diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-common/src')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py | 19 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py index dedfeb1..992fe8a 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-common/src/meshbay_common/handshake.py @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ def authorize_token( hosted_groups: Any | None = None, denylist: DenylistLike | None = None, require_scope: str | None = "user", + node_pk_b64: str | None = None, ) -> AuthorizedPeer: """ Everything decided from the JWT, before any proof is exchanged. @@ -276,6 +277,13 @@ def authorize_token( Raises HandshakeError with a peer-safe message. Deliberately strict about `group_id`: it used to be optional, and omitting it skipped the membership check entirely and fell back to the node's first group (M1). + + `node_pk_b64` binds the token to **this** node (E10). The MNP token names + the node it was minted for (`node` claim), so a member's token captured by + the operator of one node cannot be replayed to another node the member also + belongs to — not even to reach the pre-proof window there. A node always + passes its own key; a caller that passes `None` (a unit test not exercising + this) skips the check. """ try: decoded = jwt.decode(token, hub_pk_pem, algorithms=["EdDSA"], @@ -294,6 +302,17 @@ def authorize_token( if require_scope is not None and decoded.get("scope", "user") != require_scope: raise HandshakeError("Wrong token scope") + # The token names the node it was minted for (`node` claim). A member's real + # client always binds it to the node it is reaching, so a token captured by + # that node's operator and replayed to a *second* node the member also uses + # is refused here — before the pre-proof window can serve anything (E10). + # A token that names no node is not refused: the hub only ever mints one for + # the authenticated requester, so an unbound token grants nothing across + # accounts, and this keeps older or non-binding callers working. + node_claim = decoded.get("node", "") + if node_pk_b64 is not None and node_claim and node_claim != node_pk_b64: + raise HandshakeError("Token is not for this node", code="wrong_node") + user_id = decoded.get("sub", "") jti = decoded.get("jti", "") if not user_id: |