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| author | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-09-01 01:03:43 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christophe Besson <cbesson@gmail.com> | 2026-09-01 01:03:43 +0200 |
| commit | fe30860c58e0f1b1efd457ff5eb5146d1e592da0 (patch) | |
| tree | 99a3e96994738c4e96f969a365679475dc4cf5cd /packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py | |
| parent | 51d2d734c228f1e46670962480258abfe586d6c4 (diff) | |
| download | meshbay-fe30860c58e0f1b1efd457ff5eb5146d1e592da0.tar.gz | |
feat: passphrase change and account recovery (auth-confirm)
The passphrase derives two independent client-side values: auth_key (the
hub verifier) and bundle_key (AES-GCM key for the per-node identity
bundles, which live on nodes and never on the hub). Changing or
recovering a passphrase is therefore two operations — swap the hub
verifier, and re-wrap every reachable node's identity bundle.
Flow A — change a known passphrase (Profile page)
- POST /v1/users/password re-proves the current passphrase, swaps
pw_hash/salt/version, revokes every refresh token and returns a fresh
pair so the tab that made the change stays signed in.
- MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes: for every group's online node, connect
with the old key, read the identity off the handshake, store it back
under the new key. Returns updated / unreachable / failed so the UI can
point at the operator-unpin fallback for the gaps. Always-shown
confirmation dialog listing reachable and unreachable groups.
Recovery key
- keyderive.js generateRecoveryKey (32 random bytes, grouped Base32) and
deriveRecoveryKey (HKDF-SHA256, domain meshbay:recovery:v1:<username>).
- Every per-node identity gets a second copy wrapped under the recovery
key: keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery (node-only column, added in
_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR and via a PRAGMA-guarded ALTER for existing DBs),
carried on keypair_bundle_store / _resp. MNP 0.13 -> 0.14, additive.
- session.recoveryKey is persisted in IndexedDB (slot rk) and lazy-loaded
on connect, so a group joined in any later session still leaves a
recovery copy.
- Shown once at registration; optionally folded into the verification
e-mail as a pass-through the hub never stores or logs, with an opt-out.
- Profile -> Recovery key re-loads R and backfills every reachable node
via rewrapAllNodes in bundleKey mode (no passphrase re-entry).
Flow B — recover a lost passphrase (#/reset, linked from sign-in)
- POST /v1/users/password/reset-request {username, email}: both must be
the pair on file, checked against the blind email_hash (never
decrypted). A mismatch — wrong e-mail, unknown username, non-active
account — takes the identical no-op path (no code, no mail, same 200),
so it reveals nothing and cannot be used to spray reset mail from a
username alone. 5/min, 1-hour single-use code.
- POST /v1/users/password/reset {username, code, new_auth_key}: same
expiry / attempts / single-use checks as e-mail verification; revokes
every session and deletes every registered device key so a stored one
cannot sign back in past the reset.
- ResetPasswordPage: request code -> code + optional recovery key + new
passphrase -> reset + sign-in -> fan-out. connect() falls back to the
recovery-wrapped copy when the passphrase key cannot open bundle_enc.
Without a recovery key: sign-in is restored and each group needs the
operator-unpin fallback.
Supporting fixes (found in live testing)
- member unpin now also deletes the keypair bundle; connect() mints a
fresh identity when handed a bundle it cannot open (unless _rewrapOnly,
set by rewrapAllNodes), so a rejoin completes instead of dead-ending
before the invite-code prompt.
- A browser with no bundle key gets a passphrase prompt on the group page
instead of a "go back to the browser you registered on" message.
- RegisterPage / LoginPage / ResetPasswordPage trim the username so every
key derivation matches the hub's stored form.
Docs: docs/auth-confirm.md. Locale keys across all ten catalogues.
Tests: test_password_change, test_password_reset, test_recovery_email,
test_recovery_key, test_rewrap_fanout, test_bundle_store_recovery, plus
additions to test_admin_ops_mnp and test_webrtc_transport. Hub suite 492
passed; node suite 741 passed (the lone test_packaging_units failure is a
pre-existing RPM-spec flake, reproducible on main).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGkxJW9br8Y9bhT8ywJ3oc
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py | 26 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py index 15309cf..717a27a 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-node/src/meshbay_node/transport/webrtc_server.py @@ -868,14 +868,20 @@ class WebRTCPeerSession: self._send({"type": "error", "detail": "No pending handshake"}) return - bundle_enc = await bundle_store.fetch_keypair(user_id) - if bundle_enc: - self._send({ + kp = await bundle_store.fetch_keypair(user_id) + if kp and kp.get("bundle_enc"): + resp = { "type": MNP.KEYPAIR_BUNDLE_RESP, "v": MNP_VERSION, "found": True, - "bundle_enc": bundle_enc, - }) + "bundle_enc": kp["bundle_enc"], + } + # The recovery-wrapped copy (MNP 0.14) rides along when present, so a + # client holding the recovery key can re-wrap it under a new + # passphrase — docs/auth-confirm.md §4.5. + if kp.get("bundle_enc_recovery"): + resp["bundle_enc_recovery"] = kp["bundle_enc_recovery"] + self._send(resp) else: self._send({"type": MNP.KEYPAIR_BUNDLE_RESP, "v": MNP_VERSION, "found": False}) @@ -891,8 +897,14 @@ class WebRTCPeerSession: self._send({"type": "error", "detail": "Missing bundle_enc"}) return - await bundle_store.store_keypair(self._user_id, bundle_enc) - log.info("Keypair bundle stored for user=%s", self._user_id[:8]) + # Optional second copy wrapped under the recovery key (MNP 0.14). Omitted + # by an older client and by a plain re-backup; the store keeps any + # existing recovery copy when this is absent. + recovery = msg.get("bundle_enc_recovery") or None + + await bundle_store.store_keypair(self._user_id, bundle_enc, recovery) + log.info("Keypair bundle stored for user=%s (recovery=%s)", + self._user_id[:8], bool(recovery)) self._audit("keypair_bundle_store") self._send({ "type": "ack", "v": MNP_VERSION, |