only group tabs (chat, files, settings) with per-group default tab
- Transfer widget: filename becomes a clickable link to open completed downloads
- Pulse animation on transfer icon (pale→dark green) while active
- Download button feedback in FilePreview (spinner, auto-reset)
- Group mute toggle persists across navigation
- Login page autofocus, chat refocus after send
- Theme toggle closes menu, status badge and duplicate connecting removed
- Create-folder restricted to operators, download-path note removed
- User preferences API (CRUD) with Alembic migration
- Profile: email display/edit via PATCH /v1/users/me
- Settings: "Defaults" section for default tab selector
- All 10 locale files updated
Node:
- upload_dir in node.toml: separate filesystem path for uploads
- Root.direct flag: uploads land at root path, no subdirectory
- CLI --upload-dir flag on `group add`
- Admin UI accepts upload_dir
Client (Electron):
- shell.openPath bridge for opening completed downloads
- platform.js passes open callback from native save
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A group where every member may add files stays the default. Some groups want a
library the operator curates, and until now the only way to get one was to
designate no upload root at all — which refuses the operator too.
**The node enforces it; the interface merely stops offering it.** The Upload
button in the Files toolbar and the paperclip in the chat composer both
disappear, which is a courtesy to the people who are not trying. The control is
`_do_file_upload` refusing with `member_upload_off`, so a member on an old tab,
or one speaking MNP directly, gets the same answer. There is a test for each,
and the enforcement test is in the node package rather than beside the UI one so
nobody reads the hidden button as the mechanism.
**Changing it is a signed operator instruction** — `OP_MEMBER_UPLOAD`, on the
same path as removing a member. An unsigned one would let any member turn it
back on and make the setting a suggestion. The transcript's subject is `on` or
`off`: what the operator is shown before signing has to name the outcome, not
the operation.
**It lives on the node**, in a new `group_settings` table in `roster.db`. Not
the hub, which has no business deciding who may write to someone else's disk.
Not `node.toml` either: that file is hand-written and full of comments recording
decisions, `ops.py` appends to it rather than round-tripping it through a
writer, and a setting toggled from a panel must not rewrite the operator's file
or need a restart. The value is cached in the group context because the upload
path is synchronous, and the signed operation updates both — storing it without
applying it would make the panel say one thing while the node did another.
**Absent means allowed**, at every layer: no row in the table, no key in the
context, no field in `handshake_ack`. An older node and an older client both
behave exactly as before, and upgrading never silently closes a group. Each of
those three has its own test, because they fail independently.
The operator is always exempt — otherwise turning it off locks them out of their
own node with a config file and a restart as the only way back. `is_node_admin`
was being computed in two places by then and is now one function, since two
copies of "is this the operator" is how the ack and the gate come to disagree.
A change reaches everyone already connected via `member_upload_ack`, so the
button goes without a reconnection. That message is both a broadcast and the
reply to the request that caused it, which is why the client does not return
early on it.
Docs updated for a cold start: draft-v6 §2.1b and change 9, a new "Where Phase
13 stands" section in CLAUDE.md recording what is built, deployed and still
missing, the module map row, and desktop-client-v1 §10b on the Settings tab and
where group settings live.
883 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stage C. Identity keys are per node, so a browser and a desktop client are two
keys on one account there — and the node refused the second where it accepted
the first. Without this, an account created natively could never be opened in a
browser without an operator code per node, and "a native client must not prevent
web use" would have been dead on arrival.
Device linking (node)
---------------------
`identities` is keyed by `(user_id, pk_ed25519)` instead of `user_id` alone. The
old shape did `INSERT OR REPLACE`, so a second device overwrote the first
silently; SQLite cannot change a primary key in place, so the table is rebuilt.
Existing pins are carried over — verified against a live roster with 10 of them,
nobody re-pairs.
A new device files a request bound by `sha256(code ‖ its own keys)`, and a key
the node **already pinned** countersigns it. The hub cannot: it has stored no
user keys since 2026-08-14, which is what makes this safe to do without an
operator in the loop.
**The code never reaches the node.** It lists this account's pending requests
with their stored hashes; the approver recomputes and keeps the match. A node
offering fabricated keys would have to produce a hash over a code it has never
seen. Nothing rests on a human comparing digits — that ritual was dropped in
12.1 as "correct, unusable as the default" and must not return by the back door.
The design document had the approver look a request up *by* its hash, which is
circular: computing it needs the keys being asked about. Corrected in both.
Revocation marks rather than deletes, because a deleted row is a key the node
would happily pin again — which is the laptop somebody just reported lost. Your
last device cannot be revoked: coming back would need an operator's code.
Hub — the only change in the whole plan
---------------------------------------
`POST /v1/users/auth` signs in with a device Ed25519 key, on the same pattern as
`/v1/nodes/auth`, plus `/v1/users/devices` to register, list and retire. New
`user_devices` table with an Alembic migration, because `create_all()` is not
one.
This is **not** the key directory that was H3, and the tests say so: nothing
reads it but the hub, no group key is ever wrapped for one, and it is a
different key from the per-node identities. What it does cost is metadata — the
hub now knows how many devices an account has and when each last signed in.
Also `client.minimum` / `client.recommended` in `GET /v1/hub/version`: an
installed client meets a newer hub the day the interface ships in a package, and
that is cheap now and awkward to retrofit.
Browser
-------
The `key_changed` refusal becomes `unknown_device` and offers a linking code
instead of telling someone to find their operator. The Members panel lists this
account's devices here, approves one by code, and retires one.
773 tests pass. `e2e.py` gained a step that links a device end to end against
the live deployment — file, list, recompute, countersign, then open the group
with the new keys and no code — and it also gained `recv_type`, because a step
that assumes the next message is its own answer reads an ack left by the step
before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Stage A — a group's content is a set of named roots
---------------------------------------------------
`shared_dir` becomes a list of {name, path, kind}. The name is the directory's
basename, derived once at add time and *stored*: recomputing it would
re-identify a whole library the day someone renames a folder on disk. Duplicate
names are refused case-insensitively and no root may contain another — both
compared with NFC folding, because most of these directories live on exFAT or
NTFS where `Films` and `films` are one directory.
Every index path carries its root name, in a one-root group as much as in a
five-root one. One path shape has to be got right once; two have to be kept
right for ever.
**A root that goes away freezes; it never empties.** Unmounting a volume makes
watchdog report every file under it as deleted, or presents an empty directory
to the next scan. Acting on either propagates deletions for a whole library to
every member, as though the owner had erased it. So a deletion is acted on only
once its root is confirmed readable, and availability is tracked per root — one
unplugged drive leaves the others serving. 12 tests, verified to fail against an
indexer without the check.
Events are not trusted to be complete either: ReadDirectoryChangesW drops them
under load and inotify on a FUSE mount misses changes made outside it. A
periodic reconciliation sweep is the only thing that recovers a missed event.
MNP 0.2 → 0.3 (additive). The hub needs no change: SwarmSource carries a content
hash, a node id and an endpoint — no paths, no filenames — and private groups
register nothing (H7).
Stage B — one implementation behind every front door
----------------------------------------------------
C1 and C6 were both "a second path into the node with its own weaker
handshake". Two implementations of `revoke` with two authorization checks is
that shape one size down. `meshbay_node/ops.py` holds each operation once,
takes the daemon state, and knows nothing about HTTP, argv or MNP. The loopback
API is one `_op(...)` line per endpoint; the MNP handlers call the same
functions. test_ops.py asserts the shape rather than trusting it.
Phase 14 is finished on top of it — `group list`, `gek init|rotate`, `reload`
(SIGHUP), `denylist show|clear`, `file list|rm`. **No operator action requires a
browser any more.** Plus `gek_rotate` and `member_unpin` as operator-signed MNP
operations: rotation is the half of revocation that revocation cannot do, since
the ex-member holds the current key, and the node generates the replacement
with its own CSPRNG — no key material crosses the wire, which is what the C5b
rule is actually about.
Two bugs found by running it rather than by testing it
------------------------------------------------------
GroupIndex is keyed by **content hash**, so the same bytes at two paths are one
entry — which is also why a scan reports ten files and indexes nine.
Reconciliation compared paths, so it decided the second path was a missed event
every 60 s, rewrote the entry and pushed an index update to every connected
peer. Seen in a live node's log.
`meshbay-node reload` crashed on first use with `subprocess` unimported: the
module compiles fine, which is the "syntax, not names" trap already recorded for
the SPA. test_cli_dispatch.py now walks every verb and refuses to let one be
added to the parser without an entry there.
Also corrected: protocol.py declared a second MNP_VERSION of "0.1" while the
wire carried "0.2" — harmless only because nothing imported it. And
_do_dir_create/_do_dir_delete referenced an undefined `filename` on their error
path.
740 tests pass; QE/deploy/e2e.py passes end to end against the live deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The scrubber was drawn the length of the film — `ms.duration` has always been
the real duration — and then `onSeeking` quietly clamped every target back into
whatever happened to be buffered. The bar invited a click and refused it.
`stream_req` gains a `start`. The session's previous stream is retired by the
path that already exists for switching films, and ffmpeg is spawned again with
`-ss` **before** `-i`: an index lookup rather than decoding and discarding up to
the point, which is milliseconds on a 500 MB film instead of tens of seconds.
Measured over real MNP: 0s -> 492 MB, 600s -> 418 MB, 3000s -> 179 MB.
A seek at or past the end is pulled back, because ffmpeg would produce nothing
and the player would wait for segments that are never coming.
`stream_init` reports the position actually used. It has to: ffmpeg restarts its
output timestamps at zero however far in it seeks — `-copyts` does not change
that for this input, measured — so the client is the one that puts the fragments
back on the film's timeline, and it cannot guess by how much. The value is also
not what was asked for, since `-c copy` lands on the keyframe at or before it.
The diagnostics that found the rest of this are here too: a seek, a first init
and a re-init are each one line at INFO, which is rare enough to keep on. The
five-second client report stays at DEBUG.
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says who stopped
Bounding the client's read-ahead changed what a transcode slot is. It used to
be a burst — the browser took segments as fast as it could append them, so a
slot came back within the minute whatever the length of the film. Now it is
held for as long as someone is watching, so the cap counts simultaneous
viewers, and two of them meant the third was refused for the next hour and a
half.
The right number depends on the machine, so it belongs to the operator:
`[node] max_concurrent_streams` in node.toml, or
MESHBAY_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS. Default 8 — one ffmpeg per viewer, remuxing
rather than encoding, idle on a pipe for most of the film. Zero, a negative
number, a non-number and a bool are refused with a warning naming the setting:
`Semaphore(0)` is not "no limit", it is a node where no video ever plays and
nothing says why, and TOML `true` would have become 1 by way of `int()`.
A stream also ends on the peer's silence now rather than on its stinginess. A
viewer buffered well ahead deliberately grants nothing for minutes, and the
old budget accumulated over the whole wait, so a keepalive that granted no
credit could not keep a paused film alive.
The rest is diagnosis, which is what this cost. `client_diag` carries the
player's own view — readyState, refused appends, buffered ranges, the video
element's error — into the node's log at DEBUG, next to the node's view of the
same stream. It is the only window into a phone, and every field is
stringified and cut short because all of it is peer-controlled. The node also
logs the first keepalive, which distinguishes a paced client from an unpaced
one at a glance, and progress every hundred segments, whose last line says
where a stream stopped and which side stopped it.
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Two rounds of features and one long hunt.
The hub gained leaving a group, a cap of ten live public groups per owner, and
the rule that a group is listed only once a node has announced it — with
`prune-groups` to collect the ones that never got one. Presence rides on the
group list, from the registry the hub already keeps for signaling. The web
client speaks ten languages, splits Profile from Settings, and reads chat the
way it is written: newest first, paging backwards.
The rest was one symptom — "close the viewer, the next video hangs" — with three
independent causes underneath, none of which the test suite or e2e.py could see.
A background task the loop only weakly referenced, collected while it held a
transcode slot. A connection-state handler that forgot a peer without stopping
it. And `await proc.wait()` deadlocking on ffmpeg's own unread output, which no
amount of SIGKILL resolves. Found by instrumenting the node and reading the log,
after two confident fixes that addressed real but different bugs.
MNP goes to 0.2: PING/PONG and backward chat paging, both additive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reported from a phone: play a video, close the viewer, open another — the second
hangs and the third is refused. Three separate causes, found by instrumenting
rather than guessing, after two fixes that addressed real but different bugs.
A task nobody holds can be collected mid-flight. asyncio keeps only a weak
reference, so `ensure_future` with the result discarded may be garbage-collected
while running — "Task was destroyed but it is pending!" — and `_stream_video`
never reached the exit of its `async with sem`. `_spawn` holds every background
task; all nineteen call sites go through it.
Losing the peer must stop its work. The connectionstatechange handler popped the
session from a dict and nothing else, so a closed tab went on transcoding for
the full 120 s credit timeout. Measured in the log: 91 s of ffmpeg after the
connection closed. `shutdown_tasks()` now runs on the way out, and the credit
wait checks the channel before sleeping and polls in slices instead of once.
And `await proc.wait()` after `kill()` still deadlocks. ffmpeg outruns a
credit-paced viewer and fills the stdout pipe; stop reading it and the transport
cannot finish closing, SIGKILL or not. Measured against the live node with a
169 MB video, closing the viewer after 20 segments and asking for the next one:
15.1 s then "Server busy" before, 0.1 s / 0.0 s / 0.0 s after.
Chunk replies wait for room on the channel. Eight megabyte-sized chunks answered
as they arrived queued 8 MB with nothing watching — measured at 7.3 MB of
bufferedAmount in milliseconds. Fine on a LAN, minutes of head-of-line delay on
a busy link.
Upload names accept any script. The rule was ASCII-only, so `été.txt` was
refused — and so was `rapport (1).pdf`, which is the form `_free_name` produces
itself, meaning the node rejected names it had chosen. Widened to Unicode with
the C5a and H2 protections intact, plus a refusal of names that lie about
themselves: trailing space or dot, and the right-to-left override. Errors now
name the file, so one bad name no longer fails every upload in flight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`get_messages` pages forward from the oldest message. That is the right shape
for "what happened since I last looked" and the wrong one for opening a
conversation, and the browser asked it for `since=0, limit=200` — so a group
with more than two hundred messages showed its first two hundred and the
exchange anyone came for was unreachable. Demonstrated on 300 messages: the
newest was simply absent from the answer.
`get_recent` and `get_before` page backwards, cursored on the row id rather than
the timestamp. Nothing makes a `time.time()` float unique, and a cursor on a
value two rows can share eventually skips a message or repeats it.
PING/PONG covers liveness on an already-open channel: a DataChannel whose peer
vanished without closing still reads as connected, and nothing noticed until a
real request hung. It is not a discovery mechanism — opening a connection to
ping costs a full ICE/DTLS handshake, measured at 0.6-7 s across two ISPs — so
presence in the group list comes from the hub's registry instead.
Both additions are backward compatible: an 0.1 peer sends no `before` and is
answered with the newest page, which is what it wanted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The web client speaks ten languages instead of one: French, Spanish,
Brazilian Portuguese, Simplified Chinese, Japanese, German, Italian, Dutch
and Polish, all formal, with `hub`, `node` and `GEK` deliberately left in
English so the interface still matches the CLI and the docs. Catalogues
are fetched per language rather than shipped together, plural forms go
through Intl.PluralRules because Polish needs four of them, and locale
matching keeps the region so pt-BR and zh-CN resolve to the files written
for them.
Splitting one module into a loader and ten catalogues gave the SPA a
version dependency it did not have before, and the hub was serving static
assets with no explicit freshness at all. A browser that cached half a
deploy either rendered every string as its own key or, in the other
direction, failed to link the module graph and showed nothing. Static
responses now carry no-cache, which costs one conditional request and
answers 304 with no body.
The node and common packages carry no functional change; they move with
the version because the three are released together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Twenty-one commits since 0.2, and enough of them change what the thing
does that moving the old tag would have been the wrong description.
Node: video streaming paced by the client rather than pushed at it, and a
stream that ends when the viewer closes instead of holding a transcode
slot for two minutes. An operator can remove an empty directory and
revoke a member over MNP. `meshbay-node group add` attaches another hub
group without hand-editing node.toml. The node.toml operator key is gone;
the roster is the only source of authority.
Hub and web client: transfers outlive the page that started them, with a
widget that shows the rate and can cancel them; downloads stream to disk
in every browser, through the File System Access API where it exists and
a service worker where it does not; a folder can be taken as a zip built
in the browser. A group owner can remove a member and edit the
description. Nodes are recorded at the address their signed announcement
arrived from, not the one STUN told them about. Deleted accounts stop
being counted while the connection log keeps their name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop:
the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg
kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the
credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video
answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer
also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on
the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video.
While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by
arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The
reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the
chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being
handed to whatever request happens to be oldest.
**The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account
is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and
list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and
the member list of the group itself. They do not any more.
**Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address
to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it,
and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key
over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the
address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row
and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled
out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the
address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection.
Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172
after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message
and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Removing a member.** The owner can do it from the Members tab, and it
is two halves in the order that fails safe: the node stops serving the
group key first (an operator-signed request, so a paired browser only),
then the hub drops the membership row. The other order would leave
someone able to reach a node that still serves them.
It is a membership, not an account. The user row is never written: their
other groups, their files and their pinned identity survive, because one
group's owner must not be able to erase someone from the hub. It is also
per group — a node hosting two loses them from one — and it does not take
back the key they already unwrapped, which is what rotating the GEK is
for. The confirmation and the panel both say so.
**Downloads and streaming through the disk, in both browsers.** The audit
this started as found two ways to put gigabytes in a tab.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so every download
there was collected in memory. A service worker fixes it: the page keeps
the writable half of a transferred stream, the worker answers a made-up
URL with the readable half and a Content-Disposition header, and the
browser writes it to disk as it arrives, with real backpressure. The
worker caches nothing and falls through on every request that is not one
of these downloads. A zip announces no Content-Length, since the archive
is larger than the files in it and a length we miss truncates the file.
Video was worse and affected both browsers. The node pushed ffmpeg's
whole output as fast as it was produced while the player consumed a
segment at a time, so the queue held the film — and appending all of it
hit the SourceBuffer's cap, where the handler logged the error and
dropped the segment, leaving a hole in the middle of the film with
nothing to show for it. Streaming is credit-based now, 24 segments of
256 KB in flight, verified against the live node: three credits, three
segments, then silence until more are granted. The player evicts what is
more than a minute behind the playhead and retries a refused segment
rather than dropping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two things a Files panel needs and did not have.
**Removing a directory** is privileged, where creating one is not: it
acts on a name other members are using, on the operator's disk. It is
refused unless the directory is empty, and that rule is the safety
property — whatever the browser sends, this cannot destroy content. The
check runs twice, once before the challenge and once after the signature
comes back, because a file can land during the round trip. A file also
accepts its uploader's key; a directory has no uploader, so only the
operator's key will do.
**Downloading a folder** produces a zip built in the browser, written
straight to disk as the chunks arrive. An archive of a group folder is
routinely tens of gigabytes, so nothing is held: peak memory is one chunk
plus a small record per file. The node is not involved at all — it serves
the same encrypted chunks as any other download, holds no temporary
files, and cannot be asked to compress anything.
zipstream.js is store-only. Group content is video and images, already
compressed, so deflate would spend CPU on every byte to save nothing, in
the thread that is also decrypting. Sizes and CRCs go in a data
descriptor after each file because a stream cannot seek back to patch a
header, and zip64 kicks in per entry past 4 GiB and for the archive
itself. Because none of that can be checked from the Python side of the
house, test_zipstream.py runs the real module under Node and reads what
it produces with zipfile — CRCs, UTF-8 names, zip64 records and all. The
archives also pass `unzip -t`.
Firefox and Safari have no File System Access API, so there is nowhere to
stream to: the fallback builds the archive in memory and says so, with
the size, before starting rather than after failing.
One mistake worth recording: the first version of deleteDirectory passed
the node's own answer as the value to check the challenge against, which
turns the comparison into a tautology. It checks the path we asked for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Attaching a group to a node meant hand-editing node.toml with a UUID
copied from a browser URL, restarting, and knowing that gek-init exists.
Nothing in the CLI said so, and on a node reached over SSH there is no
paste buffer to carry a UUID across in the first place.
meshbay-node group add grenet --dir ~/grenet-share
The name is resolved against the operator's groups on the hub by the
daemon, which is the process holding the session. The [[groups]] block is
appended to node.toml as text rather than round-tripped through a TOML
writer: the file is hand-written and its comments explain decisions worth
keeping. The directory is created, and the command says what remains —
restart, then gek-init for that group.
It refuses a name it cannot find by printing the groups it can, with
their ids. That listing is the useful half of the answer and it was
missing everywhere: _daemon_api now renders an `available` list from any
endpoint that offers one.
The key is per group and pairing is not, which is the part that reads as
a gap until it is written down: one paired browser covers every group the
node hosts, while each group's key admits only its own members. §4 of the
user guide now says all three of those in one place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two ways the CLI misled someone attaching a second group to a node.
`meshbay-node operator pair --group grenet` accepted the flag and ignored
it: pairing is node-wide and always was. That invites exactly the wrong
reading — that a code belongs to a group, and that pairing had failed
because the group did not change. It now refuses the flag and says one
paired browser covers every group the node hosts.
`--group` also only ever accepted a UUID. A name went through untouched
and the daemon answered as though the group did not exist, which is not
what happened. It now resolves a name against node.toml, and when there
is no match it prints the groups there are, with their ids — the missing
half of the answer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A description could only be set the moment a group was created, so every
group made before anyone thought of one stayed blank for good. The owner
can now edit it from the group's page, and PATCH /v1/groups/{id} takes it.
That endpoint takes the description and nothing else, deliberately. The
name, the visibility and the join policy are the terms members joined on;
a private group that can quietly become public is not the group they
agreed to be in. Changing those needs a decision about who gets told, not
a field on a form — there is a test saying so.
Separately, the legacy operator key is gone. `admin_pk_ed25519` in
node.toml named the operator before the roster existed and was kept so
that an existing deployment would keep working; nothing uses it, and a
second source of node authority is not something to carry around out of
politeness. Authority is the roster, read fresh on every check.
It is removed rather than ignored: a config that still names the key gets
a warning at startup pointing at the file. Dropping it in silence would
refuse invites and file deletion with a signature error that looks like a
bug somewhere else — which is exactly how finding M3 presented.
Two tests were verifying admin operations by naming a key in the context,
which was the legacy path. They now pair an operator into a roster, the
way an operator does. The authority test anchored on the deleted function
and passed vacuously once it disappeared; it states the invariant against
the verifier and the daemon instead.
Also defined .btn-secondary, used in four places and styled in none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The connection log took the name from a join on `users`, and deletion
tombstones that row — so every record belonging to a deleted account
reported `deleted-3f9a1c`, which is the one answer that helps nobody. The
log is kept for a legal retention period precisely so it can say who did
what; losing the name at deletion kept the data and lost the point of it.
`ip_logs.username` is written as the account is erased, and stays NULL
while the account is alive, where the join is better because it cannot go
stale. The admin view prefers the stored name when there is one: the join
still answers after deletion, just with the tombstone.
Releasing the username for re-registration and keeping it in the log are
separate things, and the guide now says so.
On the node side, the pre-proof audit line records the username the
session already knew, instead of leaving the column empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Four things were wrong, and they compounded: a busy chat produced one row
per message, muting a group did nothing at all, there was no way to clear
the list, and the one person guaranteed to know about a message — its
author — was told about it.
The author bug was a name mismatch across two processes. The node sent
chat_notify without saying who wrote the message, so the hub used the
node's own token subject, which is the operator's account. The skip
therefore matched the operator and no one else: everybody was notified of
their own messages, and the operator was notified of nobody's. The node
now names the author and the hub reads that field.
Muting lived in the browser's localStorage and nothing ever read it, so
the checkbox was decoration. It is a column on group_members now, checked
where the notification is created — a notification nobody wants is not
written at all.
Chat keeps a single row per (user, kind, group) whose date moves and whose
read flag clears, so a conversation is one line saying when it last spoke.
Clicking it opens the group and dismisses it; joining a group dismisses
its invitation; and DELETE /v1/notifications clears the lot.
The hub deploy now runs alembic. create_all() only creates missing tables,
so group_members.muted never arrived on the running hub and /v1/groups/mine
answered 500 — worth catching in the script rather than in a browser.
Verified end to end against the deployed hub and node: the author receives
nothing, the other member receives exactly one, carrying its group_id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Correction to the previous commit. Uploads went wherever the member happened to
be looking, which spreads chat attachments through the tree and makes the
destination a client-supplied path — surface that had to be defended. Everything
a member sends now lands in `uploads/` at the root of the shared directory:
visible, one place, easy for the operator to look into or empty.
Chat attachments go there too, so the separate out-of-tree thumbs directory is
not needed and is not built. They were already ordinary uploads; now they are
ordinary uploads that land somewhere sensible.
The destination is chosen by the node, so a client naming somewhere else changes
nothing — the traversal surface simply is not there on this path. safe_subdir()
remains for dir_create, where the path genuinely does come from the client, and
keeps its tests.
One shared directory means name collisions are ordinary rather than adversarial:
every camera produces IMG_1234.jpg. The node finds a free name — "IMG_1234 (2).jpg"
— and reports it in the ack, because a chat message has to point at the file that
was actually written and not at someone else's. Nothing is ever replaced, which
is the property the per-user quarantine existed for (C5a) and the one the tests
assert; they fail if the free-name search is removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-user quarantine is gone. `.uploads/{user_id}/` was the fix for C5a, and
it worked, but it made the shared directory something nobody could organise:
every file landed under a uuid nobody recognises. Files now go where the member
is looking, most often the root.
What the quarantine actually bought is kept, and is now what the tests assert
rather than the location:
- an existing file is never replaced. That was the real defect — overwriting a
file also made the attacker its recorded uploader, and therefore able to
delete it through the uploader path
- the name allowlist is unchanged
- the destination is confined under the shared root
That last one is new surface: the directory arrives from the client. safe_subdir()
is the single place that decides, with two independent guards — every segment
against the name allowlist, and the resolved result under the root — because one
of them will eventually be refactored by someone who does not know why it is
there. Ten traversal cases are covered, and they fail if both guards go.
Also adds `dir_create` (any member may organise a shared directory; audited like
anything that writes to the operator's disk) and makes the node report its real
directory list in index_sync — folders were inferred from file paths, so a new
empty one, or one that had been emptied, simply did not exist as far as the UI
was concerned.
Two C5a tests changed their assertions deliberately, as C5b's did before: they
encoded the quarantine path, which is the thing being removed. The property they
existed for is asserted more directly than before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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All three packages together, as the conventions require, plus the RPM and DEB
metadata and their changelogs.
The tag said 0.2 while every package announced 0.1.0, which would have shipped an
RPM claiming to be the reviewed build while containing a different protocol: the
hub schema lost the user identity keys, tokens lost pk_user, and
gek_bundle_store left the wire. Pre-1.0, a breaking change bumps MINOR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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An operator's roster row is node-wide, so looking it up by the group they happen
to be opening found nothing and the client was told it had no role on a node it
administers. Falls back to the node-wide row.
Surfaced by running the live workflow twice: the first pass pins, the second is
recognised — and only the second exercised this path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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One keypair was copied to every node its owner joined, so cracking the bundle on
any single node yielded the identity used on all of them: their content on other
operators' machines, and the ability to sign as them anywhere. That lateral reach
was the part of C4 worth attacking.
Each node now gets its own keypair, generated the first time its owner joins it
and left with that node alone. An operator who cracks what sits on their own disk
holds a key that is a stranger to every other node — and on their own node, one
that unlocks nothing they did not already hold: they serve the content, the index
and every byte of it by design.
Nothing changes for the user. A first contact with a node already needed that
operator's code, and the key is created in the same step; a second browser still
recovers it from the node with the passphrase alone. Two operators can also no
longer tell they host the same person by comparing keys.
BREAKING, and deliberately without a compatibility path — the deployment is wiped
for the next demo:
- users.pk_ed25519 / pk_x25519 dropped (migration a7c31f9e40b2)
- registration no longer sends or stores a key
- PUT /v1/users/me/keys and regenerateKeys() gone; rotation is now
`member unpin` plus a fresh code, decided on the machine that pinned it
- /pubkeys returns an account id and a node's linking key. It was the directory
H3 read, and nothing wraps for it any more
- the pk_user JWT claim is gone
That last one closed a live defect the inventory turned up: the node recorded
pk_user as the uploader's identity and authorized deletion against it, so a hub
issuing a token naming its own key could delete anyone's uploads on any node.
Attribution now uses the key the node itself pinned.
A simplification falls out. Registration generates nothing, so a scripted signup
is a real account: `demo.py bootstrap` takes a wiped hub and node to a working
demo with no browser, which was impossible while keys were born in one.
Also fixes, found by running it on a wiped deployment: the key handed back on a
join now belongs to the group the connection is for, not the group named in the
invitation — an operator pairs node-wide but redeems the code while opening a
group, and expects to read it.
Tests: 343, including the two that state the property — a key pinned by one node
is refused at another, and someone else's code does not admit it. Verified end to
end against a wiped hub and node: bootstrap, pair, invite, join, download,
stream, second browser, revoke.
Design: docs/per-node-identity-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Argon2id memory 64 → 128 MB. Memory is the lever, not time: it caps how many
guesses a card can hold at once, so the ceiling on one high-end GPU moves from
roughly 4k to roughly 2k guesses/s and its 24 GB fits ~187 lanes instead of ~375.
Measured through the vendored build: 640 ms, against 322 ms at 64 MB.
While measuring the real cost of a sign-in, found the SPA deriving the bundle key
twice — once for the key pair kept for the session, then again inside
decryptBundle() for the local bundle. At these parameters that is 0.6 s of pure
waste. Measured now, end to end:
auth_key (PBKDF2 600k) 239 ms
bundle v1 (PBKDF2 600k) 240 ms legacy, until every bundle is upgraded
bundle v2 (Argon2id 128MB) 650 ms
-----------------------------------
sign-in 1 129 ms (889 ms once no v1 bundles remain)
Once per sign-in, and only then: reopening a group, downloading, streaming and
reloading the page all reuse the key, which lives in IndexedDB from login.
Also bounds two waits in the node's hub WebSocket, found because the node went
silent again mid-deploy. It had reconnected after the hub restart, sent its auth
frame, and waited for a reply that never came — `ws.recv()` had no timeout, so a
hub that accepts a socket and then says nothing for a few seconds while starting
up parks the task forever: node running, logging nothing, invisible to everyone.
The auth exchange now times out at 15 s, connect at 15 s, and a refused auth
retries with a fresh token instead of ending the task for good.
QE harness signs in once per account and reuses the token — several clients there
stand for several browsers of one person, and what tells them apart is which keys
they hold, not which token, while the hub quite rightly rate-limits repeated
logins from one address.
Tests: 341, plus the live workflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Two things the multi-browser story made obvious.
**The backup is now opt-out.** Keys are kept, encrypted with the passphrase, on
every node whose group you join — that is what lets a second browser recover
them, and it is finding C4: a PBKDF2-protected blob on other people's disks,
attackable offline at the speed of PBKDF2, which is memory-light and therefore
cheap on a GPU. Until now everybody paid that cost, including people who will
only ever use one browser and get nothing back for it.
Settings → "Use this account on other devices". Turning it off does not merely
stop future uploads: the next connection to each node withdraws what that node
already holds (new keypair_bundle_delete, which only ever deletes the caller's
own, taken from the authenticated session and never from the message). The
warning says plainly what it costs — clearing the browser then loses everything
encrypted for that account, with no recovery, which is the point of choosing it.
Default is on. Silent, unrecoverable key loss is worse for an ordinary user than
an exposure the roadmap already tracks, but that is a judgement call and it is
now visible and reversible instead of implicit.
**Passphrase floor 8 → 12 characters, plus a strength estimate** shown while
typing, with a refusal below ~60 bits. This number matters more here than in
most applications: it is what stands between a node operator and your identity
keys. It has to live in the client — with the password split (T1) the hub never
sees a password and cannot enforce anything about one — so the UI says why it
is asking, rather than nagging.
The estimator is deliberately conservative and dependency-free: character
classes and length, penalised for repetition and for the handful of patterns
everyone tries.
Verified against the live deployment: withdrawing the backup leaves a second
browser unable to recover anything, which is exactly what it promises, and
re-enabling restores it.
Tests: 338.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A member added to a group after they signed in was refused by the node, told
"Not a member of this group", and had no way forward but to log out and back in.
The hub bakes `groups` into the access token at login and never pushes updates,
so the token said they were in nothing while the database said otherwise.
This lands on every newly invited member, at their first action, and the message
tells them the opposite of the truth — toto2 was a member of newdemo on the hub
and read that they were not.
The refusal now carries a code the client can act on (`not_a_member`) rather than
prose it would have to string-match, and the SPA refreshes the access token once
and retries. Refreshing re-reads membership from the database, so the retry
succeeds. Once per mount: if a fresh token still says not a member, that is the
truth and it gets shown.
The SPA had stored a refresh token since Phase 8 and never used it. It does now.
Found in a browser, doing the ordinary thing — the automated run never sees it,
because e2e.py logs in after being added to the group.
Tests: 233 node+common, including a handshake test that the refusal carries the
code, and the full e2e run against the live deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node could be running, healthy in its own logs, and invisible to the hub with
nothing to say why. That is what "No nodes available" looked like from a browser,
and restarting the daemon was the only way out.
maintain_ws awaited the WebRTC offer handler inline, inside the loop that reads
the hub socket. One negotiation that did not finish — a client that closed its
tab mid-ICE is enough — stopped the node reading that socket at all: pings
unanswered, close frame never seen, later offers never served. The socket sat in
CLOSE-WAIT with the hub's goodbye unread in the receive queue, which is how this
was finally pinned down.
Offers are now answered in their own task, so the read loop keeps draining
whatever happens to any one peer. With that in place the existing reconnect logic
works: a hub restart is seen (1012), retried through the 502 while it comes back
up, and reconnected unattended — 19 seconds in the run that verified this.
Also:
- explicit ping_interval/ping_timeout. This connection is how a node stays
reachable, and a half-open socket looks exactly like a working one.
- a clean close ended `async for` without raising and reconnected in silence;
it now says so, because a node that stops being reachable should leave a trace.
- a failed negotiation logs the peer instead of taking the loop down with it.
Predates this branch (Phase 11), and independent of the invite work — surfaced
while testing it, because deploying the hub mid-session is exactly the trigger.
Tests: 232 node+common, plus the full QE/deploy/e2e.py run against the live
deployment after a deliberate hub restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Both found by deploying the thing and running the workflow end to end. Neither
was reachable from the test suite, for the same reason in each case: the tests
knew something a real client cannot.
1. A first-time joiner had no way to learn node_pk.
join_request signs a transcript naming the node, and the node key was only
sent in handshake_ack — which an invited member cannot reach, having no GEK to
prove. joinGroup() therefore threw "handshake incomplete" and the browser path
for an invited member was broken. Every test built the transcript from a node
key it already had, so nothing noticed.
The challenge now carries node_pk. It is unverified at that point and never a
substitute for the ack: the ack still proves possession and signs the
transcript, the client checks the two values match and refuses a peer that
changed identity mid-handshake, and TOFU pinning is unchanged. A wrong value
only makes our own verification fail.
test_invite_then_join_delivers_the_gek now takes the key from the challenge
instead of from sk_node, so it proves a real client can learn it.
2. The roster pinned everyone without a name.
`_do_join_request` took the username from the session, which takes it from the
JWT — and the hub puts no username claim in a token. So identities were pinned
with an empty name and `member revoke <name>` could never match: the live node
answered "known: , ,". Invitations now carry the name (new invites.username
column, with a migration for the roster DBs already out there), and the CLI
resolves a name through the daemon: its own roster first, the hub as fallback
for identities pinned before this.
The harness that found them is QE/deploy/e2e.py — gitignored with the rest of
QE/, so it is not in this commit. It does the SPA's job in Python against the
live deployment: hub login, WebRTC via hub signaling, the unified handshake,
joining with a code, index, chunk download and MSE segments.
Verified against meshbay.org and the local node: an account registered from
scratch is invited by code, receives the group key wrapped for a key it proved it
holds, downloads and decrypts a file, streams 5 encrypted fMP4 segments,
reconnects with no code, and is refused after `member revoke`. The node audit log
shows invite_create → join_pinned(via=code) → gek_wrapped → handshake, then
join_no_gek once revoked.
Tests: 232 node+common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node admits people from its own roster, and until now a headless operator had
no way to put anyone on it: pairing worked from the CLI, everything else needed a
browser on a machine that does not have one. Absorbs milestones 14.3/14.4.
member list who is admitted, role, status, when and how pinned
member invite <username> one-time code; the node wraps the key when they
connect, so nobody has to be online then
member revoke <username> stop serving them the key
member unpin <username> forget the pin so they can pair again after a reset
All of it goes through the daemon's loopback API with the per-run session token
(11.5.3) — _daemon_api() in daemon.py, which also replaced three hand-rolled
urllib blocks. `status` deliberately still reads the keystore, config and roster
directly, so it works while the daemon is stopped.
Two things the commands say out loud, because getting them wrong is silent:
- revoke ends by telling the operator to rotate the key. The ex-member stops
receiving it on their next connection, but they hold the current one, and
"revoked" reads like it took the key back.
- revoke/unpin refuse a username the roster does not know instead of acting on
nobody. A typo must not look like success.
Code lifetimes now differ by what the act is: 7 days for an invitation, which
crosses a human conversation and gets answered whenever someone reads their
messages, and 24 h for operator pairing, which is typed during the SSH session
that printed it. Both configurable ([node] invite_ttl_hours, pair_ttl_hours). A
day was long enough for the second and not for the first — a code that dies over
a weekend means finding a browser to issue another one.
The roster is also in the local admin UI, escaped: usernames come from the hub
and land on the page that can re-key groups and read the audit log, so H2's rule
covers them exactly as it covers filenames.
Verified by driving the real CLI against a stub daemon over a socket, which is
how the "known: <nothing>" bug in the not-found path turned up.
Tests: 89 node here (roster, endpoints, CLI routing, TTL config).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The invite flow fetched the invitee's pk_x25519 from the hub and wrapped the
GEK for whatever came back (app.js:1466, and gek-init did the same server-side).
The hub is the key directory, so a hub answering with its own key was handed the
group key by an honest member following the protocol exactly. No forgery, no
injection, nothing for the client to notice. That was H3.
The fix is not safety numbers. Nobody reads the directory any more:
- the node holds the GEK and wraps it itself, on every connection, for the
X25519 key the joiner signed with their Ed25519 identity in one transcript
(meshbay:join:v1), so the identity key vouches for the encryption key;
- identities are bound to accounts by a one-time code the hub never sees —
40 bits, single use, one account, bounded per connection AND node-wide;
- the node's own roster decides who may receive the key. Hub membership lets
someone reach a node; it no longer gets them anything. A hub that invents an
account and mints it a token is answered not_authorized_for_group.
Safety numbers would have made substitution detectable by a human who checks, at
the moment there is nothing to check against — first contact. Removing the lookup
makes it impossible, and costs the user one code to pass along.
M3 falls out of the same work. The daemon auto-pinned its own keystore key as
admin_pk_ed25519 while the browser signs with the user identity key, so every
privileged operation failed closed with a signature error that looked like a bug
somewhere else; the demo only worked because a deploy script overwrote the value.
Authority now comes from the roster, established locally by `operator pair`.
Asking the hub for the operator's key — the obvious-looking fix — would have let
the hub install itself as node administrator.
BREAKING: gek_bundle_store is deleted, not gated. No member hands the node key
material at all, so C5b becomes structural rather than an authorization to check.
Existing stored bundles are still served, so current deployments keep working.
Also:
- join_policy (invite|open) is read from node.toml, never from the hub — a hub
able to declare a group open would be handed its key. Unknown group ⇒ invite.
- admin signatures are verified against the roster on every check, so unpinning
takes effect without a restart. admin_pk_ed25519 stays readable as legacy.
- two C5b tests were rewritten, deliberately: they asserted that
gek_bundle_store demanded an operator signature, and the message is gone. They
now assert the stronger property. The file says not to fix these tests, so
this is the record of why they changed.
- a slice-1 bug found while writing slice 2: connect() never passed skEdB64, so
pairing would have failed at runtime with no test able to catch it.
Tests: 152 node+common here, including an end-to-end DataChannel run where a
member who has never held the group key redeems a code in the pre-proof window
and receives the key wrapped for a key only they can open.
Design: docs/invite-pairing-v1.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Every operator action lived behind a web UI on the node's own loopback
interface. For the normal deployment — a node on a server reached over SSH —
that is unusable: no browser on the host, and 11.5.3 added a per-run token that
had to be copied out of a log to get in.
status hub, node public key, daemon state, groups, admin-key pinning.
Reads the keystore directly so it works while the daemon is STOPPED,
which is exactly when it is needed: the daemon cannot stay up before
its key is linked or before a group exists.
ui prints the URL and the ssh -L line. It does not open a browser —
that was an assumption about the environment, and a wrong one.
gek-init initialises a group key through the daemon's loopback API. Same
operation as the admin UI button, no browser involved.
Also fixes a latent bug in QE/deploy/deploy-node.sh: the pkill pattern was
unanchored, so it matched any shell whose command line merely mentioned the
daemon — including the one running the script. It killed a session three times
before being pinned down. Anchored to the end of the command line.
Verified against the live deployment. grenet and cbesson both connect over
WebRTC through real NAT and can browse, download, stream, upload and chat. The
node audit log confirms the security properties in production: uploads land in
.uploads/{user_id}/ (C5a), the invite required the operator's signature over an
admin transcript (C5b, H5), the pre-proof bundle window is bounded and audited
(C4), and a non-member handshake was refused.
Docs updated: Phase 14 marked partially delivered with the reason, draft-v5 §5.3
records the two operator personas, QE/deploy/README.md documents the commands
and the remaining browser-only gaps (invite, delete).
Tests: 121 node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A node whose owner has not registered yet got a plain 401 from /v1/nodes/auth,
which _login_with_retry re-raised — so the daemon exited and took its local
admin UI down with it.
That UI is where the operator reads the node's public key in order to link it,
so exiting strands them: no daemon, no key, no way forward without digging the
keystore open by hand. The daemon already parks on "No node key" for exactly
this reason; it now parks on any 401, reporting waiting_for_account with a
message naming the account and hub, and keeps retrying every 30s.
The intended order remains: register on the hub, install the node, copy its key
from the local UI, paste it into Settings > Link Node. The daemon now survives
being started out of order instead of failing with a traceback.
Adds QE/deploy/ — generic deployment (deploy-hub.sh, deploy-node.sh) kept
separate from the demo scenario (demo.py, demo.env, README.md). Credentials live
in QE/, which is gitignored; verified with git check-ignore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5.10.
POST /v1/nodes/announce accepted any pk_node with no proof the announcer held
the matching private key, so a user could register a node record carrying
someone else's node key, and records accumulated without limit.
The announcer now signs a domain-separated message binding the key to their
account — meshbay:node_announce:{user_id}:{pk_node}:{timestamp} — reusing the
shape already proven by /v1/nodes/auth, so a signature for one can never
satisfy the other. Same 60-second window.
Re-announcing the same key now updates the existing record in place instead of
creating a new row.
Three test helpers had to be taught to sign, which is the useful part: nothing
in the suite had ever exercised announce with an attacker's key. The new tests
cover the missing proof, a foreign key, a stale timestamp, and idempotence.
Note for the record: the node key is independent of the user's identity key.
Two hub tests asserted the announced pk_node equalled the user's pk_ed, which
happened to be true only because the daemon announces its keystore key. They
now assert against the announced key itself.
Tests: 157 hub+common, node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5.4/5/6 — finding C6, the last open critical finding.
QUIC ran a JWT-only handshake: a forged or stolen token reached the node and
could inject chat without ever holding the group key. It now runs the same
challenge/response as WebRTC through meshbay_common.handshake — client nonce,
role-bound length-prefixed transcript, GEK proof, and the node proving itself
with a GEK proof plus an Ed25519 signature over the transcript (C3).
11.5.6 channel binding, resolved by spike and then by two findings the spike
could not predict:
* aioquic 1.3.0 exposes no RFC 5705 exporter, and the peer certificate only
via a private attribute. The server reads its own certificate from disk, so
no internals are touched on that side; the client's access is guarded and
fails loudly if an upgrade moves it.
* A RESUMED TLS session carries no certificate — aioquic does not re-send it,
so there is nothing live to bind to. The anchor therefore travels with the
session ticket, which is sound because the ticket is cryptographically
derived from the handshake where that certificate was presented.
* The anchor had to travel with the ticket rather than live on the client
object: resumption constructs a fresh client, so an instance-level cache
was silently useless. Caught by the resumption test, not by inspection.
Both paths refuse rather than degrade. No certificate and no cached anchor
means the handshake fails; it never falls back to an unbound proof, which would
silently drop MitM detection (L4).
QuicChunkClient gains a peer_cert_der property and constructor argument,
mirroring how session_ticket is already carried by the caller.
Tests: 9 quic/multi-group, full node+common suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5.4 — QUIC half. Findings M1, M9 on this transport.
quic_server._do_handshake_sync was a second, weaker copy of the WebRTC logic:
group_id was optional, so omitting it skipped the membership check entirely and
fell back to the node's first group (M1); node-scoped daemon tokens were
accepted as client tokens (M9); and the checks could drift from the WebRTC path
independently, which is how they diverged in the first place. Authorization now
comes from meshbay_common.handshake, shared with WebRTC.
C6 IS STILL OPEN ON THIS TRANSPORT. There is no GEK proof here yet: a forged or
stolen token still reaches the node over QUIC and can inject chat without
holding the group key. What remains is the challenge/response and the mutual
node proof — quic_binding() is written and unit-tested for exactly this, and
11.5.6 (whether a certificate hash is the right anchor, or an RFC 5705 exporter
is reachable from aioquic) is still unproven. This commit narrows the gap to
the proof itself; it does not close the finding.
QUIC tests updated: default tokens are members of the test group, and clients
pass group_id, since it is mandatory now.
Tests: 9 quic/multi-group, full node+common suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5.4/5/7/8 — findings C6 (WebRTC half), C3, L4, M1, M9.
New meshbay_common/handshake.py is the single implementation of authorization
and proof: JWT verify, scope, denylist, mandatory group_id, membership, hosting.
The handshake previously existed three times over and only the newest copy
enforced the GEK proof.
C3 — mutual authentication. Authentication ran one way: the client proved
itself, the node proved nothing. handshake_ack.node_pk was never verified
against anything and per-chunk signatures had been dropped in Phase 9.15, so a
peer that had hijacked signaling (C2) or been substituted by the hub could
accept the client's proof, ignore it, and serve a forged index, forged chat
history and a forged is_node_admin flag. The client now sends a nonce; the node
answers with its own GEK proof over that nonce AND an Ed25519 signature over
the transcript; the browser verifies both and refuses otherwise. It also
refuses an unchallenged handshake_ack, which previously let a peer skip proving
anything at all.
L4 — the proof was nonce ‖ offer_fp ‖ answer_fp: bare concatenation, and a
missing fingerprint silently degraded it to nonce-only, dropping MitM detection
(NS5). Every field is now length-prefixed and domain-separated, the role is
bound so a client proof cannot be replayed as a node proof, and an absent
channel binding is refused rather than tolerated.
M1 — group_id was optional; omitting it skipped the membership check entirely
and fell back to the node's first group. Now mandatory.
M9 — node-scoped daemon tokens are refused on the client path.
NOT DONE: quic_server.py still runs its own JWT-only handshake, so C6 remains
open — a forged or stolen token reaches a node over QUIC and can inject chat
without holding the GEK. quic_binding() is written and unit-tested but unwired.
11.5.6 (whether the certificate-hash anchor works with aioquic, or an RFC 5705
exporter is reachable) is unproven. 11.5.8 TOFU pinning of pk_node is not done:
the client verifies the node's signature but does not yet remember which key it
saw last.
Adds packages/meshbay-common/tests/test_handshake.py (18 tests) covering the
properties every transport must inherit. WebRTC test helpers rewritten around
the shared module; _make_jwt now defaults to the test group, since group_id is
mandatory.
Tests: 24 webrtc, 176+ node+common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 — findings H6, C4 (partial), and milestone 11.5.3.
H6 — resource exhaustion. Several paths let one peer degrade or stall a node:
* the DataChannel frame limit was a flat 64 MB applied BEFORE authentication,
so an unauthenticated peer could announce a huge frame and dribble bytes
into it. Unauthenticated peers now get 64 KB; the large budget is granted
only after the GEK proof, where it is needed for uploads.
* _do_stream_segment ran subprocess.run(..., timeout=30) directly in the event
loop, stalling the entire daemon — every peer, every group — for up to
thirty seconds per request. Now async, with a timeout and process kill.
* ffmpeg was spawned per stream request with no cap. Both streaming paths now
share a transport-wide semaphore.
* POST /v1/nodes/{id}/webrtc/offer was reachable by any authenticated user for
any node, with no membership check and no rate limit, making the target node
allocate an aiortc PeerConnection and gather ICE on demand — remote resource
exhaustion against a third party's machine. Now rate limited, capped per
user, SDP size bounded, and the caller must share an active group with the
node. That also closes the H4 gap where signaling ignored group status.
* POST /v1/nodes/{id}/incoming took peer_ip verbatim, so any user could make an
arbitrary node emit UDP packets to an address of their choosing. The probe
target must now match the caller's own source address.
C4 (partial) — the pre-proof bundle window. GEK and keypair bundle fetches are
served before the GEK proof by necessity: the client needs its wrapped bundle in
order to compute the proof. That window is a disclosure surface a hub can reach
by forging a JWT. Bounded to 4 fetches per session and audited as
"pre_proof_fetch". The real fix is removing remote keypair bundles entirely,
which belongs to the native client (Phase 13.3).
11.5.3 — the node admin UI was unauthenticated because it binds loopback. But
any local process can reach it, and so can a page in the operator's browser via
DNS rebinding — and this API re-initialises group keys and reads the audit log.
H2 showed script execution there equals full control. Now gated by a per-run
token, printed at startup, accepted as ?t= or X-MeshBay-Token.
One test needed rewriting rather than adding: the first version asserted
"subprocess.run(" was absent from the source, which also matched the comment
documenting the old behaviour. It now parses the AST and checks the property.
Tests: 121 node, 142 hub+common. Regression suite 47 node + 10 hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 hardening batch — H7, H4, M2, M6, M7, L1, L3, L6.
H7 — private content hashes leaked to the hub. The daemon registered blake3
hashes for every group it hosted, private ones included, giving the hub a
content fingerprint of every private file and letting anyone confirm whether a
known file exists in the network. The leak was dormant only because the routes
were declared on the groups router with a full path and mounted at
/v1/groups/v1/swarm/* — the node's calls 404'd into a swallowed exception.
Fixing the path alone would have activated the leak, so both land together:
registration is gated on group visibility, the routes moved to a real
/v1/swarm router, and the lookup now requires authentication.
H4 — revocation was advisory. Group revocations were signed and broadcast by
the hub and then dropped by the node, whose handler understood only "user" and
"jti", so "suspend a group" enforced nothing. The denylist was also in-memory
only, so a restart silently un-revoked everyone. Now persisted to
data_dir/denylist.json, group targets honoured on both transports, and live
sessions for a revoked group are closed.
M2 — the node keystore, which protects the node's Ed25519 and X25519 private
keys, was still deriving at 64 MB long after the hub's password verifier moved
to 256 MB; the docs recorded the bump as done, true for the hub only. Raising
the constant alone would have made every existing keystore permanently
undecryptable, so envelopes now record the parameters they were written with
and pre-M2 files continue to open under the legacy profile.
M6 — registration inserted its audit row with a NULL user_id and then ran
UPDATE ip_logs SET user_id=<new> WHERE user_id IS NULL, claiming every
unattributed row in the table: failed logins for other usernames, concurrent
registrations. In logs retained a year for legal requests, that attributed
other people's connections to the wrong account.
M7 — X-Forwarded-For was trusted unconditionally at four call sites, so anyone
could forge the IP written to the compliance log and evade per-IP rate limits.
New netutil.client_ip honours the header only from a trusted proxy and takes
the rightmost hop (the one our proxy appended); no direct header reads remain.
L1 dead GEK_REQUEST/GEK_RESPONSE constants removed; L3 peer errors no longer
echo exception text (paths, internal state); L6 email sanity-checked instead of
accepting any string — deliberately not RFC 5322, to avoid a new dependency.
test_daemon_index_change_pushes_to_peers asserted that a PRIVATE group's hashes
are registered with the hub. Split: private asserts not-called (index push to
members still asserted), and a new test proves public groups still register.
That is the fourth pre-existing test found asserting a vulnerability as
intended behaviour, after gek auto-activation, the transport-wide chat_store
and the blind admin challenge.
Tests: 116 node, 132 hub+common. Regression suite now 43.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 — findings H1, C5a, H2, C5b, H5 (see second-review.md).
Batched together because the node-side changes share webrtc_server.py and
cannot be separated into working commits.
H1 — cross-group chat leak. chat_store, the peer registry and the display-name
cache were read from the shared transport context, and daemon.py hoisted the
FIRST group's chat store onto it. On a node hosting several groups every
group's messages went to one database, chat_history served them back to members
of every other group, and chat broadcast reached all peers regardless of group.
All three now resolve through _group_ctx().
C5a — upload confinement. Uploads landed in the shared root under a
client-chosen name and overwrote whatever was there. Any member could destroy
the operator's files, and by becoming the recorded uploader of the replaced
file could then delete it through the uploader path, bypassing the Ed25519
admin challenge. Uploads now go to a per-user quarantine (.uploads/{user_id}/),
refuse to overwrite, and enforce chunk ordering, a filename allowlist and a
size cap.
H2 — stored XSS in the node admin UI. Filenames chosen by any group member were
interpolated raw into the localhost UI, which has no authentication, so script
execution there equals control of the node admin API. Now html.escape()
throughout, textContent in the audit table, plus CSP/nosniff/no-referrer. The
CSP contains exfiltration but cannot stop injected inline script — escaping is
the fix.
C5b — group key seizure. gek_bundle_store wrote whatever any member sent and
auto-activated bundles addressed to the node operator. The operator's X25519
public key is public (the node publishes it in handshake_ack), so any member
could wrap a key of their choosing for it and take over the group, locking
every legitimate member out. Storing now requires an operator signature and
_try_activate_gek is removed: nothing arriving over MNP can set a live GEK.
H5 — unbound signing oracle. The node challenged with 32 raw random bytes and
the client signed them blind, so a signature named no operation, subject, node
or time. New meshbay_common/adminop.py defines a length-prefixed,
domain-separated transcript; both sides build it independently and the client
refuses to sign when the announced op/subject do not match its request.
BREAKING: a group admin who does not operate the node can no longer store GEK
bundles on it. Invites must be performed by the node operator.
Adds tests/test_security_regressions.py. Verified against pre-fix source via
git stash. Three pre-existing tests asserted the vulnerable behaviour as a
feature and were inverted: gek auto-activation, and the transport-wide
chat_store in test_daemon.
Tests: 109 node, 132 hub+common.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5.A — findings C1 and C6 (see second-review.md).
C1: the per-group HTTP file API bound 0.0.0.0 for every configured group,
private ones included, and served two endpoints with no authentication at all:
GET /index (full Mesh Group Index) and GET /file/{id} (raw plaintext file via
FileResponse). Anyone able to reach the port — LAN, forwarded port, permissive
IPv6 — read every private file. This bypassed the entire GEK-proof and node
sovereignty layer. Deleted rather than patched: it duplicated MNP without any
of its controls.
C6: the TCP+TLS chunk server accepted a bare JWT with no GEK proof, leaving a
second non-compliant handshake path. Deleted; QUIC remains and will be brought
to parity with WebRTC by the unified handshake in 11.5.4.
Transport decision recorded in transport/__init__.py: WebRTC/ICE is primary for
browser and native clients (the only NAT traversal validated here — 2 ISPs,
IPv4 STUN + IPv6, 4G CGNAT); QUIC is kept for LAN, port-forwarded and hub-less
group:// access. punch_nat() is a direct-connection helper, not a traversal
stack.
Also removed server_ssl_context()/client_ssl_context() from tls_cert.py (no
remaining callers) and a dead import of the former in quic_server.py.
generate_self_signed_cert() stays: QUIC uses it, and the certificate hash is
the intended channel-binding anchor for 11.5.6, since QUIC has no DTLS
fingerprint to bind the GEK proof to.
BREAKING CHANGE: node.toml keys `port` and `http_port` are gone. Regenerate
config with `meshbay-node init`. Env var MESHBAY_PORT -> MESHBAY_QUIC_PORT.
Tests: 198 passed (209 - 7 test_http_server - 4 test_transport). No other test
changed status. Net -1300 lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Baseline commit capturing in-progress Phase 12 work that was already present
in the working tree (uncommitted) before the Phase 11.5 security remediation
begins. Committed as-is, without review or modification, so that remediation
changes arrive as a separable diff.
Contents: BundleStore (P2P GEK + keypair bundles), password split
(auth_key / bundle_key), node Ed25519 auth (POST /v1/nodes/auth, node-scoped
JWT), GEK-HMAC handshake proof with DTLS channel binding, Ed25519 admin
challenge-response, node local admin UI rewrite, browser key persistence.
Not authored in this session — captured to establish a baseline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Add SQLite audit store for legal compliance (LCEN/DSA): logs user IP,
actions (handshake, file download/upload/delete, stream, chat), and
timestamps. Retention: 1 year, with cleanup method.
WebRTC transport now logs all user actions to the audit store with
remote IP extraction from the ICE transport.
Local web UI rewritten as a proper admin dashboard:
- Stats cards (groups, files, peers)
- Connected peers table with IP, username, group, state
- Group cards with file listings and shared directory info
- Audit log page with event/user filtering
- Dark theme, responsive, auto-refresh
- JSON API: /api/status, /api/groups, /api/peers, /api/audit, /api/config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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When watchdog detects file changes, the daemon now:
- Pushes INDEX_SYNC to all connected WebRTC peers in that group
- Registers file hashes with hub /v1/swarm/register endpoint
Also registers all file hashes on startup for initial discovery.
hub_client: add register_swarm() method for bulk hash registration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The node daemon was previously a skeleton that only started QUIC/TCP
servers and the local web UI. All browser-facing functionality (WebRTC,
hub WebSocket, chat store, HTTP file API) lived in QE demo scripts.
This rewrites daemon.py to be fully self-contained:
- WebRTC transport for browser clients (aiortc DataChannel)
- Hub WebSocket task (signaling, revocations, WebRTC offers)
- ChatStore per group (SQLite in ~/.local/share/meshbay/)
- HTTP file API per group (create_http_app on configured port)
- Graceful shutdown (all transports, stores, tasks)
- hub_client: _ws tracking + send_ws() for chat notifications
- config: data_dir field for persistent state
- systemd: security hardening (ProtectSystem, StateDirectory)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Replace download-then-play VideoPlayer with MSE (MediaSource Extensions)
streaming. Node remuxes to fMP4 via ffmpeg, probes codecs with ffprobe,
and sends encrypted segments over DataChannel. Browser decrypts and
appends to SourceBuffer — playback starts within seconds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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inline thumbnails
Backend:
- Chat store persists sender_name (SQLite migration, no more UUID display)
- FILE_DELETE / FILE_DELETE_ACK MNP types — node admin can delete files
- Node sends chat_notify to hub WS — hub creates notifications for offline members
- Hub revocation.py handles chat_notify, creates per-member notifications
Frontend:
- Upload chunk size 64KB (was 1MB) — fixes WebRTC DataChannel max-message-size
- Show cached files immediately while WebRTC connects
- ChatImage component — inline image thumbnails in chat (download+decrypt)
- File delete action in menu (group admin, with confirm dialog)
- Member panel: "Owner" label instead of confusing "Group admin"
- Create group page: hint about needing a node
- Refresh index after chat attachment upload
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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inline thumbnails
- Upload chunks capped at 64KB to avoid WebRTC DataChannel max-message-size
- Show cached files immediately while WebRTC connects (tabs visible during connection)
- Persist sender_name in chat store (SQLite) — no more UUID display in history
- File delete action in menu (node admin only, enforced server-side)
- FILE_DELETE / FILE_DELETE_ACK MNP message types
- Inline image thumbnails in chat attachments (download+decrypt, Signal-style)
- Member panel: "Owner" label instead of "Group admin" to avoid hub/group admin confusion
- Create group page: hint about needing a node
- Refresh index after chat file attachment upload
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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