From 675beed6ff688733a9598f9d82d41578f48316be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 16:16:55 +0200 Subject: feat!: MNP 1.0 — seal index and handshake_ack under the group key MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit `index_sync`, `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` config payload now travel sealed under a GEK-derived subkey (`meshbay_common/groupbox.py`, mirrored by `sealGroup`/`openGroup` in `crypto.js`). Only `type`, `v`, `group_id` and the ack's `node_pk`/`proof`/`sig` stay in clear — a receiver must route and authenticate before it would trust a decryption. Verify, then decrypt. The ack line is integrity, not confidentiality: the signed handshake transcript names no ack field, so `is_node_admin`, `enabled_apps`, `video_root` and the rest were authenticated by the DTLS channel alone. The index line is defence in depth against a repeat of C1/C6 — a peer served before the handshake completes now gets ciphertext, not filenames. Nothing against an observer, the hub, or a member; that is the whole claim. `index_progress` stays clear (D3, counters only). Chat is out of scope. Failure is fatal: a payload that does not open ends the session naming the message type — never an empty index or an empty `enabled_apps`, both of which are legitimate states. Version negotiation ships here too (phase 15.6, brought forward): `v` + `v_min` on `handshake` and `handshake_challenge`, refused with `version_too_old` / `version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`. The flag day was already being paid for; the next breaking change now costs a refusal message. BREAKING CHANGE: breaks the WebRTC wire every deployed client speaks. Hub and every node must deploy together; the SPA is served by the hub, so a browser picks up the new client on reload. See MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md §11.1a, §13.1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HkzbhmMmK8PqQBtGz5zCvY --- docs/devel-phases-next.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'docs/devel-phases-next.md') diff --git a/docs/devel-phases-next.md b/docs/devel-phases-next.md index 48620ca..e842b62 100644 --- a/docs/devel-phases-next.md +++ b/docs/devel-phases-next.md @@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ flags. Additions that belong in the user-facing docs: | 15.3 | Node: decrypt chat on receive | Decrypt incoming chat messages, handle out-of-order | | 15.4 | Key rotation on removal | Member removed **or device revoked or unpinned** → all remaining devices rotate | | 15.5 | Chat retention config | Per-group `max_age_days` setting, periodic cleanup in ChatStore | -| 15.6 | MNP version negotiation | Handshake declares a supported version range, not a single `v` field (L2 — today `v` is sent by everyone and checked by no one). **Move this earlier**: it pairs with the minimum-client-version check, and version skew begins the day the desktop client ships (`desktop-client-v1.md` §2.6), not when chat is encrypted | +| 15.6 | MNP version negotiation | ✅ **DONE 2026-09-03**, and not here: it shipped with **MNP 1.0** (the sealed index and ack), which forced a coordinated deployment anyway. `handshake` and `handshake_challenge` each carry `v` and `v_min`; `check_version` refuses with `version_too_old` / `version_too_new` / `version_unreadable`, shaped like `not_a_member`. The flag day was already being paid for, so the next breaking change costs a refusal message instead of a second one. See `MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md` §13.1 | | 15.7 | Chat attachments | Attachments are ordinary files on the node and remain plaintext at rest. Either encrypt them under the sender key, or document the asymmetry explicitly. Note they now land in the **operator-designated upload root** (§6.7 of the desktop-client doc) | --- -- cgit v1.2.3