aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-09-01 21:51:25 +0200
committerChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-09-01 21:51:25 +0200
commit799d87999c8324564dce5159191532e008dd93d2 (patch)
tree5ff1816f18625dfece9eb67fa06c7b25fdece4f8 /packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py
parent8a6294b0412a86f378c6e2e937c28de64a903c91 (diff)
parent1e6db7d23c70b7bd7e1422f09911b3645f0fb2e2 (diff)
downloadmeshbay-799d87999c8324564dce5159191532e008dd93d2.tar.gz
Merge branch 'fix/third-review-h1-h2-m1-m6'
Third security review (docs/third-review.md) plus its remediation. Fixed and verified: - H1 moderator could grant admin / hard-revoke → handler split by field - H2 unauthenticated 2-report global blocklist → auth + distinct reporters + rate limit + refused when public groups are off - M1 registration reCAPTCHA was inert → gate unconditional; the desktop client's CSP allows the widget - M2 QUIC chat/stream handlers lagged WebRTC → brought to parity; the QUIC listener is now off by default ([node] quic_enabled) - M3 link-preview SSRF gaps → rate limit + port allowlist + connect-address re-check + decompression-bomb guard - M4 federated peer over-trust → source bound to the signer, push capped, revocation prunes the peer's own entries, replay rejected - M5 no CSP / security headers on the SPA → middleware; verified against the live app with no violations Withdrawn: - M6 add_group_member accepting node tokens is deliberate (commit 0443cf8, the CLI invite flow). The "fix" broke that flow on the deployed hub and was reverted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py')
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py17
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py
index 76d7ec0..2daa55b 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ from meshbay_hub.api.relay import router as relay_router
from meshbay_hub.api.signaling import router as signaling_router
from meshbay_hub.api.admin import router as admin_router
from meshbay_hub.api.notifications import router as notifications_router
-from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V
+from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V, CSP
from meshbay_hub.api.middleware import limiter
@@ -142,6 +142,21 @@ def create_app(cfg: HubConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI:
app.state.limiter = limiter
app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler)
+ @app.middleware("http")
+ async def _security_headers(request, call_next):
+ """
+ Second-review L5, third-review M5: the SPA shell and its assets went out
+ with no CSP and no other protective headers. This adds them everywhere —
+ `webapp.CSP` is the same policy the desktop client already enforces on
+ these exact files. `setdefault` so a route that sets its own wins.
+ """
+ response = await call_next(request)
+ response.headers.setdefault("Content-Security-Policy", CSP)
+ response.headers.setdefault("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+ response.headers.setdefault("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
+ response.headers.setdefault("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
+ return response
+
# Routers (webapp last — catches / before API routes)
app.include_router(hub_router)
app.include_router(users_router)