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authorChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-08-13 04:10:14 +0200
committerChristophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com>2026-08-13 04:10:14 +0200
commited9fb22ed703db38f9b07c00d17076f90aa4cbc8 (patch)
tree448af8bdc7734798607bb33735c2a8439c362c13 /packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py
parentee6573c57f721db8550e34e1c1c79c5922c62a4b (diff)
downloadmeshbay-ed9fb22ed703db38f9b07c00d17076f90aa4cbc8.tar.gz
fix(node)!: remove unauthenticated HTTP file API and TCP transport
Phase 11.5.A — findings C1 and C6 (see second-review.md). C1: the per-group HTTP file API bound 0.0.0.0 for every configured group, private ones included, and served two endpoints with no authentication at all: GET /index (full Mesh Group Index) and GET /file/{id} (raw plaintext file via FileResponse). Anyone able to reach the port — LAN, forwarded port, permissive IPv6 — read every private file. This bypassed the entire GEK-proof and node sovereignty layer. Deleted rather than patched: it duplicated MNP without any of its controls. C6: the TCP+TLS chunk server accepted a bare JWT with no GEK proof, leaving a second non-compliant handshake path. Deleted; QUIC remains and will be brought to parity with WebRTC by the unified handshake in 11.5.4. Transport decision recorded in transport/__init__.py: WebRTC/ICE is primary for browser and native clients (the only NAT traversal validated here — 2 ISPs, IPv4 STUN + IPv6, 4G CGNAT); QUIC is kept for LAN, port-forwarded and hub-less group:// access. punch_nat() is a direct-connection helper, not a traversal stack. Also removed server_ssl_context()/client_ssl_context() from tls_cert.py (no remaining callers) and a dead import of the former in quic_server.py. generate_self_signed_cert() stays: QUIC uses it, and the certificate hash is the intended channel-binding anchor for 11.5.6, since QUIC has no DTLS fingerprint to bind the GEK proof to. BREAKING CHANGE: node.toml keys `port` and `http_port` are gone. Regenerate config with `meshbay-node init`. Env var MESHBAY_PORT -> MESHBAY_QUIC_PORT. Tests: 198 passed (209 - 7 test_http_server - 4 test_transport). No other test changed status. Net -1300 lines. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py')
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py36
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py
index 1354ac9..374fd08 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/tls_cert.py
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
"""
-Self-signed TLS certificate generation for the node.
+Self-signed TLS certificate generation for the node's QUIC listener.
The cert is used for transport confidentiality only.
Node identity is verified via Ed25519 PK (from hub), not TLS cert chain.
-Clients connect with ssl.CERT_NONE + verify Ed25519 at the MNP handshake layer.
-Certificate is generated once and cached at ~/.config/meshbay/node_tls.pem/.key.
+Phase 11.5 note: the certificate hash is also the intended channel-binding anchor for
+the QUIC handshake proof (11.5.6), since QUIC has no DTLS fingerprint to bind to.
+
+Certificate is generated once and cached at ~/.config/meshbay/node_tls.crt/.key.
"""
import logging
import os
from pathlib import Path
-import ssl
import datetime
import ipaddress
@@ -69,27 +70,6 @@ def generate_self_signed_cert(
return cert_path, key_path
-def server_ssl_context(
- cert_path: Path = DEFAULT_CERT,
- key_path: Path = DEFAULT_KEY,
-) -> ssl.SSLContext:
- """SSL context for the node's TCP server."""
- if not cert_path.exists() or not key_path.exists():
- generate_self_signed_cert(cert_path, key_path)
-
- ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
- ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=cert_path, keyfile=key_path)
- ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3
- return ctx
-
-
-def client_ssl_context() -> ssl.SSLContext:
- """
- SSL context for clients connecting to a node.
- CERT_NONE because we verify node identity via Ed25519 PK at the MNP layer.
- """
- ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
- ctx.check_hostname = False
- ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
- ctx.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3
- return ctx
+# `server_ssl_context()` / `client_ssl_context()` were removed in Phase 11.5 along with
+# the TCP+TLS transport they served. QUIC builds its own QuicConfiguration and calls
+# generate_self_signed_cert() directly.