diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-common/src')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/__init__.py | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py | 28 |
3 files changed, 52 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/__init__.py b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/__init__.py index 77e6fac..842c52d 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/__init__.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/__init__.py @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ """MeshBay common — shared crypto primitives and protocol types.""" -__version__ = "0.15.0" +__version__ = "0.16.0" # 0.2: added PING/PONG, and `before`/`has_more` on chat history. Both are # additive — an 0.1 peer sends no `before` and gets the newest page, which is # what it wanted — so this is a MINOR bump, not a MAJOR one. @@ -241,5 +241,13 @@ __version__ = "0.15.0" # `invite_link_result` and `invite_cancel`, a code bound to no account until it # is redeemed. Additive in the same way — a 3.3 node answers `unknown message # type`, and no client can hold a link code for a node that could not issue one. -MNP_VERSION = "3.4" +# +# 4.0 (2026-09-25) is a MAJOR — a change to what a peer must *present*, not an +# additive message (§5.6). A member now authenticates to a node with a +# short-lived MNP-audience token (aud=MNP_AUD), never its hub session token: the +# node operator holds whatever is presented, and the session token opens the hub +# API. A pre-4.0 client presents the session token and is refused at the +# handshake — there is no compatibility branch, because leaving one would keep +# the disclosure reachable on every node. So the floor moves with it. +MNP_VERSION = "4.0" MHP_VERSION = "0.1" diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py index 73e0b2e..dedfeb1 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ from typing import Any, Protocol import jwt from meshbay_common import MNP_VERSION +from meshbay_common.tokens import MNP_AUD HANDSHAKE_PREFIX = b"meshbay:mnp:handshake:v1" CHALLENGE_PREFIX = b"meshbay:mnp:challenge:v1" @@ -84,7 +85,11 @@ CHALLENGE_PREFIX = b"meshbay:mnp:challenge:v1" # has no vocabulary to understand — or serving it outside every cap the operator # set, which makes the caps decoration. Neither is honest, so it is refused # here, with a code and a sentence. -MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED = "3.0" +# 4.0 (2026-09-25): a member authenticates with an MNP-audience token, not the +# hub session token (MNP_VERSION note). A pre-4.0 peer presents the session +# token, which this node now refuses — so the floor moves to 4.0 rather than +# leaving a branch that would keep a hub credential reachable by every node. +MNP_MIN_SUPPORTED = "4.0" ROLE_CLIENT = "client" ROLE_NODE = "node" @@ -274,8 +279,15 @@ def authorize_token( """ try: decoded = jwt.decode(token, hub_pk_pem, algorithms=["EdDSA"], - leeway=JWT_LEEWAY_SECONDS) + leeway=JWT_LEEWAY_SECONDS, + audience=MNP_AUD, + options={"require": ["exp", "sub", "scope"]}) except Exception as exc: + # An audience mismatch lands here too: a hub *session* token + # (aud=HUB_API_AUD) presented to a node is refused. That is the point — + # the credential a member hands a node must not be one that also opens + # the hub API (see meshbay_common.tokens). A member presents the + # short-lived MNP token instead. raise HandshakeError(f"Invalid JWT: {exc}") from exc # A node-scoped daemon token must not be usable as a client token (M9). diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c393be5 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/tokens.py @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +"""Token audiences — one hub key, two purposes, never interchangeable. + +The hub signs everything with one Ed25519 key, but a token has to say what it is +*for*, or a credential minted for one purpose is honoured for another. Two +audiences settle it: + +- ``HUB_API_AUD`` — a session token, presented to the **hub API** (``hubFetch``, + signaling). Carried by the browser and the desktop client, and by a node for + its own hub calls. +- ``MNP_AUD`` — a short-lived token a member presents to a **node** in the MNP + handshake, and to nothing else. It authorises the member to that node + (``sub``, ``groups``, ``jti``) and is **useless at the hub API**. + +The reason this exists: a member hands whatever token it holds to every node it +connects to (the handshake authenticates with it). If that were the session +token, a node operator — who is in the threat model — would hold a live hub +credential for the member and could act as them at the hub. Separating the +audiences means the credential a node receives opens nothing at the hub, and the +credential the hub API accepts is never disclosed to a node. + +The hub API decode (:func:`meshbay_hub.auth.decode_access_token`) binds +``HUB_API_AUD``; the node handshake decode +(:func:`meshbay_common.handshake.authorize_token`) binds ``MNP_AUD``. Each +rejects the other's audience. +""" + +HUB_API_AUD = "meshbay:hub-api" +MNP_AUD = "meshbay:mnp" |