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A link is redeemable by whoever opens it first, so it can be sent by any
messaging app. The address is optional (mail + label only); a link lives
7 days, fixed. Adds a Share button; see MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-recipient cooldown was shared by every purpose, so the code a
person asked for by registering within two minutes of an invitation
link was refused, silently. The cooldown is now per family (invitations
vs the account's own steps); the daily cap still counts everything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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group_invite_links holds sha256(ticket) and the invitee's address blind
index; redeeming grants membership to that account only. Owner-only
create/list/cancel (a node token may create, never mail), 20 outstanding
per group, optional mail written by the hub itself and capped at 10 per
sender per day (mail.invite_link_daily_cap). MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.4 now
carries the whole link design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the
same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the
noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the
98 it cannot fix are the next commit.
What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of
them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could
have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69)
and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12
this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with
nothing to interpolate (19).
Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports,
and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge
before it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The per-feature design notes were merged into docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md and
deleted from the tree on 2026-09-11, but ~230 comments across the three
packages still named them — usually written `docs/musicbay.md §3.2`, as
though the file were still in docs/. A reader had to know §16 existed to
resolve any of them. They now name the section directly.
Every mapping comes from §16, the concordance, which already records where
each old section landed: musicbay -> §9.8, mediacenter -> §9.7 for the
Videos app and §6.5 where the subject is derived data, photos -> §9.9,
auth-confirm -> §3.6, refactoring-search -> §9.11, invite-pairing-v1 ->
§3.4, per-node-identity-v1 -> §3.2, captcha -> §7.7, chat-sender-keys ->
§4.5, apps/refactor-groups -> §9.1–§9.4, desktop-client-v1 per section.
Bare citations of the same documents (`draft-v6 §2.11`, `§4.8`, `§3.4`)
are retargeted too: those collide with real section numbers in the design
document, so leaving them would have been worse than the named form.
Four cases the concordance does not cover, each decided rather than guessed:
Sub-item references into documents that no longer exist — mediacenter's
`§3.3 row 4`, `§3.4b/c`, `apps.md §3b` — name rows and sub-items §9.7 and
§9.2 do not reproduce. The module-level citation stays; the sub-item
pointer is dropped.
The V-findings keep their labels but lose the dead `§10.1/` prefix.
§13.8 lists V1–V13 as per-application open items, which is not what the
labels mean in these comments, so pointing them at §13.8 would have been
a false citation.
`apps.md §5`'s virtualization requirement has no counterpart anywhere in
the design document. The requirement is stated in the comment itself, so
the citation is dropped rather than aimed at a section that does not say
it.
Comments that attributed a *sentence* to an old note — musicbay's "several
thousand files" example, its "what got measured" note, its measured
~11%/~26% cover-art figures, the "original no root, whole shared tree"
call — state the fact without attribution now. §9.8 does not contain those
sentences and citing it for them would have been wrong.
CLAUDE.md's "a reference to a document that no longer exists" row now says
the concordance is for git history and out-of-tree material; the code cites
sections directly.
Verified: 2851 passed, 4 skipped. The 12 errors in the run are the Firefox
leg of test_sticky_header.py's browser harness, which is broken at the
browser level on this machine — headless Firefox (snap) dies with
`[GFX1-]: RenderCompositorSWGL failed mapping default framebuffer`, renders
nothing, and the probe exits `{"error": "no measurement"}` after its full
90s wait. Chrome runs the same 12 assertions in 3.2s and passes. Nothing
here can affect it: every changed line in style.css is inside a comment.
Also checked: ast.parse on every changed .py, `node --check` on every
changed .js, the /* */ balance in style.css, and that no changed line
exceeds the width its file already used.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The figure was a line beside the settings form, which is where it is changed
and not where it is watched. It sits with the other live figures under
Statistics now — four cards and, above them, a banner saying which of the two
ceilings has fallen. The two states are not the same to whoever is reading:
one means newcomers are turned away, the other means somebody locked out of
their account cannot get back in. The settings block keeps a line pointing at
it.
And an operator no longer has to be looking. When a global ceiling is reached
the administrators are notified — in `mail.py`, in its own session, never
raising, because this runs while a request is being refused and an alert that
fails must not turn a refusal into a 500. Once per hour, keyed on a row
rather than a flag in memory: a flood is what spends the budget, so one alert
per refusal would bury the message under its own cause, and a hub that is
refusing mail is a hub somebody is about to restart.
`/v1/admin/mail` gains `general_exhausted` and `all_exhausted` rather than
leaving the panel to compare two numbers.
Labels in all ten catalogues; `.warn-msg` for the middle state, on the
`--warn` token both themes already define.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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Two dicts in `mail.py` held the budget, so every deploy handed out a fresh
one — and this hub is deployed several times a day. A bound a restart forgets
is not a bound, for the reason the denylist is persisted rather than held in
memory (S3). It is a `mail_quota` table now, one row per counter, the
recipient hashed so the table does not become a list of plaintext addresses.
The counting moves with it, into an async `reserve` that has a session, and
`send_off_loop` is the one door it stands in. `_send` keeps the purpose
allow-list: that half needs no state, and it is what stops anything which
puts a message on the wire from naming a reason this hub does not send for.
The caller owns the commit, so a request that fails afterwards is not charged
for mail nobody received.
`hourly_reserved_for_recovery` is new. A flood of sign-ups used to be able to
spend the whole hour and lock out the person waiting on a passphrase reset;
registration and address changes may now spend only the unreserved share.
Values changed as agreed: 10 messages a day to one recipient, 300 s between
two reset codes. The address-change ceiling and its cooldown were two bounds
on one thing — 3 a day and 60 s apart — and collapse into one 48-hour delay.
Asking again for the address already pending is exempt: it reaches no new
recipient, that recipient is bounded anyway, and without the exemption a typo
locked the account out of correcting it for two days.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The previous commit metered the paths that send mail. It was not enough, and
saying it was would have been wrong: a 60-second cooldown per account still
allows one stranger a minute — 1440 a day — and registration is open, so
"per account" is a bound an attacker buys more of. And there was a third door
nobody had counted.
POST /v1/users/register an address nobody has verified
PATCH /v1/users/me an address nobody has verified, signed in
POST /v1/users/password/reset only the address already on file
POST /v1/groups/{id}/invite-notify only a registered member's address
The widest was the register *resend* branch: no token, no captcha, and the
username and address are the caller's own from a moment ago — registering a
victim's address once bought the right to mail them at the endpoint's rate
limit for as long as the account stayed pending.
So the bound moves into `mail.py`, where every message passes one function.
`purpose` is keyword-required and checked against a closed list, so a helper
that names anything else does not send and one that names nothing is a
TypeError rather than an unrestricted send. Under it:
- a bound per **recipient**, across every purpose, account and endpoint —
what a person being mail-bombed actually experiences, and the only bound
that describes it. Keyed on a hash, because this would otherwise be the
one place in the hub holding plaintext addresses in memory (S2)
- an instance-wide hourly ceiling, which cannot be bought with more accounts
- a cooldown on the resend branch, a cooldown and a daily ceiling on the
address change, and the IP-log entry that endpoint never wrote — alone
among the ones that mail
The ceiling on address changes counts IP-log rows, not EmailVerification: the
handler deletes this account's unverified rows before writing a new one, so
counting those counts one, always. Which is what the first version of it did.
Refusals never carry the address: that line goes to the journal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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`users.py` and `admin.py` under the availability lens. `admin.py` needed
nothing — its moderator/admin line is drawn explicitly, self-modification is
refused, and every list it serves is bounded. `users.py` had four findings and
one of them is the worst of this whole pass.
AV9 `mail._send` is `smtplib` with a ten-second timeout, called straight
from four async handlers. That wait is not one request's, it is the
instance's: nothing else served, no node socket read, no WebRTC offer
relayed, until the MTA answers. Reachable by any signed-in user at
request rate through the endpoint below. It has no symptom a test
catches — everything simply works slowly, for everyone, whenever the
mail server is having a bad day.
AV10 `PATCH /v1/users/me` is the third path that makes the hub send mail
and the only one with neither a rate limit nor a captcha, while
`register` and `password/reset-request` have both. The address is any
string the caller types and the duplicate check only rejects one
already held by an account here, so every address *not* registered on
this hub was a valid target: a relay for verification codes with the
hub's own reputation attached. A rate limit counting by IP bounds a
caller and not an inbox, so the floor under it is a cooldown per
account — the same for a reset request, whose cost also lands in a
mailbox that is not the asker's.
AV11 `default_tab:` accepted any suffix on a `{key:path}` route with an
unbounded Text value and no cap on rows: one account could write
without limit into a table shared with everyone. The suffix is a group
id, which is what the SPA writes, so it is checked as one. A key over
64 characters was also a 500 rather than a 400 — the column is
String(64), which PostgreSQL enforces and SQLite does not, so it would
have appeared in production and in no test.
AV12 `/v1/notifications` and `/v1/groups` had no upper bound on `limit` and
no floor under `offset`, while every list in `admin.py` carries
`le=200`. The group directory takes no authentication at all.
Two shapes recur and are now named in §13.5b: a limit written on one of
several equivalent paths, and a bound that counts the wrong thing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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The passphrase derives two independent client-side values: auth_key (the
hub verifier) and bundle_key (AES-GCM key for the per-node identity
bundles, which live on nodes and never on the hub). Changing or
recovering a passphrase is therefore two operations — swap the hub
verifier, and re-wrap every reachable node's identity bundle.
Flow A — change a known passphrase (Profile page)
- POST /v1/users/password re-proves the current passphrase, swaps
pw_hash/salt/version, revokes every refresh token and returns a fresh
pair so the tab that made the change stays signed in.
- MeshBayTransport.rewrapAllNodes: for every group's online node, connect
with the old key, read the identity off the handshake, store it back
under the new key. Returns updated / unreachable / failed so the UI can
point at the operator-unpin fallback for the gaps. Always-shown
confirmation dialog listing reachable and unreachable groups.
Recovery key
- keyderive.js generateRecoveryKey (32 random bytes, grouped Base32) and
deriveRecoveryKey (HKDF-SHA256, domain meshbay:recovery:v1:<username>).
- Every per-node identity gets a second copy wrapped under the recovery
key: keypair_bundles.bundle_enc_recovery (node-only column, added in
_SCHEMA_KEYPAIR and via a PRAGMA-guarded ALTER for existing DBs),
carried on keypair_bundle_store / _resp. MNP 0.13 -> 0.14, additive.
- session.recoveryKey is persisted in IndexedDB (slot rk) and lazy-loaded
on connect, so a group joined in any later session still leaves a
recovery copy.
- Shown once at registration; optionally folded into the verification
e-mail as a pass-through the hub never stores or logs, with an opt-out.
- Profile -> Recovery key re-loads R and backfills every reachable node
via rewrapAllNodes in bundleKey mode (no passphrase re-entry).
Flow B — recover a lost passphrase (#/reset, linked from sign-in)
- POST /v1/users/password/reset-request {username, email}: both must be
the pair on file, checked against the blind email_hash (never
decrypted). A mismatch — wrong e-mail, unknown username, non-active
account — takes the identical no-op path (no code, no mail, same 200),
so it reveals nothing and cannot be used to spray reset mail from a
username alone. 5/min, 1-hour single-use code.
- POST /v1/users/password/reset {username, code, new_auth_key}: same
expiry / attempts / single-use checks as e-mail verification; revokes
every session and deletes every registered device key so a stored one
cannot sign back in past the reset.
- ResetPasswordPage: request code -> code + optional recovery key + new
passphrase -> reset + sign-in -> fan-out. connect() falls back to the
recovery-wrapped copy when the passphrase key cannot open bundle_enc.
Without a recovery key: sign-in is restored and each group needs the
operator-unpin fallback.
Supporting fixes (found in live testing)
- member unpin now also deletes the keypair bundle; connect() mints a
fresh identity when handed a bundle it cannot open (unless _rewrapOnly,
set by rewrapAllNodes), so a rejoin completes instead of dead-ending
before the invite-code prompt.
- A browser with no bundle key gets a passphrase prompt on the group page
instead of a "go back to the browser you registered on" message.
- RegisterPage / LoginPage / ResetPasswordPage trim the username so every
key derivation matches the hub's stored form.
Docs: docs/auth-confirm.md. Locale keys across all ten catalogues.
Tests: test_password_change, test_password_reset, test_recovery_email,
test_recovery_key, test_rewrap_fanout, test_bundle_store_recovery, plus
additions to test_admin_ops_mnp and test_webrtc_transport. Hub suite 492
passed; node suite 741 passed (the lone test_packaging_units failure is a
pre-existing RPM-spec flake, reproducible on main).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GGkxJW9br8Y9bhT8ywJ3oc
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Registration now creates a pending account and sends a 6-digit code via
email; the account activates only after verification. Email changes on
the profile page follow the same flow. Group invitations send a
notification email to the invitee (without revealing their address to
the inviter) containing the invite code and hub link.
Backend: blind HMAC-SHA256 email index for uniqueness without decryption,
mail.py for localhost Postfix delivery, verification endpoints, cleanup
of expired codes and stale pending accounts, startup backfill of
email_hash for existing users.
Frontend: 3-phase register page, inline email change verification on
profile, invite-notify call with status display. All 10 locales updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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