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A phone on 4G found one of five groups missing from Search on half its
visits, and all but one on a fifth of them. Every offer that reached the node
was answered in about a second; the hub refused the others with 429 — 93 of
them in half an hour on meshbay.org, all from that phone, all to nodes that
were up. Two ceilings did it. Three pending offers per account was exactly
what one Search page dialled at once, so the first tile or reconnection beside
the sweep was refused. Thirty offers a minute per address and per node was
spent by four or five reloads of a page whose groups share one node.
Sized now against an account with twenty groups on three devices:
- 32 offers pending per account, across devices and nodes.
- A budget per account and per node, a burst of 120 refilled at two a
second. This is what bounds a member's cost to one machine (H6), and it
leaves their other nodes alone. Counted by account, because a mobile
carrier puts many subscribers behind one IPv4 address.
- 600 a minute per address and per node, as a coarse guard in front of
authentication only.
Both refusals carry Retry-After, which the browser now honours. The node's
own ceiling on peer sessions is unchanged; its comment no longer quotes the
old per-account number.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the
same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the
noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the
98 it cannot fix are the next commit.
What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of
them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could
have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69)
and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12
this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with
nothing to interpolate (19).
Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports,
and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge
before it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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group's hosts are its members'
Two checks that were not performed, in the same shape: something true of the
public case, written so it did not apply to the rest.
**Signaling.** The membership check read `if node_group_ids:`, so an empty set
skipped it — membership, group status and the public-group gate together — and
the offer was relayed. Since AV1 made an empty claim mean "no groups" rather
than "all of my owner's", that is the *normal* registration of a node hosting
nothing: the unconfigured node left running, the machine in this register's
founding incident, and the one least able to absorb the work. Each offer makes
it allocate an RTCPeerConnection and gather ICE, 30 a minute, which is H6
restored in exactly the case AV1 made common. It is refused now. Nothing
legitimate is lost: such a node refuses the handshake anyway — `group_id` is
mandatory (M1) and a node with no group key refuses (NS8) — so this declines
work the node would decline one step later at its own expense.
**The node list.** `GET /v1/groups/{id}/nodes` checked membership only for a
public group with public groups switched off. A private one answered any
authenticated account that knew the id — which an ex-member knows for ever —
with the ids and public keys of the machines hosting it. §7.4 already stated the
property for the public case. Membership is required now unless the group is
public and public groups are on. Nothing needs the list before joining: an open
join writes the membership row first, and an invitation registers the invitee's
when the code is created, both checked before making the change.
`test_webrtc_signaling_roundtrip` had to be repaired, and is the finding
restated: it registered a node in `_connected_nodes` and never in
`_node_groups`, so it drove the relay through the hole rather than through the
door — the check it routed around was the defect. It now registers the group a
real node registers.
§7.2 and §7.3 gain the rules, the register AV24 and AV25, and
test_availability_between_members.py two cases that fail on the property
against the previous source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UMxEQadpzPkYLFf5CYKhpW
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An availability review, prompted by the group claim above: a participant
supplies input — who else bears the cost? Six answers where the cost fell on
someone other than the sender, and none of them needs an attacker.
AV3 `chat_notify` carried a `group_id` the hub believed, so any connected
node could write a notification to every member of any group on the
hub, carrying a display string of its choosing, with its account
having no relation to that group. This is the group claim again, two
hundred lines further down the same socket. Gated on what the node is
registered for, and metered: the fan-out is one write per member. The
budget expires by time rather than on disconnect, or reconnecting
would refill it and a node token is good for an hour.
AV4 A swarm source named its own `endpoint` as free text documented as
"ip:port", so an account could publish a third party's address — H6's
`peer_ip` defect, never applied here. Nothing dials a swarm source
today, which is the only reason it was not already a reflection
primitive. It is a transport and a port now, never a host, and the
number of hashes one account may claim is bounded: rows were keyed
(hash, account) with no cap at all.
AV5 `handle_webrtc_answer` resolved any pending `peer_id` from any node's
socket. The answer is the SDP a browser then connects to. That this
had not happened rested on a uuid4 being unguessable.
AV6 `relay_register` had no authentication of any kind: it compared
`pk_relay` against the approved value, which is a *public* key, so
anyone who could read it could rewrite where the hub tells nodes to
send relayed traffic. The module docstring promised signed JWTs and
`jwt` was imported and never used.
AV7 The node held unlimited peer connections and kept one that never
completed a handshake for the life of the daemon. H6 bounded what one
unauthenticated peer costs; the hub's cap is three offers in flight
per *account*, a limit on each caller and not on the machine, so an
operator's exposure grew with the size of their groups.
AV8 `invite-notify` put a request-supplied `group_name` into the subject
of an email the hub sends under its own domain, to any account, with
no rate limit. The name comes from the group row now.
The tests are two accounts each, in one file that says why: a one-member test
proves a one-member property, and every finding here needed a second person
to exist at all. Each was checked against the unfixed code. Two did not
survive that check and were rewritten — one re-enacted the disconnect path
instead of running it (hence `forget_node`), the other called the reaper
itself and would have passed with the call removed from `handle_offer`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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A new General tab in Administration carries one switch, allow_public_groups,
stored in a hub_settings key/value table (runtime-editable, unlike hub.toml).
Default is on; an absent row means on, so an upgrade changes nothing.
Enforcement is server-side on every hub-mediated path, not just the SPA:
- create_group refuses visibility=public (403), staff included
- list_public_groups the directory returns nothing (local + federated)
- join_group open-joining a public group is refused
- group_online_nodes a non-member of a public group is handed no node
- signaling.webrtc_offer drops the "node hosts an open group" fallback
- federation.export_directory advertises nothing to peer hubs
The switch is read live, so flipping it back restores every path. Existing
members of a group that predates the switch keep their membership row and
their access — this is plan A, not a purge. GET /v1/hub/info exposes the
flag (unauthenticated) so the create-group form and the sidebar's "Public
groups" link render correctly.
Also in the admin Groups tab: a Revoke action beside Suspend. Suspend is the
reversible hub flag; Revoke calls POST /v1/admin/revoke, which sets
status=revoked and broadcasts a signed revocation every node enforces
(denylist + dropped live sessions). It is confirm-guarded and names the group.
And a message fix the revoke work surfaced: group_online_nodes, join_group and
webrtc_offer answered "Group is suspended" for any non-active status. They now
report the real state, so a member of a revoked group is told "Group is
revoked" rather than something reversible-sounding.
Tests: test_public_groups_toggle.py (10) covers the switch end to end and the
five enforcement paths; test_revocation.py gains the status-message assertion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018gKJ85aZyvEwarXMFzFEwi
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Create Group wizard (Electron-only) consolidates 6 steps across 4 interfaces
into a single multi-step page: group creation on hub, node attachment, root
selection via folder picker, GEK initialization, and auto-pairing — all in one
flow. Browser SPA keeps its current behavior unchanged.
Public group support (Option A — GEK for all groups):
- All groups have GEK regardless of visibility; open-join groups auto-admit
via TOFU when join_policy is "open"
- Key rotation blocked for public groups (API guard + UI hidden)
- Hub signaling allows WebRTC offers for nodes hosting open-join groups even
when the caller isn't a member yet
- attach_group writes join_policy to node.toml
- Daemon loads GEK for all groups, not just private ones
- Known-device path in join_request now auto-admits to open-join groups
Node loopback API bridge (Electron IPC):
- node:detect, node:call, node:pairing-code IPC handlers in main process
- Renderer never sees tokens, paths, or keys (session token = physical access)
- platform.js node namespace for UI consumption
- Loopback endpoints: roots CRUD, member-upload toggle, reload
Bug fixes:
- Root change detection: removed premature ctx["roots"] updates from add_root
and remove_root that prevented indexer retarget on reload
- Duplicate offline message: global fallback now gated on !group
- Signaling membership check: fallback to open-join groups for non-members
Sidebar groups sorted by last_activity_at (most recent first):
- New Group.last_activity_at column with Alembic migration
- POST /v1/groups/{id}/activity endpoint, called on connect and chat send
- Client-side sort + throttled hub updates (1/min)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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**Closing the viewer left the node working.** Nothing told it to stop:
the player dropped its handlers, which only made the browser deaf. ffmpeg
kept running and held one of the node's two transcode slots until the
credit timeout expired two minutes later — which is why the next video
answered "server busy". `stream_stop` ends it at once, and the viewer
also drops its queue, ends the MediaSource and revokes the object URL on
the way out, any of which could be holding megabytes of decrypted video.
While there: `file_chunk` replies were matched to their requests by
arrival order, which was true by luck rather than by construction. The
reply now names the file it belongs to and is matched on that and the
chunk index; a chunk nobody is waiting for is dropped instead of being
handed to whatever request happens to be oldest.
**The administration panel counted its own history.** A deleted account
is tombstoned so the connection log stays readable, and every count and
list treated that row as a user — including a group's member count, and
the member list of the group itself. They do not any more.
**Where a node is.** `endpoint_hint` is what a node believes its address
to be, learned from a STUN server and sent to us: useful for reaching it,
and a claim. The announcement that carries it is signed with the node key
over a fresh timestamp, so the address that request *arrives from* is the
address of whoever holds that key — that is now recorded on the node row
and shown in a Nodes tab, next to the hint, with the difference spelled
out. Clients get the same treatment: `webrtc_offer` is logged with the
address the hub saw when a browser starts a peer connection.
Verified against the live deployment: the node's row reads 90.112.206.172
after a restart, and in e2e a stopped stream goes quiet in one message
and the next one starts immediately instead of being refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Phase 11.5 — findings H6, C4 (partial), and milestone 11.5.3.
H6 — resource exhaustion. Several paths let one peer degrade or stall a node:
* the DataChannel frame limit was a flat 64 MB applied BEFORE authentication,
so an unauthenticated peer could announce a huge frame and dribble bytes
into it. Unauthenticated peers now get 64 KB; the large budget is granted
only after the GEK proof, where it is needed for uploads.
* _do_stream_segment ran subprocess.run(..., timeout=30) directly in the event
loop, stalling the entire daemon — every peer, every group — for up to
thirty seconds per request. Now async, with a timeout and process kill.
* ffmpeg was spawned per stream request with no cap. Both streaming paths now
share a transport-wide semaphore.
* POST /v1/nodes/{id}/webrtc/offer was reachable by any authenticated user for
any node, with no membership check and no rate limit, making the target node
allocate an aiortc PeerConnection and gather ICE on demand — remote resource
exhaustion against a third party's machine. Now rate limited, capped per
user, SDP size bounded, and the caller must share an active group with the
node. That also closes the H4 gap where signaling ignored group status.
* POST /v1/nodes/{id}/incoming took peer_ip verbatim, so any user could make an
arbitrary node emit UDP packets to an address of their choosing. The probe
target must now match the caller's own source address.
C4 (partial) — the pre-proof bundle window. GEK and keypair bundle fetches are
served before the GEK proof by necessity: the client needs its wrapped bundle in
order to compute the proof. That window is a disclosure surface a hub can reach
by forging a JWT. Bounded to 4 fetches per session and audited as
"pre_proof_fetch". The real fix is removing remote keypair bundles entirely,
which belongs to the native client (Phase 13.3).
11.5.3 — the node admin UI was unauthenticated because it binds loopback. But
any local process can reach it, and so can a page in the operator's browser via
DNS rebinding — and this API re-initialises group keys and reads the audit log.
H2 showed script execution there equals full control. Now gated by a per-run
token, printed at startup, accepted as ?t= or X-MeshBay-Token.
One test needed rewriting rather than adding: the first version asserted
"subprocess.run(" was absent from the source, which also matched the comment
documenting the old behaviour. It now parses the AST and checks the property.
Tests: 121 node, 142 hub+common. Regression suite 47 node + 10 hub.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Browser clients can now connect P2P to nodes behind residential NAT via
WebRTC DataChannel with ICE/STUN. Validated on SFR Port-Restricted Cone
NAT + 4G CGNAT across three scenarios (WiFi LAN, 4G IPv6, 4G IPv4 STUN).
No TURN relay needed. Hub serves only as signaling relay (<1 KB).
New files:
- webrtc_server.py: aiortc-based WebRTC transport (node side)
- signaling.py: SDP/ICE relay endpoint (hub side)
- transport.js: browser WebRTC client with msgpack framing
- webrtc-test.html: spike test page for browser→NAT→node validation
- test_webrtc_transport.py: 4 tests (handshake, file transfer, auth, guard)
- meshbay-draft-v4.md: architecture spec updated for web client
Modified:
- hub_client.py: WebRTC offer handling via hub WebSocket
- revocation.py: node_id from WS auth + webrtc_answer routing
- pyproject.toml: aiortc>=1.9 dependency
123 tests passing (117 existing + 6 new).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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