fix(hub): a per-account sign-in lockout, and a reviewed unauthenticated surface

Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong
passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a
`Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase
being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel;
zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6
gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so
the account is what is counted.

- Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1).
  The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field.
- The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
  … WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit.
- Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the
  last had no rate limit at all.
- A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and
  device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns
  its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it
  before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase
  only after the nodes have it.

The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed:
{json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown;
the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase.

The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route:

- No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them
  on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three.
- The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is
  accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any
  stranger holds for free.
- `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does:
  nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account.
- `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without
  an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason.

Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase
messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the
passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running
instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py
index 60b0c88..1f1f5c5 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ _connected_nodes: dict[str, WebSocket] = {}   # node_id → websocket
 _node_groups: dict[str, list[str]] = {}        # node_id → [group_id, ...]
 _punch_events: dict[str, asyncio.Event] = {}  # node_id → signaling event
 
+# How long an unauthenticated socket may stay open before saying who it is. The
+# node sends its auth message the moment the connection opens; anything that
+# has not spoken by now is holding a socket and a task for nothing.
+NODE_WS_AUTH_TIMEOUT = 10.0
+
 
 def is_node_connected(node_id: str) -> bool:
     return node_id in _connected_nodes
@@ -336,7 +341,13 @@ async def node_websocket(ws: WebSocket):
 
     try:
         # Auth: expect {"type": "auth", "token": "<jwt>", "node_id": "..."}
-        raw = await ws.receive_text()
+        # Bounded: the socket is accepted before anyone is authenticated, so an
+        # unbounded wait is a connection any stranger can hold open for ever.
+        try:
+            raw = await asyncio.wait_for(ws.receive_text(), NODE_WS_AUTH_TIMEOUT)
+        except TimeoutError:
+            await _reject(ws, "Authentication timed out", 4001)
+            return
         msg = json.loads(raw)
         if msg.get("type") != "auth" or "token" not in msg:
             await _reject(ws, "Send auth first", 4001)