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-rw-r--r--packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_transport_contracts.py75
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_transport_contracts.py b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_transport_contracts.py
index 6011ddb..fee80bb 100644
--- a/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_transport_contracts.py
+++ b/packages/meshbay-hub/tests/test_transport_contracts.py
@@ -317,3 +317,78 @@ def test_uploads_are_tracked_per_file(transport):
"""Acks interleave when two files are in flight."""
assert "this._uploaders = new Map()" in transport
assert "this._uploaders.set(file.name" in transport
+
+
+# ── MNP 1.0: the sealed handshake ack ────────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# The index half is measured for real in `test_index_seal_client.py`. The ack is
+# opened inside `connect()`, three messages into a WebRTC negotiation, so these
+# read the source — and the ordering they pin is the whole security argument, not
+# an implementation detail.
+
+def _handshake_block(transport: str) -> str:
+ start = transport.index("if (reply.type === 'handshake_challenge') {")
+ return transport[start:transport.index(" return ack;", start)]
+
+
+def test_the_ack_is_verified_before_it_is_decrypted(transport):
+ """
+ Verify, then decrypt. Opening the payload first would mean acting on data
+ from a peer we have not yet authenticated — which is the exact shape of C3,
+ where `node_pk` was never checked and a peer that had hijacked signaling
+ could serve a forged index and a forged `is_node_admin`.
+ """
+ block = _handshake_block(transport)
+ proof = block.index("Node failed to prove GEK possession")
+ signature = block.index("Node signature invalid")
+ pinned = block.index("_checkNodePin(")
+ opened = block.index("openGroup(")
+ assert proof < opened, "the payload is opened before the GEK proof is checked"
+ assert signature < opened, "the payload is opened before the signature is checked"
+ assert pinned < opened, "the payload is opened before the node is pinned"
+
+
+def test_an_ack_that_does_not_open_refuses_the_connection(transport):
+ """
+ Never a default. An `enabled_apps` that failed to open would otherwise reach
+ the client's documented fallback — show every registered app — which is a
+ confident wrong answer, indistinguishable from an operator's real choice.
+ """
+ block = _handshake_block(transport)
+ opened = block[block.index("let config;"):block.index("return ack;")
+ if "return ack;" in block else len(block)]
+ assert "throw new Error(" in opened, "a failed decrypt is swallowed"
+ assert "handshake_ack" in opened, "the failure does not name the message"
+ for fallback in ("|| {}", "?? {}", "catch { }", "config = {}"):
+ assert fallback not in opened, (
+ f"the ack falls back to {fallback} instead of refusing")
+
+
+def test_the_handshake_declares_a_version_range(transport):
+ """
+ L2: `v` used to be written by everyone and read by nobody, so a mismatch
+ surfaced as a missing field rather than a refusal. Both halves of the range
+ ride the handshake, and the node's half is checked before anything below it
+ in `connect()` runs.
+ """
+ block = transport[transport.index("type: 'handshake',"):]
+ block = block[:block.index("});")]
+ assert "v: MNP_V," in block and "v_min: MNP_V_MIN," in block
+
+ challenge = _handshake_block(transport)
+ assert challenge.index("_checkNodeVersion(") < challenge.index("openGroup("), (
+ "the node's version is checked after its messages are relied on")
+
+
+def test_the_index_is_never_reported_from_a_failed_decrypt(transport):
+ """
+ The consumer callbacks may only be reached from inside the opened path — a
+ `catch` that called `_onIndexSync` with an empty message would show "this
+ group has no files", which is a state a real group can be in.
+ """
+ body = transport[transport.index("async _applyIndexMessage("):]
+ body = body[:body.index("\n /**", 1)]
+ assert "openGroup(" in body
+ assert "catch" not in body, (
+ "_applyIndexMessage swallows its own failure instead of letting "
+ "_queueIndexMessage end the session")