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`_is_node_admin()` is `self._user_id == node_user_id`, and `_user_id` is the
`sub` of a JWT the hub issued. Six node-wide controls were gated on that alone:
`node_status` — which lists every group on the machine with each root's
**absolute path** — plus `node_settings_set`, `roster_read`, `denylist_read`,
`denylist_clear` and `node_reload`.
So the answer to "are you the operator of this node" was "the hub says so",
which NS4 and M3 rule out in as many words: operator authority comes from the
node's roster and from nowhere else, and asking the hub is how the hub installs
itself as node administrator. The reach is bounded — a completed handshake also
needs the group key — but an active hub obtains one legitimately in an
open-join group, which §3.5 concedes, and from there it could read the
operator's directory layout or clear the denylist, which is the persisted
revocation H4 exists to keep.
`_operator_device()` requires both halves now: the account is the one the node
belongs to, *and* the device on this connection has proved a key the roster
holds as an operator. `device_hello` is signed over a transcript naming the
node, the group and this connection's nonce, and `operator_pks()` is rebuilt
from the roster on each call, so an unpinned browser and a revoked one are both
refused at once. The hub holds no user keys and cannot countersign a device.
Keeping the account check as well is deliberate: dropping it would widen these
node-wide controls to any paired operator of any group on the machine, which is
a separate decision. `_is_node_admin()` stays as what it is in the handshake
ack — a hint telling a client whether to offer the Node page — and says so.
Nothing changes for a paired operator: `device_hello` runs unconditionally
after the ack, and anyone using the Node page's controls is already paired,
since `root_add` and every other signed op has always verified against
`operator_pks()`. A browser that never paired now reads nothing there, which is
the state in which it could already write nothing.
test_node_status.py's fixture set the account and not the device, which is how
it went on passing; it now wires the device the way `device_hello` leaves it.
The adversary itself is in test_security_regressions.py — a token naming the
owner's account with no proved device, which the previous source answered with
`node_status_ack`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_do_file_request` read `tr` as a boolean. Present meant "this is a leased
transfer, skip the leaseless ceiling", and nothing asked whether this node had
ever granted such a lease — `slots.touch(tr)` was called beside it and its
answer, `False` if it is not granted, was discarded. So any non-empty string
bought the whole library with no ceiling of any kind: not the per-member cap,
not the node-wide one, not the leaseless bound that exists to bound a client
claiming to be browsing. The queue held only the clients that chose to wait.
`_lease_of` decides it now, and the three answers differ on purpose:
- **granted**, and of *this* session — served, and touched so the sweeper
does not reclaim a transfer that is plainly moving. The session is checked
as well as the id, because touching another connection's lease refreshed
its idle timer.
- **queued** — refused with `lease_not_granted`, on the upload path too,
before anything reaches the operator's disk. A member reading while queued
is the cap not applying.
- **unknown** — bounded by the leaseless ceiling rather than refused. That is
also what a reconnect looks like from here, where the session's leases died
with the old connection and the client is re-opening them, and it leaves
the residual §5.5 already states: a client that lies gets that bound's
worth of files at a time, not the group. Noted once per connection so the
residual is visible rather than merely documented.
Nothing changes for the shipped client: the transfer store awaits
`lease.acquire()` before it reads a byte, so the refused case is one it never
enters. §5.5 gains a paragraph saying the node decides which of the two a
request is — the document described the accounting without ever saying it was
enforced, which is how it came not to be.
`test_lease_enforcement.py` drives the real handlers over a real index; six of
its nine cases fail against the previous source, each on the property.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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asyncio keeps only a weak reference to a task, so a coroutine started with
`asyncio.ensure_future(...)` whose result is discarded can be collected while
it is still running: the loop logs "Task was destroyed but it is pending!" and
the work simply does not happen. No error reaches the caller, and what is lost
is whatever that coroutine was in the middle of.
The node already had a guard for this, written after an abandoned stream task
lost a transcode slot for good — and it read one file, `webrtc_server.py`,
because that is where the defect was found. Outside that file there were
nineteen sites: the hub's `chat_notify` (a notification for every member of a
group), the indexer's debounce (every real-time index update), eleven in
`daemon.py` including the SIGHUP reload and each enrichment pass, two in
`ops.py`, and five in the loopback API.
`meshbay_common.background.spawn()` is the one door. It holds the task, drops
it when it finishes, and logs what it raised under the coroutine's own name —
an exception in a task nobody awaits was otherwise reported by asyncio at
collection time, out of context or not at all. A peer session's `_spawn` stays
as it is: that one can also *cancel* what it holds, which a module-level holder
cannot, because a session ends and a process does not.
`test_background_tasks.py` walks every package's source and refuses a discarded
handle. It parses rather than greps, so an assignment, a comprehension or an
await is not mistaken for one, and it was checked against a deliberate
reintroduction. A guard that stops at the edge of the file where the bug was
found is a guard against that bug, not against its class.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`_register_uploader` walked the index for the entry it had just written, at a
moment when no such entry can exist: the file was a `.part` until the rename on
the line above, which is not indexable, and the watchdog that will index it
debounces for two seconds and then hashes. The walk matched nothing, silently,
so every uploaded file in every group was owned by nobody — and `file_delete`
refuses a caller with no admin authority when the entry records no uploader, so
a member could not delete what they had just sent. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §5.4
grants that to any non-revoked device of the uploading account.
The record is now written when the last chunk lands (`indexer.record_upload`)
and the entry is stamped from it in `_hash_or_cached`, the one funnel every
entry passes through — initial scan, watchdog, reconcile and replug alike. It
lives in the index cache rather than on the entry alone, because the index is
rebuilt from disk at every start and an owner the node forgets on restart is a
right quietly taken away. It is validated against a live `stat()`, so whatever
later occupies that path inherits nothing; and `_rescan_root`'s carry-over no
longer copies over it, or memory would beat the durable record.
§5.4 also claimed ownership was *provable* — a transcript the uploader signs,
stored with the entry. No such signature has ever existed; `meshbay:upload:v1`
in the code is the groupbox purpose that seals the envelope. The section now
states what the code does, and the transcript is an open item in §15.3.
`test_upload_attribution.py` drives the real handler and a real indexer across
that seam. Against the previous source its two positive cases fail on the
property, not on a missing method — an upload, then a rebuild from disk, then
a different file at the same path inheriting nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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`ExecStartPre` ran `alembic -c /opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/alembic.ini upgrade
head`. The build does stage that file, so the path existed and the contents
were wrong: `alembic.ini` resolves `script_location` with `%(here)s`, so the
copy pointed at `/opt/meshbay-hub/migrations/src/meshbay_hub/db/migrations` —
which nothing installs, because the migrations ship inside `meshbay_hub`, in
the shared venv.
`ExecStartPre` failing stops the unit. A hub installed from the RPM or the DEB
could not start at all, and nothing noticed because the one live deployment
was assembled by hand — the same shape as the node unit that carried `User=`
into the user unit directory.
The same `%(here)s` trap was already found once on the server, where a stray
`alembic.ini` resolved to a month-old snapshot of the tree. Twice is a trap
rather than an accident, so the fix is that the path is no longer written down
anywhere: `meshbay-hub migrate` asks the installed package where its own
migrations are, which is correct for the RPM, the DEB, a venv and a checkout.
The build stages no `alembic.ini`; the repo keeps its own for `alembic
revision` and for deploy scripts that already work.
`env.py` now prefers a URL the caller resolved over re-reading the environment
itself, so `migrate --config` connects with exactly the string the server
will — one resolution, not two that agree until they do not.
Six tests, three of which fail against the unit as it was. They read the
directives rather than the file, because searching the whole thing finds the
comment explaining a directive and calls that the directive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The figure was a line beside the settings form, which is where it is changed
and not where it is watched. It sits with the other live figures under
Statistics now — four cards and, above them, a banner saying which of the two
ceilings has fallen. The two states are not the same to whoever is reading:
one means newcomers are turned away, the other means somebody locked out of
their account cannot get back in. The settings block keeps a line pointing at
it.
And an operator no longer has to be looking. When a global ceiling is reached
the administrators are notified — in `mail.py`, in its own session, never
raising, because this runs while a request is being refused and an alert that
fails must not turn a refusal into a 500. Once per hour, keyed on a row
rather than a flag in memory: a flood is what spends the budget, so one alert
per refusal would bury the message under its own cause, and a hub that is
refusing mail is a hub somebody is about to restart.
`/v1/admin/mail` gains `general_exhausted` and `all_exhausted` rather than
leaving the panel to compare two numbers.
Labels in all ten catalogues; `.warn-msg` for the middle state, on the
`--warn` token both themes already define.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`_connected_nodes`, `_node_groups`, `_webrtc_answers` and the relay registry
are per-process dictionaries. With two workers a node registers in one and
the WebRTC offers for it arrive at the other, so the symptom is a node that
is intermittently offline for half its members — which reads as a network
problem, a NAT problem, anything but a configuration line.
`server.workers` has always defaulted to 1 and the constraint was written
down nowhere. One line at startup, and a function rather than an inline check
so it can be tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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They were constants in two modules, so an operator could not touch them
without editing code and redeploying — and the hour a budget runs out is not
when anyone wants to do that.
`[mail]` in hub.toml carries the defaults; the live values live in
`hub_settings`, read at each use. A missing row falls back to what the
configuration file says, so an instance that never opens the panel behaves as
its file describes. The panel sends only what changed, the hub clamps each
value to a stated range and refuses a key it does not know, and the response
is what gets rendered — so a clamped value is never shown as stored.
`GET /v1/admin/mail` is the other half. There was no way to see any of this:
a refusal was a line in the journal, so an instance that had stopped sending
sign-up codes looked, from the panel, exactly like one with no sign-ups. It
reports the hour's use, what is left for sign-ups, and what is left for
recovery — the difference between those two being the reserved share made
visible.
Labels in all ten catalogues.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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Two dicts in `mail.py` held the budget, so every deploy handed out a fresh
one — and this hub is deployed several times a day. A bound a restart forgets
is not a bound, for the reason the denylist is persisted rather than held in
memory (S3). It is a `mail_quota` table now, one row per counter, the
recipient hashed so the table does not become a list of plaintext addresses.
The counting moves with it, into an async `reserve` that has a session, and
`send_off_loop` is the one door it stands in. `_send` keeps the purpose
allow-list: that half needs no state, and it is what stops anything which
puts a message on the wire from naming a reason this hub does not send for.
The caller owns the commit, so a request that fails afterwards is not charged
for mail nobody received.
`hourly_reserved_for_recovery` is new. A flood of sign-ups used to be able to
spend the whole hour and lock out the person waiting on a passphrase reset;
registration and address changes may now spend only the unreserved share.
Values changed as agreed: 10 messages a day to one recipient, 300 s between
two reset codes. The address-change ceiling and its cooldown were two bounds
on one thing — 3 a day and 60 s apart — and collapse into one 48-hour delay.
Asking again for the address already pending is exempt: it reaches no new
recipient, that recipient is bounded anyway, and without the exemption a typo
locked the account out of correcting it for two days.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`GET /v1/blocklist` takes no authentication — a node syncs it at startup —
and had no ceiling on `limit`, so anyone could ask for the table in one query,
repeatedly. `GET /v1/blocklist/check` took any string of any length straight
into a primary-key lookup, unmetered.
Not changed, and worth a decision rather than a quiet edit:
`AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD` is 3. Three distinct accounts blocking a hash adds it
to the list every node enforces, network-wide, automatically, with manual
admin removal the only undo. Far better than the anonymous version it
replaced, and still a censorship primitive an attacker buys for three email
addresses. §13.5b records the option — count only accounts more than a day
old, which costs a patient attacker a day and an honest reporter nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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Federation has never worked between two hubs, and the tests said so without
anyone reading it that way.
`federation.py` did `from meshbay_hub.auth import _hub_id, _hub_sk_pem` at
import — which is before `load_hub_keypair` runs. So it held the key as
`None` and the identity as the module default: `_issue_mhp_token` could only
raise, and `/mhp/info`, the directory export and every token announced this
instance as `meshbay.org` whatever it was configured as. Read through
accessors now, at call time.
And `_verify_mhp_token` named no audience while `_issue_mhp_token` sets one.
PyJWT refuses a token carrying `aud` when decode is given none, so every
token this hub issues was rejected by every hub running this code. Naming the
audience fixes that and makes the binding real: a token minted for one peer
is refused by another, which is what stops a captured request being replayed
at a third hub. The comment claiming audience binding was unavailable because
"the sending side is unbuilt" was describing a function four lines below it.
Both were already written down. `test_federation.py` built envelopes by hand
without an `aud`; `test_public_groups_toggle.py` signed its own token with a
comment saying `_issue_mhp_token` "binds `_hub_sk_pem` at import time, before
the lifespan loads it, so it cannot be used from a test", and another saying
PyJWT rejects a token carrying `aud` when decode is given none. Both
observations were exactly right, and both were treated as facts to route
around. When a test has to work around the code to run, the thing it worked
around is the finding. Those helpers now go through the real issuer, and two
tests pin the identity and the audience refusal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The previous commit metered the paths that send mail. It was not enough, and
saying it was would have been wrong: a 60-second cooldown per account still
allows one stranger a minute — 1440 a day — and registration is open, so
"per account" is a bound an attacker buys more of. And there was a third door
nobody had counted.
POST /v1/users/register an address nobody has verified
PATCH /v1/users/me an address nobody has verified, signed in
POST /v1/users/password/reset only the address already on file
POST /v1/groups/{id}/invite-notify only a registered member's address
The widest was the register *resend* branch: no token, no captcha, and the
username and address are the caller's own from a moment ago — registering a
victim's address once bought the right to mail them at the endpoint's rate
limit for as long as the account stayed pending.
So the bound moves into `mail.py`, where every message passes one function.
`purpose` is keyword-required and checked against a closed list, so a helper
that names anything else does not send and one that names nothing is a
TypeError rather than an unrestricted send. Under it:
- a bound per **recipient**, across every purpose, account and endpoint —
what a person being mail-bombed actually experiences, and the only bound
that describes it. Keyed on a hash, because this would otherwise be the
one place in the hub holding plaintext addresses in memory (S2)
- an instance-wide hourly ceiling, which cannot be bought with more accounts
- a cooldown on the resend branch, a cooldown and a daily ceiling on the
address change, and the IP-log entry that endpoint never wrote — alone
among the ones that mail
The ceiling on address changes counts IP-log rows, not EmailVerification: the
handler deletes this account's unverified rows before writing a new one, so
counting those counts one, always. Which is what the first version of it did.
Refusals never carry the address: that line goes to the journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`users.py` and `admin.py` under the availability lens. `admin.py` needed
nothing — its moderator/admin line is drawn explicitly, self-modification is
refused, and every list it serves is bounded. `users.py` had four findings and
one of them is the worst of this whole pass.
AV9 `mail._send` is `smtplib` with a ten-second timeout, called straight
from four async handlers. That wait is not one request's, it is the
instance's: nothing else served, no node socket read, no WebRTC offer
relayed, until the MTA answers. Reachable by any signed-in user at
request rate through the endpoint below. It has no symptom a test
catches — everything simply works slowly, for everyone, whenever the
mail server is having a bad day.
AV10 `PATCH /v1/users/me` is the third path that makes the hub send mail
and the only one with neither a rate limit nor a captcha, while
`register` and `password/reset-request` have both. The address is any
string the caller types and the duplicate check only rejects one
already held by an account here, so every address *not* registered on
this hub was a valid target: a relay for verification codes with the
hub's own reputation attached. A rate limit counting by IP bounds a
caller and not an inbox, so the floor under it is a cooldown per
account — the same for a reset request, whose cost also lands in a
mailbox that is not the asker's.
AV11 `default_tab:` accepted any suffix on a `{key:path}` route with an
unbounded Text value and no cap on rows: one account could write
without limit into a table shared with everyone. The suffix is a group
id, which is what the SPA writes, so it is checked as one. A key over
64 characters was also a 500 rather than a 400 — the column is
String(64), which PostgreSQL enforces and SQLite does not, so it would
have appeared in production and in no test.
AV12 `/v1/notifications` and `/v1/groups` had no upper bound on `limit` and
no floor under `offset`, while every list in `admin.py` carries
`le=200`. The group directory takes no authentication at all.
Two shapes recur and are now named in §13.5b: a limit written on one of
several equivalent paths, and a bound that counts the wrong thing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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An availability review, prompted by the group claim above: a participant
supplies input — who else bears the cost? Six answers where the cost fell on
someone other than the sender, and none of them needs an attacker.
AV3 `chat_notify` carried a `group_id` the hub believed, so any connected
node could write a notification to every member of any group on the
hub, carrying a display string of its choosing, with its account
having no relation to that group. This is the group claim again, two
hundred lines further down the same socket. Gated on what the node is
registered for, and metered: the fan-out is one write per member. The
budget expires by time rather than on disconnect, or reconnecting
would refill it and a node token is good for an hour.
AV4 A swarm source named its own `endpoint` as free text documented as
"ip:port", so an account could publish a third party's address — H6's
`peer_ip` defect, never applied here. Nothing dials a swarm source
today, which is the only reason it was not already a reflection
primitive. It is a transport and a port now, never a host, and the
number of hashes one account may claim is bounded: rows were keyed
(hash, account) with no cap at all.
AV5 `handle_webrtc_answer` resolved any pending `peer_id` from any node's
socket. The answer is the SDP a browser then connects to. That this
had not happened rested on a uuid4 being unguessable.
AV6 `relay_register` had no authentication of any kind: it compared
`pk_relay` against the approved value, which is a *public* key, so
anyone who could read it could rewrite where the hub tells nodes to
send relayed traffic. The module docstring promised signed JWTs and
`jwt` was imported and never used.
AV7 The node held unlimited peer connections and kept one that never
completed a handshake for the life of the daemon. H6 bounded what one
unauthenticated peer costs; the hub's cap is three offers in flight
per *account*, a limit on each caller and not on the machine, so an
operator's exposure grew with the size of their groups.
AV8 `invite-notify` put a request-supplied `group_name` into the subject
of an email the hub sends under its own domain, to any account, with
no rate limit. The name comes from the group row now.
The tests are two accounts each, in one file that says why: a one-member test
proves a one-member property, and every finding here needed a second person
to exist at all. Each was checked against the unfixed code. Two did not
survive that check and were rewritten — one re-enacted the disconnect path
instead of running it (hence `forget_node`), the other called the reaper
itself and would have passed with the call removed from `handle_offer`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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A node that hosts no groups sends no `group_ids` on its hub socket, and the
hub resolved the claim with `set(claimed_groups or authorized)` — so "I host
nothing" arrived as "I host every group this account belongs to", other
members' included. Such a node can serve none of them: it holds no GEK, and
its own handshake refuses them with "Group not hosted on this node".
`/v1/groups/{id}/nodes` answers in registration order and `_node_groups` is
in-memory, so which node a client was sent to depended on who reconnected
first after a hub restart. GroupPage took `nodes[0]` with no fallback. On
2026-09-11 a hub deploy at 20:14 reshuffled the registry, a second member's
unconfigured node won the race, and a group stopped opening for everyone in
it with its only real host online throughout. Any member could take one of
their groups down, by accident, by leaving an empty node running.
Four changes, because no one of them is sufficient:
- the hub never widens an absent claim, and `update_groups` goes through
the same ceiling as registration — it assigned its list verbatim, so the
bound that makes C2 hold at authentication was one message wide
- the node states the empty set rather than omitting the field
- the refusal carries `not_hosted`, so a client can tell "try the next
node" from "you, here, must do something first"
- GroupPage walks the list instead of indexing into it
The three lines involved date from 13, 20 and 23 August and each is
defensible alone. The defect is in the seam, which is where the last two
also were: a falsy empty collection must never mean "unspecified".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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A second-machine sideload of the MSIX target surfaced three things the
earlier verification round (which only proved the package installs and
runs) had missed:
1. meshbay-node missing from PATH. installer.nsh's customInstall adds
node-runtime\ to HKCU\Environment at install time -- an unelevated
per-user write, never blocked by MSIX's no-elevation rule, only by the
more basic fact that an AppX/MSIX install runs no custom code at all.
packaging/win/ensure-node-path.ps1 (idempotent, no admin verb) plus
main.js's winEnsureNodeOnPath() do it from the app itself instead, once
per launch, shipped to Full and MSIX (not Light, nothing to add there).
Verified live via the Node inspector protocol: the entry was in
HKCU\Environment\Path after a launch, absent before.
2. A daemon that crashes on startup failed silently. spawnNodeDetached()
used stdio: 'ignore', so a real crash reproduced live (a second instance
colliding with the first on 127.0.0.1:18000) left waitForNode()'s
generic 60s timeout as the only failure ever shown. spawnNodeDetachedWatched()
pipes stdio and watches ~2.5s, rejecting immediately with the daemon's
own stderr on an early exit; a survivor has its streams released and
runs fully detached exactly as before. First version bounded the
captured text by line count and a live test showed that cut the actual
OSError line -- two uvicorn/asyncio tracebacks followed it in the real
capture -- so it is bounded by characters instead.
3. No hint that a startup-mode choice exists. The install-time radio page
was the only place this was ever offered, and nothing replaces it now
that no install-time page can exist at all. SetupWelcome (the existing
first-run banner) grew a conditional hint, shown only while a bundled
node is present and neither autostart nor service mode is configured
yet. Considered and rejected: linking straight to the Node page -- its
route is gated on a linked hub node key, false on the exact fresh-install
screen this hint targets, so the link would have been dead on arrival.
New key setup.node_startup_hint, added to all ten locale catalogues.
test_packaging_win.py gained six tests pinning all three (69 total).
Full plan and verification detail: C:\Users\admin\devel\msix-installer.md
section 13 (out of repo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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An administrator's deletion answered 409 for any account owning a group,
so an erasure ordered by an authority had to wait on the person it was
about. It now deletes the account's groups with it, then pushes a signed
revocation for the account and for each group to every connected node:
an access token already issued stays valid on a node until it expires,
and the revocation is what makes the nodes refuse the account and close
the groups' sessions now. The action is written to the IP log, and the
confirmation dialog says the groups go too, in all ten catalogues.
The owner's own deletion is unchanged: refused while they own groups,
which they can hand over first (CGU 3.4, privacy statement).
Deleting a group had three partial cascades. The owner's route left
email_verifications behind, and the cleanup of unhosted groups left
notifications, invitations and reports - each an IntegrityError on
PostgreSQL, invisible on SQLite, which does not enforce foreign keys by
default. db/purge.py is now the one implementation: it finds every table
referencing groups.id from the schema, deletes the group's rows and
detaches content reports, which are evidence and outlive the group.
test_group_purge.py turns foreign-key enforcement on for its connection,
seeds every referencing table, and fails without the fix on all three
routes. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.7 states the rule, and now lists the device
keys and swarm sources that e3c68b3 erases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Store certification of the NSIS "MSI/EXE" submission failed on three
checks (silent-install verification, Add/Remove Programs entry, bundleware
check) -- traced and reproduced live to one cause: SmartScreen blocks an
unsigned, internet-downloaded installer at the shell layer before
Microsoft's own unattended validation bot ever gets to run it. MSIX
sidesteps this class of failure entirely: submitted through the Store's
native pipeline, there is no browser-download-then-launch step for
SmartScreen to intercept, and Microsoft signs the package itself at
publish time -- free, and specific to this submission type (Trusted
Signing remains a paid service for the MSI/EXE path). Full plan and
findings: C:\Users\admin\devel\msix-installer.md (out of repo).
electron-builder.msix.yml carries the same bundle as Full (node runtime,
ffmpeg, both service scripts) -- an AppX/MSIX install never elevates, by
design, but that changes only *when* the two elevated operations can run,
not whether the daemon ships. No main.js changes were needed: the on-demand
elevation path for service-mode (winElevateServiceMode(), driven from the
Node page) already existed for a different reason and depends only on
service-mode.ps1 being present as an extraResource, true for any packaged
Windows target. identityName/publisher/publisherDisplayName are the real
values from Partner Center's app-identity reservation, not placeholders.
build-win-msix.ps1 points electron-builder at the system Windows 10 SDK
(auto-detected) instead of letting it download its own bundled copy --
that download's 7z extraction creates symlinks this target never uses and
fails without SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege, reproduced on this machine.
build/appx/ carries the four tile images the AppX target requires
regardless of showNameOnTiles, generated once from the existing app icon
(see that directory's README) since the system-SDK redirect has no vendor
samples to fall back to. build/appx-extensions.xml declares
windows.startupTask by hand rather than via electron-builder's
addAutoLaunchExtension, which always targets the Electron shell -- this
points at the bundled node binary instead, matching what "starts at sign
in" already means for Full.
Verified live via a signed sideload install (self-signed test cert,
cleaned up after): the package installs and the app runs correctly. One
finding worth carrying forward -- the declared network capabilities
(internetClientServer, privateNetworkClientServer) do not create any
firewall exemption for this app, most likely because automatic
capability-based exemption is an AppContainer-sandbox property and this
app deliberately runs full-trust, outside any sandbox. Not a regression:
no install-time elevation was possible either way, so the cost is the same
one-time OS firewall prompt firewall.ps1's own header already documents as
its fallback today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MeshBay Light has no bundled meshbay-node.exe, so the create-group wizard
(which assumes it can start a local node) needs its own signal, not just
platform.node.available. main.js exposes it over IPC (node:bundled) by
checking the packaged resources directory rather than trusting a build-time
constant; preload.js and platform.js carry it through the usual
contextBridge/wrapper path.
winCanElevateServiceMode() replaces the two prior 'app.isPackaged' checks
for whether the app can offer service-mode elevation -- Light is packaged
but has no service-mode.ps1 to elevate into, so packaged alone was already
the wrong test even before this target existed.
create-group-page.js gates the wizard step that starts a node on the new
capability instead of hiding the whole feature; node-page.js's comment fix
is unrelated cosmetic drift caught in the same pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MeshBay Light ships the Electron client + UI only -- no PyInstaller node
freeze, no ffmpeg, no service install/autostart. Two standalone
electron-builder configs (Full via package.json's build field, Light via
electron-builder.light.yml passed with --config, which reads only that
file -- confirmed against app-builder-lib's own config loader) rather than
one config branching on a flag.
build-win-common.ps1 holds the steps both orchestrators share (Node check,
npm ci, Electron bump, sync-ui) so build-win.ps1 (Full) and the new
build-win-light.ps1 cannot drift apart; build-win.ps1 is refactored to
dot-source it with no behavior change (rebuilt and diffed byte-identical
output).
installer-light.nsh keeps the one thing Light still needs -- an
unconditional firewall rule, since the client listens too -- and none of
the service-mode/autostart machinery installer.nsh carries, which has
nothing to gate without a bundled node.
dist-light/ (Light's own electron-builder output dir) gets its own
.gitignore line since the bare dist/ rule does not match it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Everything under static/ is served at /a/<hash>/ with a year's
`immutable`, but the hash was computed from a hand-kept list of 43
top-level modules. The ten catalogues and vendor/ were not on it, nor
was anything the guarding test could see: it globbed *.js at the top
level only. A change confined to the catalogues therefore kept the hash,
and a phone went on showing a heading that had been rewritten and
deployed - pull-to-refresh fetched the no-store shell, which was
current, and never refetched en.js at a URL that had not moved.
The fingerprint now hashes every file under static/, path and content,
so a change, a rename or a new file moves the version with nothing to
register. _ASSETS is gone, and CLAUDE.md, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 9.4 step 6,
assets/brand/README.md and docs/playlists.md no longer ask for it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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A small link to the hub's legal pages, pinned to the bottom of the
sidebar once signed in. It opens in a new tab: the desktop application
refuses to navigate away from its interface and hands a new window to
the system browser, and in a browser it keeps the session on screen. The
address comes from hubBase(), so it is the legal pages of the hub in use.
The sidebar now sticks under the navigation bar at the window's height;
otherwise, on a long file list, the link would sit at the bottom of the
page. The music bar, pinned to the bottom of the window as well,
publishes its height through useStickyBand as --music-bar-h and the
sidebar stops above it. On a phone the slide-out panel does the same.
test_sidebar_legal_measured.py measures the real stylesheet: the link at
the bottom of the window on a 3000px page, and above the music bar, at
phone and desktop widths. Checked signed in on a local hub in Chrome and
Firefox 155.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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The browser sign-in page now carries the project's pitch beside the form:
what MeshBay is, the applications, what it is for, and what meshbay.org
does and never sees, with links to the downloads and the legal pages.
Text on the left and the form on the right on a desktop; one column,
form first, below 1000px. Not shown in the desktop application, whose
user has already downloaded it. All ten catalogues carry the text.
Every claim is held to MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 2.3: the page says content never
reaches the hub, not that the hub can read nothing (T3), and "end-to-end"
means device to node.
Signed out there is no sidebar, so the 960px main column sat at the left
of the window and the sign-in, register and reset forms were centred in
it (x=290 in 1440). `.page-center` pages now lift that cap.
test_welcome_layout_measured.py measures the real stylesheet in Chrome:
no horizontal overflow from 320 to 1440px, form first on narrow screens,
form right of the text on desktops, pair centred in the window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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erase_account cleared memberships, notifications, tokens and node
registrations, but not user_devices or swarm_sources.
A device key left on the tombstone still belonged to it, so an account
created later from the same desktop installation - which keeps its
private half - was refused that device with a 409 that only reached the
console. swarm_sources is keyed by the user id despite its column name
and carries the node's ip:port.
Both are now erased, which is what the privacy statement promises: every
account row goes except the one-year IP log.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Operator feedback on the 0.13.0 installer:
- The all-users / current-user page (electron-builder's PAGE_INSTALL_MODE)
only ever showed "anyone who uses this computer" disabled -- MeshBay is
per-user only (account-bound keystore/DPAPI, MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 11.2) and
build.nsis forbids elevation. customInstallMode forces $isForceCurrentInstall
so the page is skipped.
- The two nested Yes/No MessageBoxes are one nsDialogs radio page
(customPageAfterChangeDir): only-while-open / at-sign-in / background service,
default background service. customInit seeds MB_AutoMode "2" for silent
installs where the page never runs. "At sign-in" now writes the Startup .vbs
from the installer (meshbay-node autostart install, unelevated); the old
per-user branch set up nothing.
- The firewall rules go in for every mode, not behind a second opt-in -- a node
that accepts no connections is the failure mode MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.5 names.
Folded into the service elevation for mode 2; their own single elevation for
0/1. Unelevated short-circuit kept but narrower: firewall.ps1 check AND
service.ps1 status must both pass to skip mode 2's UAC.
Var MB_AutoMode lives inside customPageAfterChangeDir, not at file scope: the
uninstaller compile pass inserts none of the macros that read it and
makensis -WX turns "unused Var" (6001) into a hard error.
Not yet exercised on a real machine -- the NSIS UI cannot be driven from the
build env. test_packaging_win.py pins the script shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The ack was assembled from its own tuple of application names, a copy of the
daemon's `APP_DIR_KEYS`, and the two had drifted: the copy was missing
`helloworld`. So the reference application — the one that exists to prove a new
application needs no special-casing — was the single application whose
configured folders never reached a client, which made the plugin claim false
exactly where it is demonstrated.
Fixed by removing the copy rather than syncing it. The ack now emits whatever
`<app>_directories` the group context carries, and `_app_directories_ctx` is the
only thing that puts one there, so the two cannot disagree again. The transport
names an application in one place, `ALLOWED_APPS`, which is enforcement rather
than a directory list.
The client had the same fault one layer up: `group-page.js` read three names by
hand from the ack while the live-update path beside it was already generic. It
derives the map from the ack's own keys now, so the fix reaches the settings
pane instead of stopping at the wire.
A first attempt moved the list to `roster.py`, where directory *storage* lives,
and `test_helloworld_proves_the_plugin_claim.py` refused it: the roster, the ops,
the config and the root set must name no application at all. That test is the
architecture's own guard and it was right — the list belongs on the daemon, which
is what wires a group's context, and everything downstream is derived from it.
Two new tests, both verified to fail against the previous shape: the ack carries
an application the node names nowhere else, and the ack keeps no list of its own.
`test_the_lists_are_read_under_one_name_each` now asserts the shell names no
application rather than that it names exactly three.
Two stale comments went with it — the ack's, which described scalars removed in
07ff8b4, and the client's, which said those scalars still rode the wire for
MNP 1.0 peers that can no longer connect.
Full suite: 2258 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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The handshake ack's app-directories entry still said "the same three answers in
one shape" and "the scalars above are derived from these and kept for MNP 1.0
clients". Neither is true since the per-app ops were folded into one: there are
no scalars above, and a 1.0 client cannot reach this code at all — the floor
moved to 3.0 with the lease flag day.
A comment that contradicts the code beside it is worse than no comment, because
one of them is wrong and the reader cannot tell which. This is the same fault
the leaseless-bound comment had, one commit earlier.
What it says instead is what is actually load-bearing: `<app>_directories` is
the only form on the wire, and `chat_directory` below is safe as a second name
for one of them because `_app_directories_ctx` derives it on every build rather
than storing it alongside — which is precisely what the removed scalars did not
do.
daemon.py had the same stale reference three lines from the code that produces
these, pointing at `video_root` for the shape a per-group signed setting takes.
Comments only; no behaviour change. Node suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YVoHVCcfBqud6ZjG4db3y7
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`video_root`, `audio_root` and `photo_roots` are gone — the messages, the
signed operations, the handlers, the `ops` wrappers, the three scalars on the
handshake ack, and the client's handlers for their acks. `app_directories`
does the same thing for every application, keyed by the app's own registry
name, and it is what the SPA has been sending.
The three were the same instruction three times, differing only in the key they
wrote and whether they carried a string or a list. That shape is what made
adding an application mean adding a message type, an op, a handler and a widget;
it also meant three validation paths, and the older ones validated nothing —
a typo was stored and then quietly matched no entry, an app showing an empty tab
with no way to tell "misconfigured" from "no files yet".
**What stays, and why.** `Roster.LEGACY_DIR_KEYS` still reads `video_root` and
friends out of `group_settings`: that is a key on an operator's disk, not on the
wire, and a node upgraded into this must find its own configuration. The Search
page still reads its own older cache keys, for the same reason — the cache
outlives a deploy. `CTX_ALIASES` keeps only `chat`, which is the one app whose
second name something still reads.
The two per-app policy test files go with the messages. What only they held —
the real challenge/response path from message to database, which no other test
exercises — is retargeted at `app_directories` in
`test_app_directories_signed.py`, and the handler's own refusals (unknown app,
malformed `directories`, nobody to authorize it) join `test_app_directories.py`.
Node and common suites 1368 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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311 lines of Signal Double Ratchet and 167 lines of tests for it, with no
caller: group chat is a key per group, per epoch, per device, and a ratchet was
ruled out for it on the record — a node that serves history to devices which
were not present has to hand out each chain's earliest key, which is forward
secrecy of zero.
Deleted for the same reason `senderkeys.py` was: an implementation kept for a
use nobody has reads as an alternative somebody may reach for, and its cost is
paid at every refactor that has to keep it compiling. The four comments that
mention a ratchet keep doing so — they explain why this is not one, which is
the part worth keeping.
Common suite 158 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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Seven comments pointed at sections of `~/next/improve-downloads.md`, which is
not in the tree and not anywhere a reader of this repository can follow. Each
now states the thing it was citing: why a paused transfer holds nothing, why the
lease is taken after the save target and not before, why a chunk request marks
a lease alive, where the leaseless bound's number comes from.
The leaseless comment also said "two files at a time" three paragraphs under
`MAX_LEASELESS_IN_FLIGHT = 12`, left behind when the bound was raised. A comment
that contradicts the constant beside it is worse than no comment: one of them is
wrong and the reader cannot tell which.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`device_add_request` and `device_hello` were dispatched behind
`and self._nonce_node`, which reads as "pre-proof, once the challenge has gone
out" — and is not what happens: both branches sit after the
`self._user_id is None` guard, so the nonce is always set by the time either is
reached, and a peer that has not finished its handshake gets "Handshake
required" instead.
The guard is removed rather than the branches moved. Filing a device is not
something a peer needs *in order to* prove possession of the group key, which is
the only reason anything is served pre-proof: the request is countersigned later
by a device already pinned, so requiring the caller to finish its own handshake
first costs nothing and keeps the pre-proof surface at three messages.
A test drives all six device messages through the real dispatcher on an
unauthenticated session, because this is a property of the order of its branches
and of nothing else.
Node suite 1216 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`senderkeys.py` and its 13 tests implemented Signal-style sender keys, and
production has never called them: chat is a key per group, per epoch, per
device, derived by name. The reasoning that ruled the ratchet out stays where it
belongs — in `chatbox.py`, at the top of the module that replaced it — because
the argument is the useful part, and it now stands on its own instead of
pointing at a file to compare against.
Kept code that nothing calls is worse than absent code: it reads as an
alternative somebody may reach for, and it has to be maintained past every
refactor to stay compiling, which is maintenance spent on a decision already
made.
The three comments naming `GroupSenderKeyStore` are rewritten to say the thing
they were illustrating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The QUIC handler stored `payload` as it arrived and broadcast it: no envelope,
no signature check, no `device_hello` to check one against. A message reaching
a group's archive that way is a plaintext row in an encrypted history, and it
would be indistinguishable from one somebody actually wrote.
Removed rather than gated. The transport implements neither the per-device
sealing nor the device identification the WebRTC path requires, so refusing
here would mean maintaining a second, weaker set of rules for a transport with
no client; an unimplemented type is logged and dropped, like every other message
this transport does not have.
The comment on the peer registry loses its chat fan-out aside for the same
reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED` is the version this build speaks, so `check_version`
refuses everything below it at the handshake. Every capability the client was
gating on the node's version is therefore true of every peer it can reach:
* `supportsSealedUpload` — an upload is sealed or it is not sent;
* `supportsAppOps` — one `app_directories` op, and no `setVideoRoot` /
`setAudioRoot` / `setPhotoRoots` wrappers behind it;
* `supportsTransferSlots` and `Lease._skip()` — a lease is always real, so
there is no branch where a transfer runs without one;
* `legacyNode`, the read-only shared-directories table, and the two hints
telling an operator their node is too old to configure an app.
The version the node declares is still recorded, for diagnostics. Nothing
branches on it, and the comment says so, because a field kept "just in case" is
how the branches came back last time.
`test_mnp_1_0_node_compat.py` goes with them: it existed to hold the fallbacks
in place, and holding a fallback that cannot execute is how a suite starts
lying. The two locale strings for those hints are removed from all ten
catalogues.
Hub suite 872 passed (test_sticky_header deselected — failing before this).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The group-wide `member_upload` switch is gone: the message, the signed
operation, the field on the handshake ack, the `upload` alias on every root in
the index payload, and the client's fallback path to it.
Whether a member may write has been a property of each root for a while, and
that is the model that survives: a single flag over the group cannot express
"this library is published read-only and that folder is a drop box", which is
the ordinary arrangement. What was left of the switch was a handler that logged
a deprecation and acted on nothing, and a client that read `ack.member_upload`
whenever the roots carried no `writable` — a second source for one question,
with whichever the code consulted first deciding it.
`roots.describe()` drops `upload` for the same reason: it was `writable` under
an older name, and two names for one boolean is one too many.
The paperclip now says "nowhere to write" rather than picking a root, in a group
that has none writable. That is the honest answer; the fallback picked whatever
came first and failed at send time.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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`transfer_state` read `slots.per_member` — the node-wide default — while
`_has_room` decides with `member_cap()`, which prefers the group's own signed
limit, and the handshake ack announces that same `member_cap()`. Three readings
of one number, and one of them was the odd one out.
In a group where the operator signed a higher limit, every lease update told the
client "cap: 2" while the node would grant five: the transfers widget draws
`used >= cap` as saturated, so a member with two transfers running saw the rest
of their slots disappear. Lowered the other way it is worse in the other
direction — the interface offers slots the node will queue.
Nothing was ever granted or refused wrongly; the enforcement was right on both
paths. It is the number beside it that contradicted them.
Two tests, one override above the default and one below, because a bug that
reads the node-wide value passes the first whenever the default happens to be
the larger number.
Node suite 1215 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AsoWC3GmhNdwVFomW3QjH3
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The tab bar paints an opaque ring of page colour around itself, `--band-margin`
wide, so the gap it keeps in the flow is still there once it pins. A box-shadow
spread goes out on all four sides, and above the tab bar there is only whatever
the element before it happened to leave: the join-code form under a group's
title leaves 12px, the ring is 16px, and the form came back with the bottom 4px
of its field and its button painted over — page colour at z-index 30, against
content that has none to answer with. Reported as "the form is slightly cut
off", which is exactly what it looks like and says nothing about a stylesheet.
The same 4px went off the bottom of the "could not reach this node" banner, the
other thing that stands between a group's title and its tabs.
The band reserves that room itself now. `* +`, so it is the gap between two
elements rather than a margin the band always carries: `.search-bar` is a first
child on the Search page, and a margin-top there would collapse through the
page root and take the whole page down with it. Between siblings the two
margins collapse to the larger of the pair, so everywhere that already leaves
enough is untouched and only what was being painted over moves.
Only the two bands that pin against the navigation bar, and that is the rule
rather than an economy. Written for all six it fails 22 of the sticky-header
cases: the gap *between* two bands is the upper one's `--band-margin` and
nothing else — the number `--chrome-h` carries and the offset the lower band
pins at — so a lower band's own margin-top wins the collapse wherever it is the
bigger of the two and leaves the flow layout wider than the pinned one, at
every phone width in every media view. A band under another band needs no room
above it anyway: what is there is a band of higher z-index, which a ring cannot
paint over.
Measured against the shipped GroupPage in the state that was reported — a node
answering `code_required` — in Chrome: 12px of clearance under a 16px ring
before, 16 against 16 after. test_sticky_band_ring.py holds the two selector
lists together out of the source rather than in a browser, because what a
browser shows is the 4px at one width in one of the states that happen to put
something above a band, while what has to hold is which bands are in which
list. docs/apps.md sends the author of a new application to that section to
make its toolbar pin; this is what says the toolbar they add does not get the
gap, and why.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BAJawZ25MZPBJ7TKgnVA1n
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Files, Videos, Music and Photos are read by scrolling, and everything that
steers that reading left with the first screenful. Three bands now pin under
the navigation bar, in a group and on the Search page alike: the tab bar (the
search field, on Search), the application's own toolbar, and the file table's
column heads. The group's name and description still scroll — they say nothing
a reader needs while walking a directory, and the height they would cost is
height the list does not get.
A band's offset is the heights of the bands above it, and those are not
constants: the toolbar wraps to three rows on a phone, grows a field while a
folder is being named, and loses its filter on Search. So each band measures
itself and publishes `--chrome-h` / `--toolbar-h` (static/sticky.js) and the
stylesheet does the arithmetic in calc(), rather than a number written down
twice — the fault CLAUDE.md already records against this layout twice over.
A band publishes height *plus its own bottom margin*, and paints that margin
as a ring of page colour, so the pinned layout is pixel-identical to the flow
layout and nothing shifts at the moment a band pins.
Three overflow faults came out of it, all of the same class and all of them
what "the header does not stay" actually meant on Android — a document wider
than the screen leaves everything pinned attached to a viewport the reader can
no longer see, the navigation bar included:
- a directory's name cell was a bare <td>, so an unbreakable folder name
(`Rage_Against_The_Machine_Discography_1992-2000_FLAC`) set the column's
minimum: a 527px table in a 390px window
- Search's group column did the same at 442px with an underscored group
name. It also goes entirely below 768px, where there is no room for it and
the breadcrumb already names the group
- the shared-directories table has four columns of controls with a combined
minimum near 440px, none of it compressible. On a phone the row stops
being a row: the name and its eject/remove pair on one line, the two
switches — each carrying the column head's own string as a label — on the
next
- and, found by measuring at 360px, the tab bar itself was 19px too wide
`.file-table` moves to separated borders: a collapsed border belongs to the
table rather than to the cell, so the column heads lost their rule the moment
they pinned.
Measured, not read. tests/harness/sticky_header_probe.py drives the shipped
GroupPage and SearchPage against a stub node, walks to each application,
scrolls to the end and reports every rectangle — 11 views x 4 widths x 2
engines. Its fixture says what real data says: the first version used
`note-007.txt` and `un groupe`, which fit any screen, and found none of the
above. A fixture narrower than real data tests the fixture.
Also: `test_desktop_shell` no longer looks for the CSP after the first `-->`,
which made it fail on correct markup as soon as a comment was added above it,
and `search-page.js` joins test_hook_ordering's file list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tx16FhyD2BUdpooGb5jcyN
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Streaming an Xvid/MP3 .avi answered "Unsupported video codec" — a refusal, on
a file ffmpeg re-encodes at about six times playback speed on the machine that
reported it. Nothing about the source was wrong. The node simply never reached
its own re-encode path.
`probe_video` maps a source codec to an MSE codec string and knows four:
h264, hevc, vp9, av1. Everything else returns None, because there is no
MediaSource decoder in any mainstream browser to give a string to — MPEG-4
Part 2 (Xvid, DivX), MPEG-2, VC-1, WMV, Theora. `_stream_video_inner` read
that None as a verdict on the file and refused, while the re-encode sitting
twenty lines below it was gated on `raw_video_codec in
BROWSER_INCOMPATIBLE_VIDEO_CODECS` — a set containing "hevc" and nothing else.
So the whole ffmpeg fallback existed, worked, and was unreachable for every
codec that most needed it.
The setting that governs the fallback has documented the intended behaviour
since it was introduced: draft-v6 §2.11 says `transcode_incompatible_video`
covers "HEVC *and other browser-incompatible video codecs*". Only HEVC was
ever wired up.
Two questions were being answered by one value, and they are separated now.
"Is there a video stream at all" is the only thing this path genuinely cannot
serve, and the only refusal left. "Can it be copied" needs both an MSE string
to put in `stream_init` and a codec browsers decode; a source failing either
is re-encoded.
The operator's opt-out keeps meaning what it says, and it no longer means the
same thing for every source, because it cannot: HEVC has a codec string, so
`transcode_incompatible_video = false` falls back to a copy and the viewer's
own decoder decides (unchanged). MPEG-4 Part 2 has none, so there is nothing
to fall back to — a `stream_init` with no codec string is one the client
refuses before the first byte — and the stream is refused naming the setting.
"Unsupported video codec" is what sent this report to the file, and the file
was fine.
Verified against the reported file end to end: ffprobe reports mpeg4/mp3
720x404, the decision comes out `can_copy=False`, and the pipeline's exact
argv produces H264 High level 4.1 plus stereo AAC-LC — matching the
`avc1.640029,mp4a.40.2` that `stream_init` advertises and that the client puts
through MediaSource.isTypeSupported byte for byte.
test_stream_hevc_transcode.py becomes test_stream_video_transcode.py: it was
always about the policy rather than about one codec, and it now carries both
halves of it, with a synthetic Xvid/MP3 .avi built the same way as the HEVC
clip. Its module-level skip on libx265 went with it — an ffmpeg without x265
still encodes MPEG-4 Part 2, so that marker was skipping the reported defect
entirely on any box without it; it now gates the HEVC cases alone. Three
cases added, checked against the unfixed source. Hub and node suites 2269
passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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The reconnect scenario added with the fix proved the composer follows
`_setDevicePk`, and it poked that method itself at both ends. That is a
narrower claim than it reads as: it says nothing about whether a reconnect
*reaches* it, and the harness's own `Host` stands in for group-page.js, so a
green probe did not mean the page joins the two.
Both halves are real now. The scenario calls `connect()` with the arguments
`_reconnectLoop` calls it with; it stops at signaling, because there is no hub
in the harness, and the identity has to be gone by then — connect() drops it
before it touches the network. The restore is the shipped `_announceDevice`,
answered by the stand-in node with a `device_hello_ack` as `_do_device_hello`
answers it, and the key it settles on is the one the following send seals and
signs with. Three assertions check the scenario went that way rather than
through a variable set by the test.
The seam the harness cannot drive gets its own check: the wiring exists, the
prop is in `commonProps`, and the callback is set *before* `connect()` — after
it, device_hello's answer is missed and the composer starts closed. That check
first passed with the wiring deleted, on the strength of a comment naming the
callback; it matches the assignment now.
Two things the harness turned up. `do_POST` answered every path, so the offer
connect() posts to the hub was swallowed as the measurement and put the
machine's own SDP, public address included, into the probe's output — it
answers `/log` and nothing else now. And a connect() that gives up before
`await channelReady` left that promise rejected with nobody attached, so
closing the peer connection printed "Uncaught (in promise) DataChannel closed"
on every failed reconnect attempt — noise in exactly the log a freeze is read
from.
Checked against the unfixed source both ways: with the clear removed from
connect() and the wiring removed from group-page.js, three cases fail; with
them back, 15 pass. Hub and node suites 2266 passed, 4 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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The Chat tab froze about every other day — the textbox stopped taking clicks —
and it never recovered on its own: no timeout ends this one, only leaving the
group or restarting the client. A console dump of a session it happened in ruled
out everything it could and named nothing.
What that dump established was almost entirely negative, and that was the useful
part. No `Response timeout`, no `unsolicited`/`unrouted`/`with nothing waiting`
— so the 2026-08-30 routing defect, which produces this exact symptom for thirty
seconds, had not recurred. No `PC state: disconnected|failed`, no second ICE
cycle, no `Reconnected after N attempt(s)` — so the connection was alive and
untouched. The freeze was in the page, and no path that logs anything had run.
The composer is `disabled=${sending || cannotSend}`, and `cannotSend` was
`transport.connected && !transport.devicePk`, read off a **ref** during render.
`devicePk` is settled inside connect(), so every reconnect clears it and settles
it again; a ref changing re-renders nothing, and nothing else announced it. So
the panel went disabled on whatever unrelated re-render came next — a message
arriving — long after the identity was actually lost, and had no event that
would open it again. group-page.js never touches `status` after 'connected', and
`onReconnected` is claimed by video-player.js, so there was no second chance.
It was silent as well as sticky. `_announceDevice` had three exits that wrote
`devicePk` without a word: two early returns that left the *previous*
connection's value standing, and a reply that is not `device_hello_ack` — an
`error` reply does not throw, so the `.catch()` at the call site never saw it.
Reproduced in chat_send_probe.py, which mounts the real ChatPanel over the real
transport: with the old code, identity cleared leaves the composer open, an
arriving message latches it shut, and restoring the identity does not reopen it.
Every write to `devicePk` now goes through `_setDevicePk(pk, why)`, which logs,
traces and calls `onDeviceIdentity`; group-page holds the answer as state and
ChatPanel takes it as `deviceReady`. Defaulting that prop to `true` fails open —
a wiring mistake here must not be able to leave anyone with a dead textbox.
Two things found on the same path and fixed with it. `_send` throwing inside
_sendAndWait's executor left the pending entry and its 30s timer behind, so a
request that never reached the wire still logged a "Response timeout" half a
minute later. And the instrumentation this was meant to be diagnosed with
(3be8bd2) writes to localStorage behind ?trace=1, not to the console, so the
dump could not have carried it: the two lines that decide the composer's state
are now logged unconditionally, and MeshBayTrace gains `record` so the composer
writes into the same timeline as the channel events.
Hub suite 2264 passed, 4 skipped. chat_send_probe.py gains a `reconnect`
scenario and test_chat_send.py four cases, each checked against the unfixed
source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019GXmScYB1uR29YCt74si9J
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A PDF preview showed the "this browser will not display the PDF inline"
fallback everywhere — in the desktop client since its first launch, and in
the browser since the hub started sending a CSP on 2026-09-01. It read as a
missing native feature because before that commit the hub sent no policy at
all, so Chrome had once worked and the application never had.
Two directives govern one feature. `files-app.js` decrypts the file in the
page and hands it to `<object type="application/pdf">` from a Blob; Chromium
loads that as plugin data (`object-src`, absent and therefore falling back to
`default-src 'none'`) and then renders it in an internal frame (`frame-src`).
Opening either alone changes nothing visible — the second refusal produces the
same fallback. `'self'` covers neither: a same-origin `blob:` URL is not
matched by it in either directive, measured in Chrome 152 against the deployed
page and in Electron 44 against the client's own policy.
`plugins` stays at its default `false`: the built-in viewer is not behind that
flag on Electron 44, verified by rendering one.
Widening `object-src` from `'none'` to `blob:` admits only what page script
minted itself, at a type this code sets — PDFium parsing bytes that came from
a node, which is what any browser does with the same file once downloaded.
Tests: each policy is pinned to carry `blob:` in both directives (each fails
if either token is removed), and the two policies are now held identical
directive by directive apart from the two deliberate differences — the comment
claiming they were the same had already drifted and nothing checked it. The
CSP source parser in test_desktop_shell.py read `//` comment lines as
directives, which is the "parse directives, not text" mistake this file
already records; it skips them now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XauykfBvRrpy6RYbF6F7Wu
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Reported the day MNP 3.0 shipped: playing a track answered "Too many files open
at once without a transfer. Download this one instead of previewing it."
§3.4.1's bound of two was reasoned about *viewers* — a photo viewer shows one
photo, a preview modal one document, and the second is for prefetching the next.
It forgot the music player, which warms a read-ahead window: `prefetchDepth()`
returns 5 on Wi-Fi and 3 otherwise, so playing an album has six files in flight
and the fourth was refused. Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot
— that is a stated requirement, not a tuning parameter — and a constant nobody
had checked against the client broke it.
Twelve now: six for the music read-ahead at its widest, two for a photo viewer
and its own prefetch in the same session, the rest as headroom. Generosity is
cheap here and refusal is not — this is a fairness control among cooperating
clients, not a security boundary, so a client that lies gets twelve files at a
time instead of its member cap, bounded and audited, while refusing a legitimate
read breaks the requirement outright.
And the number is now derived rather than chosen: a test reads `prefetchDepth()`
out of the shipped player and fails if the node's bound no longer covers it, so
widening the client's read-ahead breaks the build instead of reaching a person.
Checked by widening it: "the music player reads 21 files ahead and the node
admits only 12".
Three cases that hard-coded "two then refuse" now set their own limit — they are
about the mechanism, and the shipped number moves with the client.
Node suite 1210 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from Chrome, with a screenshot: four downloads with no pause button
and an upload beside them with one, and nothing anywhere saying why.
The reason is real. Without a granted download folder the browser writes
through the service worker — a download it already owns, which cannot be paused
without stalling it somewhere we can neither see nor resume. An upload writes to
the node, which keeps the position, so it is always pausable. But that was
stated only in a Settings line nobody reads on the way to a download, and a gap
where the row above has a button is not an explanation.
So a download that cannot be paused now shows a dimmed pause icon where the
button would be, carrying the reason and the remedy in its tooltip. Not a
button: there is nothing to click, and a disabled one invites the click anyway.
And only where the advice can be taken. Firefox and Safari have no folder to
choose — the streamed path is the only target they have, which is what §6.5 of
~/next/improve-downloads.md costs out — so telling someone there to choose one
would be advice they cannot follow. Nothing is drawn.
Hub suite 866 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported while testing the flag day: pausing an upload put it under "Finished".
"Finished" was defined by exclusion — everything that is not running, queued or
preparing — so it swallowed `paused` the day pausing shipped. A transfer
somebody stopped on purpose then sat beside the ones that are actually over,
offering a resume button in the section of things that cannot be resumed, and
dropped out of the badge, which announced less activity than there was.
Paused is now its own group, in all ten catalogues, and counts as active: it is
not over, the person means to come back to it.
The three filters are lifted out of `app.js` and executed rather than described
in the test, and one case asserts that every status lands in exactly one group
— a state added later that falls into none is a transfer the panel simply does
not show, which is how this one got in.
The same report also said the three running downloads lost their pause buttons
when the upload was paused. That part is **not** explained and **not** fixed:
the store returns `pausable` true and status `running` for all three (new test),
closing an upload lease pumps only the upload queue, and the button's condition
is a pure function of those two. All three say the buttons should have stayed,
so an observation is missing rather than a cause.
Hub suite 864 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 4 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, the flag day. Leases become compulsory
and a 2.x peer is refused at the handshake.
**The bound on leaseless reads (§3.4.1) did not exist, and it is what makes the
rest mean anything.** Browsing a group is never subject to a transfer slot —
that is an operator decision and a requirement: a member must be able to browse
a group at capacity exactly as they browse an idle one. But "not leased" cannot
mean "unbounded", or a client that simply omits `tr` transfers outside every cap
and the caps are decoration. A session may now read two distinct files at once
without a lease: one because a viewer looks at one file, two so that prefetching
the next photo stays possible. A count of files and not a byte budget, because a
RAW photo is 60-80 MB and is browsing while a 40 MB archive is a download, and
no size threshold separates them. Thumbnails, posters and cover art never reach
this check at all — they resolve out of the node's own cache.
It is a fairness control among cooperating clients, in the company of
`max_concurrent_streams`, and is not a defence against a member determined to
saturate a node's disk. That member is a member, and the answer to them is
`member revoke`.
**MNP_VERSION and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED both move to 3.0**, on both sides. The
messages are additive; the requirement is not. An opt-in switch would leave a
leaseless branch reachable on every node, which is finding C6's lesson — a
transport that accepted a bare JWT — one feature later.
**The desktop client now checks before it connects.** The SPA is served by the
hub and picks up a new client on reload; the application ships its own
interface, so an un-updated one would sign in, list groups, and fail every
connection with `version_too_old` — a refusal in a protocol vocabulary with
nothing anyone can act on. It asks `/v1/hub/version` for `client.minimum` and
says so plainly instead. An unreachable hub is deliberately *not* "too old": a
captive portal or a closed laptop must not make starting the application
impossible.
**Every package is aligned on 0.13.0.** `meshbay-client/package.json` had
drifted to 1.0.0 while the Python packages were on 0.12.0 — invisible until
something compared those numbers, and then load-bearing: an installed client
announcing 1.0.0 sorts above a 0.13.0 minimum and walks through the gate meant
to stop it. That is stated in the code rather than left to be rediscovered; it
is acceptable exactly once, because the operator is updating every client, node
and hub by hand for this flag day. A new test fails if two packages ever
disagree again, and another fails if the hub would refuse the client the tree
builds.
Node suite 1209 passed, hub suite 861 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from Chrome: a download started while an upload was running took
thirty seconds to begin, every time. The console named it exactly —
/_mbdl/mtty5btz-sbmgdegx 404 ()
[MeshBay] the worker did not answer the download within 15s (attempt 1)
A 404 from the hub means the request reached the *network*: the worker looked,
found no entry for that id and let it through. So the worker was alive and
controlling the page, and the message handing it the stream had simply never
been processed.
`pending` lives in the worker's memory, and a worker with nothing to do is
terminated within tens of seconds. A WebRTC upload gives it no events at all,
so minutes of uploading leave it dead; the stream posted to it is lost,
silently, and the iframe then wakes it with nothing to find.
`mbdl-ping` already existed for this exact reason -- sent every ten seconds
*while* writing, because a streaming response does not count as activity.
Nothing sent one before *starting*. So a download now wakes the worker and waits
for the pong, and `sw.js` answers `mbdl-ready` once it has actually stored the
entry, which the page waits for before navigating: confirmed rather than
assumed. A worker that predates the ack sends nothing and the page navigates
anyway, which is what it did before.
This cause was measured and wrongly dismissed hours earlier, with an idle probe
that made the worker work between its own attempts -- it never actually slept.
A measurement that does not reproduce the conditions refutes nothing. The
harness now models a worker that is asleep: a ping wakes it, and anything else
posted while it sleeps is lost, which is what made the failure silent.
`test_backpressure_is_real` read the first `worker.postMessage` in the function
to check that the readable half is transferred rather than copied. The wake-up
put a ping in front of it, so it began inspecting a call that carries only a
port -- and kept passing. It now checks every post, each bounded by its own
call, since the keep-alive ping transfers nothing at all. Same shape as the
upload-seal contract this morning: a guard that reads "the first" stops
guarding the moment something is inserted before it.
Hub suite 851 passed. Both new cases checked against the unfixed source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, second half, plus the gap it exposed in
stage 7.
**Asking where to resume.** The node identifies an upload by (member,
directory, filename), so a client resuming one has to name the file — and
`transfer_open`, the obvious place to ask, travels in clear. Naming it there
would undo exactly what sealing this path bought in MNP 2.0: before it, the same
file was ciphertext leaving a node and plaintext arriving at one. So the
question is asked inside the seal that already exists, as an ordinary
`file_upload` with no bytes and `chunk_index: -1`. The node writes nothing,
creates no state, reserves no name, and answers with `resume_from` in the sealed
ack. A node that predates it refuses the index, which the client reads as "start
from the beginning" — the behaviour it had anyway — and the wait is bounded so
one that answers neither does not strand an upload.
The probe is answered after every check the write path makes, so it cannot ask
questions about a directory the caller may not write to, and it answers only
about the member who asks: otherwise one member could measure another's
progress on a file they never sent, and worse, resume it.
**Pausing an upload.** Reported: no pause button on an upload, even in the
desktop app. Stage 7 built pause around the download path — a target declares
whether it can be stopped — and an upload has no local target to ask. It was
also refused by design, since a transfer handed a lease it cannot re-create must
not be offered a button that would drop its slot for good. Uploads now ask for
their slot rather than being handed one, and say they are pausable outright: a
File is seekable and the node keeps the position. Resuming re-probes rather than
trusting the client's own memory, so it works across a reconnect too.
**And the slot they hold.** `_do_file_upload` never called `slots.touch(tr)`.
Chunks are not gated by the lease, so the file arrived — but the node reclaimed
a grant nobody appeared to be using after thirty seconds, twice, then abandoned
it, and the widget follows the lease. Measured from the journal: a 3.5 GB upload
read "waiting, 0 ahead" for a minute and a half while it was transferring. The
download twin of this was fixed on 2026-09-08; the same omission was still here,
invisible until uploads took a real lease.
`test_the_upload_itself_is_sealed` now checks every message `uploadFile` sends
rather than the first. Adding the probe put a second one in front of the one it
was written for, and it would have kept passing while guarding nothing.
Node suite 1202 passed, hub suite 850 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Stage 8 of ~/next/improve-downloads.md, first half. Two defects that are the
same defect seen from two sides.
An upload's progress lived on the session, keyed by `rel_dir/filename`. A
dropped connection threw it away and the client's next chunk was refused with
`not_started`: an upload interrupted at 99% could only be started again from
zero, on a link flaky enough to have interrupted it once. It now lives in the
group context, keyed by member as well -- a shared directory means two people
can be sending IMG_1234.jpg at the same moment and neither may inherit, or
overwrite the position of, the other's.
What the lost state left behind was a `.part` nothing would ever finish, delete
or look at again. It is not an index entry, so it is invisible to every member
and to the operator's own file list: one abandoned film is a gigabyte of their
disk, kept for ever. That leak predates this branch.
A `.part` is deleted only when **both** hold: no upload is writing it, and
nothing has been written to it for 24 hours. Waiting costs disk; being wrong
costs somebody their upload, and is not reversible -- so a read-only root is
never walked (it cannot have received an upload), an unavailable one is never
walked (an unmounted drive reporting "nothing found" is how a careless janitor
deletes a library), and a file whose mtime is in the future is left alone (a
clock that went backwards is not evidence). The reaper matches whole paths and
the state records the path it is writing, rather than both sides rebuilding one
from a root name -- two implementations of one rule whose failure mode is
deleting a live upload.
The rules are in `uploads.py`, pure logic with no asyncio and no transport, the
same shape as `transfers.py` and for the same reason.
23 cases, four of them checked against the unfixed source. Node suite 1195
passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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Reported from Chrome: connecting to a group triggered a page refresh within
seconds, taking the WebRTC session down with it.
The boot check added with the bypass repair asked its question by *performing a
download* -- a four-byte stream through a hidden iframe. Chrome rations the
downloads a page may start without a user gesture to about three, measured: on
a first visit three consecutive attempts went served, served, refused. So the
check competed with the person's own downloads for that budget, and its answer
depended on how much of the budget was left. On a healthy page it concluded the
worker could not serve, and reloaded.
The same mistake the repair was written to fix, from the other side: paying a
capability to obtain a diagnostic.
The replacement costs nothing and asks nothing. Measured on Chrome, at document
start, before anything registers:
first visit controller false, registration false
ordinary reload controller true, registration true
hard reload controller false, registration true
Being uncontrolled while an active registration already exists names a
hard-reloaded document exactly, so that is now the whole of the evidence. A
first visit is uncontrolled too and is not a bypass -- the worker is installing
and will claim the page in a moment -- which is precisely the case that was
reloading.
Four cases, each checked against the unfixed source, including that priming
performs no download at all. Hub suite 847 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HCGdheDLxGReuKHga3BtST
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