From f3fb449f3a943096a2569dc383f2819a612bccd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Besson Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2026 22:06:45 +0200 Subject: feat(node): an upload lands in the folder it was sent to MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit There is no `uploads/` subdirectory any more, and the client names the folder rather than the root. It was the last of v5's quarantine — the per-user layer went on 2026-08-14 for the same reason — and it goes on the same grounds: a folder appearing beside the operator's library because somebody sent a file is the node deciding how their disk is arranged. Somebody dropping a file into the folder they are looking at expects it to be in that folder. **What made the quarantine worth having was never the subdirectory.** It is the filename allowlist, the size cap, the chunk ordering and the no-overwrite rule, and all four are untouched: an existing file is never replaced, the second sender of IMG_1234.jpg gets a free name, and the check still sits at the write. Letting the client choose the destination is safe for one reason and only one: it is resolved through `RootSet.resolve()`, which refuses `..`, absolute segments and anything whose resolved form escapes its root, symlinks included. A member answers "which of this group's folders", never "which path on the operator's disk" — and the test that used to assert the node chose now asserts that, with six shapes of escape. `direct` goes with it. Its only job was to say "no subdirectory for this root", which is now every root, and a config flag that does nothing is worse than none. Chat's attachment folder finally does something: the directory the operator picks in the Chat settings pane is where attachments are written, falling back to the first writable root while they have not chosen one, or if the one they chose has since been made read-only or ejected — a stale choice should not become a refusal at send time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pvMdvLBG92jyhvD5pD6us --- packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/config.py | 3 +- packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py | 3 +- packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/roots.py | 6 +- .../src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py | 55 +++++++++---- .../tests/test_root_writable_policy.py | 8 +- .../tests/test_security_regressions.py | 90 +++++++++++++--------- 6 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) (limited to 'packages/meshbay-node') diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/config.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/config.py index 4712312..7673a51 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/config.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/config.py @@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ class RootSpec: kind: str = "generic" # generic|video|audio|photo — a view hint, unused for now writable: bool = False # RW roots accept uploads from group members removable: bool = False # operator can eject this root before unplugging the device - direct: bool = False # uploads land at root path, not in a subdirectory @dataclass @@ -225,7 +224,7 @@ class GroupConfig: for r in self.roots: r.writable = False self.roots.append(RootSpec( - path=self.upload_dir.strip(), writable=True, direct=True)) + path=self.upload_dir.strip(), writable=True)) @dataclass diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py index 5b10452..3dfdc23 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/ops.py @@ -679,8 +679,7 @@ async def add_root(state: dict, group_id: str, path: str, *, from meshbay_node.config import RootSpec cfg.roots.append(RootSpec( path=str(added.path), name=added.name, kind=added.kind, - writable=added.writable, removable=added.removable, - direct=added.direct)) + writable=added.writable, removable=added.removable)) # Deliberately *not* mutating the live RootSet in place. # diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/roots.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/roots.py index 9d3f7cb..ffe801c 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/roots.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/roots.py @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ class Root: kind: str = "generic" writable: bool = False removable: bool = False - direct: bool = False ejected: bool = False available: bool = True @@ -226,8 +225,7 @@ class RootSet: writable=writable, removable=bool(spec.get("removable", False)), ejected=bool(spec.get("ejected", False)), - available=not bool(spec.get("ejected", False)), - direct=bool(spec.get("direct", False))) + available=not bool(spec.get("ejected", False))) _refuse_nesting(root, roots) roots.append(root) by_folded[root.folded] = root @@ -370,8 +368,6 @@ class RootSet: "ejected": r.ejected, # Backward compat for MNP 1.0 clients "upload": r.writable} - if r.direct: - d["direct"] = True out.append(d) return out diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py index d341d8c..61458f2 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py @@ -214,7 +214,6 @@ JOIN_FAILURE_WINDOW = 600 # seconds # attachments from the chat alike. One visible directory the operator can look # into, back up or empty — rather than a hidden tree of per-user uuids that # nobody could read, or files scattered wherever someone happened to be looking. -UPLOAD_DIR_NAME = "uploads" def _extract_dtls_fingerprint(sdp: str) -> bytes: @@ -4016,7 +4015,12 @@ class WebRTCPeerSession: # later — the same reason the old single upload root was never guessed. # A client that names nothing is an MNP 1.0 one, and there was exactly # one destination in its world: the first writable root. - target_root_name = str(msg.get("root") or "").strip() + # `dir` is the folder being browsed, as a virtual path + # (`Media/Films/1999`); `root` is the older, coarser form and is what + # its first segment means on its own. + target_rel = str(msg.get("dir") or "").strip().strip("/") + target_root_name = (target_rel.split("/")[0] if target_rel + else str(msg.get("root") or "").strip()) upload_root = None if target_root_name: upload_root = roots.by_name(target_root_name) @@ -4052,18 +4056,43 @@ class WebRTCPeerSession: "filename": filename}) return - if upload_root.direct: - rel_dir = upload_root.name - target_dir = upload_root.path + # The folder the sender is looking at, and no subdirectory of the node's + # invention. + # + # Uploads used to be confined to `/uploads/`, created on demand. + # That was the last of v5's quarantine (the per-user layer went on + # 2026-08-14, for the same reason): a shared directory nobody can + # organise is not a shared directory, and a folder appearing beside the + # operator's library because somebody sent a file is the node deciding + # how their disk is arranged. + # + # What made the quarantine worth having is not the subdirectory — it is + # the filename allowlist, the size cap, the chunk ordering, and the + # no-overwrite rule below. All four are unchanged. + # + # `resolve()` and not a join: it refuses `..`, absolute segments and + # anything whose resolved form escapes its root, symlinks included. The + # client names *where among the group's own folders*, never a path on + # the operator's filesystem. + if target_rel: + target_dir = roots.resolve(target_rel) + if target_dir is None or not target_dir.is_dir(): + self._send({"type": "error", + "detail": "Not a directory in this group", + "code": "no_such_directory", + "filename": filename}) + return + rel_dir = target_rel else: - rel_dir = f"{upload_root.name}/{UPLOAD_DIR_NAME}" - target_dir = upload_root.path / UPLOAD_DIR_NAME - try: - target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - except OSError as e: - log.warning("Cannot create upload folder in root %r: %s", - upload_root.name, e) - self._send({"type": "error", "detail": "Upload folder unavailable", + # An MNP 1.0 client names nothing; the root itself is where its one + # destination now is. + target_dir = upload_root.path + rel_dir = upload_root.name + if not target_dir.is_dir(): + self._send({"type": "error", + "detail": f"Directory '{upload_root.name}' is " + f"currently unavailable", + "code": "root_unavailable", "filename": filename}) return diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_root_writable_policy.py b/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_root_writable_policy.py index da95032..d7f2666 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_root_writable_policy.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_root_writable_policy.py @@ -62,14 +62,16 @@ def _session(tmp_path: Path, user_id: str, *, def _upload(session, filename="clip.mp4", body=b"bytes"): session._do_file_upload({ - "filename": filename, "root": "shared", + "filename": filename, "dir": "shared", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "data": base64.b64encode(body).decode(), }) def _uploads_dir(session) -> Path: - return session._ctx["roots"].roots[0].path / "uploads" + # The root itself: the `uploads/` subdirectory the node used to create is + # gone (see test_security_regressions._uploads_dir for why). + return session._ctx["roots"].roots[0].path # ── The door, not the button ───────────────────────────────────────────────── @@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ async def test_a_member_cannot_upload_to_a_read_only_root(tmp_path): refusal = [m for m in session.sent if m.get("type") == "error"] assert refusal and refusal[0].get("code") == "root_read_only" - assert not _uploads_dir(session).exists() + assert not (_uploads_dir(session) / "clip.mp4").exists() async def test_members_upload_normally_to_a_writable_root(tmp_path): diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_security_regressions.py b/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_security_regressions.py index 9db8ac1..1a318f7 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_security_regressions.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/tests/test_security_regressions.py @@ -133,14 +133,22 @@ def test_the_node_never_generates_a_name_it_would_refuse(tmp_path): def _uploads_dir(session) -> Path: """ - Where this session's uploads land: uploads/ inside its first writable root. + Where an unaddressed upload lands: the first writable root itself. + + There is no `uploads/` subdirectory any more. It was the last of v5's + quarantine — the per-user layer went on 2026-08-14 — and it went for the + same reason: a folder appearing beside the operator's library because + somebody sent a file is the node deciding how their disk is arranged. The + protections that made the quarantine worth having are the allowlist, the + size cap, the chunk ordering and the no-overwrite rule, and every one of + them is asserted below, unchanged. Asked of the root set rather than assembled by hand, so a test cannot pass while agreeing with a wrong answer the code also produced. """ writable = session._ctx["roots"].writable_roots assert writable, "the fixture must give the group a writable root" - return writable[0].path / "uploads" + return writable[0].path def _session(tmp_path: Path, user_id: str) -> WebRTCPeerSession: @@ -176,7 +184,6 @@ def test_upload_cannot_overwrite_another_members_file(tmp_path): """ victim = _session(tmp_path, "victim-user") uploads = _uploads_dir(victim) - uploads.mkdir() original = uploads / "important.mp4" original.write_bytes(b"operator's original content") @@ -226,50 +233,57 @@ def test_dir_create_cannot_escape_the_shared_root(tmp_path, bad): assert set(tmp_path.rglob("*")) == before, f"created something via {bad!r}" -def test_upload_ignores_any_directory_the_client_asks_for(tmp_path): +def test_the_client_names_a_folder_and_never_a_filesystem_path(tmp_path): """ - The destination inside a root is the node's decision, and stays so. + The destination is now the folder the sender is looking at, which means the + client does choose it — and the whole of what keeps that safe is that the + choice is *resolved against the group's own roots* rather than joined to + one. - A client now names the *root* it is uploading into — it has to, once a group - can have several writable ones — but that is a name looked up in the root - table, never a path. Everything below the root is still chosen here, so the - traversal surface a client-chosen destination would open does not exist. + `RootSet.resolve()` refuses `..`, absolute segments and anything whose + resolved form escapes its root, symlinks included. So "which of this + group's folders" is answerable by a member and "which path on the + operator's disk" is not. """ session = _session(tmp_path, "user-1") + (session._ctx["roots"].roots[0].path / "sub").mkdir() + before = set(tmp_path.rglob("*")) - session._do_file_upload({ - "filename": "note.txt", "dir": "../../etc", "path": "/etc", - "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, - "data": base64.b64encode(b"x").decode(), - }) + for bad in ("../../etc", "/etc", "shared/../..", "shared/../../etc", + "nope", "shared/missing"): + session.sent.clear() + session._do_file_upload({ + "filename": "note.txt", "dir": bad, + "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, + "data": base64.b64encode(b"x").decode(), + }) + refusal = [m for m in session.sent if m.get("type") == "error"] + assert refusal, f"{bad!r} was accepted" + assert refusal[0].get("code") in ("no_such_root", "no_such_directory"), bad - assert (_uploads_dir(session) / "note.txt").read_bytes() == b"x" - assert not (tmp_path / "etc").exists() + assert set(tmp_path.rglob("*")) == before, "a refused upload still wrote" -@pytest.mark.parametrize("named_root", [ - "../../etc", "/etc", "shared/../..", "Shared/uploads", "nope", -]) -def test_a_root_name_is_looked_up_never_joined(tmp_path, named_root): +def test_an_upload_lands_in_the_folder_it_names(tmp_path): """ - The name the client sends is matched against the group's root table and - refused when it matches nothing. A version that joined it to a path — or - that quietly fell back to the first writable root — would turn "which - directory" into either a traversal or a file on a disk the operator did - not intend, and the second is discovered weeks later. + And in that folder itself — the `uploads/` subdirectory the node used to + create is gone. Somebody dropping a file into the folder they are looking + at expects it to be in that folder. """ session = _session(tmp_path, "user-1") - before = set(tmp_path.rglob("*")) + root = session._ctx["roots"].roots[0] + (root.path / "Albums").mkdir() session._do_file_upload({ - "filename": "note.txt", "root": named_root, + "filename": "note.txt", "dir": f"{root.name}/Albums", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "data": base64.b64encode(b"x").decode(), }) - refusal = [m for m in session.sent if m.get("type") == "error"] - assert refusal and refusal[0].get("code") == "no_such_root", named_root - assert set(tmp_path.rglob("*")) == before, f"wrote something via {named_root!r}" + assert (root.path / "Albums" / "note.txt").read_bytes() == b"x" + assert not (root.path / "Albums" / "uploads").exists(), ( + "the node invented a subdirectory in the operator's library") + assert not (root.path / "uploads").exists() def test_an_upload_goes_to_the_root_it_names(tmp_path): @@ -291,13 +305,13 @@ def test_an_upload_goes_to_the_root_it_names(tmp_path): ]) session._do_file_upload({ - "filename": "note.txt", "root": "Incoming", + "filename": "note.txt", "dir": "Incoming", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "data": base64.b64encode(b"x").decode(), }) - assert (incoming / "uploads" / "note.txt").read_bytes() == b"x" - assert not (media / "uploads").exists(), "it went to the first root instead" + assert (incoming / "note.txt").read_bytes() == b"x" + assert not (media / "note.txt").exists(), "it went to the first root instead" def test_a_read_only_root_refuses_an_upload(tmp_path): @@ -314,14 +328,14 @@ def test_a_read_only_root_refuses_an_upload(tmp_path): session._is_node_admin = lambda: True session._do_file_upload({ - "filename": "note.txt", "root": "Published", + "filename": "note.txt", "dir": "Published", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "data": base64.b64encode(b"x").decode(), }) refusal = [m for m in session.sent if m.get("type") == "error"] assert refusal and refusal[0].get("code") == "root_read_only" - assert not (published / "uploads").exists() + assert not (published / "note.txt").exists() def test_a_fully_read_only_group_refuses_an_unaddressed_upload(tmp_path): @@ -343,7 +357,7 @@ def test_a_fully_read_only_group_refuses_an_unaddressed_upload(tmp_path): refusal = [m for m in session.sent if m.get("type") == "error"] assert refusal and refusal[0].get("code") == "no_writable_root" - assert not (published / "uploads").exists() + assert not (published / "note.txt").exists() def test_an_ejected_root_refuses_an_upload(tmp_path): @@ -362,14 +376,14 @@ def test_an_ejected_root_refuses_an_upload(tmp_path): session._ctx["roots"] = roots session._do_file_upload({ - "filename": "note.txt", "root": "USB", + "filename": "note.txt", "dir": "USB", "chunk_index": 0, "total_chunks": 1, "data": base64.b64encode(b"x").decode(), }) refusal = [m for m in session.sent if m.get("type") == "error"] assert refusal and refusal[0].get("code") == "root_unavailable" - assert not (usb / "uploads").exists() + assert not (usb / "note.txt").exists() def test_two_members_can_send_the_same_filename(tmp_path): -- cgit v1.2.3