From f2915bc7b1550b80cadfa36f5910223106cb3bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 20:03:03 +0200 Subject: fix(hub): send a CSP and protective headers on every response MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The SPA shell and its assets went out with no Content-Security-Policy and no X-Content-Type-Options / Referrer-Policy / X-Frame-Options — so an injection that reached the SPA (rendered third-party OpenGraph data, a federated group name, chat content) had nothing stopping it from loading more code or exfiltrating to any host, and the page could be framed by any site. A middleware in `create_app` now adds all four to every response. `webapp.CSP` is deliberately the *same* policy the desktop client's protocol handler already enforces on these exact UI files, plus the two reCAPTCHA hosts the sign-up widget needs: `default-src 'none'`, `script-src 'self' 'wasm-unsafe-eval' ` (the hub's own origin is not a script source — T3), `style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'` (htm/preact inline `style=` only, nothing executes), `connect-src 'self' https: wss:`, `frame-ancestors 'none'`, `base-uri 'none'`, `form-action 'none'`. The shell's dead `` is removed (nothing has ever read it) so `script-src` needs no inline allowance. Needs verification against the running SPA — a mis-tuned CSP shows as a blank page — but it matches a policy already proven with these files under Electron. Second-review L5 / third-review M5. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG --- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-- packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py | 17 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py index 0821809..6dfd3ed 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/webapp.py @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ STATIC_DIR = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "static" router = APIRouter(tags=["webapp"]) # Assets the shell pulls in, in load order. Everything else is imported by -# app.js and rides on the same query string via window.__MB_ASSET_V. +# app.js from a relative path, which inherits the `/a//` prefix the shell +# loaded app.js under — so the whole module graph moves together. # Every module the page loads. A file missing from here is a file whose change # does not move the URL, so a browser holding the old one never asks for it — # which is the failure this list exists to prevent, and it is silent. @@ -77,6 +78,33 @@ ASSET_V = _asset_version() _NO_STORE = {"Cache-Control": "no-store"} +# Content-Security-Policy for the whole hub, applied by a middleware in app.py. +# +# This is the *same* policy the desktop client's protocol handler already sends +# for these exact UI files (`meshbay-client/src/main.js`), plus the two reCAPTCHA +# hosts the sign-up widget loads its script, challenge iframe and images from. +# `'unsafe-inline'` is style-only — htm/preact set inline `style=` attributes +# everywhere; nothing inline executes, and the shell below carries no inline +# ` diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py index 76d7ec0..2daa55b 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ from meshbay_hub.api.relay import router as relay_router from meshbay_hub.api.signaling import router as signaling_router from meshbay_hub.api.admin import router as admin_router from meshbay_hub.api.notifications import router as notifications_router -from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V +from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V, CSP from meshbay_hub.api.middleware import limiter @@ -142,6 +142,21 @@ def create_app(cfg: HubConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI: app.state.limiter = limiter app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler) + @app.middleware("http") + async def _security_headers(request, call_next): + """ + Second-review L5, third-review M5: the SPA shell and its assets went out + with no CSP and no other protective headers. This adds them everywhere — + `webapp.CSP` is the same policy the desktop client already enforces on + these exact files. `setdefault` so a route that sets its own wins. + """ + response = await call_next(request) + response.headers.setdefault("Content-Security-Policy", CSP) + response.headers.setdefault("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff") + response.headers.setdefault("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin") + response.headers.setdefault("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") + return response + # Routers (webapp last — catches / before API routes) app.include_router(hub_router) app.include_router(users_router) -- cgit v1.2.3