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group_invite_links holds sha256(ticket) and the invitee's address blind
index; redeeming grants membership to that account only. Owner-only
create/list/cancel (a node token may create, never mail), 20 outstanding
per group, optional mail written by the hub itself and capped at 10 per
sender per day (mail.invite_link_daily_cap). MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §3.4 now
carries the whole link design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The pass before this applied ruff's own fixes. These are the ones needing a
decision, and the point of doing them is that `ruff check .` now passes: a
linter reporting 98 known-acceptable findings reports nothing, because the next
real one arrives invisible.
**Lines over 100 (70).** Mostly wrapped where they stood. Two exceptions: the
aligned trailing comments in `protocol.py`'s message table were shortened rather
than wrapped, because wrapping one row of a table breaks the table; and in
`models.py` the column comments moved above their columns for the same reason.
**Imports below the first statement (14).** `csam.py` kept its FastAPI imports
under a section header halfway down the file; two node tests had a constant and
a `pytestmark` wedged between two import blocks. Moved, not suppressed.
**Bindings nothing reads (4).** Three in tests, where the call stays and only the
name goes — `_user(client, "listener")` is there to create the user, not to
return one. The fourth was in `revocation.py` and was not a lint finding at all:
`_connect_and_listen` opened an httpx stream to the WebSocket URL, did `pass`,
and then opened the real connection through the `websockets` library. One
pointless request per connect, left over from before that library was used
directly. Removed, and `httpx` with it.
**`l` as a name (4)**, **semicolons (6)** in the POC spikes, and the rest.
2893 passed, the same count as the two commits before it.
`meshbay_node/revocation.py` is worth a decision separately: 154 lines that
nothing imports, superseded by `hub_client.maintain_ws`'s `on_revocation`. This
commit only stopped it failing the linter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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`ruff check .` had gone unrun long enough to report 568 errors, which is the
same as having no linter: the next real finding would have been invisible in the
noise. This is the 521 it fixes by itself, in 173 files, and nothing else — the
98 it cannot fix are the next commit.
What actually changed: import sorting (225), imports nobody used (87, none of
them a re-export — no `__init__.py` is touched, which was the one way this could
have broken an import elsewhere), `datetime.timezone.utc` to `datetime.UTC` (69)
and `asyncio.TimeoutError` to `TimeoutError` (18), both plain aliases on the 3.12
this project requires, `Optional[X]` to `X | None` (24), and f-strings with
nothing to interpolate (19).
Checked rather than assumed: every module in the three packages still imports,
and the suite is 2893 passed — the same count, test for test, as the merge
before it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Passphrase sign-in locks per username: after `login.max_failures` wrong
passphrases (default 4) the name is refused with `429 account_locked` and a
`Retry-After` for `login.lockout_minutes` (default 60), without the passphrase
being checked. Both numbers are instance policy an admin sets from the panel;
zero failures turns it off. The per-IP limit bounds one address, and IPv6
gives every subscriber a /64 of them — an online guess targets an account, so
the account is what is counted.
- Counted by the name as typed, existing or not, so `login` stays uniform (M1).
The key is a hash: people type passphrases into the username field.
- The attempt is taken before the check in one `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
… WHERE … RETURNING`, so a concurrent burst gets no more than the limit.
- Sign-in, passphrase change and account deletion count on the same row; the
last had no rate limit at all.
- A lockout refuses passphrase sign-in and nothing else: sessions, renewal and
device sign-in continue, and a reset code clears it (AV26). A session learns
its own lockout from `/v1/users/me`, and the passphrase change checks it
before re-wrapping any node's bundle — the hub accepts the new passphrase
only after the nodes have it.
The SPA now shows what the hub said. `loginAndRecover` threw "Login failed:
{json}", so `email_verification_required` never matched and was never shown;
the passphrase-change form rendered no error at all in its first phase.
The unauthenticated surface, reviewed route by route:
- No `/docs`, `/redoc` or `/openapi.json`, in the code. The Caddyfile hid them
on meshbay.org only; a packaged hub behind any other proxy published all three.
- The node socket's first message must arrive within ten seconds. It is
accepted before anyone is known, and an unbounded read is a connection any
stranger holds for free.
- `/v1/relays` answers 503 behind `relay.RELAYS_ENABLED`, as federation does:
nothing in the tree calls it and two of its routes take no account.
- `test_unauthenticated_surface.py` walks every route and fails on one without
an authentication dependency that is not listed with its reason.
Verified in Chrome against a local hub: the lockout and wrong-passphrase
messages, the admin section saving both lockout and mail limits, and the
passphrase change refused while locked. Not verified in Firefox (a running
instance blocks the headless one), nor the upsert's concurrency on PostgreSQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LcF3QKWii7uQ2kSyXErzCt
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Two dicts in `mail.py` held the budget, so every deploy handed out a fresh
one — and this hub is deployed several times a day. A bound a restart forgets
is not a bound, for the reason the denylist is persisted rather than held in
memory (S3). It is a `mail_quota` table now, one row per counter, the
recipient hashed so the table does not become a list of plaintext addresses.
The counting moves with it, into an async `reserve` that has a session, and
`send_off_loop` is the one door it stands in. `_send` keeps the purpose
allow-list: that half needs no state, and it is what stops anything which
puts a message on the wire from naming a reason this hub does not send for.
The caller owns the commit, so a request that fails afterwards is not charged
for mail nobody received.
`hourly_reserved_for_recovery` is new. A flood of sign-ups used to be able to
spend the whole hour and lock out the person waiting on a passphrase reset;
registration and address changes may now spend only the unreserved share.
Values changed as agreed: 10 messages a day to one recipient, 300 s between
two reset codes. The address-change ceiling and its cooldown were two bounds
on one thing — 3 a day and 60 s apart — and collapse into one 48-hour delay.
Asking again for the address already pending is exempt: it reaches no new
recipient, that recipient is bounded anyway, and without the exemption a typo
locked the account out of correcting it for two days.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T4YmK41VsEURWFdop4EEeT
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An administrator's deletion answered 409 for any account owning a group,
so an erasure ordered by an authority had to wait on the person it was
about. It now deletes the account's groups with it, then pushes a signed
revocation for the account and for each group to every connected node:
an access token already issued stays valid on a node until it expires,
and the revocation is what makes the nodes refuse the account and close
the groups' sessions now. The action is written to the IP log, and the
confirmation dialog says the groups go too, in all ten catalogues.
The owner's own deletion is unchanged: refused while they own groups,
which they can hand over first (CGU 3.4, privacy statement).
Deleting a group had three partial cascades. The owner's route left
email_verifications behind, and the cleanup of unhosted groups left
notifications, invitations and reports - each an IntegrityError on
PostgreSQL, invisible on SQLite, which does not enforce foreign keys by
default. db/purge.py is now the one implementation: it finds every table
referencing groups.id from the schema, deletes the group's rows and
detaches content reports, which are evidence and outlive the group.
test_group_purge.py turns foreign-key enforcement on for its connection,
seeds every referencing table, and fails without the fix on all three
routes. MESHBAY_DESIGN.md 7.7 states the rule, and now lists the device
keys and swarm sources that e3c68b3 erases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D9MCBBWSm9GhBESmqzJxNy
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Registration now creates a pending account and sends a 6-digit code via
email; the account activates only after verification. Email changes on
the profile page follow the same flow. Group invitations send a
notification email to the invitee (without revealing their address to
the inviter) containing the invite code and hub link.
Backend: blind HMAC-SHA256 email index for uniqueness without decryption,
mail.py for localhost Postfix delivery, verification endpoints, cleanup
of expired codes and stale pending accounts, startup backfill of
email_hash for existing users.
Frontend: 3-phase register page, inline email change verification on
profile, invite-notify call with status display. All 10 locales updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Leaving is its own endpoint rather than a relaxation of the owner's removal
check — an authorization rule with an exception in it is the one that gets read
wrong later. The owner cannot leave: the group would be left with nobody able
to admit, edit or delete it, which is the answer removal and account deletion
already give.
Public groups are capped at ten live ones per owner. They are the ones that
cost other people something — listed in Discover, joinable by anyone — so a
script that opens hundreds fills the directory for everybody. Private groups
are invisible to non-members and are not capped. Hub staff are exempt; the cap
is anti-spam, not a rule about running an instance. Creation is the only place
it can be checked, and deliberately so, because PATCH refuses to change
visibility at all.
A group is now listed only once a node has announced that it hosts it. Before
that it has no files, no key and nothing to connect to, so showing it to a
member produces a name they cannot open and cannot be told why; its owner still
sees it while they set the node up. `meshbay-hub prune-groups` collects the
ones that never got a node, meant for cron, with --dry-run. The migration
backfills hosted_at from created_at: without that the first run would have
deleted every live group.
Presence rides on the group list itself, read from the signaling registry the
hub already keeps — no poll, no timer. It says a node is connected *to the hub*,
which is not a promise that this browser can reach it and not something a
dishonest hub could not fake; the client downgrades it on a connection it tried
and failed, which is the evidence that concerns the reader.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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8.1 Config-based admin authz (require_admin on all admin endpoints)
8.2 Email encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, HKDF from hub Ed25519 key)
8.3 Refresh token rotation with family-based reuse detection
8.4 Federation persistence (HubPeer model replaces in-memory dict)
8.5 Federation token verification now async (DB-backed)
8.6 CSAM hash check wired into swarm registration flow
8.7 Rate limiting on auth endpoints (5/10/20 per minute)
8.8 Healthcheck endpoint (GET /v1/health, no auth)
8.9 IP log cleanup background task (365-day retention)
8.10 Argon2id params bumped to 256 MB (pw_version, rehash on login)
Deployed to meshbay.org — schema migrated, existing emails encrypted.
117 tests pass (29 hub, 88 common+node).
Resolves security review items S1, S2, S5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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