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"""
Link unfurling for chat — fetch a URL a member pasted and pull an
OpenGraph-style card out of it (title, description, site name, image).

Who does the fetch matters. It is **the node**, not the browser and not the
hub:

  * the browser cannot — a strict `img-src`/`connect-src` and CORS block it,
    and a direct fetch would leak every reader's IP to the linked host on
    every render;
  * the hub must not — it never touches group content (draft-v6 §2.5);
  * the node already fetches third-party metadata for the Videos and Music
    apps (`_fetch_and_cache_poster`), over the same authorised path.

Because the node makes an outbound request to an address a *member* chose,
this is an SSRF surface. `safe_url()` is the gate: http(s) only, no
credentials, the port restricted to the web set, and every resolved address
must be globally routable — no loopback, private, link-local, multicast or
reserved range. Redirects are followed by hand so every hop is re-checked,
and the address the connection actually landed on is re-checked against the
same rule (`_reject_if_rebound`), so a name that resolves clean and then to
something internal (rebinding) does not get its body read. A full pin —
connect to the validated literal, verify the certificate for the name — is
the remaining hardening. How many previews a member can trigger is
rate-limited by the caller (`_do_link_preview_request`).

Nothing is stored durably: the caller keeps an in-memory TTL cache and the
OG image rides the existing `media_cache` thumb store (same as a poster).
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import ipaddress
import logging
import socket
from html.parser import HTMLParser
from io import BytesIO
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlsplit

import httpx

log = logging.getLogger(__name__)

_TIMEOUT = 5.0
# The whole fetch, redirects and body included. `_TIMEOUT` is per network
# operation, so a server that keeps sending slowly never trips it on its own.
_TOTAL_DEADLINE = 15.0
_MAX_REDIRECTS = 3
_MAX_HTML_BYTES = 512 * 1024
_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
_MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 40_000_000   # ~40 MP; an OG card image is a fraction of this
_IMAGE_MAX_DIM = 600
_UA = "MeshBayBot/1.0 (+https://meshbay.org; link preview)"

# Ports a real OpenGraph-bearing page is served on. Everything else — SSH, mail,
# databases, caches, search, admin panels — is refused, so a member cannot aim
# the node at an arbitrary service even on a public host.
_ALLOWED_PORTS = frozenset({80, 443, 8080, 8443})


class UnsafeURL(ValueError):
    """The URL points somewhere the node must not fetch from."""


def _addr_is_public(ip: str) -> bool:
    try:
        addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
    except ValueError:
        return False
    if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
        addr = addr.ipv4_mapped
    return not (
        addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local
        or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified
    )


def safe_url(url: str) -> str:
    """Return the URL unchanged if it is safe to fetch, else raise UnsafeURL."""
    if not isinstance(url, str) or len(url) > 2048:
        raise UnsafeURL("missing or oversized")
    parts = urlsplit(url)
    if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
        raise UnsafeURL(f"scheme {parts.scheme!r}")
    if parts.username or parts.password:
        raise UnsafeURL("credentials in URL")
    host = parts.hostname
    if not host:
        raise UnsafeURL("no host")
    try:
        port = parts.port
    except ValueError:
        raise UnsafeURL("bad port")
    if port is not None and port not in _ALLOWED_PORTS:
        raise UnsafeURL(f"port {port}")
    # An IP literal is checked directly; a name is resolved and every answer
    # must be public — a hostname with one public and one 127.0.0.1 record
    # would otherwise be a way in.
    try:
        infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, parts.port or (443 if parts.scheme == "https" else 80),
                                   proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP)
    except socket.gaierror as e:
        raise UnsafeURL(f"cannot resolve: {e}")
    resolved = {info[4][0] for info in infos}
    if not resolved:
        raise UnsafeURL("resolves to nothing")
    bad = [ip for ip in resolved if not _addr_is_public(ip)]
    if bad:
        raise UnsafeURL(f"non-public address {bad[0]}")
    return url


class _HeadParser(HTMLParser):
    """Collects <title> text and name/property→content from <meta> in <head>.

    Stops caring once <body> starts: everything a card needs is in the head,
    and a 512 KB page of body is not worth walking.
    """

    def __init__(self) -> None:
        super().__init__(convert_charrefs=True)
        self.metas: dict[str, str] = {}
        self.title: str | None = None
        self._in_title = False
        self.done = False

    def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
        if tag == "body":
            self.done = True
        elif tag == "title":
            self._in_title = True
        elif tag == "meta":
            a = {k.lower(): (v or "") for k, v in attrs}
            key = (a.get("property") or a.get("name") or "").lower().strip()
            if key and "content" in a and key not in self.metas:
                self.metas[key] = a["content"].strip()

    def handle_endtag(self, tag):
        if tag == "title":
            self._in_title = False

    def handle_data(self, data):
        if self._in_title and self.title is None:
            text = data.strip()
            if text:
                self.title = text


def _first(metas: dict[str, str], *keys: str) -> str | None:
    for k in keys:
        v = metas.get(k)
        if v:
            return v
    return None


def _reject_if_rebound(resp: httpx.Response) -> None:
    """
    `safe_url` validated the name's addresses; this checks the one the
    connection actually landed on, so a name that resolves clean and then to
    something internal (DNS rebinding) does not get its body read.

    Best-effort: the `network_stream` extension is not present on every
    transport (a MockTransport in tests has none), and its absence is not a
    failure — the pre-check and the per-hop redirect re-check still stand.
    """
    try:
        stream = resp.extensions.get("network_stream")
        addr = stream.get_extra_info("server_addr") if stream else None
    except Exception:
        return
    if addr and not _addr_is_public(str(addr[0])):
        raise UnsafeURL(f"connected to non-public address {addr[0]}")


async def _get(client: httpx.AsyncClient, url: str) -> httpx.Response:
    """
    One GET with manual, re-validated redirects, **body not read**.

    The caller reads it through `_read_capped` and must close it. `client.get`
    is not usable here: it reads and decodes the whole body before returning,
    so the size caps applied afterwards bounded nothing — a page, an image or a
    compressed stream of any size was held in memory first. The caps are the
    only thing between a URL a member pasted and the node's memory.
    """
    current = safe_url(url)
    for _ in range(_MAX_REDIRECTS + 1):
        request = client.build_request("GET", current, headers={"User-Agent": _UA})
        resp = await client.send(request, stream=True, follow_redirects=False)
        try:
            _reject_if_rebound(resp)
        except Exception:
            await resp.aclose()
            raise
        if resp.is_redirect and "location" in resp.headers:
            location = resp.headers["location"]
            await resp.aclose()
            current = safe_url(urljoin(current, location))
            continue
        return resp
    raise UnsafeURL("too many redirects")


async def _read_capped(resp: httpx.Response, cap: int) -> tuple[bytes, bool]:
    """
    At most `cap` bytes of the *decoded* body, and whether there was more.

    Counted after decoding, so a small compressed response that inflates to
    gigabytes stops at the cap like any other. A declared length over the cap
    is not read at all.
    """
    try:
        declared = int(resp.headers.get("content-length", ""))
    except ValueError:
        declared = -1
    if resp.headers.get("content-encoding", "identity") == "identity" \
            and declared > cap:
        return b"", True
    body = bytearray()
    async for chunk in resp.aiter_bytes():
        body += chunk
        if len(body) > cap:
            return bytes(body[:cap]), True
    return bytes(body), False


async def fetch_preview(url: str, *, client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None) -> dict | None:
    """
    Return {url, title, description, site_name, image_url} for a URL, or None
    if it cannot be unfurled (unreachable, not HTML, nothing worth showing).
    Never raises for an ordinary failure — the caller treats "no preview" as
    the common case, exactly like a TMDB miss.
    """
    own = client is None
    if own:
        client = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_TIMEOUT, max_redirects=0)
    try:
        return await asyncio.wait_for(_preview(client, url), _TOTAL_DEADLINE)
    except (httpx.HTTPError, UnsafeURL, TimeoutError) as e:
        log.debug("link preview for %s: %s", url[:80], e)
        return None
    finally:
        if own:
            await client.aclose()


async def _preview(client: httpx.AsyncClient, url: str) -> dict | None:
    safe_url(url)
    resp = await _get(client, url)
    try:
        ctype = resp.headers.get("content-type", "").split(";")[0].strip().lower()
        if resp.status_code != 200 or ctype not in ("text/html", "application/xhtml+xml"):
            return None
        # A page longer than this is cut, not refused: what a card needs is in
        # the head.
        body, _truncated = await _read_capped(resp, _MAX_HTML_BYTES)
        final_url = str(resp.url)

        parser = _HeadParser()
        try:
            parser.feed(body.decode(resp.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace"))
        except Exception:
            pass
        m = parser.metas

        title = _first(m, "og:title", "twitter:title") or parser.title
        description = _first(m, "og:description", "twitter:description", "description")
        site_name = _first(m, "og:site_name") or urlsplit(final_url).hostname
        image = _first(m, "og:image", "og:image:url", "og:image:secure_url",
                       "twitter:image", "twitter:image:src")
        if image:
            image = urljoin(final_url, image)
            try:
                safe_url(image)
            except UnsafeURL:
                image = None

        if not title and not description:
            return None

        return {
            "url": url,
            "title": (title or "")[:300] or None,
            "description": (description or "")[:600] or None,
            "site_name": (site_name or "")[:120] or None,
            "image_url": image,
        }
    finally:
        await resp.aclose()


async def fetch_image(url: str, *, client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None) -> bytes | None:
    """Fetch and re-encode an OG image to a small JPEG. None on any failure."""
    own = client is None
    if own:
        client = httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_TIMEOUT, max_redirects=0)
    try:
        raw = await asyncio.wait_for(_image_bytes(client, url), _TOTAL_DEADLINE)
    except (httpx.HTTPError, UnsafeURL, TimeoutError) as e:
        log.debug("link preview image %s: %s", url[:80], e)
        return None
    finally:
        if own:
            await client.aclose()
    if raw is None:
        return None
    # Decoding an image is CPU work on untrusted bytes; not on the event loop.
    return await asyncio.to_thread(_downscale, raw)


async def _image_bytes(client: httpx.AsyncClient, url: str) -> bytes | None:
    safe_url(url)
    resp = await _get(client, url)
    try:
        ctype = resp.headers.get("content-type", "").split(";")[0].strip().lower()
        if resp.status_code != 200 or not ctype.startswith("image/"):
            return None
        raw, too_big = await _read_capped(resp, _MAX_IMAGE_BYTES)
        return None if too_big else raw
    finally:
        await resp.aclose()


def _downscale(raw: bytes) -> bytes | None:
    try:
        from PIL import Image
    except ImportError:
        return None
    try:
        with Image.open(BytesIO(raw)) as im:
            # The header is parsed but the pixels are not decoded yet — refuse a
            # decompression bomb before convert()/thumbnail() allocate for it.
            if im.width * im.height > _MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS:
                return None
            im = im.convert("RGB")
            im.thumbnail((_IMAGE_MAX_DIM, _IMAGE_MAX_DIM))
            out = BytesIO()
            im.save(out, format="JPEG", quality=80)
            return out.getvalue()
    except Exception:
        return None