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path: root/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/vectors/gen_keyring_vectors.js
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// Golden vectors for the keypair bundle and the transcripts, produced by the
// code the desktop application ships: meshbay-client's keyring.js and
// transcripts.js, with the vendored Argon2 the page also runs.
//
//   node gen_keyring_vectors.js > keyring.json
//
// Every implementation of the bundle format and of the transcripts — the page,
// the desktop keyring, the Python reference, the Android keyring — must
// reproduce this file (test_keyring_vectors.py, and the Android unit tests).
// It is regenerated deliberately, for a format change, never by a test. The
// output is deterministic: nonces and the clock are pinned.

'use strict';

const path = require('node:path');
const crypto = require('node:crypto');

const REPO = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', '..', '..');
const CLIENT = path.join(REPO, 'packages/meshbay-client/src');
const VENDOR = path.join(REPO, 'packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/vendor');

const { createKeyring } = require(path.join(CLIENT, 'keyring.js'));
const { transcriptFor } = require(path.join(CLIENT, 'transcripts.js'));
const { wasmArgon2 } = require(path.join(CLIENT, 'argon2-wasm.js'));

const b64 = (b) => Buffer.from(b).toString('base64');
const hex = (b) => Buffer.from(b).toString('hex');
const hkdf = (ikm, info) => Buffer.from(
  crypto.hkdfSync('sha256', ikm, Buffer.alloc(0), Buffer.from(info), 32));

// Fixed inputs. Invented values only.
const NOW = 1790000000; // a fixed "now" for transcript timestamps
const INPUT = {
  username: 'vector-user',
  userId: '0f1e2d3c-4b5a-4968-8776-a5b4c3d2e1f0',
  password: 'a passphrase used only for vectors',
  pepperB64: b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 7)),
  pepperVersion: 3,
  nodePk: b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 0x11)),
  otherNodePk: b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 0x22)),
  groupId: 'grp_vector-01',
  mnemonic: 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567',
  edSeedHex: '9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60',
  xSeedHex: '77076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c2a',
  peerXPubHex: 'de9edb7d7b7dc1b4d35b61c2ece435373f8343c85b78674dadfc7e146f882b4f',
  fixedNonceHex: '000102030405060708090a0b',
  legacyNonceHex: '0b0a09080706050403020100',
  now: NOW,
};

const pkcs8 = (prefixHex, seedHex) =>
  Buffer.concat([Buffer.from(prefixHex, 'hex'), Buffer.from(seedHex, 'hex')]);
const ED_PKCS8 = pkcs8('302e020100300506032b657004220420', INPUT.edSeedHex);
const X_PKCS8 = pkcs8('302e020100300506032b656e04220420', INPUT.xSeedHex);

function withFixedRandom(bytesHex, fn) {
  const real = crypto.randomBytes;
  crypto.randomBytes = (n) => {
    const b = Buffer.from(bytesHex, 'hex');
    if (b.length !== n) throw new Error(`fixed random of ${b.length}, asked ${n}`);
    return b;
  };
  try { return fn(); } finally { crypto.randomBytes = real; }
}

function withNow(seconds, fn) {
  const real = Date.now;
  Date.now = () => seconds * 1000;
  try { return fn(); } finally { Date.now = real; }
}

(async () => {
  const argon2 = wasmArgon2(VENDOR);
  let store = {};
  const ring = createKeyring({
    argon2,
    load: () => JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(store)),
    save: (o) => { store = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(o)); },
  });

  // 1. KDF chain.
  const salt = crypto.createHash('sha256')
    .update(`meshbay:bundle:v2:${INPUT.username}`).digest().subarray(0, 16);
  const ARGON2 = { memory: 131072, passes: 3, parallelism: 1, tagLength: 32 };
  await ring.deriveSession({
    password: INPUT.password, username: INPUT.username, userId: INPUT.userId,
    pepperB64: INPUT.pepperB64, pepperVersion: INPUT.pepperVersion,
  });
  const m = Buffer.from(store.masters[INPUT.userId].m, 'base64');
  const a = Buffer.from(store.masters[INPUT.userId].legacy, 'base64');
  const kdf = {
    argon2_params: ARGON2,
    salt_hex: hex(salt),
    argon2_hex: hex(a),
    master_hex: hex(m),
    master_fingerprint: ring.currentFingerprint(INPUT.userId),
    node_key_hex: hex(hkdf(m, `meshbay:bundle:v3|node|${INPUT.nodePk}`)),
    playlist_key_b64: ring.playlistKey(INPUT.userId),
    recovery_key_hex: null, // filled below
  };

  // 2. A fixed identity, placed in the store as mint() would leave it.
  store.identities[INPUT.userId] = {
    [INPUT.nodePk]: { ed: b64(ED_PKCS8), x: b64(X_PKCS8), sealedWith: null },
  };
  const identity = {
    ed_pkcs8_b64: b64(ED_PKCS8),
    x_pkcs8_b64: b64(X_PKCS8),
    public: ring.identity(INPUT.userId, INPUT.nodePk),
  };

  // 3. Bundles.
  const fixed = withFixedRandom(INPUT.fixedNonceHex,
    () => ring.sealBundle(INPUT.userId, INPUT.nodePk));
  const recovery = withFixedRandom(INPUT.fixedNonceHex,
    () => ring.sealRecovery(INPUT.userId, INPUT.nodePk, INPUT.mnemonic, INPUT.username));

  // The recovery key, re-derived the way keyring.js does (fromMnemonic + hkdf).
  const B32 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567';
  let bits = 0; let value = 0; const raw = [];
  for (const ch of INPUT.mnemonic.replace(/[^A-Za-z2-7]/g, '').toUpperCase()) {
    value = (value << 5) | B32.indexOf(ch); bits += 5;
    if (bits >= 8) { raw.push((value >>> (bits - 8)) & 0xff); bits -= 8; }
  }
  kdf.mnemonic_bytes_hex = hex(Buffer.from(raw.slice(0, 32)));
  kdf.recovery_key_hex = hex(hkdf(Buffer.from(raw.slice(0, 32)),
    `meshbay:recovery:v1:${INPUT.username}`));

  // MBK2 (TRANSITIONAL): "MBK2" ‖ nonce ‖ AES-GCM(JSON) under the Argon2 key, no AAD.
  const legacyNonce = Buffer.from(INPUT.legacyNonceHex, 'hex');
  const c = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', a, legacyNonce);
  const plain = JSON.stringify({ skEd: b64(ED_PKCS8), skX: b64(X_PKCS8) });
  const legacy = b64(Buffer.concat([
    Buffer.from('MBK2'), legacyNonce, c.update(plain), c.final(), c.getAuthTag()]));

  // Each must open through the shipped keyring, into a fresh store.
  const check = async (label, bundleEnc, extra = {}) => {
    let s2 = {};
    const r2 = createKeyring({ argon2, load: () => JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(s2)),
                               save: (o) => { s2 = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(o)); } });
    await r2.deriveSession({ password: INPUT.password, username: INPUT.username,
      userId: INPUT.userId, pepperB64: INPUT.pepperB64, pepperVersion: INPUT.pepperVersion });
    const pub = r2.openBundle(INPUT.userId, INPUT.nodePk, { bundleEnc, ...extra });
    if (pub.pkEdB64 !== identity.public.pkEdB64 || pub.pkXB64 !== identity.public.pkXB64) {
      throw new Error(`${label} opened to another identity`);
    }
    return true;
  };
  await check('fixed', fixed.bundle);
  await check('legacy', legacy);
  // The recovery copy, through the fallback: a passphrase copy that does not open.
  await check('recovery', b64(Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('MBK3'), Buffer.alloc(30, 1)])), {
    recoveryEnc: recovery, recoveryMnemonic: INPUT.mnemonic, username: INPUT.username });

  const bundles = {
    sealed_json_plaintext: plain,
    aad: `meshbay:bundle:v3|${INPUT.userId}|${INPUT.nodePk}`,
    fixed_nonce_bundle_b64: fixed.bundle,
    fixed_nonce_fingerprint: fixed.fingerprint,
    recovery_fixed_nonce_b64: recovery,
    legacy_mbk2_b64: legacy,
  };

  // 4. Agreement.
  const agreement = {
    peer_x_pub_b64: b64(Buffer.from(INPUT.peerXPubHex, 'hex')),
    shared_b64: ring.shared(INPUT.userId, INPUT.nodePk, b64(Buffer.from(INPUT.peerXPubHex, 'hex'))),
  };

  // 5. Transcripts: every kind, then refusals.
  const ctx = { userId: INPUT.userId, nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, ...identity.public };
  delete ctx.sealedWith;
  const nonceNode = b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 0x33));
  const kinds = {
    join: { nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, groupId: INPUT.groupId, userId: INPUT.userId, nonceNode, ts: NOW },
    device_hello: { nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, groupId: INPUT.groupId, userId: INPUT.userId, nonceNode, ts: NOW - 30 },
    device_request: { nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, userId: INPUT.userId,
      codeHash: 'ab'.repeat(32), nonceNode, ts: NOW + 30 },
    device_add: { nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, userId: INPUT.userId,
      pkEd: b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 0x44)), pkX: b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 0x55)), nonceNode, ts: NOW },
    device_revoke: { nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, userId: INPUT.userId,
      pkEd: b64(Buffer.alloc(32, 0x44)), nonceNode, ts: NOW },
    chat: { groupId: INPUT.groupId, epoch: 4, nonce: b64(Buffer.alloc(24, 0x66)),
      ct: b64(Buffer.from('ciphertext of a chat line, opaque here')) },
    admin: { op: 'apps_enabled', nodePk: INPUT.nodePk, groupId: INPUT.groupId,
      subject: '{"apps":["chat","videos"],"note":"é ü 漢"}',
      nonce: b64(Buffer.alloc(16, 0x77)), ts: NOW },
  };
  const transcripts = {};
  for (const [kind, fields] of Object.entries(kinds)) {
    const bytes = withNow(NOW, () => transcriptFor(kind, fields, ctx));
    const sig = withNow(NOW, () => ring.signAs(INPUT.userId, INPUT.nodePk, kind, fields));
    transcripts[kind] = { fields, transcript_hex: hex(bytes), signature_b64: sig };
  }

  const refusals = [];
  const refuse = (label, kind, fields) => {
    try {
      withNow(NOW, () => transcriptFor(kind, fields, ctx));
      throw new Error(`vector "${label}" was NOT refused by transcripts.js`);
    } catch (e) {
      if (/NOT refused/.test(e.message)) throw e;
      refusals.push({ label, kind, fields, error: e.message });
    }
  };
  refuse('another node', 'join', { ...kinds.join, nodePk: INPUT.otherNodePk });
  refuse('another account', 'join', { ...kinds.join, userId: '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000000' });
  refuse('stale timestamp', 'join', { ...kinds.join, ts: NOW - 601 });
  refuse('future timestamp', 'device_hello', { ...kinds.device_hello, ts: NOW + 601 });
  refuse('fractional timestamp', 'join', { ...kinds.join, ts: NOW + 0.5 });
  refuse('bad group id', 'join', { ...kinds.join, groupId: 'a/b' });
  refuse('short node nonce', 'join', { ...kinds.join, nonceNode: b64(Buffer.alloc(15)) });
  refuse('not base64', 'join', { ...kinds.join, nonceNode: 'not*base64' });
  refuse('bad request hash', 'device_request', { ...kinds.device_request, codeHash: 'AB'.repeat(32) });
  refuse('device key wrong length', 'device_add', { ...kinds.device_add, pkEd: b64(Buffer.alloc(31)) });
  refuse('negative epoch', 'chat', { ...kinds.chat, epoch: -1 });
  refuse('chat nonce too short', 'chat', { ...kinds.chat, nonce: b64(Buffer.alloc(11)) });
  refuse('bad op', 'admin', { ...kinds.admin, op: 'Drop-Table' });
  refuse('an op that widens sharing (gone from MNP 6.0)', 'admin', { ...kinds.admin, op: 'root_add' });
  refuse('a well-formed op not on the list', 'admin', { ...kinds.admin, op: 'set_app_setting' });
  refuse('subject too long', 'admin', { ...kinds.admin, subject: 'x'.repeat(16385) });
  refuse('unknown kind', 'sign_anything', { bytes: 'AAAA' });

  const out = {
    _about: 'Generated by gen_keyring_vectors.js from meshbay-client keyring.js and '
      + 'transcripts.js with the vendored Argon2. Every implementation of the bundle '
      + 'format and the transcripts must reproduce every field.',
    input: INPUT,
    kdf, identity, bundles, agreement, transcripts, refusals,
  };
  process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(out, null, 2) + '\n');
})().catch((e) => { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });