1 files changed, 152 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ae51d1
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+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport-rewrap.js
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+// A passphrase change, carried to every node that holds this account's
+// identity bundle.
+
+// ── Passphrase change: re-wrap every reachable identity bundle ───────────────
+//
+// docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.6. The passphrase-derived bundle_key encrypts this
+// account's per-node identity on every node it has joined. Changing the
+// passphrase changes that key, so each bundle must be read with the old key and
+// written back with the new one — on the node, while both keys are in hand.
+//
+// The reachable set is the online nodes of the account's current groups. A node
+// that is offline, or belongs to a group left since, cannot be reached here and
+// is reported so the caller can tell the user to ask that group's operator to
+// unpin them and issue a fresh code (§3.4).
+
+function _acHubFetch(hubUrl, path, init) {
+  const p = typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.MeshBayPlatform;
+  const url = (hubUrl || '') + path;
+  return (p && p.apiFetch) ? p.apiFetch(url, init) : fetch(url, init);
+}
+
+async function _acHubGet(hubUrl, token, path) {
+  const r = await _acHubFetch(hubUrl, path, {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
+  });
+  if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`${path} → ${r.status}`);
+  return r.json();
+}
+
+function _acWithTimeout(promise, ms, label) {
+  let timer;
+  return Promise.race([
+    promise.finally(() => clearTimeout(timer)),
+    new Promise((_, rej) => {
+      timer = setTimeout(() => rej(new Error(`${label} timed out`)), ms);
+    }),
+  ]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} o
+ * @param {string} o.hubUrl        same base the SPA uses for the hub
+ * @param {string} o.token         a fresh access token
+ * @param {string} o.username
+ * @param {string} o.userId
+ * @param {string} [o.oldPassphrase]  omit in Flow B — connect falls back to the recovery copy
+ * @param {string} o.newPassphrase
+ * @param {string} [o.recoveryKey]   the recovery mnemonic (Flow B,
+ *                                   docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.6).
+ *                                   When given, the recovery-wrapped copy is read where the
+ *                                   passphrase copy cannot be, and a fresh one is written back.
+ * @param {(p:{done:number,total:number})=>void} [o.onProgress]
+ * @returns {Promise<{updated:Array,unreachable:Array,failed:Array,newBundleKey:object}>}
+ */
+async function rewrapAllNodes(o) {
+  const K = window.MeshBayKeys;
+  if (!K || !K.deriveEncryptionKey) {
+    throw new Error('key module unavailable');
+  }
+  let oldKey, newKey;
+  if (o.bundleKey) {
+    // "Keep the current passphrase key, just add / refresh the recovery copy"
+    // — the Profile backfill (docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.6). `o.bundleKey` is the
+    // live {v2,v1} session key, so no passphrase is needed.
+    oldKey = newKey = o.bundleKey;
+  } else {
+    // Flow B has no old passphrase; connect will fail the passphrase decrypt and
+    // fall back to the recovery copy, so a placeholder key is fine for `oldKey`.
+    const oldPass = o.oldPassphrase || o.newPassphrase;
+    oldKey = {
+      v2: await K.deriveEncryptionKey(oldPass, o.username),
+      v1: await K.deriveEncryptionKeyV1(oldPass, o.username),
+    };
+    newKey = {
+      v2: await K.deriveEncryptionKey(o.newPassphrase, o.username),
+      v1: await K.deriveEncryptionKeyV1(o.newPassphrase, o.username),
+    };
+  }
+  const recoveryKey = o.recoveryKey
+    ? await K.deriveRecoveryKey(o.recoveryKey, o.username)
+    : null;
+
+  const mine = await _acHubGet(o.hubUrl, o.token, '/v1/groups/mine');
+  const groups = mine.groups || (Array.isArray(mine) ? mine : []);
+  const updated = [], unreachable = [], failed = [];
+
+  for (const g of groups) {
+    const label = g.owner_username ? `${g.name}@${g.owner_username}` : g.name;
+    let nodes = [];
+    try {
+      const nd = await _acHubGet(o.hubUrl, o.token, `/v1/groups/${g.id}/nodes`);
+      nodes = nd.nodes || [];
+    } catch (e) {
+      failed.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label, reason: e.message });
+      if (o.onProgress) o.onProgress({ done: updated.length + unreachable.length + failed.length, total: groups.length });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (nodes.length === 0) {
+      unreachable.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label, reason: 'node offline' });
+      if (o.onProgress) o.onProgress({ done: updated.length + unreachable.length + failed.length, total: groups.length });
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    let anyOk = false, lastErr = null;
+    for (const n of nodes) {
+      const tp = new MeshBayTransport(o.hubUrl, o.token);
+      // Recover the *existing* identity or report this node — never mint a new
+      // one just because the stored bundle would not open.
+      tp._rewrapOnly = true;
+      try {
+        await _acWithTimeout(
+          tp.connect(n.node_id, o.token, g.id, null, null, oldKey,
+                     o.username, o.userId, null, recoveryKey),
+          30000, 'connect');
+        if (tp.newNodeBundle) {
+          // No identity existed on this node — connect just minted one under
+          // the old key. Don't persist it: the next time this group is opened
+          // the normal flow creates one under the current key, and storing it
+          // here could also walk back a deliberate bundle withdrawal. Nothing
+          // is stranded, so this node needs no fix.
+          anyOk = true;
+          continue;
+        }
+        const sk = tp.sessionKeys;
+        if (!sk) { lastErr = new Error('identity not recovered'); continue; }
+        const skEd = Uint8Array.from(atob(sk.skEdB64), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
+        const skX = Uint8Array.from(atob(sk.skXB64), c => c.charCodeAt(0));
+        const reEnc = await K.encryptBundleWithKey(skEd, skX, newKey.v2);
+        // In Flow B, refresh the recovery copy too (same R) so the node's
+        // passphrase copy and recovery copy stay in step.
+        const reRecovery = recoveryKey
+          ? await K.encryptBundleWithKey(skEd, skX, recoveryKey)
+          : null;
+        await tp.storeKeypairBundle(reEnc, reRecovery);
+        anyOk = true;
+      } catch (e) {
+        lastErr = e;
+      } finally {
+        try { tp.close(); } catch { /* already gone */ }
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (anyOk) updated.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label });
+    else failed.push({ groupId: g.id, name: label,
+                       reason: (lastErr && lastErr.message) || 'unreachable' });
+    if (o.onProgress) o.onProgress({ done: updated.length + unreachable.length + failed.length, total: groups.length });
+  }
+
+  return { updated, unreachable, failed, newBundleKey: newKey };
+}
+
+MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes = rewrapAllNodes;