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"""
Bundle store — SQLite-backed storage for GEK bundles and keypair bundles.
GEK bundles: ECIES-wrapped GEK targeted at a specific user's X25519 key.
Keypair bundles: AES-GCM encrypted (Ed25519 + X25519) private keys, encrypted
with the user's password-derived bundle_key. Opaque to the node. An optional
second copy (bundle_enc_recovery) is wrapped under the account's recovery key
instead, so a forgotten passphrase does not strand the identity — see
docs/auth-confirm.md §4.3.
Both are stored and served over the P2P DataChannel during MNP handshake.
"""
import logging
from pathlib import Path
import aiosqlite
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_SCHEMA_GEK = """\
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS gek_bundles (
group_id TEXT NOT NULL,
user_id TEXT NOT NULL,
pk_eph_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,
nonce_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,
wrapped_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,
stored_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (group_id, user_id)
);
"""
# Chat epoch keys. Wrapped to the node's own X25519 key, exactly as the node's
# copy of the group key is — never stored raw.
#
# That is the whole basis of the claim chat encryption makes: "unreadable to
# someone who obtains the node's storage without the keystore password". A
# plaintext table beside chat.db would collapse it to nothing, silently, and it
# is the obvious thing to write. `test_chat_key_storage.py` reads the file back
# and refuses to find the live key in it.
#
# Rows are kept, never replaced: opening a new epoch must not make the history
# of the old one unreadable to the members who could already read it, which is
# the difference between an epoch and a rotation.
_SCHEMA_CHAT_EPOCHS = """\
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS chat_epochs (
group_id TEXT NOT NULL,
epoch INTEGER NOT NULL,
pk_eph_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,
nonce_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,
wrapped_b64 TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now')),
PRIMARY KEY (group_id, epoch)
);
"""
_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR = """\
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS keypair_bundles (
user_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
bundle_enc TEXT NOT NULL,
bundle_enc_recovery TEXT,
stored_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
);
"""
class BundleStore:
def __init__(self, db_path: Path):
self._db_path = db_path
self._db: aiosqlite.Connection | None = None
async def open(self) -> None:
self._db_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self._db = await aiosqlite.connect(str(self._db_path))
await self._db.execute(_SCHEMA_GEK)
await self._db.execute(_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR)
await self._db.execute(_SCHEMA_CHAT_EPOCHS)
await self._migrate_keypair_recovery()
await self._db.commit()
async def _migrate_keypair_recovery(self) -> None:
"""
Add bundle_enc_recovery to a keypair_bundles table created before it
existed. SQLite has no ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS, so check the columns
first — this table is node-only and has no Alembic history.
"""
assert self._db
async with self._db.execute("PRAGMA table_info(keypair_bundles)") as cur:
cols = {row[1] for row in await cur.fetchall()}
if "bundle_enc_recovery" not in cols:
await self._db.execute(
"ALTER TABLE keypair_bundles ADD COLUMN bundle_enc_recovery TEXT")
async def store(
self,
group_id: str,
user_id: str,
pk_eph_b64: str,
nonce_b64: str,
wrapped_b64: str,
) -> None:
assert self._db
await self._db.execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO gek_bundles "
"(group_id, user_id, pk_eph_b64, nonce_b64, wrapped_b64, stored_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, datetime('now'))",
(group_id, user_id, pk_eph_b64, nonce_b64, wrapped_b64),
)
await self._db.commit()
async def fetch(self, group_id: str, user_id: str) -> dict | None:
assert self._db
async with self._db.execute(
"SELECT pk_eph_b64, nonce_b64, wrapped_b64 FROM gek_bundles "
"WHERE group_id = ? AND user_id = ?",
(group_id, user_id),
) as cursor:
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if not row:
return None
return {
"pk_eph_b64": row[0],
"nonce_b64": row[1],
"wrapped_b64": row[2],
}
async def store_keypair(
self,
user_id: str,
bundle_enc: str,
bundle_enc_recovery: str | None = None,
) -> None:
"""
Store the passphrase-wrapped keypair bundle, and optionally a second
copy wrapped under the account's recovery key.
A call that omits bundle_enc_recovery — a plain re-backup, or a
passphrase-change re-wrap (docs/auth-confirm.md §3.2) — must not erase a
recovery copy already stored, so the upsert keeps the existing value
when the new one is None.
"""
assert self._db
await self._db.execute(
"INSERT INTO keypair_bundles "
"(user_id, bundle_enc, bundle_enc_recovery, stored_at) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, datetime('now')) "
"ON CONFLICT(user_id) DO UPDATE SET "
" bundle_enc = excluded.bundle_enc, "
" bundle_enc_recovery = COALESCE(excluded.bundle_enc_recovery, "
" keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery), "
" stored_at = excluded.stored_at",
(user_id, bundle_enc, bundle_enc_recovery),
)
await self._db.commit()
async def fetch_keypair(self, user_id: str) -> dict | None:
assert self._db
async with self._db.execute(
"SELECT bundle_enc, bundle_enc_recovery FROM keypair_bundles "
"WHERE user_id = ?",
(user_id,),
) as cursor:
row = await cursor.fetchone()
if not row:
return None
return {"bundle_enc": row[0], "bundle_enc_recovery": row[1]}
async def delete_keypair(self, user_id: str) -> bool:
"""
Drop someone's keypair bundle at their own request.
Backing keys up here is what lets a second browser recover them with the
password — and it is also what puts a PBKDF2-protected blob on every node
whose group they join (finding C4). Someone who does not need the first
should be able to withdraw the second, and not merely stop adding to it.
"""
assert self._db
cur = await self._db.execute(
"DELETE FROM keypair_bundles WHERE user_id = ?", (user_id,))
await self._db.commit()
return cur.rowcount > 0
# ── Chat epoch keys ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def store_chat_epoch(
self,
group_id: str,
epoch: int,
pk_eph_b64: str,
nonce_b64: str,
wrapped_b64: str,
) -> None:
"""
Record one epoch key, wrapped to the node's own key.
`INSERT OR IGNORE`, not `REPLACE`: an epoch's key is written once and is
then the only way to read the messages sent under it. Overwriting one —
which a retry, or two callers racing to open the same epoch, would do —
would destroy that history with no error anywhere.
"""
assert self._db
await self._db.execute(
"INSERT OR IGNORE INTO chat_epochs "
"(group_id, epoch, pk_eph_b64, nonce_b64, wrapped_b64) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(group_id, epoch, pk_eph_b64, nonce_b64, wrapped_b64),
)
await self._db.commit()
async def fetch_chat_epochs(self, group_id: str) -> list[dict]:
"""Every epoch this group has had, oldest first."""
assert self._db
async with self._db.execute(
"SELECT epoch, pk_eph_b64, nonce_b64, wrapped_b64 FROM chat_epochs "
"WHERE group_id = ? ORDER BY epoch", (group_id,)
) as cur:
rows = await cur.fetchall()
return [{"epoch": r[0], "pk_eph_b64": r[1], "nonce_b64": r[2],
"wrapped_b64": r[3]} for r in rows]
async def latest_chat_epoch(self, group_id: str) -> int:
"""The highest epoch number, or 0 when the group has none yet."""
assert self._db
async with self._db.execute(
"SELECT MAX(epoch) FROM chat_epochs WHERE group_id = ?",
(group_id,)
) as cur:
row = await cur.fetchone()
return int(row[0] or 0)
async def close(self) -> None:
if self._db:
await self._db.close()
self._db = None
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