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| author | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-09-01 21:51:25 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-09-01 21:51:25 +0200 |
| commit | 799d87999c8324564dce5159191532e008dd93d2 (patch) | |
| tree | 5ff1816f18625dfece9eb67fa06c7b25fdece4f8 /packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py | |
| parent | 8a6294b0412a86f378c6e2e937c28de64a903c91 (diff) | |
| parent | 1e6db7d23c70b7bd7e1422f09911b3645f0fb2e2 (diff) | |
| download | meshbay-799d87999c8324564dce5159191532e008dd93d2.tar.gz | |
Merge branch 'fix/third-review-h1-h2-m1-m6'
Third security review (docs/third-review.md) plus its remediation.
Fixed and verified:
- H1 moderator could grant admin / hard-revoke → handler split by field
- H2 unauthenticated 2-report global blocklist → auth + distinct reporters
+ rate limit + refused when public groups are off
- M1 registration reCAPTCHA was inert → gate unconditional; the
desktop client's CSP allows the widget
- M2 QUIC chat/stream handlers lagged WebRTC → brought to parity; the QUIC
listener is now off by default ([node] quic_enabled)
- M3 link-preview SSRF gaps → rate limit + port allowlist
+ connect-address re-check + decompression-bomb guard
- M4 federated peer over-trust → source bound to the signer,
push capped, revocation prunes the peer's own entries, replay rejected
- M5 no CSP / security headers on the SPA → middleware; verified against
the live app with no violations
Withdrawn:
- M6 add_group_member accepting node tokens is deliberate (commit 0443cf8,
the CLI invite flow). The "fix" broke that flow on the deployed hub and
was reverted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011pG75yGK3NthNfyjH74omG
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py | 17 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py index 76d7ec0..2daa55b 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/app.py @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ from meshbay_hub.api.relay import router as relay_router from meshbay_hub.api.signaling import router as signaling_router from meshbay_hub.api.admin import router as admin_router from meshbay_hub.api.notifications import router as notifications_router -from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V +from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import router as webapp_router, STATIC_DIR, ASSET_V, CSP from meshbay_hub.api.middleware import limiter @@ -142,6 +142,21 @@ def create_app(cfg: HubConfig | None = None) -> FastAPI: app.state.limiter = limiter app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler) + @app.middleware("http") + async def _security_headers(request, call_next): + """ + Second-review L5, third-review M5: the SPA shell and its assets went out + with no CSP and no other protective headers. This adds them everywhere — + `webapp.CSP` is the same policy the desktop client already enforces on + these exact files. `setdefault` so a route that sets its own wins. + """ + response = await call_next(request) + response.headers.setdefault("Content-Security-Policy", CSP) + response.headers.setdefault("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff") + response.headers.setdefault("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin") + response.headers.setdefault("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") + return response + # Routers (webapp last — catches / before API routes) app.include_router(hub_router) app.include_router(users_router) |