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The ack was assembled from its own tuple of application names, a copy of the
daemon's `APP_DIR_KEYS`, and the two had drifted: the copy was missing
`helloworld`. So the reference application — the one that exists to prove a new
application needs no special-casing — was the single application whose
configured folders never reached a client, which made the plugin claim false
exactly where it is demonstrated.
Fixed by removing the copy rather than syncing it. The ack now emits whatever
`<app>_directories` the group context carries, and `_app_directories_ctx` is the
only thing that puts one there, so the two cannot disagree again. The transport
names an application in one place, `ALLOWED_APPS`, which is enforcement rather
than a directory list.
The client had the same fault one layer up: `group-page.js` read three names by
hand from the ack while the live-update path beside it was already generic. It
derives the map from the ack's own keys now, so the fix reaches the settings
pane instead of stopping at the wire.
A first attempt moved the list to `roster.py`, where directory *storage* lives,
and `test_helloworld_proves_the_plugin_claim.py` refused it: the roster, the ops,
the config and the root set must name no application at all. That test is the
architecture's own guard and it was right — the list belongs on the daemon, which
is what wires a group's context, and everything downstream is derived from it.
Two new tests, both verified to fail against the previous shape: the ack carries
an application the node names nowhere else, and the ack keeps no list of its own.
`test_the_lists_are_read_under_one_name_each` now asserts the shell names no
application rather than that it names exactly three.
Two stale comments went with it — the ack's, which described scalars removed in
07ff8b4, and the client's, which said those scalars still rode the wire for
MNP 1.0 peers that can no longer connect.
Full suite: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The handshake ack's app-directories entry still said "the same three answers in
one shape" and "the scalars above are derived from these and kept for MNP 1.0
clients". Neither is true since the per-app ops were folded into one: there are
no scalars above, and a 1.0 client cannot reach this code at all — the floor
moved to 3.0 with the lease flag day.
A comment that contradicts the code beside it is worse than no comment, because
one of them is wrong and the reader cannot tell which. This is the same fault
the leaseless-bound comment had, one commit earlier.
What it says instead is what is actually load-bearing: `<app>_directories` is
the only form on the wire, and `chat_directory` below is safe as a second name
for one of them because `_app_directories_ctx` derives it on every build rather
than storing it alongside — which is precisely what the removed scalars did not
do.
daemon.py had the same stale reference three lines from the code that produces
these, pointing at `video_root` for the shape a per-group signed setting takes.
Comments only; no behaviour change. Node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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`video_root`, `audio_root` and `photo_roots` are gone — the messages, the
signed operations, the handlers, the `ops` wrappers, the three scalars on the
handshake ack, and the client's handlers for their acks. `app_directories`
does the same thing for every application, keyed by the app's own registry
name, and it is what the SPA has been sending.
The three were the same instruction three times, differing only in the key they
wrote and whether they carried a string or a list. That shape is what made
adding an application mean adding a message type, an op, a handler and a widget;
it also meant three validation paths, and the older ones validated nothing —
a typo was stored and then quietly matched no entry, an app showing an empty tab
with no way to tell "misconfigured" from "no files yet".
**What stays, and why.** `Roster.LEGACY_DIR_KEYS` still reads `video_root` and
friends out of `group_settings`: that is a key on an operator's disk, not on the
wire, and a node upgraded into this must find its own configuration. The Search
page still reads its own older cache keys, for the same reason — the cache
outlives a deploy. `CTX_ALIASES` keeps only `chat`, which is the one app whose
second name something still reads.
The two per-app policy test files go with the messages. What only they held —
the real challenge/response path from message to database, which no other test
exercises — is retargeted at `app_directories` in
`test_app_directories_signed.py`, and the handler's own refusals (unknown app,
malformed `directories`, nobody to authorize it) join `test_app_directories.py`.
Node and common suites 1368 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Seven comments pointed at sections of `~/next/improve-downloads.md`, which is
not in the tree and not anywhere a reader of this repository can follow. Each
now states the thing it was citing: why a paused transfer holds nothing, why the
lease is taken after the save target and not before, why a chunk request marks
a lease alive, where the leaseless bound's number comes from.
The leaseless comment also said "two files at a time" three paragraphs under
`MAX_LEASELESS_IN_FLIGHT = 12`, left behind when the bound was raised. A comment
that contradicts the constant beside it is worse than no comment: one of them is
wrong and the reader cannot tell which.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`device_add_request` and `device_hello` were dispatched behind
`and self._nonce_node`, which reads as "pre-proof, once the challenge has gone
out" — and is not what happens: both branches sit after the
`self._user_id is None` guard, so the nonce is always set by the time either is
reached, and a peer that has not finished its handshake gets "Handshake
required" instead.
The guard is removed rather than the branches moved. Filing a device is not
something a peer needs *in order to* prove possession of the group key, which is
the only reason anything is served pre-proof: the request is countersigned later
by a device already pinned, so requiring the caller to finish its own handshake
first costs nothing and keeps the pre-proof surface at three messages.
A test drives all six device messages through the real dispatcher on an
unauthenticated session, because this is a property of the order of its branches
and of nothing else.
Node suite 1216 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`senderkeys.py` and its 13 tests implemented Signal-style sender keys, and
production has never called them: chat is a key per group, per epoch, per
device, derived by name. The reasoning that ruled the ratchet out stays where it
belongs — in `chatbox.py`, at the top of the module that replaced it — because
the argument is the useful part, and it now stands on its own instead of
pointing at a file to compare against.
Kept code that nothing calls is worse than absent code: it reads as an
alternative somebody may reach for, and it has to be maintained past every
refactor to stay compiling, which is maintenance spent on a decision already
made.
The three comments naming `GroupSenderKeyStore` are rewritten to say the thing
they were illustrating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The QUIC handler stored `payload` as it arrived and broadcast it: no envelope,
no signature check, no `device_hello` to check one against. A message reaching
a group's archive that way is a plaintext row in an encrypted history, and it
would be indistinguishable from one somebody actually wrote.
Removed rather than gated. The transport implements neither the per-device
sealing nor the device identification the WebRTC path requires, so refusing
here would mean maintaining a second, weaker set of rules for a transport with
no client; an unimplemented type is logged and dropped, like every other message
this transport does not have.
The comment on the peer registry loses its chat fan-out aside for the same
reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The group-wide `member_upload` switch is gone: the message, the signed
operation, the field on the handshake ack, the `upload` alias on every root in
the index payload, and the client's fallback path to it.
Whether a member may write has been a property of each root for a while, and
that is the model that survives: a single flag over the group cannot express
"this library is published read-only and that folder is a drop box", which is
the ordinary arrangement. What was left of the switch was a handler that logged
a deprecation and acted on nothing, and a client that read `ack.member_upload`
whenever the roots carried no `writable` — a second source for one question,
with whichever the code consulted first deciding it.
`roots.describe()` drops `upload` for the same reason: it was `writable` under
an older name, and two names for one boolean is one too many.
The paperclip now says "nowhere to write" rather than picking a root, in a group
that has none writable. That is the honest answer; the fallback picked whatever
came first and failed at send time.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`transfer_state` read `slots.per_member` — the node-wide default — while
`_has_room` decides with `member_cap()`, which prefers the group's own signed
limit, and the handshake ack announces that same `member_cap()`. Three readings
of one number, and one of them was the odd one out.
In a group where the operator signed a higher limit, every lease update told the
client "cap: 2" while the node would grant five: the transfers widget draws
`used >= cap` as saturated, so a member with two transfers running saw the rest
of their slots disappear. Lowered the other way it is worse in the other
direction — the interface offers slots the node will queue.
Nothing was ever granted or refused wrongly; the enforcement was right on both
paths. It is the number beside it that contradicted them.
Two tests, one override above the default and one below, because a bug that
reads the node-wide value passes the first whenever the default happens to be
the larger number.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Streaming an Xvid/MP3 .avi answered "Unsupported video codec" — a refusal, on
a file ffmpeg re-encodes at about six times playback speed on the machine that
reported it. Nothing about the source was wrong. The node simply never reached
its own re-encode path.
`probe_video` maps a source codec to an MSE codec string and knows four:
h264, hevc, vp9, av1. Everything else returns None, because there is no
MediaSource decoder in any mainstream browser to give a string to — MPEG-4
Part 2 (Xvid, DivX), MPEG-2, VC-1, WMV, Theora. `_stream_video_inner` read
that None as a verdict on the file and refused, while the re-encode sitting
twenty lines below it was gated on `raw_video_codec in
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS` — a set containing "hevc" and nothing else.
So the whole ffmpeg fallback existed, worked, and was unreachable for every
codec that most needed it.
The setting that governs the fallback has documented the intended behaviour
since it was introduced: draft-v6 §2.11 says `transcode_incompatible_video`
covers "HEVC *and other browser-incompatible video codecs*". Only HEVC was
ever wired up.
Two questions were being answered by one value, and they are separated now.
"Is there a video stream at all" is the only thing this path genuinely cannot
serve, and the only refusal left. "Can it be copied" needs both an MSE string
to put in `stream_init` and a codec browsers decode; a source failing either
is re-encoded.
The operator's opt-out keeps meaning what it says, and it no longer means the
same thing for every source, because it cannot: HEVC has a codec string, so
`transcode_incompatible_video = false` falls back to a copy and the viewer's
own decoder decides (unchanged). MPEG-4 Part 2 has none, so there is nothing
to fall back to — a `stream_init` with no codec string is one the client
refuses before the first byte — and the stream is refused naming the setting.
"Unsupported video codec" is what sent this report to the file, and the file
was fine.
Verified against the reported file end to end: ffprobe reports mpeg4/mp3
720x404, the decision comes out `can_copy=False`, and the pipeline's exact
argv produces H264 High level 4.1 plus stereo AAC-LC — matching the
`avc1.640029,mp4a.40.2` that `stream_init` advertises and that the client puts
through MediaSource.isTypeSupported byte for byte.
test_stream_hevc_transcode.py becomes test_stream_video_transcode.py: it was
always about the policy rather than about one codec, and it now carries both
halves of it, with a synthetic Xvid/MP3 .avi built the same way as the HEVC
clip. Its module-level skip on libx265 went with it — an ffmpeg without x265
still encodes MPEG-4 Part 2, so that marker was skipping the reported defect
entirely on any box without it; it now gates the HEVC cases alone. Three
cases added, checked against the unfixed source. Hub and node suites 2269
passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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Reported the day MNP 3.0 shipped: playing a track answered "Too many files open
at once without a transfer. Download this one instead of previewing it."
§3.4.1's bound of two was reasoned about *viewers* — a photo viewer shows one
photo, a preview modal one document, and the second is for prefetching the next.
It forgot the music player, which warms a read-ahead window: `prefetchDepth()`
returns 5 on Wi-Fi and 3 otherwise, so playing an album has six files in flight
and the fourth was refused. Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot
— that is a stated requirement, not a tuning parameter — and a constant nobody
had checked against the client broke it.
Twelve now: six for the music read-ahead at its widest, two for a photo viewer
and its own prefetch in the same session, the rest as headroom. Generosity is
cheap here and refusal is not — this is a fairness control among cooperating
clients, not a security boundary, so a client that lies gets twelve files at a
time instead of its member cap, bounded and audited, while refusing a legitimate
read breaks the requirement outright.
And the number is now derived rather than chosen: a test reads `prefetchDepth()`
out of the shipped player and fails if the node's bound no longer covers it, so
widening the client's read-ahead breaks the build instead of reaching a person.
Checked by widening it: "the music player reads 21 files ahead and the node
admits only 12".
Three cases that hard-coded "two then refuse" now set their own limit — they are
about the mechanism, and the shipped number moves with the client.
Node suite 1210 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 4 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, the flag day. Leases become compulsory
and a 2.x peer is refused at the handshake.
**The bound on leaseless reads (§3.4.1) did not exist, and it is what makes the
rest mean anything.** Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot —
that is an operator decision and a requirement: a member must be able to browse
a group at capacity exactly as they browse an idle one. But "not leased" cannot
mean "unbounded", or a client that simply omits `tr` transfers outside every cap
and the caps are decoration. A session may now read two distinct files at once
without a lease: one because a viewer looks at one file, two so that prefetching
the next photo stays possible. A count of files and not a byte budget, because a
RAW photo is 60-80 MB and is browsing while a 40 MB archive is a download, and
no size threshold separates them. Thumbnails, posters and cover art never reach
this check at all — they resolve out of the node's own cache.
It is a fairness control among cooperating clients, in the company of
`max_concurrent_streams`, and is not a defence against a member determined to
saturate a node's disk. That member is a member, and the answer to them is
`member revoke`.
**MNP_VERSION and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED both move to 3.0**, on both sides. The
messages are additive; the requirement is not. An opt-in switch would leave a
leaseless branch reachable on every node, which is finding C6's lesson — a
transport that accepted a bare JWT — one feature later.
**The desktop client now checks before it connects.** The SPA is served by the
hub and picks up a new client on reload; the application ships its own
interface, so an un-updated one would sign in, list groups, and fail every
connection with `version_too_old` — a refusal in a protocol vocabulary with
nothing anyone can act on. It asks `/v1/hub/version` for `client.minimum` and
says so plainly instead. An unreachable hub is deliberately *not* "too old": a
captive portal or a closed laptop must not make starting the application
impossible.
**Every package is aligned on 0.13.0.** `meshbay-client/package.json` had
drifted to 1.0.0 while the Python packages were on 0.12.0 — invisible until
something compared those numbers, and then load-bearing: an installed client
announcing 1.0.0 sorts above a 0.13.0 minimum and walks through the gate meant
to stop it. That is stated in the code rather than left to be rediscovered; it
is acceptable exactly once, because the operator is updating every client, node
and hub by hand for this flag day. A new test fails if two packages ever
disagree again, and another fails if the hub would refuse the client the tree
builds.
Node suite 1209 passed, hub suite 861 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in
stage 7.
**Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member,
directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and
`transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there
would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same
file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the
question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary
`file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing,
creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed
ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start
from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so
one that answers neither does not strand an upload.
The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask
questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only
about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's
progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it.
**Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the
desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares
whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was
also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must
not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for
their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a
File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than
trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too.
**And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`.
Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed
a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned
it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload
read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The
download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here,
invisible until uploads took a real lease.
`test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends
rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it
was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing.
Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, first half. Two defects that are the
same defect seen from two sides.
An upload's progress lived on the session, keyed by `rel_dir/filename`. A
dropped connection threw it away and the client's next chunk was refused with
`not_started`: an upload interrupted at 99% could only be started again from
zero, on a link flaky enough to have interrupted it once. It now lives in the
group context, keyed by member as well -- a shared directory means two people
can be sending IMG_1234.jpg at the same moment and neither may inherit, or
overwrite the position of, the other's.
What the lost state left behind was a `.part` nothing would ever finish, delete
or look at again. It is not an index entry, so it is invisible to every member
and to the operator's own file list: one abandoned film is a gigabyte of their
disk, kept for ever. That leak predates this branch.
A `.part` is deleted only when **both** hold: no upload is writing it, and
nothing has been written to it for 24 hours. Waiting costs disk; being wrong
costs somebody their upload, and is not reversible -- so a read-only root is
never walked (it cannot have received an upload), an unavailable one is never
walked (an unmounted drive reporting "nothing found" is how a careless janitor
deletes a library), and a file whose mtime is in the future is left alone (a
clock that went backwards is not evidence). The reaper matches whole paths and
the state records the path it is writing, rather than both sides rebuilding one
from a root name -- two implementations of one rule whose failure mode is
deleting a live upload.
The rules are in `uploads.py`, pure logic with no asyncio and no transport, the
same shape as `transfers.py` and for the same reason.
23 cases, four of them checked against the unfixed source. Node suite 1195
passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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"The node saw no transfer" was concluded twice from a journal that could not
have shown one: the open was logged at DEBUG, and the daemon runs at INFO. Two
diagnoses were built on that non-observation, and both were wrong.
Turning the root logger up to DEBUG is not the answer either — aiortc logs every
SCTP chunk, which on a 2 GB download is both unreadable and slow. One line per
transfer is not a volume problem, and it is the line that answers "did the
client ever ask for a slot, and what was it told".
Node suite 1172 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Raising the per-member cap from 2 to 4 left both waiting transfers on
"waiting". The pool granted them correctly and nobody told the peers:
`ops.set_transfer_limits` computed `granted` and never sent a `transfer_state`,
where the node-wide path (`WebRTCTransport.set_capacity`) does.
That is the first row of §5.2 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md — "node granted a
slot, the push was lost" — reached by writing the decision and forgetting the
send. It is the same omission as the missing `touch()` call one layer up, on the
same day: a mechanism that is right everywhere except at the seam where it has
to reach somebody.
The client recovered after its 60-second watchdog re-asked, which is why this
looked like a slow queue rather than a lost message.
`transfer_probe.py --operator` covers it now, separately from the node-wide
hot-swap it already covered — different door, different code path, and only one
of them was tested. Verified failing with the push removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported as "the slots seem hardcoded to 2": `meshbay-node transfers set 8 8`
and still only two downloads at a time. Not hardcoded — that is the *per-member*
cap, which is a group's setting and is checked before the node's, so raising the
machine's total cannot move it. But the diagnosis was right in the way that
matters: nothing could change it.
`OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS` shipped with exactly one front door, the signed MNP
handler, and nothing anywhere opened it — no client call, no CLI verb, no
loopback route. So the cap sat at its default of 2 for ever, which from outside
is indistinguishable from a constant. CLAUDE.md states the rule this missed:
operator operations are one implementation with several front doors.
- `PUT /api/groups/{id}/transfer-limits`, calling the same
`ops.set_transfer_limits` the signed handler calls;
- `meshbay-node transfers per-member <downloads> <uploads> [--group X]`;
- `transfers show` now separates the node-wide pools from the per-group
per-member caps, and marks each `[set]` or `[default]`. It printed "2 per
member" with no indication of where the 2 came from, which is half of why
this looked like a constant.
Zero is refused here as everywhere else: it is not "unlimited", and a member who
may not transfer at all is a member the operator revokes.
Verified on a live node: the cap changes, survives a daemon restart, and
`transfer_probe.py --want 6` measures 4 granted against a cap of 4 where it
measured 2 before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Two defects in the lease machinery, both found in the node's own log, neither
reachable from any test on either side.
**`touch()` was never called.** The node ignored `tr` on `file_req` entirely, so
`used` stayed False for every download ever made and the sweeper revoked each
grant thirty seconds in — while the file was transferring at 20 MB/s. The pool
was correct and the handlers were correct; the call between them was missing,
which is why neither side's tests could see it.
**The requeue was a permanent cycle.** A revoked grant went back in the queue,
was granted again a millisecond later because there was room, and was revoked
again thirty seconds on. The node logged the same two reclaims every thirty
seconds for as long as it ran — minutes after the transfers involved had
finished. Three chances now, then the lease is closed and the peer told.
`test_the_counter_never_drifts` could not have caught it: nothing drifted, the
same lease simply never left.
A lease that starts being used forgets its earlier misses: a client that took
two grants to get going is slow, not abandoned.
Also `transfers show` reported the module defaults rather than the operator's
values until something had transferred, so `transfers set 2 2` answered
"applied now" and the next line said 0/8 — indistinguishable, from outside,
from the hot-swap that did nothing for months. The test asserted the defaults
and so agreed with the bug; found by typing the command.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Step 3 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md. Step 2 built the pools with constants;
this gives them to the operator, in the two scopes they belong to.
**The pools are the machine's.** `[node] max_concurrent_downloads` and
`max_concurrent_uploads`, default 8, on the §2.11 pattern: node.toml for a
fresh install, a roster.db override for immediate effect, editable from the
Node page and from `meshbay-node transfers show|set`, applied live through the
one `set_capacity` step 1 fixed.
**The per-member cap is a group's.** How many transfers one member may run at
once here — on the node like every other group setting (not the hub, which
would have authority over someone else's disk; not node.toml, which is
hand-written and needs a restart), changed by a signed operator instruction
(`OP_TRANSFER_LIMITS`, subject "d=2,u=2" so what is signed names the outcome),
broadcast to the group, and read live by the pools.
That was the one thing step 2's shape could not express: `per_member` was a
single node-wide number. `group_limits` and `member_cap(kind, member)` make it
a lookup — the group's own value if it has one, the node's default otherwise —
and it is deliberately the only dimension that is not node-wide.
Three refusals, each with a test:
- **absent means the default (2), never "unlimited".** A group that predates
the setting coming back unlimited would leave the node-wide pool as the only
control, which is the situation slots exist to end;
- **zero is not "unlimited"**, and is not "this member may not transfer"
either: the floor is one everywhere, and the CLI says to revoke the member
instead;
- **an unreadable row reads as unset**, not as zero — the same discipline the
sealed messages follow, where a payload that does not open must never become
a default state on its own.
`handshake_ack` carries this member's own caps for this group, so the interface
can say "2 of your 2 slots are busy" instead of drawing a bare spinner. Absent
reads as "no limit known" and the hint is not drawn — never as "unlimited",
which would have the interface contradicting the node.
1164 node, 793 hub, 0 failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Step 2 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md. A download is invisible to the node: it
is a series of independent `file_req` messages, with nothing saying one started
or ended, so there is nothing to count and nothing to cap. The lease is that
missing object.
`meshbay_node/transfers.py` holds the decisions and has no asyncio and no
transport in it, on purpose. The failure modes this has to survive — a slot the
node never gets back, a client waiting on a grant the node has forgotten — are
races through a DataChannel and unprovable there; here the clock is a parameter
and every method returns what changed, so the caller does the I/O and the tests
drive the worst case directly.
What it decides:
- two pools, downloads and uploads, separate from the stream pool: different
resources with different costs, and merging them makes both caps meaningless;
- per-member cap checked *before* the node-wide one, so a member at their own
limit queues behind their own transfers rather than holding a slot a second
member has none of. Per account across their devices, or the cap becomes a
function of how many tabs somebody opens;
- a queue that skips a member at their cap instead of waiting for them —
granting strictly in arrival order lets one member's limit stall everyone;
- `tr` drawn by the client and idempotent, which is what makes a reconnect safe;
- bounded per member, because unbounded queues are how a node runs out of
memory politely.
Every way a slot comes back, with the session teardown as the one that matters
(a closed tab, a quit browser and a dead network all arrive at
`shutdown_tasks`, and none of them needs a timer): explicit close, session
gone, a grant nobody took up in 30 s passed to the next in line, and a granted
transfer silent for 120 s reclaimed with its peer told, so a widget can offer a
resume rather than sit on a lie.
`GET /api/transfers` is the operator's window: when somebody reports a transfer
stuck at waiting, it is the only thing that says whether the node ever had them
in a queue — a log cannot, when the symptom is that nothing is happening. It
carries no filename and no path, which a test pins, because this is exactly
where one would be tempting.
Three things found while writing it, two of them mine:
- the randomised property test rejected `in_use <= cap` at once, and it was
right to: lowering a cap never interrupts a running transfer, so the count
legitimately sits above the new value. The invariant is that a *new* grant
never happens past the cap;
- the sweeper was started with `self._spawn`, which ties a task to one
session's set. It died with whichever peer opened the first transfer, and
every other peer's abandoned lease then stopped being reclaimed — a node that
fills up over days with nothing in the log. It belongs to the node now, with
its strong reference on the transport context;
- the pools are node-wide while `_peer_registry` is per group (finding H1), so
a slot freed in one group can grant one in another and the peer to notify is
not in the notifier's registry. Silently wrong in the first version.
Nothing enforces a lease yet: `file_req` is untouched, no client asks, and the
node grants everything. That is step 4's flag day, and this lands alone.
1148 node, 793 hub, 0 failed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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`ops.set_node_settings` hot-swapped the stream pool by assigning
`webrtc._stream_sem`. That attribute has never existed on WebRTCTransport — the
pool is `ctx["_transcode_sem"]` — so `hasattr(webrtc, '_stream_sem')` was always
False and the branch never ran. The setting was accepted, written to roster.db
and node.toml, and applied only on the next restart, which is exactly what
draft-v6 §2.11 says it does not need. An operator lowering the cap on a
struggling machine, or raising it after "Server busy", saw nothing happen and
had no way to find out why.
`WebRTCTransport.set_capacity()` is the one implementation, on the object that
owns the state, so the download and upload caps the transfer-slots plan adds
next do not each grow their own copy of the mistake.
Resizing has semantics worth stating: the new cap governs new streams and never
interrupts one that is running, because a slot is held for the length of a film
and lowering a number must not take somebody's film away. The replacement pool
is built with the permits that remain (`new - in_flight`, floored at zero) — a
full set would briefly allow more concurrent viewers than either the old cap or
the new one.
That needs a count of slots in use, so `_stream_video` now maintains one instead
of the code reading the semaphore's private `_value`: a number this code keeps
itself survives the semaphore object being replaced underneath it, and the same
counter makes the "N of M in use" log lines mean something.
test_stream_capacity.py drives the real transport and the real `_stream_video`;
`test_ops_calls_the_real_mechanism` fails if the dead attribute comes back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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`thumbs` holds every generated thumbnail, every TMDB poster and backdrop, every
Cover Art Archive image and every cached audio transcode. Rows were removed only
when their source file left every group's index (`prune_file`), so a library
that merely changes over years grew this database with nothing to bound it.
Nothing in it is precious — every row is keyed off a value the node can
re-derive — which is what makes eviction the right answer rather than a bigger
disk.
512 MB, evicted on write (a cache only grows when written to; a timer is one
more thing to own and get wrong). `used_at` is marked on every read, including
the lookup by synthetic id that `_fetch_and_cache_poster` makes on every visit
to a poster grid — without that, the images shown most often would be the
coldest rows in the table. A single blob larger than the cap does not empty the
table for nothing.
The migration is the part that touches deployed nodes. `CREATE TABLE IF NOT
EXISTS` adds missing tables and never missing columns, so `used_at` would have
reached a fresh test database and never a real one. `_migrate()` does the
ALTER TABLE and seeds existing rows with "now" rather than 0 — otherwise the
first write after an upgrade evicts the whole cache, a correct-but-hostile
reading of "least recently used" for rows whose age nothing recorded.
The index on that column lives in `_migrate()`, not in `_SCHEMA`: run from the
schema script it executes before the ALTER on an existing database and fails,
which would have been every deployed node refusing to open its cache on the
first start after upgrading. Found by the migration test.
Verified against a real node's database, rebuilt into its pre-migration shape:
rows preserved, column present, seeded, index created, reopening harmless.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V8EDjk6pkYZrCbo63m2x87
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Found on two live machines within minutes of deploying: every message from the
person running the node arrived at every other member under "this account is
using a key you have not seen before".
An operator's authority is node-wide and is recorded in `members` with an
**empty** group_id — `is_authorized` has always said so, in a clause written for
exactly that. `group_devices` spelled the rule out a second time as
`WHERE m.group_id = ?`, which excludes them. So the operator was absent from the
roster relayed to members, no chain could reach their device key, and Tier 2
reported the most ordinary event there is — the operator talking in their own
group — as a key substitution.
A notice that fires on normal use is worse than no notice: it is the one people
learn to dismiss, and §4.8 budgets exactly one for the whole feature. That makes
this a defect in the property, not only in a query.
The clause now lives once, as `_MEMBER_OF_GROUP`, shared by both callers so they
cannot drift again. `DISTINCT` because an operator who is also an explicit member
of the group matches both halves of it. `get_member` is untouched: it is a raw
lookup and its callers already fall back to `get_member("", user_id)` themselves.
Three tests, and the first fails against the old query with the reported
symptom: the operator appears in the roster of a group they host and
`is_authorized` agrees; an operator who is also a member is listed once; a
revoked one comes back through neither.
No stored state to clean up — nothing was written to a client's pins when the
account was missing, so the notice stops as soon as the node serves the roster
correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Chat messages have been signed by the sending device since MNP 2.0, but a
reader had no way to know that the device belonged to the account the node
named: the signature proved *a device*, and `sender_id` was still the node's
word. This closes that for any account a client has already seen.
**What was blocking it was not effort — the evidence was not being kept.**
`_do_device_add` verified the countersignature that admits a second device and
stored only `added_by_pk`: *which* key approved, never the proof. And
`device_add_transcript` binds `nonce_node`, the approving connection's handshake
nonce, so even a stored signature was unverifiable by anyone who had not been on
that connection. `identities` gains `add_sig`, `add_nonce` and `add_ts`, added
before the migration's early return — which fires on every roster widened since
2026-08-18, i.e. all of them, so putting them inside it would have meant they
never arrived.
`group_roster_req`/`resp` relays, sealed under a new groupbox purpose and
answered to **any member of the group**, every live device of every active
member with the evidence that admitted it. The node decides nothing: it hands
over evidence and the client walks the chain from each account's root outwards
(`_verifyRoster`). That is deliberate — the node is the party the property holds
against, so it is not asked to assert trust.
Two holes the tests caught while this was being built:
- "no signature" was being treated as a trust root, so a node that writes the
roster could put any key in an account's row and have it laundered straight
into the verified set. A root is a device that names **no** countersigner.
- pinning only the verified subset at first sight raised "key changed" on
legitimate second devices whose countersignature predates this change. First
sight pins everything the node says, because that is what trust-on-first-use
means and an alarm that fires on normal events stops being read.
The property, and it must not be rounded up: **once a client has seen an
account, a node that later substitutes a key for it is detected. Nothing is
gained at first sight**, where there is nothing to compare against — the same
boundary `per-node-identity-v1.md` draws, unmoved.
The cost, stated because it is real: the roster is member-visible, so every
member learns how many devices the others hold and their public keys. It stays
inside the group, the hub is not involved, and it is scoped per group. A member
who cannot see the keys cannot check them.
User-visible surface: one notice, "this account is using a key you have not seen
before", in ten languages. Nothing else.
16 tests — 7 on the node (the evidence is stored, it verifies from the roster
alone, a fabricated device carries none, another group's members are not
disclosed), 9 running the shipped `_verifyRoster` under node against rosters
built by the shipped Python: a chain of three in any order, a signature by the
wrong key, one for another node, one for another account, and two fabricated
devices signing each other admitting nothing.
Tier 3 (operator-signed roster attestation) stays deferred, with nothing
depending on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Both sides landed a breaking MNP change and both called it 2.0, which is right:
the sealed upload, the removal of `stream_seg` and mandatory chat encryption
share one flag day. They are recorded as one version in `__init__.py` rather
than as a race between two.
The resolutions that were decisions rather than mechanics:
* **`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` moves to "2.0".** The sealed upload alone was a
*confined* break — a 1.x peer could still connect, browse, download, stream
and chat, with only its uploads refused by `upload_not_sealed` — so the floor
deliberately stayed at "1.0". Mandatory chat encryption ends that
confinement: a 1.x peer can neither produce a sealed chat message nor read
one, so it would connect, look fine, and be unable to say anything. Refusing
it at the handshake is the honest form. The per-message `upload_not_sealed`
path is untouched and still right if the floor is ever lowered.
* **`sendChat` throws on an `error` reply**, from origin, applied to the sealed
send. It matters more after this change, not less: the node now refuses a
stale epoch, a malformed envelope and a device claim that is not the
connection's own, so there are three new ways for a message to be rejected
and none of them may look like a message that was sent.
* **`req_id` supersedes the per-type routing** this branch added for
`chat_keys_resp` and `device_hello_ack`. Both blocks are kept beside the
existing `chat_hist_resp` one, for the same stated reason — a node too old to
stamp — and their comments no longer claim to be the mechanism that closes
the class. `req_id` is.
* **`chat_send_probe.py` is rebuilt on origin's structure**, not beside it: two
scenarios, a stub that stamps `req_id`, `music_meta_req` as the older pending
request. The encrypted path is layered on — a real Ed25519 device key
generated in the page, and a `chat_keys_resp` sealed by the shipped Python,
because a payload the page built itself would prove only that the page agrees
with the page.
* **`test_reply_correlation.py` now sends a sealed message.** Its subject is
which of the two messages leaving that handler carries the id; plaintext chat
was only the fixture, and the node refuses one now.
* `groupbox` keeps both new purposes (`upload`, `chat_keys`); `protocol.py`
keeps origin's removal of `STREAM_SEGMENT` and this branch's correction of
the "Double Ratchet message" comment on `CHAT_MESSAGE`, which was wrong when
it was written and is wrong differently now.
Full suite on the merged tree: 1993 passed, 11 failed — the same 11 that fail
on a pristine checkout (2 Windows service tests, 1 apps-enabled policy, 7
transcode tests that pass in isolation, and the WebRTC invite test that hangs
on its own).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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Downloads have been encrypted under a GEK-derived key since the beginning:
`file_chunk` and `stream_data` both go through `chunk_ciphertext`. Uploads
never were. `file_upload` carried the filename and the raw bytes in plain
msgpack, and `file_upload_ack` carried the name the node stored them under —
so the same file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one.
There was no threat model behind that asymmetry.
Both halves now travel sealed under a third groupbox purpose,
HKDF(GEK, info="meshbay:upload:v1"). The filename, the destination folder and
the bytes are all inside the seal; only `upload_id` and `chunk_index` stay in
clear, because the node routes and orders on them before it can decrypt. This
direction seals *towards* the node — it holds the GEK for its own group — and
it opens the payload before it picks a destination or touches the disk.
What that forced, and why none of it is optional:
- `filename` was the correlation key on both sides. It cannot be: matching an
ack to its request by name would hand back exactly what the seal hides.
`upload_id` replaces it — client-drawn, opaque to the node, unique within a
connection, never an authorization input. The property it guarded (one
refusal fails one upload, not every upload in flight) is unchanged.
- Refusals can no longer quote what they refused. `No directory named 'X'`
becomes `No such directory in this group` plus the `code` that was already
there; the client knows what it sent.
- No plaintext fallback. A path that still accepts plaintext is not a sealed
path, so an unsealed `file_upload` is refused with `upload_not_sealed`.
Hardened while here, because what comes out of a seal is authenticated but not
validated — a member can seal anything: `filename` and `data` have their types
checked before any upload state is created, and `chunk_index`/`total_chunks`,
which are outside the seal by necessity, can no longer raise where a refusal
was meant.
Tests. `test_upload_sealed.py` pins the node half: nothing identifying on the
wire, tamper/wrong-key/wrong-group all refused with nothing written, and
multi-chunk reassembly unchanged. `test_upload_seal_client.py` drives the
shipped `uploadFile` over the shipped `crypto.js` under node and feeds its real
frames to the real `_do_file_upload` — the file lands intact, and the ack the
node actually produced comes back with the name it chose for a collision, which
is the half a source-reading test cannot see. Both upload purposes join the
JS/Python groupbox parity vectors.
BREAKING CHANGE: MNP 2.0. `file_upload`/`file_upload_ack` change shape on the
wire every deployed client speaks, which is MAJOR by the same rule 1.0 was —
but the break is confined to uploads. `MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` stays at "1.0", so a
1.x peer still connects, browses, downloads, streams and chats; only its
uploads are refused, with a message saying which side is old. The client checks
the node's version before sending a chunk, so neither side meets this as a
timeout. This is the version negotiation shipped in 1.0 earning its keep: 1.0
cost a flag day, 2.0 costs a refusal code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`stream_seg` answered with an MPEG-TS segment as base64 with no encryption at
all — the one message on the content plane that never went through a
GEK-derived key. Live on both transports, answering any authenticated member.
It predates `stream_data`, which does the same job properly (`chunk_ciphertext`,
keyed per segment, AES-256-GCM) and has since Phase 12. Its only browser caller,
`fetchStreamSegment`, was defined and never once invoked — a plaintext media
endpoint with no client. Removed rather than repaired.
Gone with it: `_extract_segment` and the ffmpeg semaphore in quic_server, the
`fetch_stream_segment` QUIC client method, and `_b64decode` in transport.js,
which had no other caller.
The H6 regression test lived on this handler — it pinned `_do_stream_segment_async`
to a coroutine so `subprocess.run` could not stall the event loop for thirty
seconds per request. It is replaced by the property that outlives the handler:
no transport carries media outside an AEAD, asserted on `stream_seg` and
`data_b64` across all three transport modules. The half of H6 that survives —
the live streaming path still spawns ffmpeg — keeps its own test.
BREAKING CHANGE: `stream_seg` is no longer answered on either transport. No
shipping client sends it. Recorded as part of MNP 2.0, whose other half — the
sealed upload — carries the version bump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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MNP carried no correlation id. A reply named its own type and nothing
else, so a client with more than one request in flight worked out which
one a message answered from the message itself — and for the replies
that name nothing it could not. `_dispatch` fell through to matching by
arrival order, which is a guess. `_sendAndWait` had the right value all
along: it keys `_pending` by `this._seqId++` and never put it on the
wire.
The guess fails asymmetrically, which is why it hid. The victim is not
the request that was answered wrongly — it is the unrelated one that now
waits out its own 30s timeout for a reply already delivered elsewhere.
Live on 2026-09-06: five `music_meta_req` sat pending for over 100
seconds behind a failing MusicBrainz, and a `device_list_result` was
handed to one of them. The composer is disabled while a send is in
flight, so a chat message whose reply went astray the same way left the
Chat tab looking frozen for thirty seconds, then unfroze on its own.
The `ack` half of this was fixed on 2026-08-30 by matching on request
type. That closed the instance and left the class open: a refusal has no
type to match on either, and `_dispatch_message`'s catch-all answers
every unforeseen failure with `{"type": "error", "detail": "Request
failed"}` — 238 of this module's 240 error sends name nothing at all.
`req_id` now rides on the request and comes back on the reply. On the
node it is published for the whole handler in a ContextVar and stamped
by `_send`: a parameter would have meant threading an argument through
all 240 send sites, and asyncio copies the context into a task, so a
handler that `_spawn`s its real work still answers under the right id.
It is never stamped on a broadcast — those answer nothing, and the
owner check in `_send` is what keeps a chat broadcast or an index push
from reaching another peer looking like a reply.
On the client, `_dispatch` resolves on `req_id` first and the
arrival-order fallback is gone the moment a node proves it stamps
(`_correlates`, armed by the handshake's own reply). The fallback stays
for an MNP 1.0 node, unchanged and no wider: there it is the only thing
there is, and removing it would leave device_list_result, join_result
and the handshake replies reaching nobody.
Two things fall out. `sendChat` refuses an `error` reply like every
other request in the file — it returned it as success, which did not
matter while a refusal reached the wrong caller anyway and would now
show a rejected message as sent. And `_group_ctx` uses `.get`: a reload
pops a removed group while sessions connected to it are open, and every
request they had left raised KeyError into that same catch-all.
Sealed index messages are the one exception to the fast path. They
cannot be handed over until they are opened, which is asynchronous while
`_dispatch` is not — resolving on the id alone gave `fetchIndex` the
envelope and skipped `onIndexSync` entirely. Caught by extending
`index_seal_probe.mjs` to stamp a reply the way a current node does,
after the hub suite passed over it: the probe built its own frames and
had never seen one.
Tests, all failing before and passing after: `test_chat_send.py` drives
the real ChatPanel over the real transport for both shapes of reply with
an older request pending (3 of its 6 are new, and the 3 for `ack` pass
either way, so it discriminates); `test_reply_correlation.py` pins the
node's half — the refusals that name nothing else, the broadcast that
must not be stamped, and a late reply from a spawned task answering
under its own id rather than the most recent request's.
Full suite: 1897 passed, same 11 pre-existing failures as before.
QUIC keeps its own dispatch and is not stamped. It is disabled by
default and no browser request reaches it, but the asymmetry is real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dn1xYx9uT69mCB6UDvyKAN
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Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.
There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.
Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.
Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.
Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:
* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
(additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.
Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.
Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr
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e1dbdf0 made a replugged root re-enrich, which was correct and not enough:
the operator still watched their albums vanish. Measured on the reported
library with a cold metadata cache, the node broadcast twice — the first
delta stripped every album, the second put them back 14 seconds later.
Fourteen seconds of "no music found" is the bug, whatever happens after.
An entry's id is its content hash, so an entry that comes back under the
same id, name and path is the same bytes in the same place and everything
enrichment derived from it still holds. `_rescan_root` now carries those
fields across the drop-and-rescan that `reconcile` and `plug_root` share.
Re-enrichment stays as the fallback for what genuinely changed: a
different id is different content, and a different name or path can change
the folder and filename fallbacks that artist, album, display_title and
track_no rest on, so those entries are still handed to the daemon through
`rescanned_ids`.
`uploader_id`/`uploader_pk` ride along. They are the same shape of field —
set once on an entry, readable from nowhere on disk — and they decide who
may delete the file, so losing them to a replug quietly took a right away.
Verified on the running node: one broadcast 550ms after the plug, carrying
the albums, and no metadata lookups at all.
The tests now assert the field on the entry rather than a call to an
enricher. Counting calls is what let the previous version of this file pass
while the operator still saw an empty tab.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Reported live: a removable root ejected from Files and plugged back in
returned with its files and without its albums. Music showed "no music
found" and stayed there through a force reload — the loss was on the
node, not in the client.
`plug_root` drops the root's entries and rescans, which is right; the
drive may have changed while it was away. What comes back is a bare
IndexEntry: `_hash_or_cached` fills id/name/path/size/type and nothing
else. Every enrichment field goes with the old object, and the Music tag
fields are cached nowhere by design (enrich_audio.py re-reads them so a
rename can re-derive the filename fallback), so re-enrichment is the only
way back.
Two gates then made sure it never ran:
* enrichment is scheduled for `delta.additions`, and ejecting broadcasts
nothing, so `_last_broadcast_snapshot` still held those ids — the
rebuilt entries diffed as updates, not additions;
* `_enrich_new_*_entries` skips anything in `_enriched_attempted`, which
is only discarded for `delta.deletions` — and dropping and rescanning
inside one call broadcasts no deletion either.
A restart cleared both, since an empty snapshot makes every entry an
addition. Nothing short of one did.
The indexer now records the ids it rebuilt and the daemon drains them at
broadcast time: their "already attempted" mark is discarded and they
rejoin the entries offered to the three enrichment passes. Not
Music-specific — Videos lost durations and titles and Photos lost
thumbnails the same way; Music is just where an untagged file has no
album to file itself under, so the app goes empty rather than plain.
`reconcile()` does the same drop-and-rescan when a root reappears on its
own, so a USB drive that fell off and re-mounted hit this with nobody
touching the UI. Covered too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Caught in review, and the review was right. The previous commit documented the
flag as deprecated so that `--help` and the man page would agree. That solved
the wrong problem: the flag contradicts the model this whole refactor exists to
establish, and the coherent answer was to delete it.
It wrote `upload_dir` into a *brand-new* `[[groups]]` block, and
`GroupConfig.__post_init__` reads that key by forcing every other root
read-only and appending that path as the one writable one. So
`group add --dir X --writable --upload-dir Y` silently made X read-only — two
mechanisms deciding which directories accept uploads, one of them invisible, in
a group created after the model that replaced it.
Gone from the CLI, from `ops.attach_group`, from the loopback API and from the
MNP `group_attach` payload, which now carries `writable` instead. The *read*
path in `config.py` is deliberately untouched: an existing node.toml using
`upload_dir` must keep working, and that is the only legitimate use left. The
man page says so under the config key, and no longer lists an option.
The test that guarded the deprecation wording now guards its absence — and
earned itself immediately by finding a `group add` usage string still offering
the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`member upload` reached the generic usage line for the other `member` verbs —
"usage: meshbay-node member upload <username>" — which advertises a removed
feature and sends the operator looking for a username it would then reject. It
names `root set --writable` now, and the man page carries the same. Three lines
between an operator finding the replacement and concluding the CLI is broken.
`--upload-dir` still works, so an existing script keeps working, but its help
and the man page say it is the old spelling and name what replaced it.
The Windows pass (§4.4) is what can be checked from here, made checkable:
drive letters and UNC through `as_posix()` into TOML, a drive root having no
basename to derive a name from — sharing a whole drive is ordinary there — and
a case-insensitive collision, which on NTFS and exFAT is one directory indexed
as two roots. `PureWindowsPath` throughout, for the reason the backslash test
earlier this branch got wrong.
What it cannot check is written down rather than glossed: ReadDirectoryChangesW
dropping events, MAX_PATH, and whether an eject actually lets a drive be
removed. §7d says so, along with two things the plan never considered — the
RO/RW asymmetry in `_do_dir_delete`, and `index_delta` carrying roots but not
`dirs`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Every other test of the plugin architecture reads source for the *absence* of
app names. That proves nobody wrote a special case for Videos; it cannot prove
a genuinely new application works, because there was no new application.
This is one. It stores directories, appears as a tab, has a settings pane and
lists files, and the node has never heard its name outside a single allow-list
entry. Two files and one registry line, which is the claim
`docs/refactor-groups.md` §4.1 makes.
It ships hidden behind `?dev=1` (`dev: true` in the registry, the same opt-in
shape as transport.js's `?trace=1`). Registering it normally would put a toy
app in every operator's group; not registering it would prove nothing, since
registration is exactly what is claimed to be sufficient.
**Adding it found two places where the claim was nearly true rather than true,
and both are fixed by making the code less app-specific:**
`group-settings.js` fell back to the whole registry when a group had no
`enabled_apps` yet — which would have turned a hidden app on for everyone. It
asks `availableApps()` now.
`group-page.js` wrote out `videoDirectories` / `musicDirectories` /
`photoDirectories` by hand, so a fifth app would have needed that file edited.
It derives `<key>Directories` from the registry.
Neither was found by reading; both were found by adding the app, which is the
whole reason it exists.
Verified in a real Electron window as well as by the tests: hidden by default,
present with the flag, offered its own settings section, and listing exactly
the files under its configured folder and its subfolders — not the ones beside
it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The control was hidden and its `canCreateDir` left computed and unused. It is
back in the Files toolbar as an icon: the toolbar already carries one labelled
primary action, and a second beside it competes for the width the breadcrumb
trail needs. The name is in `title` *and* `aria-label` — a title is invisible
to a screen reader on a button with no text, so an icon-only control without
both is simply unnamed for anyone not reading with their eyes.
Its gate changes. It required `isNodeAdmin`, which contradicted the node's own
rule — "making a directory is not a privileged act; a member who can add a file
can organise where it goes" — and hid the control from everyone who could have
used it. It now follows the Upload button: a writable root, and not at the top
of a group, where the level is the set of roots rather than a directory on
anyone's disk.
Restoring it surfaced a real gap. `_do_dir_create` never learned about RO/RW:
`_do_file_upload` gained the `writable` check with the model and this one did
not, so a member refused a file in a published library could still leave empty
directories all through it, and could write to a drive mid-eject. Read-only has
to mean read-only for every way of writing, not just for files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The directory table travelled on `index_sync` alone — a *full* index, which the
node only ever sends on request. Every ongoing change went out as an
`index_delta`, which carried files and nothing else. So the message that says
"something changed" was the one message that could not say a root had.
The acks hid it: `root_add_ack` and friends broadcast the new table to whoever
is connected, so the common cases looked right. What that could not cover was
the operator's own client, where the ack landed and was then overwritten — the
table calls `onRefreshIndex` after an add, that fetch returns the set from
*before* the node's reload (fire-and-forget, because a rescan is minutes on a
real library), and `applyIndex` writes it over what the ack had just delivered.
The new directory appeared for one paint and vanished.
Two halves. `index_delta` now carries the roots table, sealed with the rest and
identical to `index_sync`'s — additive, so a 1.0 client sees a field it does not
read. And the table no longer refreshes the index after a root change: the ack
gives it the new set immediately, and the delta the node pushes when the scan
finishes gives it again, along with the files.
The test that pins it uses an *eject* as its case, because an eject changes no
file at all — the entries freeze — so its delta is empty of additions,
deletions and updates. Without the table it says literally nothing, which is
how a library disappearing from under a group went unannounced to everyone but
whoever pressed the button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`RootSet.describe()` feeds two audiences that want opposite things. The index
payload goes to every member and has always deliberately carried no paths — a
member is told what exists and whether it is readable, not that the library
sits under someone's home directory. The loopback API answers the operator
themselves, over a channel that already requires their machine and the run
token, and the path is exactly what they asked for.
The `root list` CLI I added in Phase 1 read `path` from the member form, so it
printed a placeholder for every directory. Nothing caught it: the CLI reads a
dict, the API returns a dict, and neither end states which keys it owes.
`describe(with_paths=True)` is the operator's view and `list_groups` is the
only caller. The shared-directories table has the same hole over MNP — the
roots there come from the index payload — so its Path column now appears only
when a path is actually present, rather than rendering a column of blanks.
The test asserts both halves, because they pull opposite ways: one that only
checked the operator sees paths would be satisfied by leaking them to every
member. It reads the indexer's source for the member side, and compares the
CLI's key reads against what the payload offers for the other — checked to
fail in each direction independently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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There is no `uploads/` subdirectory any more, and the client names the folder
rather than the root.
It was the last of v5's quarantine — the per-user layer went on 2026-08-14 for
the same reason — and it goes on the same grounds: a folder appearing beside
the operator's library because somebody sent a file is the node deciding how
their disk is arranged. Somebody dropping a file into the folder they are
looking at expects it to be in that folder.
**What made the quarantine worth having was never the subdirectory.** It is the
filename allowlist, the size cap, the chunk ordering and the no-overwrite rule,
and all four are untouched: an existing file is never replaced, the second
sender of IMG_1234.jpg gets a free name, and the check still sits at the write.
Letting the client choose the destination is safe for one reason and only one:
it is resolved through `RootSet.resolve()`, which refuses `..`, absolute
segments and anything whose resolved form escapes its root, symlinks included.
A member answers "which of this group's folders", never "which path on the
operator's disk" — and the test that used to assert the node chose now asserts
that, with six shapes of escape.
`direct` goes with it. Its only job was to say "no subdirectory for this root",
which is now every root, and a config flag that does nothing is worse than none.
Chat's attachment folder finally does something: the directory the operator
picks in the Chat settings pane is where attachments are written, falling back
to the first writable root while they have not chosen one, or if the one they
chose has since been made read-only or ejected — a stale choice should not
become a refusal at send time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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The previous commit was the wrong fix. `add_root` did leave the running node
unchanged, but editing the live `RootSet` in place — which is what I did — is
wrong in the other direction.
`DirectoryIndexer.retarget` decides what to scan by diffing the names it
already holds against the ones it is handed, and `_retarget_indexer` hands it
`groups_ctx[gid]["roots"]`: the very object the op had edited. So the new root
sat on both sides of the comparison, nothing was scanned, and the directory
would have appeared in the table permanently empty. `_reload_config_inner`
diffs the same way and would have concluded nothing changed. `remove_root` had
the same shape and would have kept serving a removed directory's files.
The real defect is that two front doors did different things. `ui/app.py` has
always fired the daemon's `reload_fn` after these ops, which re-reads node.toml
and builds a *fresh* set; the MNP path retargeted a stale object instead. That
asymmetry is exactly what `ops.py` exists to prevent, and it is why the bug
survived until an operator added a directory from a browser — the loopback path
worked all along.
So: the ops leave the live set alone, `_retarget_indexer` asks the daemon to
reload, and `update_root` keeps editing in place because flags change no files
and the synchronous upload handler reads that object on the next request.
The tests now check the files rather than `describe()`, which proves nothing
about whether anything was scanned. One of them demonstrates the failure mode
instead of describing it, so the rule is checkable and will say so if
`retarget` ever changes. Two more cover the seam itself — that the MNP path
reloads, and that a context with no daemon still retargets.
Diagnosed by reading the running node's journal rather than the source: the
first add logged "Reloading config" and a rescan, the two later ones logged
neither. I should have looked there before the first attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`add_root` appended to the config and to node.toml and stopped there.
`_retarget_indexer` — the MNP path — then re-points the indexer at
`groups_ctx[gid]["roots"]`, an object nobody had touched, so it was retargeted
at exactly what it already had. The directory was in the config file and
invisible everywhere else until a restart.
Worse than invisible: the ack does carry the new set, so the client showed the
directory for one paint and the next index_sync took it away again — which
reads as a UI bug and is not one. Adding it a second time was then refused as
colliding with itself, which is the only reason anyone found out.
`remove_root` and `update_root` already updated the live set; this one was
missed. The loopback API hid it, because `ui/app.py` fires `reload_fn()` after
the op and that re-reads node.toml from disk. The MNP path does not, and the
shared-directories table only started offering Add over MNP in this refactor —
a latent bug made reachable.
The ack now describes the set the node will actually serve rather than one
built on the side, so the two cannot disagree.
test_root_ops_reach_the_live_set.py holds all three ops to it, including the
counter-property that the same directory is still refused twice and that
node.toml and the live set stay in step — the two halves drifting is how an
operator's next restart silently undoes their last change. Four of its seven
fail against the code above.
Recovery on a node already in this state is `meshbay-node reload`: node.toml
has everything, nothing was lost.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`ops.update_root` and `remove_root` returned `[]` when the group context had
no live RootSet, and `group-page.js` accepted it: `if (msg.roots)` is true for
an empty array. An op that succeeded would have emptied the shared-directories
table, and "the node says this group has no directories" is not something the
client can tell from "the node could not say". Both ends now refuse it — the
node builds from config rather than answering empty, and the client requires a
non-empty array.
Found while adding `test_spa_imports.py`, which is the other half of this: it
resolves every named import across the SPA against what the target actually
exports. That failure has a shape nothing else here catches — no build step to
fail, so the browser resolves the graph at load, finds a missing binding, and
the page renders blank or the component just does not appear. `node --check`
parses one file at a time and the source-reading guards look inside a file
rather than between two. The settings split moved two shared components into a
new module and rewired eight files to import them, which is exactly the change
where a rename lands in one file and not the other.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Each app's settings were inlined in `group-settings.js` — TMDB, MusicBrainz,
and one folder picker per app, each with its own draft state and save handler
saying the same thing about a different key. They are one file per app now,
reached through the `apps.js` registry, and the page that renders them names no
application at all: adding one is a registry entry and a settings file.
The line between the two is what makes that true. What every app has — folders
— the page does generically, through one `saveDirectories` bound to the app.
What one app alone has, its pane does itself with the transport it is handed.
An app that only needs directories touches neither `group-settings.js` nor
`group-page.js`, which is `test_app_settings_plugin.py`'s subject.
`settings-ui.js` exists because a pane importing the page that renders it is a
cycle, and ES modules answer that with a temporal-dead-zone ReferenceError at
first render — a component that silently does not appear, the fault already
recorded in CLAUDE.md about hook ordering.
The flat depth-indented `<select>` of every folder in the library becomes a
modal tree. It asks the node for nothing: the tree is derived from paths the
client already holds, so it shows exactly what the group's index contains and
adds no folder-browsing protocol. For Chat's attachment folder — the one
directory that is written to rather than read — read-only roots are greyed
out, so the node's refusal arrives before the operator picks rather than when
somebody sends a file.
Videos and Music take a list of folders. A library on two drives could not be
described before; the only recourse was pointing the app at a parent containing
both, which pulls in everything else under it. The scalar shapes survive on the
wire alone, for a node speaking MNP 1.0, and the client reads them as a
one-element list.
Two things the tests caught that I would not have:
`test_asset_versioning` — six new modules were missing from `_ASSETS`. Reached
through the registry rather than imported by name, they are exactly the files
nothing else would notice changing, and a stale one is served from cache with
no version bump.
And `node --check foo.js` does **not** reliably report a module syntax error:
it accepted `${/* ... */''}` — htm template syntax pasted into a plain object
literal — and reported success. A `.mjs` copy forces the module parser and
reports it. The suite had no syntax check at all, which is how that reached a
file; `test_spa_syntax.py` does it for every module now, and pins that the
loose path is not what it uses.
Suite: 12 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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`video_root` (a string), `audio_root` (a string) and `photo_roots` (a list)
said the same thing three ways: three roster accessors, three ops, three MNP
messages, three admin-op subjects. They become `set_app_directories(app_key,
paths)` and its single-directory wrapper, stored under `<app>_directories` and
keyed by the app's registry name — so an application can be added without
touching this layer, which is the whole claim of the plugin architecture.
The three old names still work. Their MNP messages are handled, and the roster
falls back to the old key when the new one is unset, so a node upgraded into
this keeps working with no migration step — the plan called for a script, and
a script nobody runs on the machine where it matters is worse than a fallback.
Two things are new rather than moved:
The paths are validated. The setters this replaces accepted anything, so a
typo — or a path left behind when a root was removed — was stored happily and
then matched no entry, leaving an app showing an empty tab with nothing to
distinguish "misconfigured" from "no files yet". Deliberately not
`RootSet.resolve()`: that also refuses a currently-unavailable root, and an
operator must be able to point an app at a library on a drive they ejected.
The legacy scalar is derived, never stored. `video_root` still rides on the
handshake ack for MNP 1.0 clients; kept as a second stored value it would
drift from the list within one run, which reads as "it works after a restart".
Also here: chat's own two settings (a directory, which must be on a read-write
root because it is a destination rather than a view, and a link-preview switch
gating the unfurl path — checked before the cache, or turning it off would
still serve every preview already fetched), the `app_directories`,
`chat_directory` and `chat_link_preview` MNP messages, the plural
`<app>_directories` on the handshake ack, and `music` as the app's one
identifier where storage said `audio` and the registry said `music`.
The Music enricher now resolves a boundary per configured directory rather
than one for the group: with several, a single boundary is wrong for all but
one of them, and for Music that is the difference between reading a folder as
an artist and reading it as a release.
Suite: 11 failures, all pre-existing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Review of the Phase 1 commit found the RO/RW model sound but three paths
unfinished, each of which broke the flow the phase exists to deliver. Plus
29 test failures it introduced and no coverage for anything it added.
Uploads went to the wrong directory. The node read a `root` field on
file_upload that no client ever sent, so every upload landed in the first
writable root while the Files toolbar offered its button based on the root
being browsed — with two writable roots, uploading from one wrote into the
other. Files now names the root it is showing; Chat names one chosen in the
shell (an operator-configured directory arrives in Phase 2); the node refuses
an unknown name rather than falling back, and refuses read-only and ejected
roots by code.
Shared directories were unreachable on the web. The table read its roots
only from the loopback API, which resolves to "not available" in a browser,
so the section rendered for nobody there — while the Uploads controls it
replaced had worked — and the transport.updateRoot/ejectRoot/plugRoot methods
beside it were dead. MNP is now the path, loopback the fallback for a local
node with no live connection, and adding a root over MNP takes a typed path
since no web page can browse a remote disk.
Ejecting updated nobody's screen. transport.js resolves an admin ack against
the pending request and returns, which is right for every op whose caller
knows the value it chose; the root acks carry state only the node can compute,
so the operator who clicked Eject was the one client that never saw it happen.
And the ejected flag reached roster.db but was never read back, so a restart
undid it and the next scan read an empty mount point as an erased library.
Also: the member-upload endpoint answered 200 and did nothing (removed); the
wizard ignored the first root's RW switch; reload compared roots on name and
path, so editing writable in node.toml did nothing; the table had no path
column, which is the only thing separating two libraries sharing a basename;
apps_enabled normalisation differed between the two sides of a signed subject.
Tests: eject/plug, per-root upload refusal and the node.toml rewrite had no
coverage at all. test_member_upload_policy.py is replaced by
test_root_writable_policy.py — it tested a removed feature — and every
property worth keeping from it moved rather than being dropped.
Docs: draft-v6 structural decision 9 is annotated as superseded (the operator
can no longer have a directory only they may write to — a real capability
removed, flagged rather than hidden), the man page documents the root verb and
the RO/RW fields, and refactor-groups.md §7b records what the plan got wrong.
Suite: 41 failures before, 13 after — all 13 pre-existing on main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us
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Replace the upload boolean with per-root writable/removable/ejected flags.
Backend: new ops (update_root, eject_root, plug_root), MNP 1.1 protocol
messages, live RootSet updates so API always reflects current state, CLI
root subcommand (add/remove/set/list/eject/plug).
Frontend: SharedDirectoriesTable with optimistic toggle switches, eject/plug
in Files and Settings, upload gated on root.writable, ejected-root filtering
in all media apps, updated Create Group wizard, 10-locale i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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content
The real-time watchdog path lacked the duplicate-content guard that
reconciliation already had. When a file with identical content appeared
(e.g. browser download appending " (2)"), add_entry overwrote the
original's index entry — making it vanish from the file list despite
still being on disk. Now check get_entry before adding, matching the
reconciliation logic.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Files above 40 MB are no longer read in full. Instead, blake3 hashes
45 MB of samples (first 20 MB + last 20 MB + 5 MB at 50% offset).
Files at or below 40 MB are unchanged (full read, hash_version 1).
A new `hash_version` field on IndexEntry (default 1) travels on the
wire and through the cache so both versions coexist without breaking
existing nodes or clients.
The IndexCache auto-migrates its schema on open (ALTER TABLE), so no
manual step is required on upgrade. A standalone migration script is
available in QE/migration/ for operators who want to preview or force
a full re-hash.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-LogonType S4U
schtasks.exe has no flag naming the logon type directly -- it only infers
S4U vs Interactive from whether /rp is present, and both readings broke
live on a blank-password account: /rp "" fails schtasks' own credential
validation, and omitting /rp registers "Interactive only", which never
launches the process at boot or on demand despite installing cleanly.
Register-ScheduledTask -LogonType S4U names the logon type explicitly, no
inference. Confirmed live: install, manual start, and unattended boot-time
start all now work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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