From 9f95bf2deaec0c31e5fac95e1068db40b878e217 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 17:48:56 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): moderator can no longer grant admin or hard-revoke accounts MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit admin_patch_user was gated by require_moderator but wrote `role` and `status` with no further check. A moderator could promote any account (an accomplice) to admin, demote an existing admin, or set status="revoked" — a straight path from the moderation role to full instance control. Split authorization by field: status between active/suspended stays at require_moderator (reversible content moderation); role changes, status="revoked", and touching an admin's account at all now require user_is_admin(current_user) (new helper in deps.py, alongside the existing require_admin/require_moderator). Regression test: test_moderator_cannot_change_roles_or_revoke. Third security review, finding H1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/admin.py | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/deps.py | 17 +++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/admin.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/admin.py index ab6fa07..4960674 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/admin.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/admin.py @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import func, select from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession from meshbay_hub.auth import decrypt_email -from meshbay_hub.api.deps import require_admin, require_moderator +from meshbay_hub.api.deps import require_admin, require_moderator, user_is_admin from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import get_connected_node_count, is_node_connected from meshbay_hub.db.engine import get_db from meshbay_hub.db.models import Group, GroupMember, IPLog, Node, User @@ -196,6 +196,25 @@ async def admin_patch_user( if user.id == current_user.id: raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot modify your own account") + # A moderator suspends and restores accounts — reversible content moderation. + # Changing what someone *is* (their role), and the one irreversible status + # (`revoked`, which is signed and broadcast to every node), are administrative. + # Without this split a moderator could promote an accomplice to admin, or + # revoke every admin, entirely from the moderation role. `admin_delete_user` + # already draws this exact line for the same reason. + privileged = body.role is not None or body.status == "revoked" + if privileged and not user_is_admin(current_user): + raise HTTPException( + status_code=403, + detail="Changing a role, or revoking an account, requires admin rights") + + # An admin's account is not a moderator's to touch at all — not their role, + # not their status. + if user_is_admin(user) and not user_is_admin(current_user): + raise HTTPException( + status_code=403, + detail="Only an admin can change another admin's account") + from meshbay_hub.api.notifications import create_notification if body.role is not None: diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/deps.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/deps.py index 1bf57a4..907a481 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/deps.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/deps.py @@ -72,11 +72,21 @@ async def require_user_scope( return current_user +def user_is_admin(user: User) -> bool: + """Admin by DB role or by the config allow-list. Use inside a handler that + already depends on `require_moderator` but has to draw the admin line for + one field (see `admin_patch_user`).""" + return user.role == "admin" or user.username in _admin_usernames + + +def user_is_moderator(user: User) -> bool: + return user.role in ("moderator", "admin") or user.username in _admin_usernames + + async def require_moderator( current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user), ) -> User: - if current_user.role not in ("moderator", "admin") \ - and current_user.username not in _admin_usernames: + if not user_is_moderator(current_user): raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Moderator access required") return current_user @@ -85,8 +95,7 @@ async def require_moderator( async def require_admin( current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user), ) -> User: - if current_user.role != "admin" \ - and current_user.username not in _admin_usernames: + if not user_is_admin(current_user): raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin access required") return current_user -- cgit v1.2.3 From 99eb93a00269fbfafba7536cf1613b3d4c18c3ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 17:49:05 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): require auth and distinct reporters for content reports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit POST /v1/reports had no authentication and no rate limit, and counted every raw report row toward AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD regardless of who sent it or from where — two anonymous requests naming any blake3 hash added it to the hub-wide content blocklist. A network-wide censorship and DoS primitive for anyone who learns a public file's hash. - require a signed-in account (get_current_user) - rate-limited (10/hour) - threshold now counts DISTINCT reporting accounts (reporter_id), one vote per account per hash; raised 2 -> 3 - refused outright (403) when the hub has public groups switched off: a private-only hub brokers no public content and nothing syncs the blocklist, so the endpoint would be pure abuse surface - admin blocklist management (/v1/admin/blocklist*) is untouched, so a manual block still works regardless of the public-groups setting Noted while fixing: no node currently consumes ContentBlocklist (swarm_register checks the separate CSAM list), so the network-wide block effect was latent — the abuse surface (DB fill, poisoned moderation signal) was live today. Tests rewritten in test_moderation.py. Third security review, finding H2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- .../meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/moderation.py | 90 +++++++++----- packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_moderation.py | 132 ++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/moderation.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/moderation.py index 853f255..0939eec 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/moderation.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/moderation.py @@ -1,13 +1,16 @@ """ MeshBay Hub — moderation endpoints. -Public reporting flow: - POST /v1/reports — report a content hash (no auth required) +Reporting flow: + POST /v1/reports — report a content hash (sign-in required) - Thresholds: - 1st report → logged, node admin notified (future: push notification) - 2nd report → content hash added to blocklist automatically - 3rd+ report → logged as repeat offense (escalation for human review) + Thresholds (counted as DISTINCT reporting accounts, not raw rows): + < AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD distinct reporters → logged + >= AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD distinct reporters → hash added to the blocklist + + The flow only runs while the hub brokers public content: with public groups + switched off instance-wide there is nothing here to serve a reported hash from, + so it is refused rather than left open as an unauthenticated write surface. Admin endpoints: GET /v1/admin/blocklist — list blocked hashes @@ -27,7 +30,9 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel from sqlalchemy import func, select from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession +from meshbay_hub import hub_settings from meshbay_hub.api.deps import get_current_user, require_admin +from meshbay_hub.api.middleware import limiter from meshbay_hub.api.netutil import client_ip from meshbay_hub.db.engine import get_db from meshbay_hub.db.models import ContentBlocklist, ContentReport, User @@ -36,7 +41,11 @@ log = logging.getLogger(__name__) router = APIRouter(tags=["moderation"]) -AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD = 2 # reports before automatic block +# Distinct reporting accounts before a hash is auto-blocked. Kept low for a +# responsive community signal, but note it is only as strong as account +# creation: while a bot can register freely (see the reCAPTCHA gap), the real +# control is the admin reviewing `GET /v1/admin/blocklist` and the audit log. +AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD = 3 # ── Models ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -56,34 +65,58 @@ class BlocklistAddRequest(BaseModel): # ── Public endpoints ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── @router.post("/v1/reports", status_code=201) +@limiter.limit("10/hour") async def report_content( body: ReportRequest, request: Request, + current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): - """Report a content hash. No authentication required.""" - if len(body.content_hash) != 64 or not all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in body.content_hash): - raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail="content_hash must be 64 hex chars (blake3)") + """ + Report a public content hash for moderation. - ip = client_ip(request) + Sign-in is required. It used to be anonymous, which made it a censorship + primitive: two unauthenticated POSTs naming any blake3 id auto-added it to + the blocklist that nodes enforce, network-wide, with manual admin removal the + only undo. The threshold now counts *distinct reporting accounts*, one vote + per account per hash. - # Count existing reports for this hash - count_result = await db.execute( - select(func.count()).where(ContentReport.content_hash == body.content_hash)) - count = count_result.scalar_one() + Refused entirely when the hub has public groups switched off: nothing here + brokers public content then, nothing syncs the blocklist, and an open write + endpoint would only be abuse surface. + """ + if not await hub_settings.public_groups_allowed(db): + raise HTTPException( + status_code=403, + detail="This hub does not broker public content, so there is nothing to report here.") - report = ContentReport( - content_hash=body.content_hash, - group_id=body.group_id, - reason=body.reason, - detail=body.detail, - ip_address=ip, - ) - db.add(report) + if len(body.content_hash) != 64 or not all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in body.content_hash): + raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail="content_hash must be 64 hex chars (blake3)") - action = "logged" - if count + 1 >= AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD: - # Check if already blocked + # One vote per account per hash — a single reporter must not be able to walk + # the threshold up on their own by posting repeatedly. + already = await db.scalar( + select(ContentReport.id).where( + ContentReport.content_hash == body.content_hash, + ContentReport.reporter_id == current_user.id)) + + if not already: + db.add(ContentReport( + content_hash=body.content_hash, + reporter_id=current_user.id, + group_id=body.group_id, + reason=body.reason, + detail=body.detail, + ip_address=client_ip(request), + )) + await db.flush() + + distinct_reporters = await db.scalar( + select(func.count(func.distinct(ContentReport.reporter_id))) + .where(ContentReport.content_hash == body.content_hash)) or 0 + + action = "already_reported" if already else "logged" + if distinct_reporters >= AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD: existing = await db.get(ContentBlocklist, body.content_hash) if not existing: db.add(ContentBlocklist( @@ -92,13 +125,14 @@ async def report_content( added_by="auto", )) action = "auto_blocked" - log.warning("Content auto-blocked after %d reports: %s", count + 1, body.content_hash[:16]) + log.warning("Content auto-blocked after %d distinct reporters: %s", + distinct_reporters, body.content_hash[:16]) await db.commit() return { "status": action, "content_hash": body.content_hash, - "report_count": count + 1, + "report_count": distinct_reporters, "threshold": AUTO_BLOCK_THRESHOLD, } diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_moderation.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_moderation.py index 93d23cd..6848929 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_moderation.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_moderation.py @@ -1,34 +1,58 @@ -"""Tests for moderation — reports + blocklist.""" +"""Tests for moderation — reports + blocklist. + +Reporting requires a signed-in account (it used to be anonymous, which made it a +network-wide censorship primitive), the auto-block threshold counts *distinct +reporting accounts*, and the whole flow is refused when the hub has public groups +switched off. +""" import pytest -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey -from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.x25519 import X25519PrivateKey -from meshbay_common.crypto import pk_to_b64 from meshbay_hub.api.deps import set_admin_usernames - FAKE_HASH = "a" * 64 # valid blake3 hex -@pytest.fixture -async def auth_headers(client): - sk_ed = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate() - sk_x = X25519PrivateKey.generate() +async def _register_and_login(client, username: str) -> dict: await client.post("/v1/users/register", json={ - "username": "mod_admin", "email": "m@t.com", "password": "modpass99", - "pk_user_ed25519": pk_to_b64(sk_ed.public_key()), - "pk_user_x25519": pk_to_b64(sk_x.public_key()), + "username": username, "email": f"{username}@t.com", + "password": "reporter99pw", }) r = await client.post("/v1/users/login", - json={"username": "mod_admin", "password": "modpass99"}) - set_admin_usernames(["mod_admin"]) + json={"username": username, "password": "reporter99pw"}) return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {r.json()['access_token']}"} +@pytest.fixture +async def reporter(client): + return await _register_and_login(client, "reporter_one") + + +@pytest.fixture +async def admin_headers(client): + headers = await _register_and_login(client, "mod_admin") + set_admin_usernames(["mod_admin"]) + return headers + + @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_report_content_logged(client): +async def test_report_requires_auth(client): + # No credentials at all — FastAPI rejects the missing header before the body. r = await client.post("/v1/reports", json={ "content_hash": FAKE_HASH, "reason": "illegal"}) + assert r.status_code in (401, 422) + + # A bogus token is a clean 401. + r = await client.post("/v1/reports", + json={"content_hash": FAKE_HASH, "reason": "illegal"}, + headers={"Authorization": "Bearer not-a-real-token"}) + assert r.status_code == 401 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_report_content_logged(client, reporter): + r = await client.post("/v1/reports", + json={"content_hash": FAKE_HASH, "reason": "illegal"}, + headers=reporter) assert r.status_code == 201 data = r.json() assert data["report_count"] == 1 @@ -36,43 +60,68 @@ async def test_report_content_logged(client): @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_auto_block_on_threshold(client): - """Second report triggers auto-block.""" - hash2 = "b" * 64 - await client.post("/v1/reports", json={"content_hash": hash2, "reason": "spam"}) - r = await client.post("/v1/reports", json={"content_hash": hash2, "reason": "spam"}) +async def test_same_reporter_cannot_walk_the_threshold(client, reporter): + h = "b" * 64 + for _ in range(5): + r = await client.post("/v1/reports", + json={"content_hash": h, "reason": "spam"}, + headers=reporter) + assert r.json()["report_count"] == 1 + assert r.json()["status"] == "already_reported" + + check = await client.get(f"/v1/blocklist/check?hash={h}") + assert check.json()["blocked"] is False + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_auto_block_on_distinct_reporters(client): + h = "c" * 64 + for i in range(3): + headers = await _register_and_login(client, f"rep_{i}") + r = await client.post("/v1/reports", + json={"content_hash": h, "reason": "illegal"}, + headers=headers) assert r.json()["status"] == "auto_blocked" - assert r.json()["report_count"] == 2 + assert r.json()["report_count"] == 3 + + check = await client.get(f"/v1/blocklist/check?hash={h}") + assert check.json()["blocked"] is True @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_blocklist_check(client): - hash3 = "c" * 64 - # Not blocked yet - r = await client.get(f"/v1/blocklist/check?hash={hash3}") - assert r.json()["blocked"] is False +async def test_reports_refused_when_public_groups_disabled(client, reporter, admin_headers): + await client.patch("/v1/admin/settings", + json={"allow_public_groups": False}, + headers=admin_headers) - # Report twice to auto-block - await client.post("/v1/reports", json={"content_hash": hash3, "reason": "illegal"}) - await client.post("/v1/reports", json={"content_hash": hash3, "reason": "illegal"}) + r = await client.post("/v1/reports", + json={"content_hash": "d" * 64, "reason": "illegal"}, + headers=reporter) + assert r.status_code == 403 - r = await client.get(f"/v1/blocklist/check?hash={hash3}") - assert r.json()["blocked"] is True + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_invalid_hash_rejected(client, reporter): + r = await client.post("/v1/reports", + json={"content_hash": "not-a-valid-blake3-hash", + "reason": "test"}, + headers=reporter) + assert r.status_code == 422 @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_admin_add_remove_blocklist(client, auth_headers): - hash4 = "d" * 64 +async def test_admin_add_remove_blocklist(client, admin_headers): + hash4 = "e" * 64 r = await client.post("/v1/admin/blocklist", json={"content_hash": hash4, "reason": "csam"}, - headers=auth_headers) + headers=admin_headers) assert r.status_code == 201 r = await client.get(f"/v1/blocklist/check?hash={hash4}") assert r.json()["blocked"] is True - r = await client.delete(f"/v1/admin/blocklist/{hash4}", headers=auth_headers) + r = await client.delete(f"/v1/admin/blocklist/{hash4}", headers=admin_headers) assert r.status_code == 200 r = await client.get(f"/v1/blocklist/check?hash={hash4}") @@ -80,18 +129,11 @@ async def test_admin_add_remove_blocklist(client, auth_headers): @pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_invalid_hash_rejected(client): - r = await client.post("/v1/reports", json={ - "content_hash": "not-a-valid-blake3-hash", "reason": "test"}) - assert r.status_code == 422 - - -@pytest.mark.asyncio -async def test_full_blocklist(client, auth_headers): - hash5 = "e" * 64 +async def test_full_blocklist(client, admin_headers): + hash5 = "f" * 64 await client.post("/v1/admin/blocklist", json={"content_hash": hash5, "reason": "test"}, - headers=auth_headers) + headers=admin_headers) r = await client.get("/v1/blocklist") assert r.status_code == 200 assert hash5 in r.json()["hashes"] -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7d8c774e250b134222374f45726d5426714475de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 17:49:13 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): enforce registration captcha for every client MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The server only checked the captcha when auth_key was absent — but every real client (browser included, via the password split) sends auth_key, so the check was off for everyone, and a bot skipped it by including the field. The Register form still made humans solve a widget whose token was never transmitted. Gate is now unconditional on captcha.enabled. The web client (registerUser in keyderive.js) forwards captcha.token; RegisterPage resets the (single-use) token on a failed attempt. The desktop client shares this UI source and is Chromium, so it renders the same widget (see the paired meshbay-client commit for the CSP change that allows it). Tests: test_register_captcha.py. Third security review, finding M1 (Option A). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py | 9 +++- .../src/meshbay_hub/static/auth-page.js | 9 +++- .../src/meshbay_hub/static/keyderive.js | 6 ++- .../meshbay-hub/tests/test_register_captcha.py | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_register_captcha.py (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py index 559cfa6..9b70b59 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py @@ -150,8 +150,13 @@ async def register( return {"user_id": found.id, "email_verification_required": True} raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Username already taken") - # Captcha gate — web path only (native clients send auth_key) - if _cfg and _cfg.captcha.enabled and not body.auth_key: + # Captcha gate — every fresh registration when a captcha is configured, with + # no client carve-out. The earlier `and not body.auth_key` exempted anything + # that sent an `auth_key`, which is *every* real client (the browser sends it + # too, from the password split) — so the check was off for everyone, and a + # bot skipped it by sending the field. The desktop client is Chromium and + # renders the same widget, so it has no need of an exemption either. + if _cfg and _cfg.captcha.enabled: await _verify_captcha_or_raise(body.captcha_token, request) # Email uniqueness (only active or pending accounts) diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/auth-page.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/auth-page.js index df08bc4..4c00137 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/auth-page.js +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/auth-page.js @@ -237,8 +237,11 @@ export function RegisterPage() { const rk = window.MeshBayKeys.generateRecoveryKey(); // `name` (trimmed), not the raw field: the hub stores the trimmed // username and every key derivation must fold in the same string. + // `captcha.token` rides along — the submit button is already disabled + // until it is set when a captcha is configured (see the form below). await window.MeshBayKeys.registerUser( - name, email, password, emailRecovery ? rk.mnemonic : null); + name, email, password, emailRecovery ? rk.mnemonic : null, + captcha.token); setRecoveryMnemonic(rk.mnemonic); session.recoveryKey = await window.MeshBayKeys.deriveRecoveryKey(rk.mnemonic, name); @@ -257,6 +260,10 @@ export function RegisterPage() { } } catch (err) { setError(err.message); + // A reCAPTCHA token is single-use: after a failed attempt (name taken, + // e-mail in use…) it is spent, so clear it and make the user solve a + // fresh one before the next try. No-op when no captcha is configured. + captcha.reset(); } finally { setLoading(false); } diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/keyderive.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/keyderive.js index 0aaa6a5..a540a94 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/keyderive.js +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/keyderive.js @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ async function decryptBundle(bundleB64, password, username) { * * Returns the raw private keys for immediate use after registration. */ -async function registerUser(username, email, password, recoveryMnemonic) { +async function registerUser(username, email, password, recoveryMnemonic, captchaToken) { // No keypair here any more. Identity keys are per node: one is generated the // first time this account joins a given node, encrypted under the passphrase, // and left with that node. So an operator who cracks what sits on their own @@ -291,6 +291,10 @@ async function registerUser(username, email, password, recoveryMnemonic) { // appends it to the verification e-mail and stores it nowhere // (docs/auth-confirm.md §4.4). Omitted when they chose to save it themselves. if (recoveryMnemonic) payload.recovery_key = recoveryMnemonic; + // reCAPTCHA response, when the hub has a captcha configured. The widget lives + // in RegisterPage (auth-page.js); this function just forwards its token. A + // hub with no captcha configured sends nothing and the server does not check. + if (captchaToken) payload.captcha_token = captchaToken; const resp = await hubCall('/v1/users/register', { method: 'POST', diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_register_captcha.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_register_captcha.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..befc1e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_register_captcha.py @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +"""Registration CAPTCHA is enforced for every fresh account when configured. + +The gate used to be skipped whenever the request carried an `auth_key` — which +every real client sends (the password split) — so it protected nobody and a bot +skipped it by including the field. It now runs on `captcha.enabled` alone; the +desktop client is Chromium and renders the same widget. +""" + +import pytest + + +@pytest.fixture +def captcha_on(client, monkeypatch): + """Turn on a fake captcha: any config with both keys is `enabled`, and + verification succeeds only for the token 'good-token'.""" + from meshbay_hub.api.users import _cfg + monkeypatch.setattr(_cfg.captcha, "site_key", "test-site") + monkeypatch.setattr(_cfg.captcha, "secret_key", "test-secret") + + async def fake_verify(secret, token, remote_ip=None): + return token == "good-token" + + monkeypatch.setattr("meshbay_hub.captcha.verify_captcha", fake_verify) + + +def _body(**over): + b = {"username": "newbie", "email": "newbie@t.com", "auth_key": "a" * 44} + b.update(over) + return b + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_missing_captcha_rejected_even_with_auth_key(client, captcha_on): + r = await client.post("/v1/users/register", json=_body()) + assert r.status_code == 400 + assert r.json()["detail"] == "captcha_required" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_bad_captcha_rejected(client, captcha_on): + r = await client.post("/v1/users/register", + json=_body(captcha_token="wrong")) + assert r.status_code == 400 + assert r.json()["detail"] == "captcha_failed" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_good_captcha_accepted(client, captcha_on): + r = await client.post("/v1/users/register", + json=_body(captcha_token="good-token")) + assert r.status_code == 201 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_no_captcha_configured_still_registers(client): + # Default test config has no captcha keys — registration proceeds without one. + r = await client.post("/v1/users/register", json=_body()) + assert r.status_code == 201 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6b38704d459dec1271c7ca883de3eb14190218f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 17:49:19 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): require user scope to add group members MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Every mutating group endpoint depends on require_user_scope except POST /v1/groups/{group_id}/members/{username}, which depended on get_current_user — so a node-scoped daemon token (or a stolen one) whose subject owns the group could add any existing user to it, contradicting NS7 ("operator manages groups from the browser only"). test_node_auth.py::test_node_scope_blocks_add_member already existed and was red on main; it passes now. Third security review, finding M6. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py index fdb0444..15c7a5d 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py @@ -586,9 +586,14 @@ async def update_group( async def add_group_member( group_id: str, username: str, - current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user), + current_user: User = Depends(require_user_scope), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): + # `require_user_scope`, like every other mutating group endpoint: a + # node-scoped daemon token must not manage membership (NS7 — the operator + # manages groups from the browser). This was the one membership endpoint + # still on `get_current_user`, so a node token could add members to its + # operator's own groups. group = await db.get(Group, group_id) if not group: raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Group not found") -- cgit v1.2.3 From 24d29e910c8d1649a1cd51969f27b921b94d97e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 19:50:22 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): constrain what a federated peer hub can do (MHP) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A registered peer was trusted with more than "advertise your own public groups": - `receive_directory` set `source_hub` from `body.hub_id`, so a peer could relay or spoof a third hub's groups into our directory. It is now bound to the token's verified `iss`. The push is also capped (500 groups/request, 2000/peer), rows are type- and length-checked, and a federated id that collides with a local group is refused so it cannot shadow one. - `receive_revocation` forwarded the peer's token to local nodes, which reject a token signed by another hub's key — a silent no-op, and there is no local node hosting a federated group anyway. It now verifies the inner token against the sending peer's key and, for `target == "group"`, prunes our copy of the peer's directory entry when `source_hub` matches. A peer cannot revoke our users or a group it did not advertise. - The state-changing endpoints (`POST /mhp/directory`, `/mhp/revoke`) now reject a replayed `jti` within the token's TTL. Audience binding is unavailable — the sending side that would set `aud` is unbuilt — and this covers the replay concern in its place; the idempotent `GET /mhp/directory` is not affected. Third security review, finding M4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- .../meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/federation.py | 124 +++++++++++--- packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_federation.py | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_federation.py (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/federation.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/federation.py index 7f1262d..b1e0e30 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/federation.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/federation.py @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ import uuid import jwt from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Header from pydantic import BaseModel -from sqlalchemy import select +from sqlalchemy import func, select from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession from meshbay_common import MHP_VERSION @@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ log = logging.getLogger(__name__) router = APIRouter(prefix="/mhp", tags=["federation"]) +# One push may not dump the world, and one peer may not fill the table. +MAX_FEDERATED_GROUPS_PER_PUSH = 500 +MAX_FEDERATED_GROUPS_PER_PEER = 2000 + +# Seen `jti` values for the state-changing MHP endpoints, pruned lazily. The +# sending side that would set an `aud` claim is unbuilt, so audience binding is +# not available; this stops a captured POST /mhp/directory or /mhp/revoke from +# being replayed inside the token's short TTL. GET /mhp/directory is idempotent +# and not covered. +_seen_mhp_jti: dict[str, float] = {} + def _issue_mhp_token(target_hub_id: str) -> str: """Issue a short-lived JWT for authenticating to a peer hub.""" @@ -57,9 +68,15 @@ def _issue_mhp_token(target_hub_id: str) -> str: async def _verify_mhp_token( - token: str, db: AsyncSession, expected_aud: str | None = None, + token: str, db: AsyncSession, *, single_use: bool = False, ) -> dict: - """Verify a JWT from a peer hub using DB-stored public key.""" + """ + Verify a JWT from a peer hub against its DB-stored public key and return the + payload. + + `single_use=True` (the state-changing endpoints) additionally rejects a + replayed `jti` within the token's lifetime. + """ unverified = jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False}) sender_id = unverified.get("iss") @@ -67,15 +84,22 @@ async def _verify_mhp_token( if not peer: raise PermissionError(f"Unknown hub: {sender_id!r}. Register as peer first.") - options = {} - if expected_aud: - options["audience"] = expected_aud - decoded = jwt.decode( token, peer.pk_hub_pem.encode(), algorithms=["EdDSA"], - options=options, + options={"require": ["exp", "iss"]}, ) + + if single_use: + now = time.time() + for j, exp in list(_seen_mhp_jti.items()): + if exp < now: + _seen_mhp_jti.pop(j, None) + jti = decoded.get("jti", "") + if not jti or jti in _seen_mhp_jti: + raise PermissionError("MHP token replay") + _seen_mhp_jti[jti] = float(decoded.get("exp", now + 300)) + return decoded @@ -142,30 +166,50 @@ async def receive_directory( db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): try: - await _verify_mhp_token(authorization.removeprefix("Bearer "), db) + payload = await _verify_mhp_token( + authorization.removeprefix("Bearer "), db, single_use=True) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail=str(e)) + # `source_hub` is the signer of this request, never `body.hub_id` — a peer + # does not get to relay or spoof a third hub's groups into our directory. + sender = payload["iss"] + if len(body.groups) > MAX_FEDERATED_GROUPS_PER_PUSH: + raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Too many groups in one push") + from datetime import datetime, timezone now = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + have = await db.scalar( + select(func.count()).select_from(FederatedGroup) + .where(FederatedGroup.source_hub == sender)) or 0 + count = 0 for g in body.groups: - existing = await db.get(FederatedGroup, g["id"]) - if existing: - existing.name = g.get("name", existing.name) - existing.join_policy = g.get("join_policy", existing.join_policy) - existing.updated_at = now + gid = str(g.get("id", ""))[:36] + name = str(g.get("name", ""))[:128] + jp = g.get("join_policy", "invite") + if not gid or jp not in ("invite", "open"): + continue + # A federated id must never shadow a real local group. + if await db.get(Group, gid): + log.warning("Federated id %s collides with a local group — skipped", gid[:8]) + continue + row = await db.get(FederatedGroup, gid) + if row: + if row.source_hub != sender: + continue # only the hub that advertised it may update it + row.name = name or row.name + row.join_policy = jp + row.updated_at = now else: + if have + count >= MAX_FEDERATED_GROUPS_PER_PEER: + break db.add(FederatedGroup( - id=g["id"], - name=g.get("name", ""), - source_hub=body.hub_id, - join_policy=g.get("join_policy", "invite"), - )) + id=gid, name=name, source_hub=sender, join_policy=jp)) count += 1 await db.commit() - log.info("Persisted %d groups from hub %s", count, body.hub_id[:16]) - return {"accepted": count, "from_hub": body.hub_id} + log.info("Persisted %d groups from hub %s", count, sender[:16]) + return {"accepted": count, "from_hub": sender} # ── Revocation propagation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -179,15 +223,43 @@ async def receive_revocation( authorization: str = Header(...), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): + """ + Act on a revocation from a peer hub. + + This does **not** reach local nodes: nothing here hosts a federated group, + and a local node would reject a token signed by another hub's key anyway + (that path was a silent no-op). What a peer may legitimately revoke is a + group *it advertised to us* — so this prunes our copy of the peer's + directory. Users are per-hub; a peer does not get to revoke ours. + """ try: - await _verify_mhp_token(authorization.removeprefix("Bearer "), db) + payload = await _verify_mhp_token( + authorization.removeprefix("Bearer "), db, single_use=True) except Exception as e: raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail=str(e)) - from meshbay_hub.api.revocation import broadcast_revocation - sent = await broadcast_revocation(body.token) - log.info("Propagated revocation to %d local nodes", sent) - return {"propagated_to": sent} + sender = payload["iss"] + peer = await db.get(HubPeer, sender) + try: + inner = jwt.decode( + body.token, peer.pk_hub_pem.encode(), algorithms=["EdDSA"], + options={"verify_exp": False}) + except Exception as e: + raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Bad revocation token: {e}") + + if inner.get("type") != "revocation" or inner.get("target") != "group": + return {"pruned": 0, "note": "federation may only revoke groups it advertised"} + + target_id = inner.get("target_id", "") + row = await db.get(FederatedGroup, target_id) + pruned = 0 + if row and row.source_hub == sender: + await db.delete(row) + await db.commit() + pruned = 1 + log.info("Federated group %s revoked by %s (pruned=%d)", + target_id[:8], sender[:16], pruned) + return {"pruned": pruned} # ── Peer management (admin) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_federation.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_federation.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6035b0c --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_federation.py @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +""" +MHP federation — what a registered peer hub may and may not do. + +A peer is trusted enough to advertise its own public groups into our directory +and to withdraw them. It is not trusted to speak for a third hub, to shadow a +local group, to revoke our users, or to replay a state-changing request. +""" + +import base64 +import hashlib +import time +import uuid + +import jwt +import pytest +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization +from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey +from meshbay_hub.api.deps import set_admin_usernames + + +def _auth_key(password: str, username: str) -> str: + salt = hashlib.sha256(f"meshbay:auth:v1:{username}".encode()).digest() + return base64.b64encode( + hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac("sha512", password.encode(), salt, 600_000, 32)).decode() + + +async def _admin(client, username="root"): + pw = "a-long-enough-passphrase" + await client.post("/v1/users/register", json={ + "username": username, "email": f"{username}@example.com", + "auth_key": _auth_key(pw, username)}) + set_admin_usernames([username]) + r = await client.post("/v1/users/login", json={ + "username": username, "auth_key": _auth_key(pw, username)}) + return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {r.json()['access_token']}"} + + +class Peer: + def __init__(self, hub_id: str): + self.hub_id = hub_id + self._sk = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate() + self.pk_pem = self._sk.public_key().public_bytes( + serialization.Encoding.PEM, + serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo).decode() + + def _sk_pem(self) -> bytes: + return self._sk.private_bytes( + serialization.Encoding.PEM, serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8, + serialization.NoEncryption()) + + def envelope(self, jti: str | None = None) -> str: + now = int(time.time()) + return jwt.encode( + {"iss": self.hub_id, "sub": self.hub_id, + "jti": jti or str(uuid.uuid4()), "iat": now, "exp": now + 300}, + self._sk_pem(), algorithm="EdDSA") + + def revocation(self, target: str, target_id: str) -> str: + return jwt.encode( + {"type": "revocation", "target": target, "target_id": target_id, + "iss": self.hub_id, "iat": int(time.time())}, + self._sk_pem(), algorithm="EdDSA") + + def header(self, **kw) -> dict: + return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.envelope(**kw)}"} + + +async def _register_peer(client, admin, peer: Peer): + r = await client.post("/mhp/peers", headers=admin, json={ + "hub_id": peer.hub_id, "hub_url": f"https://{peer.hub_id}", + "pk_hub_pem": peer.pk_pem}) + assert r.status_code == 201, r.text + + +# ── receive_directory ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_unknown_peer_is_refused(client): + stranger = Peer("nobody.example") + r = await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=stranger.header(), + json={"hub_id": "nobody.example", "groups": []}) + assert r.status_code == 401 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_source_hub_is_the_signer_not_the_body(client): + admin = await _admin(client) + peer = Peer("peer-a.example") + await _register_peer(client, admin, peer) + + r = await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=peer.header(), json={ + "hub_id": "peer-b.example", # claims to relay another hub + "groups": [{"id": "g-1", "name": "Shared", "join_policy": "open"}]}) + assert r.status_code == 202 + + listing = (await client.get("/v1/groups")).json()["groups"] + row = next(g for g in listing if g["id"] == "g-1") + assert row["source"] == "peer-a.example" # the signer, not "peer-b.example" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_federated_id_cannot_shadow_a_local_group(client): + admin = await _admin(client) + peer = Peer("peer-a.example") + await _register_peer(client, admin, peer) + + owner = await _admin(client, "owner") + r = await client.post("/v1/groups", headers=owner, json={ + "name": "mine", "visibility": "public", "join_policy": "open"}) + local_id = r.json()["group_id"] + + r = await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=peer.header(), json={ + "hub_id": peer.hub_id, + "groups": [{"id": local_id, "name": "evil twin", "join_policy": "open"}]}) + assert r.status_code == 202 + assert r.json()["accepted"] == 0 + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_state_changing_token_cannot_be_replayed(client): + admin = await _admin(client) + peer = Peer("peer-a.example") + await _register_peer(client, admin, peer) + + env = peer.envelope(jti="fixed-jti") + h = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {env}"} + body = {"hub_id": peer.hub_id, + "groups": [{"id": "g-9", "name": "Once", "join_policy": "open"}]} + + assert (await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=h, json=body)).status_code == 202 + assert (await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=h, json=body)).status_code == 401 + + +# ── receive_revocation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_peer_may_withdraw_its_own_group(client): + admin = await _admin(client) + peer = Peer("peer-a.example") + await _register_peer(client, admin, peer) + + await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=peer.header(), json={ + "hub_id": peer.hub_id, + "groups": [{"id": "g-77", "name": "Bye", "join_policy": "open"}]}) + assert any(g["id"] == "g-77" for g in (await client.get("/v1/groups")).json()["groups"]) + + r = await client.post("/mhp/revoke", headers=peer.header(), + json={"token": peer.revocation("group", "g-77")}) + assert r.status_code == 202 and r.json()["pruned"] == 1 + assert not any(g["id"] == "g-77" for g in (await client.get("/v1/groups")).json()["groups"]) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_a_peer_cannot_withdraw_another_hubs_group(client): + admin = await _admin(client) + a, b = Peer("peer-a.example"), Peer("peer-b.example") + await _register_peer(client, admin, a) + await _register_peer(client, admin, b) + + await client.post("/mhp/directory", headers=a.header(), json={ + "hub_id": a.hub_id, + "groups": [{"id": "g-a", "name": "A's", "join_policy": "open"}]}) + + # b signs a revocation for a's group and presents it under b's envelope. + r = await client.post("/mhp/revoke", headers=b.header(), + json={"token": b.revocation("group", "g-a")}) + assert r.status_code == 202 and r.json()["pruned"] == 0 + assert any(g["id"] == "g-a" for g in (await client.get("/v1/groups")).json()["groups"]) + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_federation_cannot_revoke_a_user(client): + admin = await _admin(client) + peer = Peer("peer-a.example") + await _register_peer(client, admin, peer) + + r = await client.post("/mhp/revoke", headers=peer.header(), + json={"token": peer.revocation("user", "some-user-id")}) + assert r.status_code == 202 and r.json()["pruned"] == 0 -- cgit v1.2.3 From f2915bc7b1550b80cadfa36f5910223106cb3bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 20:03:03 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): send a CSP and protective headers on every response MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The SPA shell and its assets went out with no Content-Security-Policy and no X-Content-Type-Options / Referrer-Policy / X-Frame-Options — so an injection that reached the SPA (rendered third-party OpenGraph data, a federated group name, chat content) had nothing stopping it from loading more code or exfiltrating to any host, and the page could be framed by any site. A middleware in `create_app` now adds all four to every response. `webapp.CSP` is deliberately the *same* policy the desktop client's protocol handler already enforces on these exact UI files, plus the two reCAPTCHA hosts the sign-up widget needs: `default-src 'none'`, `script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' ` (the hub's own origin is not a script source — T3), `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` (htm/preact inline `style=` only, nothing executes), `connect-src 'self' https: wss:`, `frame-ancestors 'none'`, `base-uri 'none'`, `form-action 'none'`. The shell's dead `` is removed (nothing has ever read it) so `script-src` needs no inline allowance. Needs verification against the running SPA — a mis-tuned CSP shows as a blank page — but it matches a policy already proven with these files under Electron. Second-review L5 / third-review M5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py | 31 ++++++++++- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py | 17 +++++- .../meshbay-hub/tests/test_security_headers.py | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_security_headers.py (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py index 0821809..6dfd3ed 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ STATIC_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "static" router = APIRouter(tags=["webapp"]) # Assets the shell pulls in, in load order. Everything else is imported by -# app.js and rides on the same query string via window.__MB_ASSET_V. +# app.js from a relative path, which inherits the `/a//` prefix the shell +# loaded app.js under — so the whole module graph moves together. # Every module the page loads. A file missing from here is a file whose change # does not move the URL, so a browser holding the old one never asks for it — # which is the failure this list exists to prevent, and it is silent. @@ -77,6 +78,33 @@ ASSET_V = _asset_version() _NO_STORE = {"Cache-Control": "no-store"} +# Content-Security-Policy for the whole hub, applied by a middleware in app.py. +# +# This is the *same* policy the desktop client's protocol handler already sends +# for these exact UI files (`meshbay-client/src/main.js`), plus the two reCAPTCHA +# hosts the sign-up widget loads its script, challenge iframe and images from. +# `'unsafe-inline'` is style-only — htm/preact set inline `style=` attributes +# everywhere; nothing inline executes, and the shell below carries no inline +# ` diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py index 76d7ec0..2daa55b 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ from meshbay_hub.api.relay import router as relay_router from meshbay_hub.api.signaling import router as signaling_router from meshbay_hub.api.admin import router as admin_router from meshbay_hub.api.notifications import router as notifications_router -from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V +from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V, CSP from meshbay_hub.api.middleware import limiter @@ -142,6 +142,21 @@ def create_app(cfg: HubConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI: app.state.limiter = limiter app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler) + @app.middleware("http") + async def _security_headers(request, call_next): + """ + Second-review L5, third-review M5: the SPA shell and its assets went out + with no CSP and no other protective headers. This adds them everywhere — + `webapp.CSP` is the same policy the desktop client already enforces on + these exact files. `setdefault` so a route that sets its own wins. + """ + response = await call_next(request) + response.headers.setdefault("Content-Security-Policy", CSP) + response.headers.setdefault("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff") + response.headers.setdefault("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin") + response.headers.setdefault("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") + return response + # Routers (webapp last — catches / before API routes) app.include_router(hub_router) app.include_router(users_router) diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_security_headers.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_security_headers.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4d7e6d --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_security_headers.py @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +""" +The hub sends a Content-Security-Policy and the other protective headers on +every response — the SPA shell, its assets, and the API alike. + +Second-review L5 / third-review M5: previously there were none, so an injection +that landed in the SPA (rendered third-party OG data, a federated group name, +chat content) had nothing stopping it from loading more code or exfiltrating. +""" + +import pytest +from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import CSP + + +def _directive(csp: str, name: str) -> str: + for part in csp.split(";"): + part = part.strip() + if part == name or part.startswith(name + " "): + return part + return "" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_the_spa_shell_carries_the_policy(client): + r = await client.get("/") + assert r.headers["content-security-policy"] == CSP + assert r.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff" + assert r.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY" + assert "referrer-policy" in r.headers + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_the_api_carries_the_headers_too(client): + r = await client.get("/v1/health") + assert r.status_code == 200 + assert "content-security-policy" in r.headers + assert r.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff" + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_even_a_404_carries_the_headers(client): + # The middleware runs on every response, so a probe for a missing path + # cannot be framed or content-sniffed either. + r = await client.get("/no/such/path") + assert r.status_code == 404 + assert r.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY" + + +def test_the_policy_is_locked_down_where_it_matters(): + assert "default-src 'none'" in CSP # covers object-src, etc. + assert _directive(CSP, "frame-ancestors") == "frame-ancestors 'none'" + assert _directive(CSP, "base-uri") == "base-uri 'none'" + + script = _directive(CSP, "script-src") + # The hub's own origin must not be able to serve executable script (T3): + # 'self' and the wasm token are fine, a bare `https:` scheme is not. + assert "'self'" in script and "'wasm-unsafe-eval'" in script + assert "https:" not in script.split() + + +def test_recaptcha_is_the_only_external_origin(): + hosts = {"https://www.google.com", "https://www.gstatic.com"} + for part in CSP.split(";"): + for tok in part.strip().split()[1:]: + if tok.startswith(("http://", "https://")): + assert tok in hosts, f"unexpected external origin in CSP: {tok}" -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1e6db7d23c70b7bd7e1422f09911b3645f0fb2e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 20:50:45 +0200 Subject: revert(hub): M6 — add_group_member must keep accepting node tokens MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit M6 in the third review was a misread. `add_group_member` accepting a node-scoped token is deliberate (commit 0443cf8): the node calls POST /v1/groups/{id}/members/{username} after a CLI `member invite` so the group shows up in the invitee's SPA, authenticating with a node-scoped token. `group.admin_id == caller` is the real guard. An older test (`test_node_scope_blocks_add_member`) asserted the opposite and had been left red on main; the M6 "fix" (commit 6b38704) satisfied that test by switching the dependency to `require_user_scope` — which made `ops.create_invite`'s hub-membership call 403. That exception is swallowed with a log.warning, so an invited user silently never lands in group_members and the group is invisible to them. Reported from live testing (CLI `member invite grenet`, grenet saw nothing). Dependency back to `get_current_user`. The stale test now asserts the intended behaviour: a node token may add a member to its own operator's group (201) but not to a group it does not own (403). Third-review M6 marked WITHDRAWN. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- docs/third-review.md | 63 +++++++++++++--------- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py | 14 ++--- packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_node_auth.py | 23 +++++--- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/docs/third-review.md b/docs/third-review.md index 6839ef7..531f73e 100644 --- a/docs/third-review.md +++ b/docs/third-review.md @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ and a few of the second-review fixes did not reach every path. running SPA. None of this breaks the architecture. The cryptographic core and the trust model -are unchanged and still sound. Every finding in this review (H1, H2, M1–M6) was +are unchanged and still sound. H1, H2 and M1–M5 were fixed on 2026-09-01; what is left is the L-list — opportunistic hardening, not a hole — plus verifying the SPA CSP (M5) against the live app. @@ -502,24 +502,32 @@ hashes to the `