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| author | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-09-25 11:28:31 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-09-25 12:07:49 +0200 |
| commit | b7bf11c077bdd165400cf8d80c5cd1ad4248d854 (patch) | |
| tree | e80590cd7b798e21a4ac663fd1e653a66e5f3b34 /packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js | |
| parent | 6348698322e5bfcb80d0ef0dcd833ba4e6179640 (diff) | |
| download | meshbay-b7bf11c077bdd165400cf8d80c5cd1ad4248d854.tar.gz | |
refactor(client): split transport.js into classic scripts
transport.js keeps the core (connection, reconnect, leases, dispatch).
Chat, media, admin, upload and device methods move, cut as text, into
transport-*.js scripts that hand a class of their own to extendTransport,
which copies each method onto MeshBayTransport.prototype; the codec,
roster checks, node pins and the rewrap fan-out move as they were. Both
shells load them after transport.js. Every prototype member, class
property and top-level function has the same source text as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js | 152 |
1 files changed, 152 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ae51d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +// A passphrase change, carried to every node that holds this account's +// identity bundle. + +// ── Passphrase change: re-wrap every reachable identity bundle ─────────────── +// +// docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.6. The passphrase-derived bundle_key encrypts this +// account's per-node identity on every node it has joined. Changing the +// passphrase changes that key, so each bundle must be read with the old key and +// written back with the new one — on the node, while both keys are in hand. +// +// The reachable set is the online nodes of the account's current groups. A node +// that is offline, or belongs to a group left since, cannot be reached here and +// is reported so the caller can tell the user to ask that group's operator to +// unpin them and issue a fresh code (§3.4). + +function _acHubFetch(hubUrl, path, init) { + const p = typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.MeshBayPlatform; + const url = (hubUrl || '') + path; + return (p && p.apiFetch) ? p.apiFetch(url, init) : fetch(url, init); +} + +async function _acHubGet(hubUrl, token, path) { + const r = await _acHubFetch(hubUrl, path, { + headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, + }); + if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`${path} → ${r.status}`); + return r.json(); +} + +function _acWithTimeout(promise, ms, label) { + let timer; + return Promise.race([ + promise.finally(() => clearTimeout(timer)), + new Promise((_, rej) => { + timer = setTimeout(() => rej(new Error(`${label} timed out`)), ms); + }), + ]); +} + +/** + * @param {object} o + * @param {string} o.hubUrl same base the SPA uses for the hub + * @param {string} o.token a fresh access token + * @param {string} o.username + * @param {string} o.userId + * @param {string} [o.oldPassphrase] omit in Flow B — connect falls back to the recovery copy + * @param {string} o.newPassphrase + * @param {string} [o.recoveryKey] the recovery mnemonic (Flow B, + * docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.6). + * When given, the recovery-wrapped copy is read where the + * passphrase copy cannot be, and a fresh one is written back. + * @param {(p:{done:number,total:number})=>void} [o.onProgress] + * @returns {Promise<{updated:Array,unreachable:Array,failed:Array,newBundleKey:object}>} + */ +async function rewrapAllNodes(o) { + const K = window.MeshBayKeys; + if (!K || !K.deriveEncryptionKey) { + throw new Error('key module unavailable'); + } + let oldKey, newKey; + if (o.bundleKey) { + // "Keep the current passphrase key, just add / refresh the recovery copy" + // — the Profile backfill (docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.6). `o.bundleKey` is the + // live {v2,v1} session key, so no passphrase is needed. + oldKey = newKey = o.bundleKey; + } else { + // Flow B has no old passphrase; connect will fail the passphrase decrypt and + // fall back to the recovery copy, so a placeholder key is fine for `oldKey`. + const oldPass = o.oldPassphrase || o.newPassphrase; + oldKey = { + v2: await K.deriveEncryptionKey(oldPass, o.username), + v1: await K.deriveEncryptionKeyV1(oldPass, o.username), + }; + newKey = { + v2: await K.deriveEncryptionKey(o.newPassphrase, o.username), + v1: await K.deriveEncryptionKeyV1(o.newPassphrase, o.username), + }; + } + const recoveryKey = o.recoveryKey + ? await K.deriveRecoveryKey(o.recoveryKey, o.username) + : null; + + const mine = await _acHubGet(o.hubUrl, o.token, '/v1/groups/mine'); + const groups = mine.groups || (Array.isArray(mine) ? mine : []); + const updated = [], unreachable = [], failed = []; + + for (const g of groups) { + const label = g.owner_username ? `${g.name}@${g.owner_username}` : g.name; + let nodes = []; + try { + const nd = await _acHubGet(o.hubUrl, o.token, `/v1/groups/${g.id}/nodes`); + nodes = nd.nodes || []; + } catch (e) { + failed.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label, reason: e.message }); + if (o.onProgress) o.onProgress({ done: updated.length + unreachable.length + failed.length, total: groups.length }); + continue; + } + if (nodes.length === 0) { + unreachable.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label, reason: 'node offline' }); + if (o.onProgress) o.onProgress({ done: updated.length + unreachable.length + failed.length, total: groups.length }); + continue; + } + + let anyOk = false, lastErr = null; + for (const n of nodes) { + const tp = new MeshBayTransport(o.hubUrl, o.token); + // Recover the *existing* identity or report this node — never mint a new + // one just because the stored bundle would not open. + tp._rewrapOnly = true; + try { + await _acWithTimeout( + tp.connect(n.node_id, o.token, g.id, null, null, oldKey, + o.username, o.userId, null, recoveryKey), + 30000, 'connect'); + if (tp.newNodeBundle) { + // No identity existed on this node — connect just minted one under + // the old key. Don't persist it: the next time this group is opened + // the normal flow creates one under the current key, and storing it + // here could also walk back a deliberate bundle withdrawal. Nothing + // is stranded, so this node needs no fix. + anyOk = true; + continue; + } + const sk = tp.sessionKeys; + if (!sk) { lastErr = new Error('identity not recovered'); continue; } + const skEd = Uint8Array.from(atob(sk.skEdB64), c => c.charCodeAt(0)); + const skX = Uint8Array.from(atob(sk.skXB64), c => c.charCodeAt(0)); + const reEnc = await K.encryptBundleWithKey(skEd, skX, newKey.v2); + // In Flow B, refresh the recovery copy too (same R) so the node's + // passphrase copy and recovery copy stay in step. + const reRecovery = recoveryKey + ? await K.encryptBundleWithKey(skEd, skX, recoveryKey) + : null; + await tp.storeKeypairBundle(reEnc, reRecovery); + anyOk = true; + } catch (e) { + lastErr = e; + } finally { + try { tp.close(); } catch { /* already gone */ } + } + } + + if (anyOk) updated.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label }); + else failed.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label, + reason: (lastErr && lastErr.message) || 'unreachable' }); + if (o.onProgress) o.onProgress({ done: updated.length + unreachable.length + failed.length, total: groups.length }); + } + + return { updated, unreachable, failed, newBundleKey: newKey }; +} + +MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes = rewrapAllNodes; |