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"""
The hub sends a Content-Security-Policy and the other protective headers on
every response — the SPA shell, its assets, and the API alike.

Second-review L5 / third-review M5: previously there were none, so an injection
that landed in the SPA (rendered third-party OG data, a federated group name,
chat content) had nothing stopping it from loading more code or exfiltrating.
"""

import pytest
from meshbay_hub.api.webapp import CSP


def _directive(csp: str, name: str) -> str:
    for part in csp.split(";"):
        part = part.strip()
        if part == name or part.startswith(name + " "):
            return part
    return ""


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_the_spa_shell_carries_the_policy(client):
    r = await client.get("/")
    assert r.headers["content-security-policy"] == CSP
    assert r.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"
    assert r.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"
    assert "referrer-policy" in r.headers


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_the_api_carries_the_headers_too(client):
    r = await client.get("/v1/health")
    assert r.status_code == 200
    assert "content-security-policy" in r.headers
    assert r.headers["x-content-type-options"] == "nosniff"


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_even_a_404_carries_the_headers(client):
    # The middleware runs on every response, so a probe for a missing path
    # cannot be framed or content-sniffed either.
    r = await client.get("/no/such/path")
    assert r.status_code == 404
    assert r.headers["x-frame-options"] == "DENY"


def test_the_policy_is_locked_down_where_it_matters():
    assert "default-src 'none'" in CSP          # covers object-src, etc.
    assert _directive(CSP, "frame-ancestors") == "frame-ancestors 'none'"
    assert _directive(CSP, "base-uri") == "base-uri 'none'"

    script = _directive(CSP, "script-src")
    # The hub's own origin must not be able to serve executable script (T3):
    # 'self' and the wasm token are fine, a bare `https:` scheme is not.
    assert "'self'" in script and "'wasm-unsafe-eval'" in script
    assert "https:" not in script.split()


def test_recaptcha_is_the_only_external_origin():
    hosts = {"https://www.google.com", "https://www.gstatic.com"}
    for part in CSP.split(";"):
        for tok in part.strip().split()[1:]:
            if tok.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
                assert tok in hosts, f"unexpected external origin in CSP: {tok}"