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`ops.set_node_settings` hot-swapped the stream pool by assigning
`webrtc._stream_sem`. That attribute has never existed on WebRTCTransport — the
pool is `ctx["_transcode_sem"]` — so `hasattr(webrtc, '_stream_sem')` was always
False and the branch never ran. The setting was accepted, written to roster.db
and node.toml, and applied only on the next restart, which is exactly what
draft-v6 §2.11 says it does not need. An operator lowering the cap on a
struggling machine, or raising it after "Server busy", saw nothing happen and
had no way to find out why.
`WebRTCTransport.set_capacity()` is the one implementation, on the object that
owns the state, so the download and upload caps the transfer-slots plan adds
next do not each grow their own copy of the mistake.
Resizing has semantics worth stating: the new cap governs new streams and never
interrupts one that is running, because a slot is held for the length of a film
and lowering a number must not take somebody's film away. The replacement pool
is built with the permits that remain (`new - in_flight`, floored at zero) — a
full set would briefly allow more concurrent viewers than either the old cap or
the new one.
That needs a count of slots in use, so `_stream_video` now maintains one instead
of the code reading the semaphore's private `_value`: a number this code keeps
itself survives the semaphore object being replaced underneath it, and the same
counter makes the "N of M in use" log lines mean something.
test_stream_capacity.py drives the real transport and the real `_stream_video`;
`test_ops_calls_the_real_mechanism` fails if the dead attribute comes back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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`thumbs` holds every generated thumbnail, every TMDB poster and backdrop, every
Cover Art Archive image and every cached audio transcode. Rows were removed only
when their source file left every group's index (`prune_file`), so a library
that merely changes over years grew this database with nothing to bound it.
Nothing in it is precious — every row is keyed off a value the node can
re-derive — which is what makes eviction the right answer rather than a bigger
disk.
512 MB, evicted on write (a cache only grows when written to; a timer is one
more thing to own and get wrong). `used_at` is marked on every read, including
the lookup by synthetic id that `_fetch_and_cache_poster` makes on every visit
to a poster grid — without that, the images shown most often would be the
coldest rows in the table. A single blob larger than the cap does not empty the
table for nothing.
The migration is the part that touches deployed nodes. `CREATE TABLE IF NOT
EXISTS` adds missing tables and never missing columns, so `used_at` would have
reached a fresh test database and never a real one. `_migrate()` does the
ALTER TABLE and seeds existing rows with "now" rather than 0 — otherwise the
first write after an upgrade evicts the whole cache, a correct-but-hostile
reading of "least recently used" for rows whose age nothing recorded.
The index on that column lives in `_migrate()`, not in `_SCHEMA`: run from the
schema script it executes before the ALTER on an existing database and fails,
which would have been every deployed node refusing to open its cache on the
first start after upgrading. Found by the migration test.
Verified against a real node's database, rebuilt into its pre-migration shape:
rows preserved, column present, seeded, index created, reopening harmless.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V8EDjk6pkYZrCbo63m2x87
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Found on two live machines within minutes of deploying: every message from the
person running the node arrived at every other member under "this account is
using a key you have not seen before".
An operator's authority is node-wide and is recorded in `members` with an
**empty** group_id — `is_authorized` has always said so, in a clause written for
exactly that. `group_devices` spelled the rule out a second time as
`WHERE m.group_id = ?`, which excludes them. So the operator was absent from the
roster relayed to members, no chain could reach their device key, and Tier 2
reported the most ordinary event there is — the operator talking in their own
group — as a key substitution.
A notice that fires on normal use is worse than no notice: it is the one people
learn to dismiss, and §4.8 budgets exactly one for the whole feature. That makes
this a defect in the property, not only in a query.
The clause now lives once, as `_MEMBER_OF_GROUP`, shared by both callers so they
cannot drift again. `DISTINCT` because an operator who is also an explicit member
of the group matches both halves of it. `get_member` is untouched: it is a raw
lookup and its callers already fall back to `get_member("", user_id)` themselves.
Three tests, and the first fails against the old query with the reported
symptom: the operator appears in the roster of a group they host and
`is_authorized` agrees; an operator who is also a member is listed once; a
revoked one comes back through neither.
No stored state to clean up — nothing was written to a client's pins when the
account was missing, so the notice stops as soon as the node serves the roster
correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Chat messages have been signed by the sending device since MNP 2.0, but a
reader had no way to know that the device belonged to the account the node
named: the signature proved *a device*, and `sender_id` was still the node's
word. This closes that for any account a client has already seen.
**What was blocking it was not effort — the evidence was not being kept.**
`_do_device_add` verified the countersignature that admits a second device and
stored only `added_by_pk`: *which* key approved, never the proof. And
`device_add_transcript` binds `nonce_node`, the approving connection's handshake
nonce, so even a stored signature was unverifiable by anyone who had not been on
that connection. `identities` gains `add_sig`, `add_nonce` and `add_ts`, added
before the migration's early return — which fires on every roster widened since
2026-08-18, i.e. all of them, so putting them inside it would have meant they
never arrived.
`group_roster_req`/`resp` relays, sealed under a new groupbox purpose and
answered to **any member of the group**, every live device of every active
member with the evidence that admitted it. The node decides nothing: it hands
over evidence and the client walks the chain from each account's root outwards
(`_verifyRoster`). That is deliberate — the node is the party the property holds
against, so it is not asked to assert trust.
Two holes the tests caught while this was being built:
- "no signature" was being treated as a trust root, so a node that writes the
roster could put any key in an account's row and have it laundered straight
into the verified set. A root is a device that names **no** countersigner.
- pinning only the verified subset at first sight raised "key changed" on
legitimate second devices whose countersignature predates this change. First
sight pins everything the node says, because that is what trust-on-first-use
means and an alarm that fires on normal events stops being read.
The property, and it must not be rounded up: **once a client has seen an
account, a node that later substitutes a key for it is detected. Nothing is
gained at first sight**, where there is nothing to compare against — the same
boundary `per-node-identity-v1.md` draws, unmoved.
The cost, stated because it is real: the roster is member-visible, so every
member learns how many devices the others hold and their public keys. It stays
inside the group, the hub is not involved, and it is scoped per group. A member
who cannot see the keys cannot check them.
User-visible surface: one notice, "this account is using a key you have not seen
before", in ten languages. Nothing else.
16 tests — 7 on the node (the evidence is stored, it verifies from the roster
alone, a fabricated device carries none, another group's members are not
disclosed), 9 running the shipped `_verifyRoster` under node against rosters
built by the shipped Python: a chain of three in any order, a signature by the
wrong key, one for another node, one for another account, and two fabricated
devices signing each other admitting nothing.
Tier 3 (operator-signed roster attestation) stays deferred, with nothing
depending on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Both sides landed a breaking MNP change and both called it 2.0, which is right:
the sealed upload, the removal of `stream_seg` and mandatory chat encryption
share one flag day. They are recorded as one version in `__init__.py` rather
than as a race between two.
The resolutions that were decisions rather than mechanics:
* **`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` moves to "2.0".** The sealed upload alone was a
*confined* break — a 1.x peer could still connect, browse, download, stream
and chat, with only its uploads refused by `upload_not_sealed` — so the floor
deliberately stayed at "1.0". Mandatory chat encryption ends that
confinement: a 1.x peer can neither produce a sealed chat message nor read
one, so it would connect, look fine, and be unable to say anything. Refusing
it at the handshake is the honest form. The per-message `upload_not_sealed`
path is untouched and still right if the floor is ever lowered.
* **`sendChat` throws on an `error` reply**, from origin, applied to the sealed
send. It matters more after this change, not less: the node now refuses a
stale epoch, a malformed envelope and a device claim that is not the
connection's own, so there are three new ways for a message to be rejected
and none of them may look like a message that was sent.
* **`req_id` supersedes the per-type routing** this branch added for
`chat_keys_resp` and `device_hello_ack`. Both blocks are kept beside the
existing `chat_hist_resp` one, for the same stated reason — a node too old to
stamp — and their comments no longer claim to be the mechanism that closes
the class. `req_id` is.
* **`chat_send_probe.py` is rebuilt on origin's structure**, not beside it: two
scenarios, a stub that stamps `req_id`, `music_meta_req` as the older pending
request. The encrypted path is layered on — a real Ed25519 device key
generated in the page, and a `chat_keys_resp` sealed by the shipped Python,
because a payload the page built itself would prove only that the page agrees
with the page.
* **`test_reply_correlation.py` now sends a sealed message.** Its subject is
which of the two messages leaving that handler carries the id; plaintext chat
was only the fixture, and the node refuses one now.
* `groupbox` keeps both new purposes (`upload`, `chat_keys`); `protocol.py`
keeps origin's removal of `STREAM_SEGMENT` and this branch's correction of
the "Double Ratchet message" comment on `CHAT_MESSAGE`, which was wrong when
it was written and is wrong differently now.
Full suite on the merged tree: 1993 passed, 11 failed — the same 11 that fail
on a pristine checkout (2 Windows service tests, 1 apps-enabled policy, 7
transcode tests that pass in isolation, and the WebRTC invite test that hangs
on its own).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Downloads have been encrypted under a GEK-derived key since the beginning:
`file_chunk` and `stream_data` both go through `chunk_ciphertext`. Uploads
never were. `file_upload` carried the filename and the raw bytes in plain
msgpack, and `file_upload_ack` carried the name the node stored them under —
so the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one.
There was no threat model behind that asymmetry.
Both halves now travel sealed under a third groupbox purpose,
HKDF(GEK, info="meshbay:upload:v1"). The filename, the destination folder and
the bytes are all inside the seal; only `upload_id` and `chunk_index` stay in
clear, because the node routes and orders on them before it can decrypt. This
direction seals *towards* the node — it holds the GEK for its own group — and
it opens the payload before it picks a destination or touches the disk.
What that forced, and why none of it is optional:
- `filename` was the correlation key on both sides. It cannot be: matching an
ack to its request by name would hand back exactly what the seal hides.
`upload_id` replaces it — client-drawn, opaque to the node, unique within a
connection, never an authorization input. The property it guarded (one
refusal fails one upload, not every upload in flight) is unchanged.
- Refusals can no longer quote what they refused. `No directory named 'X'`
becomes `No such directory in this group` plus the `code` that was already
there; the client knows what it sent.
- No plaintext fallback. A path that still accepts plaintext is not a sealed
path, so an unsealed `file_upload` is refused with `upload_not_sealed`.
Hardened while here, because what comes out of a seal is authenticated but not
validated — a member can seal anything: `filename` and `data` have their types
checked before any upload state is created, and `chunk_index`/`total_chunks`,
which are outside the seal by necessity, can no longer raise where a refusal
was meant.
Tests. `test_upload_sealed.py` pins the node half: nothing identifying on the
wire, tamper/wrong-key/wrong-group all refused with nothing written, and
multi-chunk reassembly unchanged. `test_upload_seal_client.py` drives the
shipped `uploadFile` over the shipped `crypto.js` under node and feeds its real
frames to the real `_do_file_upload` — the file lands intact, and the ack the
node actually produced comes back with the name it chose for a collision, which
is the half a source-reading test cannot see. Both upload purposes join the
JS/Python groupbox parity vectors.
BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 2.0. `file_upload`/`file_upload_ack` change shape on the
wire every deployed client speaks, which is MAJOR by the same rule 1.0 was —
but the break is confined to uploads. `MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` stays at "1.0", so a
1.x peer still connects, browses, downloads, streams and chats; only its
uploads are refused, with a message saying which side is old. The client checks
the node's version before sending a chunk, so neither side meets this as a
timeout. This is the version negotiation shipped in 1.0 earning its keep: 1.0
cost a flag day, 2.0 costs a refusal code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`stream_seg` answered with an MPEG-TS segment as base64 with no encryption at
all — the one message on the content plane that never went through a
GEK-derived key. Live on both transports, answering any authenticated member.
It predates `stream_data`, which does the same job properly (`chunk_ciphertext`,
keyed per segment, AES-256-GCM) and has since Phase 12. Its only browser caller,
`fetchStreamSegment`, was defined and never once invoked — a plaintext media
endpoint with no client. Removed rather than repaired.
Gone with it: `_extract_segment` and the ffmpeg semaphore in quic_server, the
`fetch_stream_segment` QUIC client method, and `_b64decode` in transport.js,
which had no other caller.
The H6 regression test lived on this handler — it pinned `_do_stream_segment_async`
to a coroutine so `subprocess.run` could not stall the event loop for thirty
seconds per request. It is replaced by the property that outlives the handler:
no transport carries media outside an AEAD, asserted on `stream_seg` and
`data_b64` across all three transport modules. The half of H6 that survives —
the live streaming path still spawns ffmpeg — keeps its own test.
BREAKING CHANGE: `stream_seg` is no longer answered on either transport. No
shipping client sends it. Recorded as part of MNP 2.0, whose other half — the
sealed upload — carries the version bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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MNP carried no correlation id. A reply named its own type and nothing
else, so a client with more than one request in flight worked out which
one a message answered from the message itself — and for the replies
that name nothing it could not. `_dispatch` fell through to matching by
arrival order, which is a guess. `_sendAndWait` had the right value all
along: it keys `_pending` by `this._seqId++` and never put it on the
wire.
The guess fails asymmetrically, which is why it hid. The victim is not
the request that was answered wrongly — it is the unrelated one that now
waits out its own 30s timeout for a reply already delivered elsewhere.
Live on 2026-09-06: five `music_meta_req` sat pending for over 100
seconds behind a failing MusicBrainz, and a `device_list_result` was
handed to one of them. The composer is disabled while a send is in
flight, so a chat message whose reply went astray the same way left the
Chat tab looking frozen for thirty seconds, then unfroze on its own.
The `ack` half of this was fixed on 2026-08-30 by matching on request
type. That closed the instance and left the class open: a refusal has no
type to match on either, and `_dispatch_message`'s catch-all answers
every unforeseen failure with `{"type": "error", "detail": "Request
failed"}` — 238 of this module's 240 error sends name nothing at all.
`req_id` now rides on the request and comes back on the reply. On the
node it is published for the whole handler in a ContextVar and stamped
by `_send`: a parameter would have meant threading an argument through
all 240 send sites, and asyncio copies the context into a task, so a
handler that `_spawn`s its real work still answers under the right id.
It is never stamped on a broadcast — those answer nothing, and the
owner check in `_send` is what keeps a chat broadcast or an index push
from reaching another peer looking like a reply.
On the client, `_dispatch` resolves on `req_id` first and the
arrival-order fallback is gone the moment a node proves it stamps
(`_correlates`, armed by the handshake's own reply). The fallback stays
for an MNP 1.0 node, unchanged and no wider: there it is the only thing
there is, and removing it would leave device_list_result, join_result
and the handshake replies reaching nobody.
Two things fall out. `sendChat` refuses an `error` reply like every
other request in the file — it returned it as success, which did not
matter while a refusal reached the wrong caller anyway and would now
show a rejected message as sent. And `_group_ctx` uses `.get`: a reload
pops a removed group while sessions connected to it are open, and every
request they had left raised KeyError into that same catch-all.
Sealed index messages are the one exception to the fast path. They
cannot be handed over until they are opened, which is asynchronous while
`_dispatch` is not — resolving on the id alone gave `fetchIndex` the
envelope and skipped `onIndexSync` entirely. Caught by extending
`index_seal_probe.mjs` to stamp a reply the way a current node does,
after the hub suite passed over it: the probe built its own frames and
had never seen one.
Tests, all failing before and passing after: `test_chat_send.py` drives
the real ChatPanel over the real transport for both shapes of reply with
an older request pending (3 of its 6 are new, and the 3 for `ack` pass
either way, so it discriminates); `test_reply_correlation.py` pins the
node's half — the refusals that name nothing else, the broadcast that
must not be stamped, and a late reply from a spawned task answering
under its own id rather than the most recent request's.
Full suite: 1897 passed, same 11 pre-existing failures as before.
QUIC keeps its own dispatch and is not stamped. It is disabled by
default and no browser request reaches it, but the asymmetry is real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dn1xYx9uT69mCB6UDvyKAN
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Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.
There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.
Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.
Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.
Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:
* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
(additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.
Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.
Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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e1dbdf0 made a replugged root re-enrich, which was correct and not enough:
the operator still watched their albums vanish. Measured on the reported
library with a cold metadata cache, the node broadcast twice — the first
delta stripped every album, the second put them back 14 seconds later.
Fourteen seconds of "no music found" is the bug, whatever happens after.
An entry's id is its content hash, so an entry that comes back under the
same id, name and path is the same bytes in the same place and everything
enrichment derived from it still holds. `_rescan_root` now carries those
fields across the drop-and-rescan that `reconcile` and `plug_root` share.
Re-enrichment stays as the fallback for what genuinely changed: a
different id is different content, and a different name or path can change
the folder and filename fallbacks that artist, album, display_title and
track_no rest on, so those entries are still handed to the daemon through
`rescanned_ids`.
`uploader_id`/`uploader_pk` ride along. They are the same shape of field —
set once on an entry, readable from nowhere on disk — and they decide who
may delete the file, so losing them to a replug quietly took a right away.
Verified on the running node: one broadcast 550ms after the plug, carrying
the albums, and no metadata lookups at all.
The tests now assert the field on the entry rather than a call to an
enricher. Counting calls is what let the previous version of this file pass
while the operator still saw an empty tab.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Reported live: a removable root ejected from Files and plugged back in
returned with its files and without its albums. Music showed "no music
found" and stayed there through a force reload — the loss was on the
node, not in the client.
`plug_root` drops the root's entries and rescans, which is right; the
drive may have changed while it was away. What comes back is a bare
IndexEntry: `_hash_or_cached` fills id/name/path/size/type and nothing
else. Every enrichment field goes with the old object, and the Music tag
fields are cached nowhere by design (enrich_audio.py re-reads them so a
rename can re-derive the filename fallback), so re-enrichment is the only
way back.
Two gates then made sure it never ran:
* enrichment is scheduled for `delta.additions`, and ejecting broadcasts
nothing, so `_last_broadcast_snapshot` still held those ids — the
rebuilt entries diffed as updates, not additions;
* `_enrich_new_*_entries` skips anything in `_enriched_attempted`, which
is only discarded for `delta.deletions` — and dropping and rescanning
inside one call broadcasts no deletion either.
A restart cleared both, since an empty snapshot makes every entry an
addition. Nothing short of one did.
The indexer now records the ids it rebuilt and the daemon drains them at
broadcast time: their "already attempted" mark is discarded and they
rejoin the entries offered to the three enrichment passes. Not
Music-specific — Videos lost durations and titles and Photos lost
thumbnails the same way; Music is just where an untagged file has no
album to file itself under, so the app goes empty rather than plain.
`reconcile()` does the same drop-and-rescan when a root reappears on its
own, so a USB drive that fell off and re-mounted hit this with nobody
touching the UI. Covered too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Caught in review, and the review was right. The previous commit documented the
flag as deprecated so that `--help` and the man page would agree. That solved
the wrong problem: the flag contradicts the model this whole refactor exists to
establish, and the coherent answer was to delete it.
It wrote `upload_dir` into a *brand-new* `[[groups]]` block, and
`GroupConfig.__post_init__` reads that key by forcing every other root
read-only and appending that path as the one writable one. So
`group add --dir X --writable --upload-dir Y` silently made X read-only — two
mechanisms deciding which directories accept uploads, one of them invisible, in
a group created after the model that replaced it.
Gone from the CLI, from `ops.attach_group`, from the loopback API and from the
MNP `group_attach` payload, which now carries `writable` instead. The *read*
path in `config.py` is deliberately untouched: an existing node.toml using
`upload_dir` must keep working, and that is the only legitimate use left. The
man page says so under the config key, and no longer lists an option.
The test that guarded the deprecation wording now guards its absence — and
earned itself immediately by finding a `group add` usage string still offering
the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`member upload` reached the generic usage line for the other `member` verbs —
"usage: meshbay-node member upload <username>" — which advertises a removed
feature and sends the operator looking for a username it would then reject. It
names `root set --writable` now, and the man page carries the same. Three lines
between an operator finding the replacement and concluding the CLI is broken.
`--upload-dir` still works, so an existing script keeps working, but its help
and the man page say it is the old spelling and name what replaced it.
The Windows pass (§4.4) is what can be checked from here, made checkable:
drive letters and UNC through `as_posix()` into TOML, a drive root having no
basename to derive a name from — sharing a whole drive is ordinary there — and
a case-insensitive collision, which on NTFS and exFAT is one directory indexed
as two roots. `PureWindowsPath` throughout, for the reason the backslash test
earlier this branch got wrong.
What it cannot check is written down rather than glossed: ReadDirectoryChangesW
dropping events, MAX_PATH, and whether an eject actually lets a drive be
removed. §7d says so, along with two things the plan never considered — the
RO/RW asymmetry in `_do_dir_delete`, and `index_delta` carrying roots but not
`dirs`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Every other test of the plugin architecture reads source for the *absence* of
app names. That proves nobody wrote a special case for Videos; it cannot prove
a genuinely new application works, because there was no new application.
This is one. It stores directories, appears as a tab, has a settings pane and
lists files, and the node has never heard its name outside a single allow-list
entry. Two files and one registry line, which is the claim
`docs/refactor-groups.md` §4.1 makes.
It ships hidden behind `?dev=1` (`dev: true` in the registry, the same opt-in
shape as transport.js's `?trace=1`). Registering it normally would put a toy
app in every operator's group; not registering it would prove nothing, since
registration is exactly what is claimed to be sufficient.
**Adding it found two places where the claim was nearly true rather than true,
and both are fixed by making the code less app-specific:**
`group-settings.js` fell back to the whole registry when a group had no
`enabled_apps` yet — which would have turned a hidden app on for everyone. It
asks `availableApps()` now.
`group-page.js` wrote out `videoDirectories` / `musicDirectories` /
`photoDirectories` by hand, so a fifth app would have needed that file edited.
It derives `<key>Directories` from the registry.
Neither was found by reading; both were found by adding the app, which is the
whole reason it exists.
Verified in a real Electron window as well as by the tests: hidden by default,
present with the flag, offered its own settings section, and listing exactly
the files under its configured folder and its subfolders — not the ones beside
it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The control was hidden and its `canCreateDir` left computed and unused. It is
back in the Files toolbar as an icon: the toolbar already carries one labelled
primary action, and a second beside it competes for the width the breadcrumb
trail needs. The name is in `title` *and* `aria-label` — a title is invisible
to a screen reader on a button with no text, so an icon-only control without
both is simply unnamed for anyone not reading with their eyes.
Its gate changes. It required `isNodeAdmin`, which contradicted the node's own
rule — "making a directory is not a privileged act; a member who can add a file
can organise where it goes" — and hid the control from everyone who could have
used it. It now follows the Upload button: a writable root, and not at the top
of a group, where the level is the set of roots rather than a directory on
anyone's disk.
Restoring it surfaced a real gap. `_do_dir_create` never learned about RO/RW:
`_do_file_upload` gained the `writable` check with the model and this one did
not, so a member refused a file in a published library could still leave empty
directories all through it, and could write to a drive mid-eject. Read-only has
to mean read-only for every way of writing, not just for files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The directory table travelled on `index_sync` alone — a *full* index, which the
node only ever sends on request. Every ongoing change went out as an
`index_delta`, which carried files and nothing else. So the message that says
"something changed" was the one message that could not say a root had.
The acks hid it: `root_add_ack` and friends broadcast the new table to whoever
is connected, so the common cases looked right. What that could not cover was
the operator's own client, where the ack landed and was then overwritten — the
table calls `onRefreshIndex` after an add, that fetch returns the set from
*before* the node's reload (fire-and-forget, because a rescan is minutes on a
real library), and `applyIndex` writes it over what the ack had just delivered.
The new directory appeared for one paint and vanished.
Two halves. `index_delta` now carries the roots table, sealed with the rest and
identical to `index_sync`'s — additive, so a 1.0 client sees a field it does not
read. And the table no longer refreshes the index after a root change: the ack
gives it the new set immediately, and the delta the node pushes when the scan
finishes gives it again, along with the files.
The test that pins it uses an *eject* as its case, because an eject changes no
file at all — the entries freeze — so its delta is empty of additions,
deletions and updates. Without the table it says literally nothing, which is
how a library disappearing from under a group went unannounced to everyone but
whoever pressed the button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`RootSet.describe()` feeds two audiences that want opposite things. The index
payload goes to every member and has always deliberately carried no paths — a
member is told what exists and whether it is readable, not that the library
sits under someone's home directory. The loopback API answers the operator
themselves, over a channel that already requires their machine and the run
token, and the path is exactly what they asked for.
The `root list` CLI I added in Phase 1 read `path` from the member form, so it
printed a placeholder for every directory. Nothing caught it: the CLI reads a
dict, the API returns a dict, and neither end states which keys it owes.
`describe(with_paths=True)` is the operator's view and `list_groups` is the
only caller. The shared-directories table has the same hole over MNP — the
roots there come from the index payload — so its Path column now appears only
when a path is actually present, rather than rendering a column of blanks.
The test asserts both halves, because they pull opposite ways: one that only
checked the operator sees paths would be satisfied by leaking them to every
member. It reads the indexer's source for the member side, and compares the
CLI's key reads against what the payload offers for the other — checked to
fail in each direction independently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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There is no `uploads/` subdirectory any more, and the client names the folder
rather than the root.
It was the last of v5's quarantine — the per-user layer went on 2026-08-14 for
the same reason — and it goes on the same grounds: a folder appearing beside
the operator's library because somebody sent a file is the node deciding how
their disk is arranged. Somebody dropping a file into the folder they are
looking at expects it to be in that folder.
**What made the quarantine worth having was never the subdirectory.** It is the
filename allowlist, the size cap, the chunk ordering and the no-overwrite rule,
and all four are untouched: an existing file is never replaced, the second
sender of IMG_1234.jpg gets a free name, and the check still sits at the write.
Letting the client choose the destination is safe for one reason and only one:
it is resolved through `RootSet.resolve()`, which refuses `..`, absolute
segments and anything whose resolved form escapes its root, symlinks included.
A member answers "which of this group's folders", never "which path on the
operator's disk" — and the test that used to assert the node chose now asserts
that, with six shapes of escape.
`direct` goes with it. Its only job was to say "no subdirectory for this root",
which is now every root, and a config flag that does nothing is worse than none.
Chat's attachment folder finally does something: the directory the operator
picks in the Chat settings pane is where attachments are written, falling back
to the first writable root while they have not chosen one, or if the one they
chose has since been made read-only or ejected — a stale choice should not
become a refusal at send time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The previous commit was the wrong fix. `add_root` did leave the running node
unchanged, but editing the live `RootSet` in place — which is what I did — is
wrong in the other direction.
`DirectoryIndexer.retarget` decides what to scan by diffing the names it
already holds against the ones it is handed, and `_retarget_indexer` hands it
`groups_ctx[gid]["roots"]`: the very object the op had edited. So the new root
sat on both sides of the comparison, nothing was scanned, and the directory
would have appeared in the table permanently empty. `_reload_config_inner`
diffs the same way and would have concluded nothing changed. `remove_root` had
the same shape and would have kept serving a removed directory's files.
The real defect is that two front doors did different things. `ui/app.py` has
always fired the daemon's `reload_fn` after these ops, which re-reads node.toml
and builds a *fresh* set; the MNP path retargeted a stale object instead. That
asymmetry is exactly what `ops.py` exists to prevent, and it is why the bug
survived until an operator added a directory from a browser — the loopback path
worked all along.
So: the ops leave the live set alone, `_retarget_indexer` asks the daemon to
reload, and `update_root` keeps editing in place because flags change no files
and the synchronous upload handler reads that object on the next request.
The tests now check the files rather than `describe()`, which proves nothing
about whether anything was scanned. One of them demonstrates the failure mode
instead of describing it, so the rule is checkable and will say so if
`retarget` ever changes. Two more cover the seam itself — that the MNP path
reloads, and that a context with no daemon still retargets.
Diagnosed by reading the running node's journal rather than the source: the
first add logged "Reloading config" and a rescan, the two later ones logged
neither. I should have looked there before the first attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`add_root` appended to the config and to node.toml and stopped there.
`_retarget_indexer` — the MNP path — then re-points the indexer at
`groups_ctx[gid]["roots"]`, an object nobody had touched, so it was retargeted
at exactly what it already had. The directory was in the config file and
invisible everywhere else until a restart.
Worse than invisible: the ack does carry the new set, so the client showed the
directory for one paint and the next index_sync took it away again — which
reads as a UI bug and is not one. Adding it a second time was then refused as
colliding with itself, which is the only reason anyone found out.
`remove_root` and `update_root` already updated the live set; this one was
missed. The loopback API hid it, because `ui/app.py` fires `reload_fn()` after
the op and that re-reads node.toml from disk. The MNP path does not, and the
shared-directories table only started offering Add over MNP in this refactor —
a latent bug made reachable.
The ack now describes the set the node will actually serve rather than one
built on the side, so the two cannot disagree.
test_root_ops_reach_the_live_set.py holds all three ops to it, including the
counter-property that the same directory is still refused twice and that
node.toml and the live set stay in step — the two halves drifting is how an
operator's next restart silently undoes their last change. Four of its seven
fail against the code above.
Recovery on a node already in this state is `meshbay-node reload`: node.toml
has everything, nothing was lost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`ops.update_root` and `remove_root` returned `[]` when the group context had
no live RootSet, and `group-page.js` accepted it: `if (msg.roots)` is true for
an empty array. An op that succeeded would have emptied the shared-directories
table, and "the node says this group has no directories" is not something the
client can tell from "the node could not say". Both ends now refuse it — the
node builds from config rather than answering empty, and the client requires a
non-empty array.
Found while adding `test_spa_imports.py`, which is the other half of this: it
resolves every named import across the SPA against what the target actually
exports. That failure has a shape nothing else here catches — no build step to
fail, so the browser resolves the graph at load, finds a missing binding, and
the page renders blank or the component just does not appear. `node --check`
parses one file at a time and the source-reading guards look inside a file
rather than between two. The settings split moved two shared components into a
new module and rewired eight files to import them, which is exactly the change
where a rename lands in one file and not the other.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Each app's settings were inlined in `group-settings.js` — TMDB, MusicBrainz,
and one folder picker per app, each with its own draft state and save handler
saying the same thing about a different key. They are one file per app now,
reached through the `apps.js` registry, and the page that renders them names no
application at all: adding one is a registry entry and a settings file.
The line between the two is what makes that true. What every app has — folders
— the page does generically, through one `saveDirectories` bound to the app.
What one app alone has, its pane does itself with the transport it is handed.
An app that only needs directories touches neither `group-settings.js` nor
`group-page.js`, which is `test_app_settings_plugin.py`'s subject.
`settings-ui.js` exists because a pane importing the page that renders it is a
cycle, and ES modules answer that with a temporal-dead-zone ReferenceError at
first render — a component that silently does not appear, the fault already
recorded in CLAUDE.md about hook ordering.
The flat depth-indented `<select>` of every folder in the library becomes a
modal tree. It asks the node for nothing: the tree is derived from paths the
client already holds, so it shows exactly what the group's index contains and
adds no folder-browsing protocol. For Chat's attachment folder — the one
directory that is written to rather than read — read-only roots are greyed
out, so the node's refusal arrives before the operator picks rather than when
somebody sends a file.
Videos and Music take a list of folders. A library on two drives could not be
described before; the only recourse was pointing the app at a parent containing
both, which pulls in everything else under it. The scalar shapes survive on the
wire alone, for a node speaking MNP 1.0, and the client reads them as a
one-element list.
Two things the tests caught that I would not have:
`test_asset_versioning` — six new modules were missing from `_ASSETS`. Reached
through the registry rather than imported by name, they are exactly the files
nothing else would notice changing, and a stale one is served from cache with
no version bump.
And `node --check foo.js` does **not** reliably report a module syntax error:
it accepted `${/* ... */''}` — htm template syntax pasted into a plain object
literal — and reported success. A `.mjs` copy forces the module parser and
reports it. The suite had no syntax check at all, which is how that reached a
file; `test_spa_syntax.py` does it for every module now, and pins that the
loose path is not what it uses.
Suite: 12 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`video_root` (a string), `audio_root` (a string) and `photo_roots` (a list)
said the same thing three ways: three roster accessors, three ops, three MNP
messages, three admin-op subjects. They become `set_app_directories(app_key,
paths)` and its single-directory wrapper, stored under `<app>_directories` and
keyed by the app's registry name — so an application can be added without
touching this layer, which is the whole claim of the plugin architecture.
The three old names still work. Their MNP messages are handled, and the roster
falls back to the old key when the new one is unset, so a node upgraded into
this keeps working with no migration step — the plan called for a script, and
a script nobody runs on the machine where it matters is worse than a fallback.
Two things are new rather than moved:
The paths are validated. The setters this replaces accepted anything, so a
typo — or a path left behind when a root was removed — was stored happily and
then matched no entry, leaving an app showing an empty tab with nothing to
distinguish "misconfigured" from "no files yet". Deliberately not
`RootSet.resolve()`: that also refuses a currently-unavailable root, and an
operator must be able to point an app at a library on a drive they ejected.
The legacy scalar is derived, never stored. `video_root` still rides on the
handshake ack for MNP 1.0 clients; kept as a second stored value it would
drift from the list within one run, which reads as "it works after a restart".
Also here: chat's own two settings (a directory, which must be on a read-write
root because it is a destination rather than a view, and a link-preview switch
gating the unfurl path — checked before the cache, or turning it off would
still serve every preview already fetched), the `app_directories`,
`chat_directory` and `chat_link_preview` MNP messages, the plural
`<app>_directories` on the handshake ack, and `music` as the app's one
identifier where storage said `audio` and the registry said `music`.
The Music enricher now resolves a boundary per configured directory rather
than one for the group: with several, a single boundary is wrong for all but
one of them, and for Music that is the difference between reading a folder as
an artist and reading it as a release.
Suite: 11 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Review of the Phase 1 commit found the RO/RW model sound but three paths
unfinished, each of which broke the flow the phase exists to deliver. Plus
29 test failures it introduced and no coverage for anything it added.
Uploads went to the wrong directory. The node read a `root` field on
file_upload that no client ever sent, so every upload landed in the first
writable root while the Files toolbar offered its button based on the root
being browsed — with two writable roots, uploading from one wrote into the
other. Files now names the root it is showing; Chat names one chosen in the
shell (an operator-configured directory arrives in Phase 2); the node refuses
an unknown name rather than falling back, and refuses read-only and ejected
roots by code.
Shared directories were unreachable on the web. The table read its roots
only from the loopback API, which resolves to "not available" in a browser,
so the section rendered for nobody there — while the Uploads controls it
replaced had worked — and the transport.updateRoot/ejectRoot/plugRoot methods
beside it were dead. MNP is now the path, loopback the fallback for a local
node with no live connection, and adding a root over MNP takes a typed path
since no web page can browse a remote disk.
Ejecting updated nobody's screen. transport.js resolves an admin ack against
the pending request and returns, which is right for every op whose caller
knows the value it chose; the root acks carry state only the node can compute,
so the operator who clicked Eject was the one client that never saw it happen.
And the ejected flag reached roster.db but was never read back, so a restart
undid it and the next scan read an empty mount point as an erased library.
Also: the member-upload endpoint answered 200 and did nothing (removed); the
wizard ignored the first root's RW switch; reload compared roots on name and
path, so editing writable in node.toml did nothing; the table had no path
column, which is the only thing separating two libraries sharing a basename;
apps_enabled normalisation differed between the two sides of a signed subject.
Tests: eject/plug, per-root upload refusal and the node.toml rewrite had no
coverage at all. test_member_upload_policy.py is replaced by
test_root_writable_policy.py — it tested a removed feature — and every
property worth keeping from it moved rather than being dropped.
Docs: draft-v6 structural decision 9 is annotated as superseded (the operator
can no longer have a directory only they may write to — a real capability
removed, flagged rather than hidden), the man page documents the root verb and
the RO/RW fields, and refactor-groups.md §7b records what the plan got wrong.
Suite: 41 failures before, 13 after — all 13 pre-existing on main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Replace the upload boolean with per-root writable/removable/ejected flags.
Backend: new ops (update_root, eject_root, plug_root), MNP 1.1 protocol
messages, live RootSet updates so API always reflects current state, CLI
root subcommand (add/remove/set/list/eject/plug).
Frontend: SharedDirectoriesTable with optimistic toggle switches, eject/plug
in Files and Settings, upload gated on root.writable, ejected-root filtering
in all media apps, updated Create Group wizard, 10-locale i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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content
The real-time watchdog path lacked the duplicate-content guard that
reconciliation already had. When a file with identical content appeared
(e.g. browser download appending " (2)"), add_entry overwrote the
original's index entry — making it vanish from the file list despite
still being on disk. Now check get_entry before adding, matching the
reconciliation logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Files above 40 MB are no longer read in full. Instead, blake3 hashes
45 MB of samples (first 20 MB + last 20 MB + 5 MB at 50% offset).
Files at or below 40 MB are unchanged (full read, hash_version 1).
A new `hash_version` field on IndexEntry (default 1) travels on the
wire and through the cache so both versions coexist without breaking
existing nodes or clients.
The IndexCache auto-migrates its schema on open (ALTER TABLE), so no
manual step is required on upgrade. A standalone migration script is
available in QE/migration/ for operators who want to preview or force
a full re-hash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-LogonType S4U
schtasks.exe has no flag naming the logon type directly -- it only infers
S4U vs Interactive from whether /rp is present, and both readings broke
live on a blank-password account: /rp "" fails schtasks' own credential
validation, and omitting /rp registers "Interactive only", which never
launches the process at boot or on demand despite installing cleanly.
Register-ScheduledTask -LogonType S4U names the logon type explicitly, no
inference. Confirmed live: install, manual start, and unattended boot-time
start all now work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Windows-only changes, all found by actually running the previous session's
work rather than by review alone:
- CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT/LOGOFF/SHUTDOWN handler (platform.py, ctypes
SetConsoleCtrlHandler) so closing a console window, signing off, or a
system shutdown runs the daemon's real _shutdown() instead of Windows
just ending the process — closing WebRTC sessions and any in-flight
ffmpeg transcode instead of orphaning it. `taskkill /F` itself stays
uncatchable (like SIGKILL), so autostart_run() now spawns with
CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP instead of DETACHED_PROCESS and autostart_end()
tries CTRL_BREAK_EVENT against the recorded pid first, falling back to
the hard kill only if that doesn't stop it in time.
- Replaced the Node page's two independent autostart/service-mode toggles
with one "start automatically" select (off / at sign-in / as a
background service). The old pair let both be active at once — starting
the daemon twice, at boot and at sign-in — and their layout broke
wrapping inside .node-service's flex row. The new control always removes
whichever mechanism is active before installing the target; platform.py's
service_install() does the same on the CLI side. The "background
service" option disables itself (with a hint pointing at the CLI) when
running unpackaged, since service-mode.ps1/service.ps1/firewall.ps1 all
assume an installed build's layout — verified live rather than assumed
by actually running those scripts unelevated.
- findNodeBinary() no longer bakes a stray \r into resolved paths. Found by
rebooting after enabling per-user autostart: where.exe listed two
matches, and stdout.trim().split('\n')[0] only strips the whole string's
ends, leaving line one's own trailing \r attached — which landed inside
the Startup .vbs's quoted path and broke it with "Unterminated string
constant" at boot. Fixed by splitting on \r?\n and trimming every line.
- Dependency audit for the Windows installer (docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md): no
VC++ Redistributable needed, confirmed by inspecting the built
node-runtime's actual import table rather than assuming. New
docs/windows-build.md: a concise clone-to-installer build guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-user Startup-folder launcher (W3) only ever runs after this user
signs in. A real Windows Service would start earlier, but under
LocalSystem/NetworkService -- accounts with no normal profile, so
%LOCALAPPDATA%\meshbay\ (config, keystore, data) would not exist for it.
Relocating storage to make that work is real surgery, deliberately not
done here.
Instead: a Scheduled Task, created once with admin rights, that runs AS
THIS USER at boot without needing them to sign in first.
`schtasks /create ... /ru <user> /rp ""` with no `/it` registers an S4U
(Service For User) logon -- no password stored anywhere, and unlike
LocalSystem it loads this account's own profile, so config_dir()/
data_dir() need zero changes. The cost: S4U carries no network credential,
which the node never needed -- everything it touches is local disk plus
outbound internet. Creating the task needs admin (a boot trigger touches
system-wide scheduler state, the same reason /sc onlogon needed it);
querying/starting/stopping an existing one does not -- Task Scheduler
grants the owning user that much itself, which is what lets the Node
page's Start/Stop/Restart drive it with no further UAC prompts.
meshbay_node/platform.py
service_install/_remove/_status/_run/_end -- mirrors autostart_* but
for the Scheduled Task; TASK_NAME moved here (was decorative before)
meshbay_node/daemon.py
new `service install|remove|start|stop|status` verb; restart-daemon and
reset now check for the service task too
packaging/win/service.ps1
the installer-side equivalent (extraResource); status/run/end never
self-elevate -- only install/remove do, exactly matching what
Task Scheduler itself requires
packaging/win/service-mode.ps1
ONE elevated helper running service.ps1 + firewall.ps1 together, so
choosing service mode costs exactly one UAC prompt, not two
build/installer.nsh
the install-time choice: "run as a background service?" (one
elevation, both jobs) vs the existing per-user + separate firewall
question. Checked first, unelevated, so re-running setup with
everything already configured asks nothing. Uninstall offers the
matching one-elevation cleanup, default No.
src/main.js
winServiceTaskStatus/Run/End, wired into node:installed,
node:service-status/-stop/-restart and node:start: when the Scheduled
Task exists, drive it; otherwise fall back to the existing per-user
spawn/kill path. This is the hard requirement -- Start/Stop/Restart
from the Node page must work in either mode.
node-page.js / locales
a hint explaining why the per-user autostart toggle is absent when
service mode is active (info.mode from the backend, no new field to
gate on -- it just isn't sent in that case)
package.json: 0.1.0 -> 1.0.0.
Verified: electron-builder compiles the new NSIS choice logic and ships
all three scripts; service.ps1's S4U install fails cleanly (Access
denied) when run unelevated, and its status/run/end never touch "runas".
Cannot verify the elevated success path myself (no admin in this
session) -- that needs a real UAC click. Node suite 843 pass / 25 skip;
test_packaging_win.py pins the one-elevation property, the S4U flags,
and that main.js actually checks the service task in all three handlers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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"DataChannel closed" from a peer and a clean node log look identical: the
answer-ready line reported only the srflx count, not the host addresses.
On a NAT'd host or a VM the sole host candidate is an address no other
machine can route to, and that is exactly the case you cannot see. The
line now reads `... host: 192.168.200.173, 1 srflx`, so "did the node
offer anything routable" is answerable from the journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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stun.services.mozilla.com no longer resolves — Mozilla shut the service
down — so every ICE gather waited out a DNS timeout on it. Removed from the
node defaults (config.py), the browser defaults (transport.js) and the Node
page's "reset to defaults" (node-page.js). Google (two endpoints) plus
Cloudflare still give two-provider coverage against a single outage, which
is the §2.12 resilience claim. draft-v6 §2.12 updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Staying inert without a contact is the documented policy (module docstring,
musicbay.md §3.1): the usage policy wants a contact in the User-Agent, so an
unidentified client is never sent. Staying *silent* about it was not a
decision — the operator sees Music tiles with no metadata or cover art and
has nothing to search the logs for.
Warns once per client rather than once per lookup, since the condition is
constant for the client's lifetime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DtfG7z6wHWj8RKHCvxQtY1
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default.env was empty in every build, for three independent reasons:
1. build-node.sh read QE/node.env, which does not exist. Even pointed at the
real file it would have failed: its `grep MESHBAY_TMDB_DEFAULT_TOKEN=`
cannot match QE/tmdb.txt, which is a free-form note, not KEY=VALUE.
2. Nothing consumed default.env. packaging/README.md and build-node.sh both
claimed `meshbay-node init` copies it to <config>/node.env; grep found the
name in exactly two places, the README and the script that writes it. No
code implemented the copy, and `EnvironmentFile=-` hid the absence.
3. build-win.ps1 had no env handling at all, so Windows was empty for a
different reason than Linux.
Now: the build extracts the v4 read token -- tmdb.py sends `Authorization:
Bearer`, so it is the JWT, not the 32-char v3 key beside it in the same file --
matching KEY=VALUE first and then by shape, from MESHBAY_TMDB_TOKEN,
MESHBAY_TMDB_TOKEN_FILE, QE/node.env, QE/tmdb.txt. It writes default.env 0600
and *fails the build* if no token resolves; MESHBAY_ALLOW_NO_TMDB=1 opts out.
An empty default.env is invisible until a user opens Videos and finds no
metadata, which is how this shipped empty on two platforms at once.
platform.py gains packaged_default_env()/install_node_env()/load_node_env().
init copies the packaged file once, never overwriting an existing node.env,
and the daemon loads node.env itself at startup: systemd does this on Linux
via EnvironmentFile, but Windows autostart is a Startup-folder .vbs with no
equivalent. Already-set variables always win.
Also fixes an UnboundLocalError in main(): `config_dir` was assigned at the
top of the init branch, which made it function-local for all of main(), while
the reset branch calls `config_dir()` as the imported function. init returns
before that line, so `meshbay-node reset` could only ever raise. The local is
now cfg_dir.
Verified end to end on Linux: token baked (239 chars), init writes
<config>/node.env 0600 with it. The PowerShell half is written but unrun --
no pwsh on this machine.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DtfG7z6wHWj8RKHCvxQtY1
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`ice_interfaces` compared the operator's entry against ifaddr's
`adapter.name` only -- the kernel name on Linux (`wlp3s0f0`), but the adapter
GUID on Windows (`{846EE342-...}`). A setting written on Linux, or copied
into a Windows node's node.toml, matched no adapter at all.
The failure was silent and total rather than partial: aioice binds one socket
per host address, so an empty list means no sockets, no host candidates, and
an SDP offering only a reflexive address. The settings field is free text
with no picker, and on Windows the operator sees neither the GUID nor the
description -- `ipconfig` shows the connection name -- so an entry now
matches the adapter name, the device description, or one of the adapter's own
IPv4 addresses, case-insensitively. An address is the one identifier visible
on every platform.
A filter that matches nothing now falls back to the unfiltered list with a
warning. Losing the 5 s timeout saving is a regression; being silently
unconnectable is a defect.
Also fixes IPv4/IPv6 discrimination in the same loop: the two were told apart
by falling through to an `elif` that index-probed `ip.ip[0]` and `ip.ip[2]`,
which on an IPv4 str yields characters that compared unequal by luck rather
than by design. Now discriminated by isinstance.
WINDOWS-PORT.md claimed Transport had "no platform dependency"; it does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01DtfG7z6wHWj8RKHCvxQtY1
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The Linux node runs under `systemctl --user`. Windows has no per-user
equivalent that works without elevation: `schtasks /create /sc ONLOGON`
(even `/rl LIMITED /it`) fails with "Access is denied" for a non-admin
user, because a logon trigger touches machine-wide scheduler state.
So autostart is a `.vbs` in the per-user Startup folder instead:
CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run Chr(34) & "<exe>" & Chr(34), 0, False
wscript runs it at every sign-in, hidden (0) and non-blocking. No admin,
no console window, no new dependency. Verified end to end: the launcher
brings the daemon up with no window and it answers its loopback API.
node/platform.py
autostart_install/remove/status — write / delete / detect the launcher
autostart_run/end — start now (DETACHED|NO_WINDOW) / taskkill
_node_exe — PATH, then next to sys.executable, then argv[0]
node/daemon.py
new `autostart install|remove|start|stop|status` verb
reload (win32) -> POST /api/reload on the loopback API
restart-daemon (win32) -> autostart_end + autostart_run
reset (win32) -> also removes the launcher
client/main.js, preload.js
node:autostart handler + winAutostart* helpers (kept in step with platform.py)
node:service-status (win32) probes the daemon; stop/restart/start use
taskkill + a detached, windowless spawn
Tests: 8 autostart cases in test_platform.py (mocked sys.platform, APPDATA
pointed at tmp); `autostart status` added to the CLI dispatch sweep. Full
meshbay-node suite green on Windows (784 passed / 34 skipped).
Still open: no CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT handler, so a bare taskkill / window close
does not run _shutdown() (SetConsoleCtrlHandler, follow-up). Service mode
(pywin32/NSSM) stays Phase 2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Verified end to end: a live browser peer on Windows connecting to a Windows
node — handshake, index sync, file download and an ffmpeg-transcoded video
stream all work on the ProactorEventLoop. aiortc only hangs on it in the
same-process loopback the tests use, which the repo-root conftest already
handles for the suite.
So the daemon no longer forces the SelectorEventLoop: that fixed
aiortc-in-one-process but broke ffmpeg (no subprocess support on a Windows
SelectorEventLoop). `use_compatible_event_loop()` becomes
`configure_event_loop()` — a no-op unless MESHBAY_NODE_EVENT_LOOP=selector
is set explicitly, as an escape hatch that probably never needs pulling.
This drops the planned "move ffmpeg off the asyncio loop" work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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A client whose clock is a little fast could not connect at all: the MNP
handshake verified the hub-issued token with no leeway, so a token whose
`iat` was a few seconds ahead of the node's clock failed with "the token
is not yet valid (iat)". Seen against a freshly-resumed VM guest.
`meshbay_common.handshake.JWT_LEEWAY_SECONDS = 60` is the shared value;
applied to the handshake, the node's own hub-token decode, revocation-token
verification, and the hub's access-token decode. 60s absorbs NTP-level skew
without meaningfully widening the window on a stolen token (they already
carry a jti and an exp).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Whether aiortc actually hangs on the ProactorEventLoop for a live peer (as
opposed to the same-process loopback the tests use) is still open. This lets
a Windows node keep the default loop for that comparison — and, if Proactor
turns out fine, keep subprocess ffmpeg working without a code change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Found by running the daemon on Windows for the first time:
- `meshbay-node init` wrote `unlock_file = "C:\Users\..."`, and
attach_group / add_root write `path = "C:\..."` — a raw Windows path in a
TOML basic string is a parse error (`\U`, `\a`, ... are escape sequences),
so the config would not load. All now write `Path(...).as_posix()`;
pathlib reads the forward-slash form fine on Windows.
- any `print()` carrying a `->` arrow or em dash (the CLI help and messages
are full of them) raised UnicodeEncodeError on a cp1252 console and took
the command down. New `platform.force_utf8_stdio()` reconfigures
stdout/stderr to UTF-8, called at the top of `main()`.
Verified on Windows: init writes parseable LF node.toml, the keystore
Argon2-decrypts, the loopback control API binds 127.0.0.1, and
`_update_node_toml` reads a CRLF file and rewrites it LF-only with its
standalone comments intact. Two regression tests added in test_ops.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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node.toml, the keystore envelope, the unlock key, the loopback UI token,
pairing/invite code files and the denylist were all read and written with
the platform default encoding and newline translation. On Windows that is
cp1252 + CRLF: a node.toml or keystore holding any non-ASCII byte failed to
load, and ops.py's line-based node.toml editor round-tripped CRLF in and
LF out.
Every read is now `encoding="utf-8"`; every write is `encoding="utf-8",
newline="\n"` so the files stay LF whatever the OS. No-op where the locale
was already UTF-8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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aiortc's ICE stack does not run on Windows' default ProactorEventLoop -- a
DataChannel handshake never completes. `platform.use_compatible_event_loop()`
switches to the SelectorEventLoop on win32, called at the top of `main()`
before `asyncio.run()`. No-op off Windows.
Known cost, for when the node runs on Windows: the SelectorEventLoop cannot
spawn subprocesses, so ffmpeg streaming (asyncio.create_subprocess_exec in
webrtc_server.py) needs a thread-based runner there. Tracked separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Platform directories, signal handling, chmod guards, ffmpeg discovery,
and platform-conditional CLI messages — all testable on Linux.
See docs/WINDOWS-PORT.md §5 for the plan these implement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel
sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by
`sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the
ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and
authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt.
The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript
names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the
rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in
depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes
now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a
member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters
only). Chat is out of scope.
Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the
message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which
are legitimate states.
Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min`
on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` /
`version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid
for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message.
BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and
every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser
picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY
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Reported live: after installing the .deb, systemd printed "Warning: The
unit file, source configuration file or drop-ins of meshbay-node.service
changed on disk. Run 'systemctl --user daemon-reload' to reload units."
Both postinst scripts (deb and rpm) already run a daemon-reload, but only
for the system manager — they run as root, and the unit that changed is
the *user* unit (packaging/systemd/meshbay-node-user.service), owned by
each signed-in person's own user manager, a different process root
cannot reach. Iterating over logged-in users from postinst was
considered and rejected: fragile (depends on machined and each user's
session bus), and root has no business doing a user's job.
`_systemctl_user` — the one place `reload` and `restart-daemon` already
shell out to systemd — now reloads the user manager first, under the
correct privilege, right before the verb that would otherwise act on a
stale unit. Best-effort and unchecked, like the postinst's own
daemon-reload: a reload the manager did not need must never block what
the operator asked for, and systemd still reports a genuine failure from
the verb itself.
Does not touch the postinst scripts. On a package upgrade the warning
can still appear once, before the next reload/restart-daemon (or a login,
which starts a fresh user manager that reads the current file); this
closes it from the CLI's own lifecycle commands rather than reaching
into every session from root.
test_lifecycle_commands_delegate_to_systemctl_user now expects the
daemon-reload call ahead of the verb — checked failing against the
previous code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AbwJDbNTkiRUh7HTWEoyss
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`file_chunk` and `index_sync` were each built twice, once per transport, and
the two copies did not agree. WebRTC sent binary, unsigned chunks carrying a
`file_id`; QUIC sent base64 fields, two BLAKE3 hashes, a per-chunk Ed25519
signature and no `file_id`. `index_sync` was plain entries on one transport
and a `GroupIndex.serialize()` envelope on the other. One message type, two
shapes, one consumer each, and nothing that failed when they drifted — finding
C6 one size down, in the two places the handshake unification did not reach.
Phase 9.15 moved WebRTC to the binary format and dropped the per-chunk
signature; the QUIC encoder was never brought along. It is dropped here rather
than reintroduced: the AES-GCM tag authenticates the ciphertext under a
GEK-derived key, and since C3 the node authenticates itself once in the
handshake instead of once per megabyte.
`meshbay_common.protocol` now owns the chunk codec (`chunk_ciphertext`,
`file_chunk_wire`, `file_chunk_plaintext`) and `meshbay_node/transport/wire.py`
the index builder, which also absorbs the delta the daemon used to hand-build.
`test_transport_wire_parity.py` fails if either server grows its own copy back.
`ChunkRequest`/`ChunkResponse` are deleted. `ChunkResponse` described the QUIC
half while reading like the contract for both, which is what made the fork hard
to see at all.
BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 0.15 changes the encoding of `file_chunk` and `index_sync`
on the QUIC transport. The WebRTC shapes are byte for byte unchanged and no
QUIC client ships, which is why this is a MINOR bump; a deployed QUIC peer
would have made it MAJOR.
Also fixes a test fixture that put a `Path` where the daemon puts a `RootSet`.
Nothing caught it: the old QUIC index handler never touched `roots`, and
`entry_abs_path` fell through `Path.resolve(strict=...)`, reading the virtual
path as a truthy flag and returning the right file by accident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`create_invite` wrote the invite to the roster and *then* asked for the
hub. An unreachable hub therefore raised "Hub not connected" after the
code was already stored: the operator saw an error and no code, and a
valid invitation sat in the roster that nobody had been given. Every
retry left another.
Registering first means a failure costs nothing — no code exists to be
orphaned. A membership row without an invite is harmless: without the
code there is still no group key. The endpoint is idempotent (`if not
mem: db.add(...)`, no 409), so the SPA registering the same membership
again right after createInvite costs nothing either.
The registration is now fatal rather than swallowed, which is the part
that matters. `/v1/groups/mine` joins GroupMember, so someone who was
never registered does not see the group at all and can never redeem the
code. Tolerating that failure handed the operator a code that cannot
work and said nothing — a worse outcome than the error, because it is
silent. Skipped only when there is no username to register with: the MNP
path allows an empty one and there the SPA is the one that registers.
Found by test_invite_then_join_delivers_the_gek, whose fixture had no
hub and which passed only because the failure was swallowed. It has one
now. And 0443cf8 added this registration to the CLI path without any
test asserting it happened, which is how it came to be skipped whenever
the hub was merely absent — test_cli_invite_asks_the_hub_for_an_account_
never_a_key checks it now, and
test_an_unreachable_hub_leaves_no_invite_behind covers the orphan
(verified failing against the previous ordering).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AbwJDbNTkiRUh7HTWEoyss
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Opening a different season of the same show moved everything under the
synopsis, which is where the season control and the episode list are, so the
thing just clicked was no longer under the pointer.
- The synopsis is exactly three lines for a multi-season show, with a "read
more" link floated into the third line box (-webkit-line-clamp only ever
puts its ellipsis at the end of the last line and leaves no room after it).
Clamped from above and pinned from below to the same number: a constant,
not a range — a season summary runs two lines and the next one twelve, and
a band still reads as a jump. Whether three lines is all of it depends on
the modal's width, so it is measured in the browser and re-measured on a
resize.
- The cast is clamped to two lines.
- SeasonMenu replaces SeasonTabs: the tab row scrolled sideways once a show
had more seasons than fit, which is close to unusable on a phone. One
trigger reading "Season 5 · 1997" and a menu of every season with its
episode count, one row high whatever the season count.
- media_meta_resp.director was filled from the credits crew's job ==
"Director", a movie shape. TMDB's aggregate tv_credits crew is routinely
empty and never carries that job, so every show answered null and the modal
dropped the line. It now comes from created_by on the show details. Cached
show metadata keeps its null until TMDB_META_TTL_SECS expires or an
operator re-matches.
The facts line is joined rather than concatenated (a title with no rating
used to open with " · ") and carries the show's own year next to the
director; the selected season's air year moved onto the picker.
test_video_detail_measured.py asserts rectangles through layout_probe.py, not
declarations: the picker's offset inside its own modal body is the same pixel
either way, the synopsis and cast heights, where the read-more link lands,
and the open menu at 320 px. Each measured block sits in a whole-pixel-height
container, or two identical layouts an eighth of a pixel apart round to tops
one pixel apart. test_tmdb_show_director.py covers the credit.
docs/mediacenter.md §10.4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014UtzVrzM7e2tG9fSpkR9ML
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