# MeshBay User Guide This guide covers MeshBay in depth — architecture, configuration, security, and the full API. Read the [Quickstart](QUICKSTART.md) first if you have not set up a node yet. --- ## Table of Contents 1. [Architecture overview](#1-architecture-overview) 2. [Account management](#2-account-management) 3. [Groups](#3-groups) 4. [Setting up a node](#4-setting-up-a-node) 5. [Sharing files](#5-sharing-files) 6. [Accessing files](#6-accessing-files) 7. [Video streaming](#7-video-streaming) 8. [Security model](#8-security-model) 9. [Moderation and legal](#9-moderation-and-legal) 10. [Troubleshooting](#10-troubleshooting) 11. [API reference](#11-api-reference) --- ## 1. Architecture Overview MeshBay has three components. Understanding which role each plays avoids a lot of confusion. ``` ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Mesh Hub (meshbay.org) │ │ │ │ • User accounts and public keys │ │ • Group registry (name, membership) │ │ • Encrypted GEK bundles (opaque blobs) │ │ • JWT issuance and verification key │ │ • Connection logs (legal compliance) │ │ • No file content, no indexes, no GEKs │ └──────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘ │ HTTPS (identity + routing only) │ ┌──────────┴──────────┐ │ │ ┌───▼────────┐ ┌──────▼───────┐ │ Mesh Node │ │ Mesh Client │ │ │ │ │ │ Your files │ MNP │ Browser or │ │ Your keys │◄───►│ Android app │ │ TCP+TLS │ │ │ └────────────┘ └──────────────┘ ``` **Mesh Hub** — a lightweight registrar. Its job is to vouch for identities, track group membership, and store encrypted GEK bundles. After login, clients talk directly to nodes. The hub is never in the data path for file transfers. **Mesh Node** — the program you run on your server or home machine. It watches a directory, maintains a group index, handles connections from clients, encrypts files at read time, and holds your private keys. You are the legal host of everything in your shared directory. **Mesh Client** — a web browser or Android app. It authenticates with the hub, fetches the encrypted GEK bundle, and connects directly to nodes for file browsing and download. **Protocol versioning:** MNP (Mesh Node Protocol) is currently at v0.1 over TCP+TLS 1.3. QUIC transport is planned for v2 with no protocol changes. Every wire message carries a `v` field; N-2 minor version backward compatibility is guaranteed. --- ## 2. Account Management ### Register Registration creates an account and nothing else: a username, an email, and a value derived from your passphrase that lets the hub check it without ever seeing it. **No keys are generated here.** An identity keypair belongs to a *node*, not to the hub: one is created the first time you join a given node, encrypted under your passphrase, and left with that node. So an operator who takes their own disk holds a key that is worthless on anyone else's, and the hub has no key directory to publish — which is what finding H3 read. **Deux modes de génération de clés :** **Mode CLI / native node** (`setup_demo.py`, `meshbay-node`) : Les clés sont *dérivées* de votre username + password via Argon2id — pas besoin de fichier de clés séparé. Même identifiants → mêmes clés sur n'importe quelle machine. Implémenté dans `meshbay_common.keyderive.derive_keys_from_password()`. ```python from meshbay_common.keyderive import derive_keys_from_password sk_ed, sk_x = derive_keys_from_password("alice", "MonMotDePasse!") ``` **Mode navigateur** (interface web) : Le navigateur génère des clés aléatoires via WebCrypto, les chiffre avec une clé dérivée du mot de passe (PBKDF2-SHA512), et envoie le bundle chiffré au hub. À la prochaine connexion, le hub retourne le bundle et le navigateur le déchiffre localement. Le hub stocke le bundle mais ne peut pas le lire. Implémenté dans `static/keyderive.js`. ``` POST /v1/users/register { "username": "string", "email": "string", "auth_key": "base64 (PBKDF2-SHA512 of your passphrase — the hub never sees the passphrase itself)" } → 201 {"user_id": "uuid"} → 409 if username is taken ``` POST /v1/users/login {"username": "yourname", "password": "yourpassword"} → { "access_token": "JWT (Ed25519, 1 hour validity)", "refresh_token": "opaque 256-bit token (30 days)", "token_type": "bearer", "expires_in": 3600, } ``` Le trousseau ne vient pas d'ici : chaque nœud conserve celui qui lui est propre, chiffré par votre phrase de passe, et un nouveau navigateur le récupère auprès du nœud auquel il se connecte. ```bash curl -s -X POST https://meshbay.org/v1/users/login \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"alice_test","password":"AliceTest2026!"}' ``` ### Token refresh Access tokens are valid for 1 hour. When one expires, use the refresh token to get a new one without re-entering your password: ``` POST /v1/users/token/refresh {"refresh_token": "your-refresh-token"} → {"access_token": "new JWT", "token_type": "bearer", "expires_in": 3600} ``` ```bash curl -s -X POST https://meshbay.org/v1/users/token/refresh \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"refresh_token":"YOUR_REFRESH_TOKEN"}' ``` Refresh tokens are valid for 30 days and can be immediately invalidated by the hub on account compromise. Revoking the refresh token means the next access token renewal will fail; any active access token expires within 1 hour at most. ### Access token structure The JWT payload contains: | Claim | Value | |---|---| | `iss` | Hub ID (`meshbay.org`) | | `sub` | Your `user_id` (UUID4) | | `hub_id` | `meshbay.org` | | `jti` | UUID4 — unique per token, enables revocation, prevents replay | | `groups` | The `group_id`s you are a member of, for node-side authorization | | `scope` | `user` for a browser, `node` for a daemon | | `iat` | Issued at (Unix timestamp) | | `exp` | Expires at (Unix timestamp, 1 hour from issue) | The token carries **no public key of yours**. It used to carry `pk_user`, and a node recorded that key as the uploader of a file — which meant the party issuing tokens decided who was allowed to delete it. The hub certifies *accounts*; keys are generated on each node and pinned there (§4). Nodes verify this JWT locally using the hub's cached Ed25519 public key. No hub roundtrip is needed — verified at 884µs in testing. This means your files remain accessible even if the hub is temporarily unreachable. ### Deleting your account **Settings → Delete account.** You re-enter your passphrase: a live session may be a borrowed laptop or a tab left open, and this cannot be undone. A hub administrator can also delete an account, from Administration → Users. What deletion does: - Releases the username — someone else may register it afterwards - Clears the email and password hash, and drops the node linking key - Removes group memberships, notifications and refresh tokens - Refuses any access token still in its hour of validity, immediately What deletion does **not** do: - **It does not touch anything on a node.** Your files stay where you uploaded them, and so do the identity pinned in the node's roster and the keypair bundle it holds for you. Nodes are other people's machines; the hub cannot command them. To be removed there, ask the operator — `meshbay-node member unpin ` and deleting your files are their commands to run (§4). - **It does not erase the connection log.** IP records are kept for their legal retention period and stay attributable: the username is copied onto those rows as the account is deleted, so the log still says *who*, and does not answer `deleted-3f9a1c` for exactly the records anyone would be asking about. Releasing the name for re-registration and keeping it in the log are separate things. Deletion is refused while you still own a group. Hand the group over or delete it first — otherwise its members would be stranded. The error names the groups blocking you. ``` DELETE /v1/users/me Authorization: Bearer {"auth_key": ""} → 200 {"status": "deleted", "username": "alice_test"} → 403 {"detail": "Passphrase does not match"} → 409 {"detail": "This account still owns groups: ..."} ``` Node registrations are removed as well, so a deleted operator's nodes stop being announced. The daemons keep running and keep their data — again, the hub does not command them. --- ## 3. Groups Groups are the primary unit of organization. Every file on a node belongs to a group. ### Create a group ```bash TOKEN="your-access-token" curl -s -X POST https://meshbay.org/v1/groups \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -d '{"name": "my-group"}' ``` Response: ```json {"group_id": "uuid", "name": "my-group"} ``` Save `group_id` — you will need it in your `node.toml` and when adding members. ### The description Set it at creation with `"description"`, or later from the group's page — the owner sees an **Edit description** link under the name. Members see it on their home page and, for public groups, in Explore. ``` PATCH /v1/groups/{group_id} Authorization: Bearer (the group's owner) {"description": "host grenoble"} → 200 {"group_id": "...", "description": "host grenoble"} ``` An empty string clears it; anything past 512 characters is trimmed rather than refused. The description is all this endpoint changes: the name, the visibility and the join policy are the terms members joined on, and a private group that could quietly become public is not the group they agreed to be in. Changing those needs a decision about who gets told, so it is not a field on a form. ### Public vs. private groups | | Public | Private | |---|---|---| | File index | Plaintext + Ed25519 signed | GEK-encrypted, members only | | Content | TLS transport only (no application-layer encryption) | GEK-encrypted per chunk | | Join | Open / approval-gated | By invitation only | | GEK | Not applicable | Required | For private groups the node holds a Group Encryption Key (GEK) — a random 32-byte key that is never sent over the wire in cleartext. Each member receives a copy wrapped for their own X25519 public key (ECIES: X25519 + HKDF + AEAD). **The node does the wrapping, and it never asks the hub for anybody's key.** That matters: the hub is the account directory, so a hub that answered a key lookup with its own key would be handed the group key by an honest member following the protocol exactly (finding H3). Instead the recipient presents their own public keys over the authenticated P2P channel, signed by their identity key, and the node wraps for what it just verified. ### Add a member to a private group The node operator issues a one-time code, from the server or from their browser: ```bash # On the node, over SSH — no browser needed meshbay-node member invite bob INVITATION CODE R3H8-TB6V valid until 2026-08-21T12:00:00+00:00 ``` Send the code to Bob however you already talk to him — it never passes through the hub, which is what stops the hub from claiming to be Bob. He enters it the first time he opens the group, and the node then wraps the group key for the key he proved he holds. After that first time the pin is his credential: he is recognised on every later connection, and asked for nothing. You do not need to be online when he joins. | | | |---|---| | Code lifetime | 7 days (`[node] invite_ttl_hours`) | | Reuse | Single use; re-inviting supersedes the previous code | | If it expires | Issue another one — nothing else is affected | | Wrong code, repeatedly | Bounded per connection and node-wide, and logged in the node's audit log | The same operation is available in the web app: the group's **Members** tab, if your browser is paired with the node (`meshbay-node operator pair`). ### Removing a member ```bash meshbay-node member revoke bob meshbay-node gek-init # rotate: Bob still holds the old key ``` Revoking stops the node serving Bob the key from his next connection onward — there is no stored bundle left behind that could outlive the decision. It does **not** take back the key he already has, which is why the second command exists. ### What revocation does and does not do Rotating the GEK (`meshbay-node gek-init`) makes the node encrypt new content with a new key, which every remaining member picks up automatically on their next connection — nothing has to be re-uploaded or re-wrapped by hand. A former member can still decrypt content they already received: there is no retroactive re-encryption, and there is no way to reach into someone's disk. Revocation controls what happens next, not what already happened. ### Notifications The bell in the top bar counts what you have not read. Clicking an entry takes you to what it is about and dismisses it. - **Chat is one entry per group, not one per message.** A conversation that has been busy all afternoon is a single line whose date moves to the last thing said and which turns unread again each time. Opening the group clears it. - **You are never notified of your own messages.** The node names the author when it tells the hub a message was posted, and the hub skips them. - **An invitation disappears once you have joined**, i.e. after you enter the pairing code — not when you first look at it. - **Muting a group works from anywhere.** The setting lives on the hub with your membership, so a muted group creates no notification at all rather than hiding one after the fact. It follows you to another browser. (It used to be a checkbox in the browser's local storage that nothing read, so it did nothing.) - **Clear all** empties the list in one action. ``` GET /v1/notifications → {"notifications": [{id, kind, group_id, title, link, read, created_at}], "unread": 3} POST /v1/notifications/{id}/read → mark one read POST /v1/notifications/read-all → mark every one read DELETE /v1/notifications → delete them all POST /v1/groups/{group_id}/mute {"muted": true} ``` `GET /v1/groups/mine` reports `muted` for each group, so the browser shows the checkbox in the state the hub actually holds. --- ## 4. Setting up a Node ### Configuration file Full `~/.config/meshbay/node.toml` reference: ```toml [hub] url = "https://meshbay.org" [auth] username = "yourname" password = "YourPassword123!" # Each group this node hosts gets its own [[groups]] block [[groups]] group_id = "uuid-of-your-group" shared_dir = "/srv/meshbay/my-group" [[groups]] group_id = "uuid-of-second-group" shared_dir = "/srv/meshbay/second-group" [node] # MNP listener port (must be internet-reachable) listen_port = 19001 # Local web UI port (loopback only, not exposed externally) ui_port = 18000 # Announce this address to the hub (auto-detected via STUN if not set) # endpoint_hint = "203.0.113.42:19001" [keystore] # "secure" — password prompt at each startup # "lazy_file" — password read from ~/.config/meshbay/unlock.key (chmod 600) # "service" — password read from MESHBAY_UNLOCK_KEY env var unlock_mode = "secure" path = "~/.config/meshbay/keystore.enc" [crypto] # Argon2id parameters for keystore password derivation. # Run `meshbay-node --calibrate-argon2` to tune for your hardware. # Target: ~500ms on your machine. argon2_iterations = 4 argon2_memory_cost = 262144 # 256 MB argon2_parallelism = 1 ``` ### Hosting another of your groups A node can host several groups, each with its own directory and its own key. Create the group in the web app first, then, on the node: ```bash meshbay-node group add grenet --dir ~/grenet-share # grenet (480d553f) added to /home/cbesson/.config/meshbay/node.toml # shared_dir /home/cbesson/grenet-share # restart the daemon, then: meshbay-node gek-init --group grenet ``` `group add` looks the name up among your groups on the hub, appends a `[[groups]]` block to your `node.toml` — comments and all, it is appended, not rewritten — and creates the directory. The daemon reads its config at startup, so it needs a restart before the group exists for it; `gek-init` then generates that group's key. Three things follow from the design, and are worth being explicit about: - **Each group's key is its own.** Members of one group cannot read another's files, and admitting someone to one says nothing about the other. That is why `gek-init` is per group. - **Pairing is not.** `meshbay-node operator pair` pairs a *browser* with the *node*: one paired browser can invite to, and delete files in, every group the node hosts. It takes no `--group`. - **Members are per group.** `meshbay-node member invite alice --group grenet` admits alice to that group only. The roster keeps one row per group. `meshbay-node status` prints what the node hosts, with each directory — the quickest way to see whether a group made in the browser is attached here yet. ### Environment variables (alternative to node.toml) | Variable | Equivalent config | |---|---| | `MESHBAY_HUB_URL` | `[hub] url` | | `MESHBAY_USERNAME` | `[auth] username` | | `MESHBAY_PASSWORD` | `[auth] password` | | `MESHBAY_UNLOCK_KEY` | keystore unlock key (for `service` mode) | | `MESHBAY_LISTEN_PORT` | `[node] listen_port` | ### Keystore unlock modes The keystore is an Argon2id-derived AES-256-GCM encrypted file holding your Ed25519 and X25519 private keys plus GEK copies. **secure (default):** prompts for a password at startup. Suitable for interactive use. The password is not stored anywhere. **lazy_file:** reads the password from `~/.config/meshbay/unlock.key` (must be `chmod 600`). Use on a physically secure home server where you want unattended restarts. ```bash echo -n "YourKeystorePassword" > ~/.config/meshbay/unlock.key chmod 600 ~/.config/meshbay/unlock.key ``` **service:** reads the unlock key from the `MESHBAY_UNLOCK_KEY` environment variable. Standard practice for systemd deployments: ```ini # /etc/systemd/system/meshbay-node.service [Unit] Description=MeshBay Node After=network.target [Service] User=meshbay EnvironmentFile=/etc/meshbay/unlock.env # chmod 600, owned by meshbay ExecStart=/usr/bin/meshbay-node --config /etc/meshbay/node.toml Restart=on-failure [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target ``` ```bash # /etc/meshbay/unlock.env (chmod 600, owned by meshbay user) MESHBAY_UNLOCK_KEY=YourKeystorePassword ``` ### Argon2id calibration The keystore password derivation is intentionally slow. Tune it to your hardware: ```bash meshbay-node --calibrate-argon2 ``` This prints the derivation time for several parameter combinations. Choose the set that gives ~500ms. The default (iterations=4, memory=256MB) is calibrated for a modern home server. ### Hardware sizing (upload bandwidth is the constraint) | Scenario | Simultaneous users | Upload needed | RAM | |---|---|---|---| | Files + chat, no streaming | 10 | 20–50 Mbps | 512 MB | | 1080p streaming, 5–6 streams | 10 | 50–80 Mbps | 1 GB | | Mixed, light streaming | 50 | 200–300 Mbps | 2 GB | | Heavy streaming | 50 | 400 Mbps | 2–4 GB | A standard home fiber line (100–500 Mbps symmetric) handles 10–30 concurrent users. Beyond that, a dedicated server is needed. --- ## 5. Sharing Files ### How indexing works The node watches `shared_dir` for file changes using filesystem events (`watchdog` library). When a file is added, modified, or removed: 1. The node computes `blake3(file)` as the file identifier 2. It builds or updates a Mesh Group Index entry for that file 3. The index entry is serialized as msgpack, compressed with zstd, then encrypted with the GEK (for private groups) or signed with the node's Ed25519 key (for public groups) 4. Connected members receive an index delta push; new connections receive the full index ### Index entry structure ```python { "version": 1, "id": "", # file identity and chunk key input "name": "filename.mkv", "path": "Movies/2024/", # relative path within shared_dir "size": 4294967296, # bytes "type": "video", # video | audio | image | document | archive | other "duration": 7245, # seconds (media files only) "thumb_hash": "", # thumbnail, also GEK-encrypted "added_at": 1720000000 # Unix timestamp } ``` ### Supported file types The node detects type by file extension and MIME sniffing: | Type | Extensions | |---|---| | `video` | mp4, mkv, avi, mov, webm | | `audio` | mp3, flac, ogg, opus, m4a | | `image` | jpg, jpeg, png, gif, webp, avif | | `document` | pdf, txt, md, epub, doc, docx, odt | | `archive` | zip, tar, gz, bz2, xz, 7z | | `other` | everything else | ### Where uploaded files land Everything a member sends arrives in **`shared_dir/uploads/`** — both files uploaded from the Files panel and attachments sent in the chat. One visible directory, so an operator can look at what was sent, move it, or empty it without hunting through the tree. - Filenames are checked against a conservative allowlist and nothing is ever overwritten: a colliding name gets a suffix, and the sender is told the name it was stored under. - Chat thumbnails are scaled by the browser from the file itself. The node writes no derived images, so nothing accumulates beside your files. - Uploads are attributed to the identity the node pinned for that member, and that is what decides who may delete the file later — not anything the hub says. ### Selecting files, and where transfers live The Files panel has a **Select** button. Turning it on puts a checkbox on every row — files and folders — and the **⋮ Actions** button next to it acts on what is ticked: download, play, view, download folders as a zip, delete. There is no per-row menu: several transfers at once is the normal case, and starting them one context menu at a time was the thing that made it awkward. Selection is remembered as you walk into folders, so you can tick something in one and something else in another before choosing an action. **Transfers run outside the page.** They are listed in the widget next to the bell, with a progress bar, the current rate, and a cancel button each: - Leaving the group, or the group page, does not stop them. The connection stays open until the last transfer using it is finished. - **Signing out cancels them all** — they are moving data on a token that is about to stop being yours. - Cancelling stops the work, not just the display; a partly written file is left where you told the browser to put it. - Rates are measured over the last few seconds, so a stalled transfer reads as stalled rather than reporting the average it once managed. ### Downloading a folder as a zip Any member can take a whole folder: **⋮ → Download as zip** on the folder's row. The archive is built in the browser as the files arrive and written straight to disk, so a 40 GB folder costs 40 GB of disk and a few megabytes of memory. - Nothing is compressed. Group content is video, images and archives — already compressed — so deflating would spend CPU on every byte to save nothing, in the same thread that is decrypting. - The archive opens as the folder you asked for: a zip of `Holidays/2026` unpacks as `2026/…`, not as a chain of empty parents. - Files over 4 GiB, and archives over 4 GiB, use zip64. Anything current reads them; a tool from before 2003 may not. - **Firefox and Safari cannot write a download straight to disk** (no File System Access API). There, the archive has to be assembled in memory first, and the browser says so, with the size, before starting. Use Chrome or Edge for a large one. ### Deleting a directory **⋮ → Delete folder**, for the node operator, from a paired browser (§3). The directory must be **empty** — nothing here is recursive, and a folder with anything in it is refused before a signature is even asked for. Delete the files first, where you can see what you are losing. Like every privileged action on a node, it is signed with the key the node pinned for that browser and refused otherwise: hub membership, or an admin role on the hub, grants nothing here. ### Creating a directory Any active member can create a directory from the Files panel (**New folder**). It is created relative to the folder you are looking at, under `shared_dir`, and the same name rules apply. Paths that try to leave the shared root are refused. ### Files are stored in plaintext on disk The node holds your files in plaintext. Encryption happens at read time — the node encrypts each 1 MB chunk using a per-chunk key derived from the GEK before sending it over the wire. This means: - Disk-level encryption (LUKS, etc.) is your responsibility if you need at-rest protection - Backups of the shared directory are plaintext - Node compromise exposes all files in plaintext --- ## 6. Accessing Files **There is no HTTP file API.** Files are requested over MNP — the node's authenticated message channel, carried by WebRTC DataChannel or QUIC — and nothing on the node answers an unauthenticated request. The `GET /index`, `GET /file/{id}` and `GET /stream/...` endpoints documented before 0.2.0 were removed (findings C1 and C6): they served the index and file bytes to anyone holding a token, outside the handshake that decides what a peer is allowed to see. Port 19001 is the MNP listener, not a web server. The node's only HTTP surface is its admin UI, bound to loopback and requiring a token (§4). It is for the operator, on the machine, over SSH. ### Browse the index After the handshake, ask for the index: ``` → {"type": "index_sync", "v": "0.1"} ← {"type": "index_sync", "entries": [{"id": "", "name": "...", "size": 1234, "type": "video", "path": "uploads/"}, ...]} ``` For a private group the index itself is encrypted with the GEK, so a peer that never proved possession of the key is served nothing to read. ### Download a file, chunk by chunk ``` → {"type": "file_req", "v": "0.1", "file_id": "", "chunk_index": 0} ← {"type": "file_chunk", "file_id": ..., "chunk_index": 0, "nonce": , "ct": , "plaintext_size": 1048576} ``` Chunks are 1 MB. Chunk 0 is the first megabyte; for a 5 MB file, request 0–4. **Per-chunk key derivation** — each chunk has an independent key derived from the GEK and the chunk's position, so a leaked chunk key opens exactly one chunk of one file, and a player can seek without decrypting from the start: ```python chunk_key = HKDF( algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None, info=b"file:" + file_hash_bytes + b":chunk:" + chunk_index.to_bytes(4, "big"), ).derive(gek) plaintext = ChaCha20Poly1305(chunk_key).decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, None) ``` The browser client derives the same key the same way but uses **AES-GCM**: WebCrypto has no ChaCha20-Poly1305. The node picks the cipher from what the peer negotiated at handshake; the key schedule above is identical in both. ### Identifying the node The node's `pk_node` (Ed25519) comes from the hub — `GET /v1/nodes/{node_id}` — and the client checks the handshake signature against it. A node that cannot sign the transcript with the key the hub published for it is refused, so hub signaling can introduce you to a node but cannot substitute one. --- ## 7. Video Streaming Video is streamed over the same MNP channel and played through Media Source Extensions. The node transcodes to fragmented MP4 on the fly and encrypts each segment exactly like a file chunk, so a standard `