From fe30860c58e0f1b1efd457ff5eb5146d1e592da0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 01:03:43 +0200 Subject: feat: passphrase change and account recovery (auth-confirm) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The passphrase derives two independent client-side values: auth_key (the hub verifier) and bundle_key (AES-GCM key for the per-node identity bundles, which live on nodes and never on the hub). Changing or recovering a passphrase is therefore two operations — swap the hub verifier, and re-wrap every reachable node's identity bundle. Flow A — change a known passphrase (Profile page) - POST /v1/users/password re-proves the current passphrase, swaps pw_hash/salt/version, revokes every refresh token and returns a fresh pair so the tab that made the change stays signed in. - MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes: for every group's online node, connect with the old key, read the identity off the handshake, store it back under the new key. Returns updated / unreachable / failed so the UI can point at the operator-unpin fallback for the gaps. Always-shown confirmation dialog listing reachable and unreachable groups. Recovery key - keyderive.js generateRecoveryKey (32 random bytes, grouped Base32) and deriveRecoveryKey (HKDF-SHA256, domain meshbay:recovery:v1:). - Every per-node identity gets a second copy wrapped under the recovery key: keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery (node-only column, added in _SCHEMA_KEYPAIR and via a PRAGMA-guarded ALTER for existing DBs), carried on keypair_bundle_store / _resp. MNP 0.13 -> 0.14, additive. - session.recoveryKey is persisted in IndexedDB (slot rk) and lazy-loaded on connect, so a group joined in any later session still leaves a recovery copy. - Shown once at registration; optionally folded into the verification e-mail as a pass-through the hub never stores or logs, with an opt-out. - Profile -> Recovery key re-loads R and backfills every reachable node via rewrapAllNodes in bundleKey mode (no passphrase re-entry). Flow B — recover a lost passphrase (#/reset, linked from sign-in) - POST /v1/users/password/reset-request {username, email}: both must be the pair on file, checked against the blind email_hash (never decrypted). A mismatch — wrong e-mail, unknown username, non-active account — takes the identical no-op path (no code, no mail, same 200), so it reveals nothing and cannot be used to spray reset mail from a username alone. 5/min, 1-hour single-use code. - POST /v1/users/password/reset {username, code, new_auth_key}: same expiry / attempts / single-use checks as e-mail verification; revokes every session and deletes every registered device key so a stored one cannot sign back in past the reset. - ResetPasswordPage: request code -> code + optional recovery key + new passphrase -> reset + sign-in -> fan-out. connect() falls back to the recovery-wrapped copy when the passphrase key cannot open bundle_enc. Without a recovery key: sign-in is restored and each group needs the operator-unpin fallback. Supporting fixes (found in live testing) - member unpin now also deletes the keypair bundle; connect() mints a fresh identity when handed a bundle it cannot open (unless _rewrapOnly, set by rewrapAllNodes), so a rejoin completes instead of dead-ending before the invite-code prompt. - A browser with no bundle key gets a passphrase prompt on the group page instead of a "go back to the browser you registered on" message. - RegisterPage / LoginPage / ResetPasswordPage trim the username so every key derivation matches the hub's stored form. Docs: docs/auth-confirm.md. Locale keys across all ten catalogues. Tests: test_password_change, test_password_reset, test_recovery_email, test_recovery_key, test_rewrap_fanout, test_bundle_store_recovery, plus additions to test_admin_ops_mnp and test_webrtc_transport. Hub suite 492 passed; node suite 741 passed (the lone test_packaging_units failure is a pre-existing RPM-spec flake, reproducible on main). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGkxJW9br8Y9bhT8ywJ3oc --- packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py index 07579cd..cd5dc32 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py @@ -219,6 +219,16 @@ async def unpin_member(state: dict, user_id: str) -> dict: roster = _roster(state) if not await roster.unpin(user_id): raise OpError("No such pinned identity", status=404) + # Drop the stored keypair bundle too. Left behind, it is served to the next + # connection, which then cannot open it (the passphrase may have changed + # since) and dies in the identity step before it ever reaches the join the + # unpin was meant to enable. + bundle_store = state.get("bundle_store") + if bundle_store: + try: + await bundle_store.delete_keypair(user_id) + except Exception: + log.warning("unpin: could not drop keypair bundle for %s", user_id[:8]) log.info("Identity unpinned: user=%s", user_id[:8]) return {"status": "unpinned", "user_id": user_id} -- cgit v1.2.3