// An account's devices and what they hold: joining a group, linking a device,
// the identity bundles and the per-account blobs (playlists).
//
// Methods of MeshBayTransport, copied onto its prototype by extendTransport
// (transport.js, which the shell loads first).

extendTransport(class {
  /**
   * Who is in this group and which device keys they hold — verified here, not
   * taken on the node's word.
   *
   * Tier 2 of `docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md` §3.3. The node relays, for each device,
   * the already-pinned key that countersigned it and the signature itself; this
   * walks that from each account's first device outwards and keeps only the
   * devices it could actually reach. A device the node asserts but cannot
   * evidence is reported as unverified rather than dropped — the reader is
   * shown a gap, never a silent absence.
   *
   * The property this buys, stated exactly: once a client has seen an account,
   * a node that later substitutes a key for it is **detected**. It buys nothing
   * at first sight, where there is nothing to compare against — that boundary
   * is `docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md` §3.2's and does not move.
   */
  async groupRoster() {
    if (this._roster) return this._roster;
    if (this._rosterInFlight) return this._rosterInFlight;

    this._rosterInFlight = (async () => {
      const resp = await this._sendAndWait({
        type: 'group_roster_req', v: '2.0', group_id: this._groupId || '',
      });
      if (resp.type === 'error') throw new Error(resp.detail);
      const payload = msgpack_decode(await window.MeshBayCrypto.openGroup(
        this._gekRaw, 'roster', 'group_roster_resp', this._groupId || '', resp));
      this._roster = await _verifyRoster(payload, this.nodePk);
      return this._roster;
    })();
    try {
      return await this._rosterInFlight;
    } finally {
      this._rosterInFlight = null;
    }
  }

  /**
   * How this client regards `devicePk` as a device of `userId`.
   *
   *   'pinned'    seen before, and the same key — nothing to say
   *   'linked'    new, and countersigned by a key already pinned for it
   *   'first'     first sight of this account: trust on first use
   *   'changed'   a key this account has not shown before and cannot evidence
   *
   * Only `changed` is worth a person's attention, and it is the one notice
   * docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.3 budgets for. `first` is not an alarm — every
   * account is new once, and treating that as a warning is how a warning stops
   * being read.
   */
  async accountDeviceStatus(userId, devicePk) {
    let roster;
    try {
      roster = await this.groupRoster();
    } catch {
      return 'unknown';
    }
    const known = await _readPinnedAccount(this.nodePk, userId);
    const entry = roster.byAccount.get(userId);
    if (known && known.includes(devicePk)) return 'pinned';
    if (!known) {
      // First sight, so **everything the node says** is pinned — not only what
      // a chain reaches. There is nothing to compare against yet: that is what
      // trust-on-first-use means, and pinning only the verified subset would
      // raise "key changed" on a legitimate second device whose
      // countersignature simply predates it being kept. What TOFU buys is that
      // a substitution *later* is visible; it cannot buy anything now.
      if (entry) await _writePinnedAccount(this.nodePk, userId, entry.all);
      return entry && entry.all.includes(devicePk) ? 'first' : 'changed';
    }
    if (entry && entry.verified.includes(devicePk)
        && entry.chain.get(devicePk)
        && known.includes(entry.chain.get(devicePk))) {
      // Countersigned by a key we already trust for this account: a second
      // device of someone we know, admitted without anybody comparing digits.
      await _writePinnedAccount(this.nodePk, userId,
                                [...new Set([...known, devicePk])]);
      return 'linked';
    }
    return 'changed';
  }

  /**
   * Ask the node to recognise us and hand over the group key.
   *
   * Sent when we hold no GEK for a group. `code` is needed only the first time
   * this node sees this account (and not at all in an open-join group).
   */
  async joinGroup(userId, groupId, code) {
    if (!this._sessionKeys || !this._sessionKeys.skEdB64 || !this._sessionKeys.skXB64) {
      throw new Error('Identity keys unavailable in this browser — sign in again');
    }
    if (!this._nonceNode || !this.nodePk) {
      throw new Error('Handshake incomplete — reconnect and retry');
    }

    const C = window.MeshBayCrypto;
    const pkEdB64 = await _pkEdFromSk(this._sessionKeys.skEdB64);
    const pkXB64 = await _pkFromSk(this._sessionKeys.skXB64);
    const ts = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);

    const transcript = C.joinTranscript(
      this.nodePk, groupId || '', userId, pkEdB64, pkXB64, this._nonceNode, ts);
    const sig = await window.MeshBayKeys.signBytes(this._sessionKeys.skEdB64, transcript);

    const resp = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'join_request',
      v: '0.1',
      group_id: groupId || '',
      pk_ed25519: pkEdB64,
      pk_x25519: pkXB64,
      code: code || '',
      ts,
      sig,
    });

    if (resp.type === 'error') throw new Error(resp.detail || 'Join refused');
    if ((resp.type !== 'join_result' || !resp.ok) || !resp.gek) {
      const reason = resp.reason || 'unknown';
      const err = new Error(JOIN_REFUSALS[reason] || `Join refused: ${reason}`);
      // The UI reacts to `code_required` by asking for one; everything else is
      // shown as-is.
      err.reason = reason;
      throw err;
    }

    // Unwrap with our own secret key — the node wrapped for the public key we
    // just proved we hold, so nobody else can open this.
    const skXRaw = Uint8Array.from(atob(this._sessionKeys.skXB64), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
    const myPkX = Uint8Array.from(atob(pkXB64), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
    const gekRaw = await C.unwrapGEK(resp, skXRaw, myPkX);
    this._gekRaw = gekRaw;
    // What the node's roster says this identity is, which is not what the hub
    // says: `operator` here means this browser's key was paired with the node,
    // not merely that the account owns it.
    this.memberRole = resp.role || '';
    return gekRaw;
  }

  // ── Device linking ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────

  /**
   * Ask to be added, and return the code to show the person.
   *
   * They read it off this screen and type it into a device already paired with
   * this node. The code is hashed together with our own keys, so that other
   * device cannot be handed a substituted key and sign for it by mistake.
   */
  async requestDeviceAdd(userId) {
    if (!this._sessionKeys || !this._sessionKeys.skEdB64) {
      throw new Error('Identity keys unavailable in this browser — sign in again');
    }
    if (!this._nonceNode || !this.nodePk) {
      throw new Error('Handshake incomplete — reconnect and retry');
    }
    const C = window.MeshBayCrypto;
    const pkEdB64 = await _pkEdFromSk(this._sessionKeys.skEdB64);
    const pkXB64 = await _pkFromSk(this._sessionKeys.skXB64);

    // 40 bits from the platform CSPRNG, in the same alphabet as a pairing code
    // so it reads and types the same way.
    const alphabet = '0123456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTVWXYZ';
    const bytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(8));
    const raw = Array.from(bytes, b => alphabet[b % alphabet.length]).join('');
    const code = `${raw.slice(0, 4)}-${raw.slice(4)}`;

    const codeHash = await C.deviceCodeHash(
      C.normalizeCode(code), pkEdB64, pkXB64);
    const ts = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
    const transcript = C.deviceRequestTranscript(
      this.nodePk, userId, pkEdB64, pkXB64, codeHash, this._nonceNode, ts);
    const sig = await window.MeshBayKeys.signBytes(
      this._sessionKeys.skEdB64, transcript);

    const resp = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'device_add_request', v: '0.1',
      pk_ed25519: pkEdB64, pk_x25519: pkXB64, code_hash: codeHash, ts, sig,
    });
    if (resp.type === 'error') throw new Error(resp.detail || 'Refused');
    return { code, expiresAt: resp.expires_at };
  }

  /**
   * Approve a device waiting with this code.
   *
   * The node is a mailbox: it is asked for a request matching
   * sha256(code ‖ keys), and the keys in that hash came from the device that
   * filed it. A node returning something else produces no match, so there is
   * nothing to sign and nothing for a person to misread.
   */
  async approveDevice(userId, code) {
    if (!this._sessionKeys || !this._sessionKeys.skEdB64) {
      throw new Error('Identity keys unavailable in this browser — sign in again');
    }
    if (!this._nonceNode || !this.nodePk) {
      throw new Error('Handshake incomplete — reconnect and retry');
    }
    const C = window.MeshBayCrypto;
    const normalized = C.normalizeCode(code);

    // The code never leaves this browser. The node lists what is pending, each
    // with the hash the requesting device computed over the code and its own
    // keys; we recompute and keep the one that matches. A node offering
    // fabricated keys would have to produce a hash matching sha256(code ‖
    // fabricated) — and it does not know the code.
    const listed = await this._sendAndWait({ type: 'device_lookup', v: '0.1' });
    if (listed.type === 'error') throw new Error(listed.detail || 'Not found');

    let match = null;
    for (const req of listed.requests || []) {
      const expect = await C.deviceCodeHash(
        normalized, req.pk_ed25519, req.pk_x25519);
      if (expect === req.code_hash) { match = req; break; }
    }
    if (!match) {
      throw new Error('No device is waiting with that code');
    }
    return this._countersign(userId, match.code_hash,
                             match.pk_ed25519, match.pk_x25519);
  }

  async _countersign(userId, codeHash, pkEdB64, pkXB64) {
    const C = window.MeshBayCrypto;
    const ts = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
    const transcript = C.deviceAddTranscript(
      this.nodePk, userId, pkEdB64, pkXB64, this._nonceNode, ts);
    const sig = await window.MeshBayKeys.signBytes(
      this._sessionKeys.skEdB64, transcript);
    const resp = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'device_add', v: '0.1',
      pk_ed25519: pkEdB64, pk_x25519: pkXB64, code_hash: codeHash, ts, sig,
    });
    if (resp.type === 'error') throw new Error(resp.detail || 'Refused');
    return resp;
  }

  async listDevices() {
    const resp = await this._sendAndWait({ type: 'device_list', v: '0.1' });
    if (resp.type === 'error') throw new Error(resp.detail || 'Refused');
    return { devices: resp.devices || [], pending: resp.pending || 0 };
  }

  /** Retire a device — a lost laptop. Countersigned like an addition. */
  async revokeDevice(userId, pkEdB64, pkXB64) {
    const C = window.MeshBayCrypto;
    const ts = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
    const transcript = C.deviceAddTranscript(
      this.nodePk, userId, pkEdB64, pkXB64, this._nonceNode, ts);
    const sig = await window.MeshBayKeys.signBytes(
      this._sessionKeys.skEdB64, transcript);
    const resp = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'device_revoke', v: '0.1', pk_ed25519: pkEdB64, ts, sig,
    });
    if (resp.type === 'error') throw new Error(resp.detail || 'Refused');
    return resp;
  }

  /**
   * Withdraw our key backup from this node.
   *
   * The counterpart of storeKeypairBundle: turning the setting off has to remove
   * what is already stored, not merely stop adding to it — otherwise the blob
   * stays on every node the account has ever joined (C4).
   */
  async deleteKeypairBundle() {
    const msg = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'keypair_bundle_delete', v: '0.1',
    });
    if (msg.type === 'error') throw new Error(msg.detail);
    return msg;
  }

  async storeKeypairBundle(bundleEnc, recoveryEnc) {
    const msg = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'keypair_bundle_store',
      v: '0.1',
      bundle_enc: bundleEnc,
      // MNP 0.14, optional: the recovery-wrapped copy. Omitted for a plain
      // re-backup; the node keeps any copy it already holds.
      ...(recoveryEnc ? { bundle_enc_recovery: recoveryEnc } : {}),
    });
    if (msg.type === 'error') throw new Error(msg.detail);
    return msg;
  }

  // ── Per-account blobs (playlists) ──────────────────────────────────────

  async storeUserBlob(kind, rev, blobEnc) {
    const msg = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'user_blob_store', v: '0.1',
      kind, rev, blob_enc: blobEnc,
    });
    // A refused store is the size cap or the account quota, and the node says
    // which. Thrown rather than swallowed: the caller has to be able to tell
    // the reader that this playlist did not save.
    if (msg.type === 'error') throw new Error(msg.detail);
    return msg;
  }

  /**
   * One blob, or `{ rev: null, blob_enc: null }` when this account has never
   * written that kind here — which is the ordinary state of a node the reader
   * has just joined, and must not read as a failure.
   */
  async fetchUserBlob(kind) {
    const msg = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'user_blob_fetch', v: '0.1', kind,
    });
    if (msg.type === 'error') throw new Error(msg.detail);
    return { rev: msg.rev ?? null, blob_enc: msg.blob_enc ?? null };
  }

  /**
   * Which kinds this node holds, and at what revision — never a payload.
   *
   * What a client that has lost its local state needs: playlist ids are
   * client-generated, so there is nothing to fetch by name until this says
   * what the names are.
   */
  async listUserBlobs() {
    const msg = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'user_blob_list', v: '0.1',
    });
    if (msg.type === 'error') throw new Error(msg.detail);
    return msg.blobs || [];
  }

  async deleteUserBlob(kind) {
    const msg = await this._sendAndWait({
      type: 'user_blob_delete', v: '0.1', kind,
    });
    if (msg.type === 'error') throw new Error(msg.detail);
    return msg;
  }
});