aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/packages/meshbay-hub/src
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'packages/meshbay-hub/src')
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py69
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/relay.py51
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py77
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/signaling.py22
-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/group-settings.js5
5 files changed, 203 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py
index 88125c0..b1a22f7 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/groups.py
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
"""Group endpoints — /v1/groups/*"""
+import re
+
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from pydantic import BaseModel
from datetime import datetime, timezone
@@ -10,6 +12,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from meshbay_hub import hub_settings, mail
from meshbay_hub.auth import decrypt_email
from meshbay_hub.api.deps import get_current_user, require_user_scope
+from meshbay_hub.api.middleware import limiter
from meshbay_hub.api.netutil import client_ip
from meshbay_hub.db.engine import get_db
from meshbay_hub.db.models import (
@@ -192,12 +195,31 @@ async def list_public_groups(
class SwarmRegisterRequest(BaseModel):
content_hash: str # blake3 hex
- endpoint: str # "ip:port"
+ endpoint: str # "<scheme>:<port>" — a port on the caller, never a host
+
+
+# A transport and a port, and deliberately no host. The field used to be free
+# text documented as "ip:port", so a caller could name *someone else's*
+# address as a source; nothing dials a swarm source today, which is the only
+# reason that was not already a reflection primitive. A reader learns where a
+# node is from the node record, which is stamped with the address the announce
+# actually came from — so a host here would be a second, weaker, answer to a
+# question already settled elsewhere.
+_SWARM_ENDPOINT = re.compile(r"^(webrtc|quic):([0-9]{1,5})$")
+
+# One account, this many public hashes. Rows are keyed (hash, account) with no
+# cap, so a loop of invented hashes was unbounded storage growth on a hub
+# shared with everyone else. A public library far larger than this is a real
+# thing — but it is one a hub operator should be asked about, not something a
+# client establishes by writing rows.
+MAX_SWARM_HASHES_PER_ACCOUNT = 10_000
@swarm_router.post("/register", status_code=201)
+@limiter.limit("120/minute")
async def swarm_register(
body: SwarmRegisterRequest,
+ request: Request,
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
@@ -209,11 +231,21 @@ async def swarm_register(
node's calls 404'd and the leak was masked by a routing bug rather than
prevented. Nodes now filter by group visibility before calling, and the path is
correct, so the filter has to be right.
+
+ Availability: the endpoint is a port, not an address, and the number of
+ hashes one account may claim is bounded. See the two constants above.
"""
from meshbay_hub.csam import check_content_hash
if check_content_hash(body.content_hash):
raise HTTPException(status_code=451, detail="Content blocked")
+ m = _SWARM_ENDPOINT.match(body.endpoint or "")
+ if not m or not (0 < int(m.group(2)) < 65536):
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=422,
+ detail="endpoint must be '<webrtc|quic>:<port>' — a port on the "
+ "registering node, not an address")
+
from datetime import datetime, timezone
existing = await db.get(SwarmSource, (body.content_hash, current_user.id))
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
@@ -221,6 +253,14 @@ async def swarm_register(
existing.endpoint = body.endpoint
existing.last_seen = now
else:
+ held = (await db.execute(
+ select(func.count()).select_from(SwarmSource)
+ .where(SwarmSource.node_id == current_user.id))).scalar() or 0
+ if held >= MAX_SWARM_HASHES_PER_ACCOUNT:
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=429,
+ detail="This account already claims the maximum number of "
+ "public content hashes")
db.add(SwarmSource(
content_hash=body.content_hash,
node_id=current_user.id,
@@ -672,16 +712,27 @@ async def delete_group(
return {"status": "deleted", "group_id": group_id}
+# `XXXX-XXXX`, as `roster.generate_code` produces. Checked because this string
+# is placed in an email the hub sends under its own domain, and the endpoint
+# used to accept any text at all.
+_INVITE_CODE = re.compile(r"^[0-9A-Za-z]{4}-[0-9A-Za-z]{4}$")
+
+
class InviteNotifyRequest(BaseModel):
username: str
code: str
- group_name: str
+ # `group_name` used to be here and went straight into the email's subject
+ # line. The hub knows the group's name — it is reading the row two lines
+ # into the handler — so accepting a second answer only let the sender
+ # choose the subject of a message the hub signs with its own domain.
@router.post("/{group_id}/invite-notify")
+@limiter.limit("20/hour")
async def invite_notify(
group_id: str,
body: InviteNotifyRequest,
+ request: Request,
current_user: User = Depends(require_user_scope),
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
@@ -691,6 +742,15 @@ async def invite_notify(
because the inviter's browser sends it here. The hub looks up the
invitee's encrypted email, decrypts it, and sends the notification.
The inviter never sees the email address.
+
+ Availability: the target is any account on the hub — it has to be, since
+ an invitee is by definition not yet a member — so this is the one endpoint
+ where one user causes mail to be sent to another. It was unmetered and the
+ subject line came from the request. Anyone who created a group, which is to
+ say anyone, could send any registered account arbitrary text from the hub's
+ own domain, as fast as they liked. The rate limit and the two checks below
+ are what keep that from being a phishing kit with the hub's reputation
+ attached.
"""
group = await db.get(Group, group_id)
if not group:
@@ -699,6 +759,9 @@ async def invite_notify(
raise HTTPException(status_code=403,
detail="Only the group owner can send invitations")
+ if not _INVITE_CODE.match(body.code or ""):
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail="Not an invite code")
+
target = (await db.execute(
select(User).where(User.username == body.username))).scalar_one_or_none()
if not target:
@@ -715,7 +778,7 @@ async def invite_notify(
try:
mail.send_invite_notification(
- email, body.code, current_user.username, body.group_name)
+ email, body.code, current_user.username, group.name)
except Exception:
return {"status": "send_failed"}
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/relay.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/relay.py
index f82495b..c6ef26e 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/relay.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/relay.py
@@ -8,24 +8,25 @@ Relay registration:
POST /v1/relays/register — relay announces itself (signed JWT)
GET /v1/relays — list active relays (for nodes)
-Relay authentication: relay generates an Ed25519 keypair at install time.
-It registers its public key with the hub admin, then signs keepalive JWTs.
+Relay authentication: relay generates an Ed25519 keypair at install time. An
+admin approves the public key, and every register call carries an Ed25519
+signature over "meshbay:relay_register:<relay_id>:<endpoint>:<timestamp>" —
+the same proof-of-possession shape as /v1/nodes/announce.
Relay is responsible for E2E encrypted QUIC traffic only (it cannot
read the application-layer content, only forward UDP packets).
"""
+import base64
import logging
import time
-import uuid
-import jwt
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
-from meshbay_hub.api.deps import get_current_user, require_admin
-from meshbay_hub.auth import _hub_id, hub_public_key_pem
+from meshbay_hub.api.deps import require_admin
from meshbay_hub.db.engine import get_db
from meshbay_hub.db.models import User
@@ -40,11 +41,13 @@ _relays: dict[str, dict] = {} # relay_id → {endpoint, pk, last_seen, capacit
# ── Models ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
class RelayRegisterRequest(BaseModel):
- """Relay self-registers with a signed JWT."""
+ """Relay self-registers, proving possession of its approved key."""
relay_id: str
endpoint: str # "ip:port" (UDP)
pk_relay: str # base64 Ed25519 public key
capacity: int = 100 # max concurrent connections
+ timestamp: int | None = None # unix seconds
+ signature: str | None = None # base64 Ed25519 over the register message
class RelayAdminApproveRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -54,20 +57,48 @@ class RelayAdminApproveRequest(BaseModel):
# ── Relay endpoints ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+REGISTER_TIMESTAMP_WINDOW = 300 # seconds either side, as /v1/nodes/announce
+
+
@router.post("/register", status_code=201)
async def relay_register(
body: RelayRegisterRequest,
db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
"""
- Relay announces itself. Must be pre-approved by a hub admin.
- The relay's public key must already be in the approved list.
+ Relay announces itself. Must be pre-approved by a hub admin, and must prove
+ it holds the private key that approval registered.
+
+ This endpoint has no `Depends` on an account on purpose — a relay is not a
+ user — but it had no proof of anything either: it compared `pk_relay`
+ against the approved value, which is a **public** key, so anyone who could
+ read it could rewrite where the hub tells nodes to send relayed traffic.
+ The module docstring said "signs keepalive JWTs" and nothing verified a
+ signature; `jwt` was imported and never used. A key is not a password, and
+ the fix is the proof-of-possession pattern already used by
+ /v1/nodes/announce and /v1/nodes/auth.
"""
approved = _relays.get(body.relay_id)
if not approved or approved.get("pk") != body.pk_relay:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403,
detail="Relay not approved — ask hub admin to run POST /v1/relays/approve")
+ if body.timestamp is None or not body.signature:
+ raise HTTPException(
+ status_code=400,
+ detail="register requires timestamp and signature (proof of possession)")
+ if abs(int(time.time()) - body.timestamp) > REGISTER_TIMESTAMP_WINDOW:
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Timestamp too old or too far ahead")
+
+ message = (f"meshbay:relay_register:{body.relay_id}:"
+ f"{body.endpoint}:{body.timestamp}").encode()
+ try:
+ pk = Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(base64.b64decode(body.pk_relay))
+ pk.verify(base64.b64decode(body.signature), message)
+ except Exception:
+ log.warning("Relay %s failed proof of possession", body.relay_id[:8])
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid relay key proof of possession")
+
_relays[body.relay_id].update({
"endpoint": body.endpoint,
"capacity": body.capacity,
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py
index 7c37a1e..0e274f9 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/revocation.py
@@ -68,6 +68,53 @@ def get_online_nodes_for_group(group_id: str) -> list[str]:
return [nid for nid, gids in _node_groups.items() if group_id in gids]
+# A chat_notify costs one query per member of the group plus a write for each,
+# and nothing on the node's side paces it. Without a budget, one node can keep
+# the hub's database busy on behalf of a group it belongs to — a cost borne by
+# every other group on the instance. Generous enough that a lively conversation
+# never meets it: notifications aggregate to one row per person per group, so
+# the useful rate is far below this.
+NOTIFY_BURST = 30 # messages
+NOTIFY_WINDOW_SECONDS = 60
+
+_notify_window: dict[str, tuple[float, int]] = {} # node_id → (window start, count)
+
+
+def forget_node(node_id: str) -> None:
+ """Drop everything a disconnected node's socket owned.
+
+ One function rather than three lines in a `finally`, so that what a
+ disconnect does can be asserted by running it instead of by re-enacting it
+ — a test that re-enacts cleanup tests its own re-enactment, and would not
+ have noticed `_notify_window` being added here.
+
+ Which is the point: `_notify_window` is **not** cleared. Dropping it would
+ make reconnecting the way to refill the budget, and a node's token stays
+ valid for an hour. It expires by time, in `_notify_budget`.
+ """
+ _connected_nodes.pop(node_id, None)
+ _node_groups.pop(node_id, None)
+
+
+def _notify_budget(node_id: str) -> bool:
+ """True if this node may send one more chat_notify now."""
+ now = time.monotonic()
+ if len(_notify_window) > 1000:
+ # Swept here rather than on disconnect, which would let a node refill
+ # its budget by reconnecting — the same token stays valid for an hour.
+ for nid, (started, _) in list(_notify_window.items()):
+ if now - started >= NOTIFY_WINDOW_SECONDS:
+ _notify_window.pop(nid, None)
+ start, count = _notify_window.get(node_id, (now, 0))
+ if now - start >= NOTIFY_WINDOW_SECONDS:
+ start, count = now, 0
+ if count >= NOTIFY_BURST:
+ _notify_window[node_id] = (start, count)
+ return False
+ _notify_window[node_id] = (start, count + 1)
+ return True
+
+
async def _mark_hosted(group_ids: list[str]) -> None:
"""Stamp the first time a node announced it hosts each of these groups.
@@ -133,10 +180,27 @@ def _sign_revocation(target: str, target_id: str, reason: str) -> str:
# ── WebSocket endpoint ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-async def _handle_chat_notify(group_id: str, sender_name: str, sender_user_id: str) -> None:
- """Node informs hub that a chat message was posted — create notifications for offline members."""
+async def _handle_chat_notify(group_id: str, sender_name: str, sender_user_id: str,
+ *, node_id: str) -> None:
+ """Node informs hub that a chat message was posted — create notifications for offline members.
+
+ `group_id` arrives in the node's own message and is checked against what
+ that node is registered for. Without the check, any connected node could
+ write a notification to every member of **any** group on the hub, carrying
+ a display string of its choosing, with its account having no relation to
+ that group at all. Same shape as the empty group claim: something believed
+ about a group the sender has nothing to do with.
+
+ `node_id` is keyword-**required** rather than defaulted. A default here
+ would mean "unchecked when the caller forgets", which is the failure this
+ whole review is about.
+ """
if not group_id:
return
+ if group_id not in _node_groups.get(node_id, ()):
+ log.warning("Node %s sent chat_notify for a group it does not host",
+ (node_id or "?")[:8])
+ return
try:
from meshbay_hub.db.engine import get_session_factory
from meshbay_hub.db.models import GroupMember, Group
@@ -318,7 +382,7 @@ async def node_websocket(ws: WebSocket):
event.set()
elif msg.get("type") == "webrtc_answer":
from meshbay_hub.api.signaling import handle_webrtc_answer
- handle_webrtc_answer(msg)
+ handle_webrtc_answer(msg, node_id)
elif msg.get("type") == "update_groups":
# Through the same gate as the registration above. This used to
# assign the message's list verbatim, so the ceiling that makes
@@ -330,6 +394,9 @@ async def node_websocket(ws: WebSocket):
await _mark_hosted(new_gids)
log.info("Node %s updated groups: %d", node_id[:8], len(new_gids))
elif msg.get("type") == "chat_notify":
+ if not _notify_budget(node_id):
+ log.warning("Node %s exceeded its chat_notify rate", node_id[:8])
+ continue
asyncio.ensure_future(_handle_chat_notify(
msg.get("group_id", ""),
msg.get("sender_name", ""),
@@ -339,6 +406,7 @@ async def node_websocket(ws: WebSocket):
# that lied here could only suppress one notification, which
# is the same power it has by not sending the message at all.
msg.get("sender_user_id", ""),
+ node_id=node_id,
))
except WebSocketDisconnect:
@@ -347,8 +415,7 @@ async def node_websocket(ws: WebSocket):
log.error("Node WS error: %s", e)
finally:
if node_id:
- _connected_nodes.pop(node_id, None)
- _node_groups.pop(node_id, None)
+ forget_node(node_id)
# ── Admin revocation endpoint ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/signaling.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/signaling.py
index a8feae8..b4be3f2 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/signaling.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/api/signaling.py
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/v1/nodes", tags=["signaling"])
_webrtc_answers: dict[str, asyncio.Future] = {}
+# peer_id → the node the offer was relayed to. An answer is only accepted
+# from that node (see handle_webrtc_answer).
+_answer_owner: dict[str, str] = {}
class WebRTCOfferRequest(BaseModel):
@@ -133,6 +136,7 @@ async def webrtc_offer(
peer_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
answer_future: asyncio.Future = asyncio.get_event_loop().create_future()
_webrtc_answers[peer_id] = answer_future
+ _answer_owner[peer_id] = node_id
_pending_per_user[current_user.id] = _pending_per_user.get(current_user.id, 0) + 1
try:
@@ -157,6 +161,7 @@ async def webrtc_offer(
)
finally:
_webrtc_answers.pop(peer_id, None)
+ _answer_owner.pop(peer_id, None)
remaining = _pending_per_user.get(current_user.id, 1) - 1
if remaining > 0:
_pending_per_user[current_user.id] = remaining
@@ -164,13 +169,26 @@ async def webrtc_offer(
_pending_per_user.pop(current_user.id, None)
-def handle_webrtc_answer(msg: dict) -> None:
- """Called from the node WebSocket message loop when a webrtc_answer arrives."""
+def handle_webrtc_answer(msg: dict, node_id: str) -> None:
+ """Called from the node WebSocket message loop when a webrtc_answer arrives.
+
+ `node_id` is the socket this arrived on, and the answer is accepted only for
+ a `peer_id` the hub issued to **that** node. The answer carries the SDP the
+ browser then connects to, so without the check any connected node could
+ resolve any pending offer and stand in for the node the client asked for.
+ That it had not happened rested on a uuid4 being unguessable, which is a
+ reason it was hard, not a reason it was refused.
+ """
peer_id = msg.get("peer_id")
if not peer_id:
log.warning("webrtc_answer without peer_id")
return
+ if _answer_owner.get(peer_id) != node_id:
+ log.warning("Node %s answered an offer it was never sent (peer=%s)",
+ (node_id or "?")[:8], str(peer_id)[:8])
+ return
+
future = _webrtc_answers.get(peer_id)
if future and not future.done():
future.set_result({
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/group-settings.js b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/group-settings.js
index 8e11088..0f8ccdd 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/group-settings.js
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/src/meshbay_hub/static/group-settings.js
@@ -794,7 +794,10 @@ function GroupSettingsPanel({ groupId, group, token, transportRef, gekRef,
try {
const notif = await hubFetch(`/v1/groups/${groupId}/invite-notify`, {
method: 'POST', token,
- body: { username, code: result.code, group_name: group?.name || '' },
+ // No group_name: the hub reads it from the group row it has already
+ // loaded. Sending one offered a second answer to a settled question,
+ // and that answer was the subject line of an email the hub signs.
+ body: { username, code: result.code },
});
emailStatus = notif.status;
} catch { /* best effort */ }