feat(chat): encrypt group chat under per-device epoch keys (MNP 2.0)

Chat messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM under a key derived per group, per
epoch, per *device*, and signed over the ciphertext with the device key the
node pinned. The node relays and archives; it cannot read a message.

There is no switch. MNP goes to 2.0 and MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED moves with it, so a
1.x peer is refused at the handshake with `version_too_old` rather than
admitted and then unable to speak. An opt-in flag was designed and rejected:
every node is a test node, so it would have bought nothing and left a plaintext
branch reachable — C6's lesson one feature later. A test reads the source and
refuses any code that consults a `chat_encrypted` setting.

Not Sender Keys, and `senderkeys.py` is now documented as unused. With
distribution under the group key and a node that serves history to devices
which were not present, the node must retain each chain's earliest key, and a
chain key at iteration i yields every message key from i on by pure HKDF —
forward secrecy is zero either way. What the ratchet was left buying was
stateful client code with silent failure modes, three of them reproduced: any
member could sign as any other, a second device dropped the first's chain, and
the skipped-key cache grew without bound. The reasoning is in
docs/chat-sender-keys.md, which is the specification and the decision record.

Epochs, not rotation: the epoch key is wrapped under the group key at delivery
and never stored under it, so `gek_rotate` is a re-wrap. A group-key-derived
archive key would have made every message ever sent unreadable on the first
`member unpin`, which is the documented step after removing a member. A new
epoch opens on member revoke/unpin, device revoke and `gek_rotate`; old epochs
are kept and still delivered, so history stays readable to everyone who could
already read it, and nothing anywhere deletes one.

Three prerequisites this needed, each a live defect on its own:

* The peer registry was keyed by user_id, so one account's second device
  evicted the first and the broadcast skipped recipients by account — a
  person's phone never saw what they typed on their laptop.
* The handshake authenticated an account, never a device. `device_hello`
  (additive, signed, refused unless the key is a live device of this account in
  the node's own roster) is what lets the node refuse a member claiming
  somebody else's key.
* `_admin_exec_file_delete` authorized against the exact uploading key, so
  device linking had already broken deleting your own file from your other
  device. It now authorizes against any non-revoked device of `uploader_id`.

Found by driving the real panel over the real transport, not by reading source:
`chat_keys_resp` was routed by arrival order and handed to an unanswered
`media_meta_req` — the original frozen-tab defect in a message type that did
not exist when that probe was written. And `_asText` had been deleted with an
unrelated helper beside it; its only caller sits inside a promise the panel
catches, so every conversation rendered empty with nothing in the console.

Existing node data is migrated by QE/migration/migrate_chat_encryption.py
(not versioned, per the QE rule), run with the node stopped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TZZxYjz8YeWRz13xDi8LJr

1 files changed, 13 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py
index f7d4911..188a8aa 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py
@@ -66,11 +66,19 @@ from meshbay_common import MNP_VERSION
 
 HANDSHAKE_PREFIX = b"meshbay:mnp:handshake:v1"
 
-# The oldest peer this build will talk to. MNP 1.0 sealed `index_sync`,
-# `index_delta` and the `handshake_ack` payload under the group key, which no
-# 0.x peer can open and which a 0.x peer's own messages do not carry — there is
-# nothing to be compatible with, which is what makes it a MAJOR bump.
-MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED = "1.0"
+# The oldest peer this build will talk to.
+#
+# 2.0 (2026-09-07): chat messages are sealed under a per-device subkey of the
+# group's chat epoch key, and the node refuses a plaintext one. A 1.x peer can
+# neither produce nor read that, so there is nothing to be compatible with —
+# the same reasoning that made 1.0 a MAJOR bump for the sealed index.
+#
+# Moving the floor with the version is the point: a 1.x client is refused here,
+# with `version_too_old` and a sentence saying so, instead of completing a
+# handshake and then discovering that every message it sends is rejected and
+# every message it receives is unreadable. A stated refusal is a bug report; a
+# chat that quietly does not work is a support case.
+MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED = "2.0"
 
 ROLE_CLIENT = "client"
 ROLE_NODE = "node"