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|
"""
Link unfurling for chat — fetch a URL a member pasted and pull an
OpenGraph-style card out of it (title, description, site name, image).
Who does the fetch matters. It is **the node**, not the browser and not the
hub:
* the browser cannot — a strict `img-src`/`connect-src` and CORS block it,
and a direct fetch would leak every reader's IP to the linked host on
every render;
* the hub must not — it never touches group content (draft-v6 §2.5);
* the node already fetches third-party metadata for the Videos and Music
apps (`_fetch_and_cache_poster`), over the same authorised path.
Because the node makes an outbound request to an address a *member* chose,
this is an SSRF surface. `check_url()` is the gate: http(s) only, no
credentials, the port restricted to the web set, and every resolved address
must be globally routable — no loopback, private, link-local, multicast or
reserved range. Redirects are followed by hand so every hop is re-checked.
**The connection goes to the address that was checked** (`_PinnedBackend`):
the name is resolved once, off the event loop, every answer is checked, and
the socket is opened to that IP literal — TLS still verifies the certificate
for the name. Resolving to check and letting the HTTP client resolve again to
connect would let a name answer clean the first time and with a LAN address
the second (DNS rebinding), and the request would be sent before anything
could look. How many previews a member can trigger is rate-limited by the
caller (`_do_link_preview_request`).
Nothing is stored durably: the caller keeps an in-memory TTL cache and the
OG image rides the existing `media_cache` thumb store (same as a poster).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import ipaddress
import logging
import socket
from html.parser import HTMLParser
from io import BytesIO
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlsplit
import httpcore
import httpx
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_TIMEOUT = 5.0
# The whole fetch, redirects and body included. `_TIMEOUT` is per network
# operation, so a server that keeps sending slowly never trips it on its own.
_TOTAL_DEADLINE = 15.0
_MAX_REDIRECTS = 3
_MAX_HTML_BYTES = 512 * 1024
_MAX_IMAGE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024
_MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS = 40_000_000 # ~40 MP; an OG card image is a fraction of this
_IMAGE_MAX_DIM = 600
_UA = "MeshBayBot/1.0 (+https://meshbay.org; link preview)"
# Ports a real OpenGraph-bearing page is served on. Everything else — SSH, mail,
# databases, caches, search, admin panels — is refused, so a member cannot aim
# the node at an arbitrary service even on a public host.
_ALLOWED_PORTS = frozenset({80, 443, 8080, 8443})
class UnsafeURL(ValueError):
"""The URL points somewhere the node must not fetch from."""
def _addr_is_public(ip: str) -> bool:
try:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
except ValueError:
return False
if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
addr = addr.ipv4_mapped
return not (
addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local
or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified
)
def safe_url(url: str) -> str:
"""
The URL unchanged if its shape is safe to fetch, else raise UnsafeURL.
Shape only — scheme, credentials, port, and the address when it is a
literal. A name is checked by `check_url` and, again, at connect time;
resolving here would block the event loop on a member's choice of name.
"""
if not isinstance(url, str) or len(url) > 2048:
raise UnsafeURL("missing or oversized")
parts = urlsplit(url)
if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise UnsafeURL(f"scheme {parts.scheme!r}")
if parts.username or parts.password:
raise UnsafeURL("credentials in URL")
host = parts.hostname
if not host:
raise UnsafeURL("no host")
try:
port = parts.port
except ValueError:
raise UnsafeURL("bad port")
if port is not None and port not in _ALLOWED_PORTS:
raise UnsafeURL(f"port {port}")
if _is_literal(host) and not _addr_is_public(host):
raise UnsafeURL(f"non-public address {host}")
return url
def _is_literal(host: str) -> bool:
try:
ipaddress.ip_address(host)
return True
except ValueError:
return False
_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT = 5.0
async def resolve_public(host: str, port: int) -> str:
"""
One public address for `host`, resolved off the event loop, or UnsafeURL.
Every answer must be public: a name with one public and one 127.0.0.1
record would otherwise be a way in.
"""
if _is_literal(host):
if not _addr_is_public(host):
raise UnsafeURL(f"non-public address {host}")
return host
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
infos = await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.getaddrinfo(host, port, proto=socket.IPPROTO_TCP), _RESOLVE_TIMEOUT)
except (socket.gaierror, TimeoutError) as e:
raise UnsafeURL(f"cannot resolve: {e}")
resolved = list(dict.fromkeys(info[4][0] for info in infos))
if not resolved:
raise UnsafeURL("resolves to nothing")
bad = [ip for ip in resolved if not _addr_is_public(ip)]
if bad:
raise UnsafeURL(f"non-public address {bad[0]}")
return resolved[0]
async def check_url(url: str) -> str:
"""`safe_url`, and the name's addresses checked too. The URL unchanged."""
safe_url(url)
parts = urlsplit(url)
await resolve_public(parts.hostname or "",
parts.port or (443 if parts.scheme == "https" else 80))
return url
class _PinnedBackend(httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
"""
Opens every connection to an address `resolve_public` checked.
httpcore hands the backend the request's host; the TLS layer above still
uses that name for SNI and certificate verification, so pinning the socket
changes where it connects and nothing about whom it trusts.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self._inner = httpcore.AnyIOBackend()
async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None,
socket_options=None):
ip = await resolve_public(host, port)
return await self._inner.connect_tcp(ip, port, timeout=timeout,
local_address=local_address,
socket_options=socket_options)
async def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
raise UnsafeURL("no unix sockets")
async def sleep(self, seconds: float) -> None:
await self._inner.sleep(seconds)
class _PinnedTransport(httpx.AsyncHTTPTransport):
"""httpx's transport over a pool that connects through `_PinnedBackend`.
No proxy from the environment (`trust_env=False`): a proxy would resolve
the name itself, and the pin would bind nothing.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__(trust_env=False, retries=0)
self._pool = httpcore.AsyncConnectionPool(
ssl_context=httpx.create_ssl_context(trust_env=False),
network_backend=_PinnedBackend(), max_connections=10)
def _new_client() -> httpx.AsyncClient:
return httpx.AsyncClient(transport=_PinnedTransport(), timeout=_TIMEOUT,
max_redirects=0, trust_env=False)
class _HeadParser(HTMLParser):
"""Collects <title> text and name/property→content from <meta> in <head>.
Stops caring once <body> starts: everything a card needs is in the head,
and a 512 KB page of body is not worth walking.
"""
def __init__(self) -> None:
super().__init__(convert_charrefs=True)
self.metas: dict[str, str] = {}
self.title: str | None = None
self._in_title = False
self.done = False
def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
if tag == "body":
self.done = True
elif tag == "title":
self._in_title = True
elif tag == "meta":
a = {k.lower(): (v or "") for k, v in attrs}
key = (a.get("property") or a.get("name") or "").lower().strip()
if key and "content" in a and key not in self.metas:
self.metas[key] = a["content"].strip()
def handle_endtag(self, tag):
if tag == "title":
self._in_title = False
def handle_data(self, data):
if self._in_title and self.title is None:
text = data.strip()
if text:
self.title = text
def _first(metas: dict[str, str], *keys: str) -> str | None:
for k in keys:
v = metas.get(k)
if v:
return v
return None
async def _get(client: httpx.AsyncClient, url: str) -> httpx.Response:
"""
One GET with manual, re-validated redirects, **body not read**.
The caller reads it through `_read_capped` and must close it. `client.get`
is not usable here: it reads and decodes the whole body before returning,
so the size caps applied afterwards bounded nothing — a page, an image or a
compressed stream of any size was held in memory first. The caps are the
only thing between a URL a member pasted and the node's memory.
"""
current = await check_url(url)
for _ in range(_MAX_REDIRECTS + 1):
request = client.build_request("GET", current, headers={"User-Agent": _UA})
resp = await client.send(request, stream=True, follow_redirects=False)
if resp.is_redirect and "location" in resp.headers:
location = resp.headers["location"]
await resp.aclose()
current = await check_url(urljoin(current, location))
continue
return resp
raise UnsafeURL("too many redirects")
async def _read_capped(resp: httpx.Response, cap: int) -> tuple[bytes, bool]:
"""
At most `cap` bytes of the *decoded* body, and whether there was more.
Counted after decoding, so a small compressed response that inflates to
gigabytes stops at the cap like any other. A declared length over the cap
is not read at all.
"""
try:
declared = int(resp.headers.get("content-length", ""))
except ValueError:
declared = -1
if resp.headers.get("content-encoding", "identity") == "identity" \
and declared > cap:
return b"", True
body = bytearray()
async for chunk in resp.aiter_bytes():
body += chunk
if len(body) > cap:
return bytes(body[:cap]), True
return bytes(body), False
async def fetch_preview(url: str, *, client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None) -> dict | None:
"""
Return {url, title, description, site_name, image_url} for a URL, or None
if it cannot be unfurled (unreachable, not HTML, nothing worth showing).
Never raises for an ordinary failure — the caller treats "no preview" as
the common case, exactly like a TMDB miss.
"""
own = client is None
if own:
client = _new_client()
try:
return await asyncio.wait_for(_preview(client, url), _TOTAL_DEADLINE)
except (httpx.HTTPError, UnsafeURL, TimeoutError) as e:
log.debug("link preview for %s: %s", url[:80], e)
return None
finally:
if own:
await client.aclose()
async def _preview(client: httpx.AsyncClient, url: str) -> dict | None:
resp = await _get(client, url)
try:
ctype = resp.headers.get("content-type", "").split(";")[0].strip().lower()
if resp.status_code != 200 or ctype not in ("text/html", "application/xhtml+xml"):
return None
# A page longer than this is cut, not refused: what a card needs is in
# the head.
body, _truncated = await _read_capped(resp, _MAX_HTML_BYTES)
final_url = str(resp.url)
parser = _HeadParser()
try:
parser.feed(body.decode(resp.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace"))
except Exception:
pass
m = parser.metas
title = _first(m, "og:title", "twitter:title") or parser.title
description = _first(m, "og:description", "twitter:description", "description")
site_name = _first(m, "og:site_name") or urlsplit(final_url).hostname
image = _first(m, "og:image", "og:image:url", "og:image:secure_url",
"twitter:image", "twitter:image:src")
if image:
image = urljoin(final_url, image)
try:
await check_url(image)
except UnsafeURL:
image = None
if not title and not description:
return None
return {
"url": url,
"title": (title or "")[:300] or None,
"description": (description or "")[:600] or None,
"site_name": (site_name or "")[:120] or None,
"image_url": image,
}
finally:
await resp.aclose()
async def fetch_image(url: str, *, client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None) -> bytes | None:
"""Fetch and re-encode an OG image to a small JPEG. None on any failure."""
own = client is None
if own:
client = _new_client()
try:
raw = await asyncio.wait_for(_image_bytes(client, url), _TOTAL_DEADLINE)
except (httpx.HTTPError, UnsafeURL, TimeoutError) as e:
log.debug("link preview image %s: %s", url[:80], e)
return None
finally:
if own:
await client.aclose()
if raw is None:
return None
# Decoding an image is CPU work on untrusted bytes; not on the event loop.
return await asyncio.to_thread(_downscale, raw)
async def _image_bytes(client: httpx.AsyncClient, url: str) -> bytes | None:
resp = await _get(client, url)
try:
ctype = resp.headers.get("content-type", "").split(";")[0].strip().lower()
if resp.status_code != 200 or not ctype.startswith("image/"):
return None
raw, too_big = await _read_capped(resp, _MAX_IMAGE_BYTES)
return None if too_big else raw
finally:
await resp.aclose()
def _downscale(raw: bytes) -> bytes | None:
try:
from PIL import Image
except ImportError:
return None
try:
with Image.open(BytesIO(raw)) as im:
# The header is parsed but the pixels are not decoded yet — refuse a
# decompression bomb before convert()/thumbnail() allocate for it.
if im.width * im.height > _MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS:
return None
im = im.convert("RGB")
im.thumbnail((_IMAGE_MAX_DIM, _IMAGE_MAX_DIM))
out = BytesIO()
im.save(out, format="JPEG", quality=80)
return out.getvalue()
except Exception:
return None
|