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authorChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-09-14 03:01:58 +0200
committerChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-09-17 12:43:09 +0200
commit0370d001a4e74d2af0809a3e1eb5ada699b1bca2 (patch)
tree4eca51060cc94c04856c59765886523b70583b7c /packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub
parent9d1d4a7af5844f50f168ff00818382ffe57c3452 (diff)
downloadmeshbay-0370d001a4e74d2af0809a3e1eb5ada699b1bca2.tar.gz
fix(hub): the password verifier is Argon2id 64 MiB, and a hash's version names its parameters
`pw_version` 4: Argon2id 64 MiB, t=3, lanes=4 — RFC 9106's second recommended setting. A v3 hash (256 MB) still verifies at its own parameters and is rewritten at the new ones on the next sign-in, through the rehash path that already existed. Why not more. The verifier matters against an offline attacker holding the database; online guessing is bounded by the sign-in lockout. That attacker pays the client's 600 000 PBKDF2-SHA512 iterations and the hub's Argon2id per guess, since `auth_key` is 256 bits and cannot be searched directly. Memory above 64 MiB multiplies that cost by a constant — at most 16 at 256 MB, less with PBKDF2 counted — while the hub pays the same memory at every sign-in, one derivation at a time. Measured on meshbay.org: 450 ms at 256 MB, 105 ms at 64 MiB, so a burst of sign-ins clears about four times faster. Changing the current version exposed a latent lockout. `hash_password` always used the current version's parameters, while the raw-password scheme recorded `pw_version = 2` — harmless while versions 2 and 3 shared their parameters, and with version 4 every legacy registration and v1→v2 rehash would have stored a 64 MiB hash labelled 256 MB, which nothing could then verify. Seventeen tests caught it. `hash_password` now takes the version it is hashing for. The OpenSSL deadlock between two concurrent `lanes=4` derivations is the same at 64 MiB, so Argon2 stays on its single worker. The loop-stall test measures against a v3 hash, because half of a 45 ms inline derivation is too close to scheduling noise to be a reliable bound. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub')
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py4
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/auth.py31
2 files changed, 25 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py
index 991a4f7..7b2fc8c 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/users.py
@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ async def register(
if not credential:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="auth_key or password required")
- pw_hash, pw_salt = await hash_password_off_loop(credential)
pw_ver = current_pw_version() if body.auth_key else 2
+ pw_hash, pw_salt = await hash_password_off_loop(credential, pw_ver)
hub_id = _cfg.identity.id if _cfg else "meshbay.org"
user = User(
username=body.username,
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ async def login(
user.pw_version = current_pw_version()
elif user.pw_version < 2:
# Legacy rehash: upgrade Argon2 params within the password scheme (v1 -> v2)
- new_hash, new_salt = await hash_password_off_loop(body.password)
+ new_hash, new_salt = await hash_password_off_loop(body.password, 2)
user.pw_hash = new_hash
user.pw_salt = new_salt
user.pw_version = 2
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/auth.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/auth.py
index 58e2310..7045197 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/auth.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/auth.py
@@ -31,10 +31,17 @@ _ARGON2_KEY_LEN = 32
_ARGON2_VERSIONS = {
1: {"iterations": 3, "memory_cost": 65536}, # 64 MB — initial
- 2: {"iterations": 3, "memory_cost": 262144}, # 256 MB — production target
+ 2: {"iterations": 3, "memory_cost": 262144}, # 256 MB — raw password (legacy)
3: {"iterations": 3, "memory_cost": 262144}, # 256 MB — auth_key input (password split)
+ # 64 MiB, t=3, p=4 — RFC 9106's second recommended setting. What this hashes
+ # is already PBKDF2-SHA512 at 600 000 iterations of the passphrase, done by
+ # the client, and online guessing is bounded by the sign-in lockout, so the
+ # memory above this bought a constant factor against an offline attacker
+ # with the database, at four times the cost of every sign-in. Versions 3 and
+ # above are the auth_key scheme; a v3 hash is rewritten at its next sign-in.
+ 4: {"iterations": 3, "memory_cost": 65536},
}
-_ARGON2_CURRENT_VERSION = 3
+_ARGON2_CURRENT_VERSION = 4
# Module-level hub keypair (loaded once at startup)
_hub_sk_pem: bytes | None = None
@@ -112,10 +119,16 @@ def hub_id() -> str:
# ── Password ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-def hash_password(password: str) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
- """Hash a password with Argon2id (current version). Returns (hash, salt)."""
+def hash_password(password: str, version: int = _ARGON2_CURRENT_VERSION) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
+ """Hash with the parameters of `version`, which is what the caller stores.
+
+ The version is an argument because the stored `pw_version` is what
+ verification reads the parameters from: hashing at one version's parameters
+ and recording another makes an account nobody can sign in to. That mistake
+ sat unseen while versions 2 and 3 shared their parameters.
+ """
salt = os.urandom(16)
- params = _ARGON2_VERSIONS[_ARGON2_CURRENT_VERSION]
+ params = _ARGON2_VERSIONS[version]
pw_hash = Argon2id(
salt=salt,
length=_ARGON2_KEY_LEN,
@@ -143,7 +156,8 @@ def verify_password(password: str, pw_hash: bytes, salt: bytes, version: int = 2
# ── Argon2 off the event loop, one at a time ─────────────────────────────────
#
-# One derivation is 256 MB and a quarter to half a second of CPU. Called from an
+# One derivation is 64 MiB and ~0.1 s on meshbay.org (0.45 s for an old 256 MB
+# hash, until its account next signs in). Called from an
# async handler it stops the whole hub for that long — every request, every node
# socket, every offer relayed — once per sign-in, passphrase change, reset and
# registration.
@@ -164,9 +178,10 @@ def verify_password(password: str, pw_hash: bytes, salt: bytes, version: int = 2
_argon2_executor = ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1, thread_name_prefix="argon2")
-async def hash_password_off_loop(password: str) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
+async def hash_password_off_loop(password: str,
+ version: int = _ARGON2_CURRENT_VERSION) -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
- return await loop.run_in_executor(_argon2_executor, hash_password, password)
+ return await loop.run_in_executor(_argon2_executor, hash_password, password, version)
async def verify_password_off_loop(password: str, pw_hash: bytes, salt: bytes,