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/**
* The account's keys in the desktop application: the bundle master key `M` and
* the identity on every node, held here and never handed to the page.
*
* The page parses content from nodes, which is attacker-controlled input
* (docs/MESHBAY_DESIGN.md §8.2), so it asks this process to sign and to agree
* on an X25519 secret, and is told public keys. The derivation and the bundle
* format are the page's own (keyderive.js) byte for byte — a bundle this seals
* opens in a browser and the reverse — and a test holds the two together.
*
* One key does leave: the playlist key. It opens nothing but the playlists the
* page displays anyway, and sealing them in the page keeps that code in one
* place.
*
* Storage is injected (`load`/`save` of one JSON object): the main process
* keeps it in the OS key storage beside the device key.
*/
'use strict';
const crypto = require('node:crypto');
// keyderive.js: the same numbers, or no bundle opens across the two.
const ARGON2 = { memory: 131072, passes: 3, parallelism: 1, tagLength: 32 };
const MAGIC = Buffer.from('MBK3');
const X25519_SPKI = Buffer.from('302a300506032b656e032100', 'hex');
const B32 = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567';
const b64 = (buf) => Buffer.from(buf).toString('base64');
const unb64 = (s) => Buffer.from(String(s || ''), 'base64');
const hkdf = (ikm, info) => Buffer.from(
crypto.hkdfSync('sha256', ikm, Buffer.alloc(0), Buffer.from(info), 32));
const rawPublic = (keyObject) => {
const der = crypto.createPublicKey(keyObject).export({ format: 'der', type: 'spki' });
return der.subarray(der.length - 32);
};
const privateFrom = (pkcs8B64) =>
crypto.createPrivateKey({ key: unb64(pkcs8B64), format: 'der', type: 'pkcs8' });
function fromMnemonic(mnemonic) {
const clean = String(mnemonic).replace(/[^A-Za-z2-7]/g, '').toUpperCase();
let bits = 0; let value = 0; const out = [];
for (const ch of clean) {
value = (value << 5) | B32.indexOf(ch);
bits += 5;
if (bits >= 8) { out.push((value >>> (bits - 8)) & 0xff); bits -= 8; }
}
if (out.length < 32) throw new Error('recovery key too short');
return Buffer.from(out.slice(0, 32));
}
const aad = (userId, nodePk) => Buffer.from(`meshbay:bundle:v3|${userId}|${nodePk}`);
function seal(identity, key, userId, nodePk, pepperVersion) {
const nonce = crypto.randomBytes(12);
const c = crypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, nonce);
c.setAAD(aad(userId, nodePk));
const ct = Buffer.concat([
c.update(JSON.stringify({ skEd: identity.ed, skX: identity.x })), c.final(), c.getAuthTag()]);
return b64(Buffer.concat([MAGIC, Buffer.from([pepperVersion & 0xff]), nonce, ct]));
}
function open(bundleB64, key, userId, nodePk) {
const raw = unb64(bundleB64);
if (!raw.subarray(0, 4).equals(MAGIC)) {
const err = new Error('bundle_format_retired');
err.code = 'bundle_format_retired';
throw err;
}
const nonce = raw.subarray(5, 17);
const body = raw.subarray(17, raw.length - 16);
const d = crypto.createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, nonce);
d.setAAD(aad(userId, nodePk));
d.setAuthTag(raw.subarray(raw.length - 16));
const plain = JSON.parse(Buffer.concat([d.update(body), d.final()]).toString());
return { ed: plain.skEd, x: plain.skX };
}
/**
* `argon2(password, salt, params)` is injected: Electron's own crypto has no
* Argon2 (argon2-wasm.js), and the test runs what the application runs.
*/
function createKeyring({ load, save, argon2 }) {
if (typeof argon2 !== 'function') throw new Error('keyring: no Argon2 implementation');
// In memory: the key of a passphrase change not yet accepted by the hub.
const pending = new Map();
const state = () => {
const s = load() || {};
s.masters = s.masters || {};
s.identities = s.identities || {};
s.access = s.access || {};
return s;
};
const master = (userId, { usePending = false } = {}) => {
if (usePending && pending.has(userId)) return pending.get(userId);
const m = state().masters[userId];
if (!m) throw new Error('no bundle key in this session');
return { m: unb64(m.m), v: m.v };
};
const fingerprint = (m) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(m).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
const stored = (userId, nodePk) => {
const id = (state().identities[userId] || {})[nodePk];
if (!id) throw new Error('no identity for this node');
return id;
};
const publicOf = (id) => ({
pkEdB64: b64(rawPublic(privateFrom(id.ed))),
pkXB64: b64(rawPublic(privateFrom(id.x))),
});
const keep = (userId, nodePk, id) => {
const s = state();
s.identities[userId] = s.identities[userId] || {};
s.identities[userId][nodePk] = { ...(s.identities[userId][nodePk] || {}), ...id };
save(s);
};
return {
hasSession: (userId) => Boolean(state().masters[userId]),
/**
* `M` from the passphrase and the pepper — one Argon2 run, as in the page.
* `pending`: a passphrase change, kept aside until the hub accepts it.
*/
async deriveSession({ password, username, userId, pepperB64, pepperVersion, pending: p }) {
if (!userId || !pepperB64) throw new Error('the hub did not provide the bundle pepper');
const salt = crypto.createHash('sha256')
.update(`meshbay:bundle:v2:${username}`).digest().subarray(0, 16);
const a = await argon2(password, salt, ARGON2);
const m = hkdf(Buffer.concat([a, unb64(pepperB64)]), `meshbay:bundle-master:v3|${userId}`);
const v = pepperVersion || 1;
if (p) { pending.set(userId, { m, v }); return true; }
const s = state();
s.masters[userId] = { m: b64(m), v };
save(s);
return true;
},
commitPending(userId) {
const p = pending.get(userId);
if (!p) return false;
const s = state();
s.masters[userId] = { m: b64(p.m), v: p.v };
save(s);
pending.delete(userId);
return true;
},
dropPending: (userId) => pending.delete(userId),
/** Sign-out: `M` goes. The identities stay — they are this device's. */
forgetSession(userId) {
const s = state();
delete s.masters[userId];
save(s);
pending.delete(userId);
return true;
},
identity(userId, nodePk) {
const id = (state().identities[userId] || {})[nodePk];
return id ? { ...publicOf(id), sealedWith: id.sealedWith || null } : null;
},
/**
* Take an identity out of a node's bundle and keep it here. The recovery
* copy is tried when the passphrase copy does not open and a recovery key
* was entered (a reset on a machine that had never held this identity).
*/
openBundle(userId, nodePk, { bundleEnc, recoveryEnc, recoveryMnemonic, username }) {
const { m } = master(userId);
let id;
try {
id = open(bundleEnc, hkdf(m, `meshbay:bundle:v3|node|${nodePk}`), userId, nodePk);
} catch (err) {
if (err.code === 'bundle_format_retired' || !recoveryEnc || !recoveryMnemonic) throw err;
const rk = hkdf(fromMnemonic(recoveryMnemonic), `meshbay:recovery:v1:${username}`);
id = open(recoveryEnc, rk, userId, nodePk);
}
keep(userId, nodePk, { ...id, sealedWith: null });
return publicOf(id);
},
mint(userId, nodePk) {
const ed = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
const x = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('x25519');
const id = {
ed: b64(ed.privateKey.export({ format: 'der', type: 'pkcs8' })),
x: b64(x.privateKey.export({ format: 'der', type: 'pkcs8' })),
sealedWith: null,
};
keep(userId, nodePk, id);
return publicOf(id);
},
/** The identity sealed for its node, under `M` (or the pending one). */
sealBundle(userId, nodePk, { pending: usePending = false } = {}) {
const { m, v } = master(userId, { usePending });
const bundle = seal(stored(userId, nodePk), hkdf(m, `meshbay:bundle:v3|node|${nodePk}`),
userId, nodePk, v);
return { bundle, fingerprint: fingerprint(m) };
},
/** The recovery copy: sealed under the recovery key, owing nothing to `M`. */
sealRecovery(userId, nodePk, mnemonic, username) {
const rk = hkdf(fromMnemonic(mnemonic), `meshbay:recovery:v1:${username}`);
return seal(stored(userId, nodePk), rk, userId, nodePk, 0);
},
/** After the node took it: what the next connection compares against. */
markSealed(userId, nodePk, fp) {
keep(userId, nodePk, { sealedWith: fp || null });
return true;
},
currentFingerprint: (userId) => fingerprint(master(userId).m),
sign(userId, nodePk, bytesB64) {
return b64(crypto.sign(null, unb64(bytesB64), privateFrom(stored(userId, nodePk).ed)));
},
shared(userId, nodePk, peerPkB64) {
const publicKey = crypto.createPublicKey({
key: Buffer.concat([X25519_SPKI, unb64(peerPkB64)]), format: 'der', type: 'spki' });
return b64(crypto.diffieHellman({
privateKey: privateFrom(stored(userId, nodePk).x), publicKey }));
},
playlistKey: (userId) => b64(hkdf(master(userId).m, 'meshbay:playlists:v2')),
// ── browser access ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Whether this account leaves bundles on nodes for a browser to open. An
// account created here says no until the person says yes (natively, in
// main.js); any other account keeps what it always had.
browserAccess: (userId) => state().access[userId] !== false,
setBrowserAccess(userId, on) {
const s = state();
s.access[userId] = Boolean(on);
save(s);
return Boolean(on);
},
};
}
module.exports = { createKeyring };
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