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authorChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-09-25 14:53:42 +0200
committerChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-09-25 17:24:16 +0200
commitbce962c39fcb2d124506e33f77c3ca9082f145dd (patch)
tree54cce4900f27f639bc8dec63f5e62d747ccdfe07 /packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py
parent6b9b5394c5ec01c5de01b7bf23bc161792f38278 (diff)
downloadmeshbay-bce962c39fcb2d124506e33f77c3ca9082f145dd.tar.gz
fix(hub): present a node-audience token in the handshake, not the hub session token
A member authenticated to a node in the MNP handshake with its hub *session* token — scope=user, valid at the hub API for hours. A node operator is in the threat model, so this handed them a live hub credential for the member: enough to enumerate the member's other groups, act as them, and (before the previous commit closed it) take the account over. The node genuinely needs a hub-signed membership assertion, so the fix is to make that a separate credential that opens nothing at the hub API. Two audiences signed by the one hub key (meshbay_common/tokens.py): - HUB_API_AUD — session tokens (login, device-auth, node-auth, refresh), used for hub calls and signaling. decode_access_token now binds this audience, so an MNP token cannot be replayed against the hub API. - MNP_AUD — a short-lived token a member presents to a node and nothing else, from POST /v1/nodes/mnp-token. authorize_token now binds this audience, so a session token presented to a node is refused. This closes the disclosure. The node's own self-decode (hub_client.py) reads its node token with audience=HUB_API_AUD. The client fetches the MNP token inside transport.connect() (and on every reconnect) using the session token, so callers are unchanged and signaling keeps using the session token. No regression to a long session: the MNP token is checked once, at the handshake, before any proof — a film already playing is not re-authenticated, so a 15-minute token does not interrupt a 4-hour film; reconnects refetch a fresh one. Denylist and membership checks are unchanged (the MNP token carries sub/jti/groups). Tests: authorize_token refuses a session/no-audience token and accepts an MNP token; the hub API refuses an MNP token; POST /v1/nodes/mnp-token is minted only for a member's own session. Verified red-before/green-after; common, node and hub suites green (the pre-existing test_cli_golden failure is an argparse/pytest prog artifact unrelated to this change). Still to do before deploy (B2): bump the MNP version and client.minimum so a stale desktop client is told to update rather than getting a handshake refusal, update docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and MESHBAY_NODE_PROTOCOL.md, and validate against a real node locally, then deploy hub+node+SPA atomically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py')
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diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py
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+"""Token audiences — one hub key, two purposes, never interchangeable.
+
+The hub signs everything with one Ed25519 key, but a token has to say what it is
+*for*, or a credential minted for one purpose is honoured for another. Two
+audiences settle it:
+
+- ``HUB_API_AUD`` — a session token, presented to the **hub API** (``hubFetch``,
+ signaling). Carried by the browser and the desktop client, and by a node for
+ its own hub calls.
+- ``MNP_AUD`` — a short-lived token a member presents to a **node** in the MNP
+ handshake, and to nothing else. It authorises the member to that node
+ (``sub``, ``groups``, ``jti``) and is **useless at the hub API**.
+
+The reason this exists: a member hands whatever token it holds to every node it
+connects to (the handshake authenticates with it). If that were the session
+token, a node operator — who is in the threat model — would hold a live hub
+credential for the member and could act as them at the hub. Separating the
+audiences means the credential a node receives opens nothing at the hub, and the
+credential the hub API accepts is never disclosed to a node.
+
+The hub API decode (:func:`meshbay_hub.auth.decode_access_token`) binds
+``HUB_API_AUD``; the node handshake decode
+(:func:`meshbay_common.handshake.authorize_token`) binds ``MNP_AUD``. Each
+rejects the other's audience.
+"""
+
+HUB_API_AUD = "meshbay:hub-api"
+MNP_AUD = "meshbay:mnp"