diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src')
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/nodes.py | 44 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js | 48 |
2 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/nodes.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/nodes.py index 7738875..6582a86 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/nodes.py +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/nodes.py @@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ async def node_auth( class NodeAnnounceRequest(BaseModel): pk_node: str endpoint_hint: str | None = None + timestamp: int | None = None # unix seconds + signature: str | None = None # base64 Ed25519 over the announce message @router.post("/announce", status_code=201) @@ -93,6 +95,48 @@ async def announce_node( current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): + """ + Register a node record. + + Finding M8: this accepted any pk_node with no proof the announcer held the + matching private key, so a user could announce a record carrying someone + else's node key — useful for muddying node identity, and records accumulated + without limit. The announcer must now sign a domain-separated message binding + the key to their account, the same pattern already used by /v1/nodes/auth. + """ + if body.timestamp is None or not body.signature: + raise HTTPException( + status_code=400, + detail="announce requires timestamp and signature (proof of possession)") + + now = int(time.time()) + if abs(now - body.timestamp) > NODE_AUTH_TIMESTAMP_WINDOW: + raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Timestamp too old or too far ahead") + + message = (f"meshbay:node_announce:{current_user.id}:" + f"{body.pk_node}:{body.timestamp}").encode() + try: + pk = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(base64.b64decode(body.pk_node)) + pk.verify(base64.b64decode(body.signature), message) + except Exception: + db.add(IPLog(user_id=current_user.id, event="node_announce_fail", + ip_address=client_ip(request), detail=body.pk_node[:16])) + await db.commit() + raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid node key proof of possession") + + # One active record per key per account — announcing again updates in place + # instead of accumulating rows. + existing = await db.execute( + select(Node).where(Node.user_id == current_user.id, + Node.pk_node == body.pk_node)) + node = existing.scalar_one_or_none() + if node is not None: + node.endpoint_hint = body.endpoint_hint + db.add(IPLog(user_id=current_user.id, event="node_announce", + ip_address=client_ip(request), detail=body.endpoint_hint)) + await db.commit() + return {"node_id": node.id} + node = Node( user_id=current_user.id, pk_node=body.pk_node, diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js index 18faea1..50304f3 100644 --- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js +++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/transport.js @@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ class MeshBayTransport { || !await C.verifyNodeSignature(ack.node_pk, ack.sig, transcript)) { throw new Error('Node signature invalid — refusing connection'); } + // Trust On First Use (11.5.8). With C6 closed, a substituted node already + // fails the GEK proof — this covers the case where an attacker HAS the GEK + // (an ex-member, or a leaked key) and swaps the node underneath. + // Strict refusal: a warning users can click through is decorative. + _checkNodePin(nodeId, ack.node_pk); this.nodePk = ack.node_pk; return ack; @@ -692,5 +697,48 @@ function _extractDtlsFingerprint(sdp) { return bytes; } +// ── Node identity pinning (11.5.8) ─────────────────────────────────────────── + +const NODE_PIN_PREFIX = 'mb_nodepin_'; + +function _checkNodePin(nodeId, nodePk) { + if (!nodeId || !nodePk) return; + const key = NODE_PIN_PREFIX + nodeId; + + let pinned = null; + try { pinned = localStorage.getItem(key); } catch { return; } + + if (pinned === null) { + try { localStorage.setItem(key, nodePk); } catch {} + return; + } + if (pinned !== nodePk) { + throw new Error( + 'This node\'s identity key has changed. That is expected only if its ' + + 'operator reinstalled the node — otherwise someone may be impersonating ' + + 'it. Verify with the operator out of band, then clear the pin in ' + + 'Settings to accept the new key.'); + } +} + +/** Forget a pinned node identity — the deliberate escape hatch for a legitimate rotation. */ +function clearNodePin(nodeId) { + try { + if (nodeId) localStorage.removeItem(NODE_PIN_PREFIX + nodeId); + else { + for (const k of Object.keys(localStorage)) + if (k.startsWith(NODE_PIN_PREFIX)) localStorage.removeItem(k); + } + } catch {} +} + +function pinnedNodeCount() { + try { + return Object.keys(localStorage).filter(k => k.startsWith(NODE_PIN_PREFIX)).length; + } catch { return 0; } +} + // Export +MeshBayTransport.clearNodePin = clearNodePin; +MeshBayTransport.pinnedNodeCount = pinnedNodeCount; window.MeshBayTransport = MeshBayTransport; |